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Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are essentially weapon systems that, 
once activated, can select and engage targets without further human intervention. 
While these are not currently fielded nor officially part of any nation’s defence 
strategy, there is ample evidence that many States and defence contractors are 
currently developing LAWS for future deployment. The main law of armed conflict 
(LOAC) problem posed by these weapon systems is that lethal action will be taken by 
machine hardware and control software, rather than human operators exercising 
deliberative judgment at the point of weapons release.  
 
Specifically, LAWS will follow a set of technical processes, which may operate with 
super-human accuracy and precision, or with brittleness and potential failure, 
depending on context and circumstances. In contradistinction, LOAC presupposes 
sentience and self-awareness, for imposing legal obligations; and human 
metacognitive judgment, for its effective application in armed conflict. LAWS will 
possess none of these characteristics in the near-term. Accordingly, such weapon 
systems may only be lawfully deployed with meaningful human control (MHC), to 
ensure compliance with the LOAC targeting rules.  
 
The US/NATO Joint Targeting process affords substantial opportunity to ensure MHC 
in LAWS deployments, because of its highly deliberative planning processes. This will 
remain true, so long as autonomy does not supplant human judgment in the wider 
decision-making process, and so long as the (legally-enshrined) ‘individual attack’ 
limitation is maintained over and above mere technical viability. Moreover, by 
regarding precautions in attack as a full LOAC principle, and by integrating more 
technical personnel into the battle staffs, commanders will be in a stronger position to 
address the LAWS LOAC challenge. That is, to ensure that appropriate systems are 
deployed in a suitable operational environment to undertake machine-feasible tasks, 
along with appropriate precautionary measures to sufficiently mitigate civilian risk. 
 
Outside the US/NATO context, it is proposed that the LAWS LOAC challenge be 
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1.1 Background and Research Motivation 
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are essentially “weapon system[s] that, 
once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator”.1 While they are not yet fielded,2 LAWS are currently in early stage 
development in numerous States,3 and may well be deployed within the next decade 
or so. For the United States (US) in particular, broader military autonomy is an integral 
part of its Third Offset Strategy,4 which aims to bolster US conventional deterrence in 
the face of declining force structures vis-à-vis near-peer adversaries.5 More recently, 
the 2018 National Defense Strategy has pledged to “invest broadly in military 
applications of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning” as part of its 
goal of ‘modernising key capabilities’, to gain competitive military advantage.6 
Accordingly, the development, fielding and deployment of LAWS is arguably likely 
to occur in the near-term, as advancing technologies combine with a perceived sense 
of military necessity and strategic competition.  
 
LAWS will differ from more traditional means of warfare in ways that will give rise 
to specific legal challenges under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), also known as 
international humanitarian law (IHL).7 For the purpose of this thesis, it is significant 
                                                          
1 US Department of Defense (DoD), Directive No. 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (21 
November 2012, incorporating Change 1, 8 May 2017) (hereafter, Directive 3000.09), 13  
<http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf> accessed 30 
September 2018. 
2 But see the Israeli Harpy, in 2.4. 
3 See Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘Regulating Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems I: Assessing the Sense 
and Scope of ‘Autonomy’ in Emerging Military Weapon Systems’, TLI Think! Paper 76/2017 (2017), 
22-23 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3027540> accessed 30 September 2018. 
4 See Pentagon Memorandum, ‘The Defense Innovation Initiative’ (15 November 2014) 
<http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/OSD013411-14.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018. 
5 Cheryl Pellerin, ‘Deputy Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters America’s Military Deterrence’, 
US Department of Defense News (31 October 2016) 
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/991434/deputy-secretary-third-offset-strategy-
bolsters-americas-military-deterrence/> accessed 30 September 2018. 
6 US DoD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (DoD, 
January 2018) (hereafter, 2018 NDS), 7.  
7 These two terms will be used interchangeably in this thesis, though with a preference for LOAC. 
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that the human operator is kept ‘out-of-the-loop’ in the critical functions,8 thereby 
leaving sensory equipment and software algorithms to determine the nature, extent and 
timing of lethal action against specific targets. This is in contradistinction to manned 
and remotely-piloted systems, where lethal action is taken by human operators 
exercising deliberative reasoning at the point of weapons release, and it raises 
questions on the capacity of LAWS to be deployed in compliance with the LOAC 
targeting rules. However, such legal problems will not necessarily include an 
accountability gap, so long as commanders and their staffs retain meaningful human 
control over LAWS.9 At a minimum, control will be exercised over broader (strategic 
and operational) parameters during the targeting process;10 hence, commanders should 
be held to account if such parameters are set negligently or recklessly, and if this leads 
to unlawful actions on the battlefield. 
 
Rather, the main LOAC-based problem concerns decision-making under relatively 
more abstract circumstances. Deliberative human decisions on lethal targeting will 
have to be made in earlier phases of the targeting cycle, at locations further removed 
from the intended strike site, and with less accurate knowledge of concrete threats or 
specific civilian risks.11 Thus, with software algorithms that lack the cognitive 
sophistication of a human mind, there will need to be an effective ‘division of labour’ 
between man and machine, to optimise the allocation of tasks in accordance with their 
respective cognitive strengths.12 
 
Consider the following broad examples. 
• Where LAWS are deployed in ostensibly benign battlefields, yet systems begin 
to struggle to distinguish between protected and non-protected entities.13  
• An abundance of civilians unexpectedly appears, leading to a heightened risk 
of ‘disproportionate’ attack; especially considering the indeterminate and 
context-specific nature of proportionality, which a LAWS will not be able to 
assess in fully autonomous mode.14  
                                                          
8 That is, to select (find, fix, track) and engage (target, engage, assess) a target. See 2.3.2 and 5.3.2.1. 
9 See Chapter 4. 
10 See Chapter 5. 
11 See Chapter 2, especially 2.3.4.3. 
12 See 4.2. 
13 See Chapter 6. 
14 See 7.2. 
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• Since earlier and more geographically removed targeting decisions are made 
in relatively more abstract circumstances, commanders may miss opportunities 
to implement effective and LAWS-relevant precautionary measures. In turn, 
this may lead to insufficient civilian risk mitigation once the concrete 
battlefield situation materialises.15 
 
All of these scenarios may lead to potentially unlawful (machine) actions on the 
battlefield; certainly, they increase civilian risk. Underlying the concern is the fact that 
systems are inherently brittle and they cannot always adapt to changing 
circumstances;16 they do not possess agency, and they cannot apply the law.17 Only 
responsible humans are the addressees of LOAC, hence the associated obligations 
under targeting law are exclusively for commanders, their battle staffs and weapons 
operators to meet. Accordingly, the LAWS IHL/LOAC challenge is for human 
decision-makers to ensure that appropriate systems are deployed in a suitable 
operational environment to undertake machine-feasible tasks, along with appropriate 
precautionary measures to sufficiently mitigate civilian risk.  
 
An alternative response to the above legal challenge is to institute a comprehensive 
and pre-emptive ban on the development, testing, production, deployment and use of 
LAWS.18 Indeed, since May 2013, this is exactly what is being pursued at the United 
Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), by a coalition of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) known as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.19 
As of 13 April 2018, 23 States have also joined the call for a pre-emptive ban,20 thus 
providing a sizeable minority of governmental support. Meanwhile, in July 2015 the 
Future of Life Institute (FLI) published an open letter – now signed by almost 4,000 
artificial intelligence (AI) researchers – calling for “a ban on offensive autonomous 
                                                          
15 See 7.3. 
16 See Chapter 2, especially 2.5.5-2.5.7. 
17 See Chapters 2 and 3.  
18 Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots (Human Rights Watch, 
2012), 46-47. See also the Berlin Statement (2010) and the Original and 2014 Mission Statements of 
the International Committee for Robot Arms Control <http://icrac.net/statements/> both accessed 4 
October 2018. 
19 See <https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/> accessed 10 May 2018. 
20 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Retaining Human Control of Weapons Systems (9-13 April 2018) 
<https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/KRC_Briefing_CCWApr2018.pdf> 
accessed 4 October 2018 (listing 22 States, after which China curiously joined the call for a ban). 
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weapons beyond meaningful human control”.21 The widespread media attention this 
received ensured that concern about ‘killer robots’ has, to a certain extent, mobilised 
the general public. More recently (August 2017), the FLI issued a second open letter, 
this time not explicitly calling for a ban, but listing the apparent dangers of lethal 
autonomy and imploring State Parties at the CCW’s first Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) meeting to “find a way to protect us all from these dangers”.22  
 
However, while ban proponents have vigorously argued their position,23 there remain 
near-insurmountable practical issues that would make both the negotiation/signing and 
enforcement of a ban treaty unlikely to succeed.24 Chief amongst these are the potential 
military advantage and force multiplying capabilities of LAWS, which will very likely 
defeat consensus towards a ban;25 as well as numerous difficulties with verifying 
compliance, in the event that a ban is formally agreed.26 In addition, there are strong 
arguments pointing to the normative desirability of allowing potentially beneficial 
nascent technologies to develop.27 Chief amongst these are the opportunity to remove 
from the battlefield the human frailties and imperfections28 that often lead to erroneous 
                                                          
21 FLI, ‘Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers’ (28 July 2015) 
<https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/> accessed 4 October 2018. 
22 FLI, ‘An Open Letter to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’ (21 
August 2017) <https://futureoflife.org/autonomous-weapons-open-letter-2017> accessed 4 October 
2018. 
23 For example, Human Rights Watch (n 18); Human Rights Watch, Precedent for Preemption: The 
Ban on Blinding Lasers as a Model for a Killer Robots Prohibition (Human Rights Watch, November 
2015); Human Rights Watch, Making the Case: The Dangers of Killer Robots and the Need for a 
Preemptive Ban (Human Rights Watch, 2016); Thompson Chengeta, ‘Measuring Autonomous Weapon 
Systems Against International Humanitarian Law Rules’ (2016) 5 Journal of Law and Cyber Warfare 
63; Peter Asaro, ‘On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the 
Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 687; 
Noel E. Sharkey, ‘The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare’ (2012) 94 International Review of 
the Red Cross 787. 
24 Rebecca Crootof, ‘Why the Prohibition on Permanently Blinding Lasers is Poor Precedent for a Ban 
on Autonomous Weapon Systems’, Lawfare (24 November 2015) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-
prohibition-permanently-blinding-lasers-poor-precedent-ban-autonomous-weapon-systems> accessed 
4 October 2018.  
25 Ibid.; Sean Watts, ‘Autonomous Weapons: Regulation Tolerant or Regulation Resistant?’ (2016) 30 
Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 177, 187 (pointing to a potential “Balkanized sector 
of weapons law”). 
26 Rebecca Crootof, ‘The Killer Robots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications’ (2015) 36 Cardozo 
Law Review 1837. 
27 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr, ‘To Ban New Weapons or Regulate Their Use?’ Just Security (3 April 2015) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/21766/guest-post-ban-weapons-regulate-use/> accessed 4 October 2018. 




targeting, or even war crimes;29 and to exploit more accurate, precise and responsive 
technology that could lower civilian casualties.30 
 
For these reasons, the following thesis will assume that LAWS will not be banned; 
instead, they will very likely be developed, fielded and deployed by States, but also 
specifically regulated,31 or otherwise be the subject of a non-binding LOAC Manual.32 
The preference is for the latter, as this may be quicker to conclude and – being written 
by a group of LOAC experts – is likely to attract greater respect from the world’s 
militaries, which have to apply the rules in the field.33 
1.2 Drivers of Greater Levels of Autonomy in Weapon Systems 
While not central to the legal arguments, it is worth briefly reflecting on the reasons 
why weapons autonomy is becoming a reality; hence, why the application of the 
LOAC targeting rules to LAWS will soon be inevitable. These drivers of greater 
autonomy can be categorised into three groups.  
1.2.1 Advances in Autonomous Technologies 
First, there are substantial advances in AI, which are making reliable autonomy 
increasingly viable.34 In turn, these developments are driven by a “perfect storm of 
[cheap] parallel computation, bigger data, and deeper algorithms”,35 which are 
revolutionising both civilian and military technologies. For example, AI systems can 
now beat humans at poker36 and Go,37 and they can even beat a real Top Gun pilot in 
                                                          
29 Ronald C. Arkin, ‘Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight of the Non-Combatant’ (2013) 137 
AISB Quarterly 4; Marco Sassóli, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: 
Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified’ (2014) 90 International Law 
Studies 308. 
30 Ibid.; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A 
Reply to the Critics’ (2013) Harvard National Security Journal Features 1. 
31 Crootof (n 26). 
32 Steven Groves, ‘A Manual Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems’, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Special Report No. 183, (The Heritage Foundation, 
7 April 2016) <http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/SR183.pdf> accessed 4 October 2018. 
33 See 8.2, on the merits of producing a LOAC Manual on LAWS. 
34 See Chapter 2. 
35 Kevin Kelly, ‘The Three Breakthroughs That Have Finally Unleashed AI on the World’, Wired (27 
October 2014) <http://www.wired.com/2014/10/future-of-artificial-intelligence/> accessed 4 October 
2018. 
36 Cade Metz, ‘Inside Libratus, The Poker AI That Out-Bluffed the Best Humans, Wired (1 February 
2017) <https://www.wired.com/2017/02/libratus/> accessed 4 October 2018. 
37 Dan Silver et al., ‘Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge’ (2017) 550 Nature 354. 
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a simulated aerial dogfight.38 With such rapidly-advancing technologies offering 
greater speed, accuracy and precision, it is arguably only a matter of time before they 
are integrated into critical weapons functions. 
1.2.2 Advantages of Weapons Autonomy39 
Second, LAWS will offer a number of distinct (military) advantages that will give 
deploying forces an upper hand. These include the following. 
• The ability to operate without communications links. This offers certain 
tactical benefits, such as minimising the risk of hacking and jamming in the 
field.40 It also offers major strategic benefits, which are of growing importance 
with the recent return to Great Power Competition.41 For example, near-peer 
adversaries like Russia and China have stepped up their ‘grey zone’ activities,42 
and have erected numerous anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks,43 which 
create a communications-denied environment on their shores. This prevents 
US/NATO forces from having the capability to ‘look deep and strike deep’ into 
their territory, thereby limiting the projection of Western power into these 
distant theatres.44 Accordingly, the capability to strike in communications-
denied environments is now of premium strategic value to US/NATO forces, 
even if such capability never actually results in a kinetic attack.45 
• The speed and responsiveness of machine action relative to human 
performance. This arises because of electronic data-processing speeds, 
compared with the human neuromuscular delay of around 0.25 seconds. It 
                                                          
38 Nick Ernest and Kelly Cohen, ‘Genetic Fuzzy Based Artificial Intelligence for Unmanned Combat 
Aerial Vehicle Control in Simulated Air Combat Missions’ (2015) 6 Journal of Defense Management 
139. 
39 For fuller analyses of these advantages, see Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘The Lawful Use of Autonomous 
Weapon Systems for Targeted Strikes (Part 1): Concepts, Advantages and Technologies’, TLI Think! 
Paper 11/2018 (2018), 16-26 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158170> accessed 4 October 2018. 
40 Jeff Hecht, ‘Did Iran Capture US Drone by Hacking its GPS Signal?’ New Scientist (16 December 
2011). 
41 2018 NDS (n 6). 
42 ‘Pride and Prejudice: The Odds on a Conflict Between the Great Powers’, The Economist Special 
Report: The Future of War (27 January 2018) (referring to cyber-attacks, assassination, fake news, 
propaganda, bribery, and military intimidation). 
43 Ibid.; General Sir Nicholas Carter, ‘Dynamic Security Threats and the British Army’, Speech 
Delivered to the Royal United Services Institute (22 January 2018) <https://rusi.org/event/dynamic-
security-threats-and-british-army> accessed 4 October 2018. 
44 Interview with former US Deputy Defense Secretary, Robert O. Work, in Octavian Manea, ‘The Role 
of Offset Strategies in Restoring Conventional Deterrence’, Small Wars Journal (4 January 2018) 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/role-offset-strategies-restoring-conventional-deterrence> accessed 
4 October 2018. 
45 Homayounnejad (n 39), 20. 
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manifests itself in military advantages (responding quicker to enemy fire); 
humanitarian benefits (cancelling attacks quicker upon detecting an apparently 
unlawful situation); and preserving combat capability (taking more evasive 
defensive manoeuvres when coming under enemy fire).46 
• Cost and resource utilisation. With no crews required to operate individual 
units (save for ground crews and a weapons operator per n tactical units), 
LAWS will clearly result in major cost-savings. Moreover, with autonomous 
pattern-recognition capabilities, a LAWS can loiter for extended periods and 
can simply alert a human operator when there is a relevant situational change 
that may call for kinetic action. This obviates the need to always have military 
personnel standing watch, and it affords an opportunity to reallocate manpower 
to other tasks.47 
1.2.3 Strategic Competition48 
Finally, while no State has officially declared a policy of integrating LAWS into its 
armed forces, certain official policies and statements have pointed to a competitive 
element that may ultimately drive the fielding of LAWS. For example, in December 
2017 China announced its National AI Strategy, part of which aims to promote a 
military-civil fusion in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seeks to capitalise 
on the disruptive military potential of AI.49 The aim is to take the PLA from today’s 
‘informatized’ way of warfare towards ‘intelligentized’ warfare.50 In September 2017, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that “the one who becomes the leader in [the 
AI] sphere will be the ruler of the world”,51 and this approach was clearly reflected in 
Russia’s opposition to a LAWS ban at the November 2017 GGE meeting.52 Arguably, 
                                                          
46 Ibid., 20-25. 
47 Ibid., 25-26. 
48 See Michael C. Horowitz et al., Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence’, CNAS 
Series on AI and International Security (July 2018) 
<https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Strategic-Competition-in-an-Era-of-AI-
July-2018_v2.pdf?mtime=20180716122000> accessed 4 October 2018. 
49 Ibid., 13. 
50 Elsa B. Kania, ‘China is On a Whole-of-Nation Push for AI. The US Must Match It’, Defense One (8 
December 2017) <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/12/us-china-artificial-
intelligence/144414/> accessed 4 October 2018. 
51 Associated Press, ‘Putin: Leader in Artificial Intelligence Will Rule World’, CNBC (4 September 
2017) <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/04/putin-leader-in-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-world.html> 
accessed 4 October 2018.  
52 Patrick Tucker, ‘Russia to the United Nations: Don’t Try to Stop Us From Building Killer Robots’, 
Defense One (21 November 2017) <https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/russia-united-
nations-dont-try-stop-us-building-killer-robots/142734/> accessed 4 October 2018. 
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this position is not new, given the 2015 statement of Chief of General Staff Valery 
Gerasimov’s that in the near-future, Russia may have “a fully roboticized 
unit…capable of independently conducting military operations”.53 For their part, US 
officials have not been as publicly bold, though former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Robert Work has posed the question: 
 
If our competitors go to Terminators…and it turns out the Terminators 
are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we 
respond?54 
 
Other US officials have dubbed this “The Terminator Conundrum”,55 and it essentially 
points to a growing offence-defence dynamic. Namely, while US policy in Directive 
3000.09 currently requires a man-in-the-loop in every kill decision, this may well come 
under pressure if near-peer adversaries begin to field and deploy LAWS. 
1.3 Methodology and Scope of Thesis 
With the above in mind, this thesis will examine the application of the LOAC targeting 
rules of international armed conflict to the likely eventual deployment and use of 
LAWS. Primarily (though not exclusively), the focus will be on the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I56 (AP I), cross-referenced with customary international law. Formally, the 
difference between the two is that only the 174 States party to AP I are bound by it, 
whereas all States are bound by customary law. In practice, much of AP I is customary 
and, therefore, binds all States; where this is not the case, the thesis will comment on 
the difference, which will be relevant to AP I non-Party States such as the US. In 
addition, extensive interpretive guidance will be gleaned from the AP I Commentary57 
and the Commentary to the Air and Missile Warfare Manual.58 
                                                          
53 See US Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, Robert Work, CNAS Defense Forum (14 December 
2015) <http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum> 
accessed 4 October 2018. 
54 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (Norton, 2018), 8. 
55 Colin Clark, The Terminator Conundrum: VCJCS Selva on Thinking Weapons’, Breaking Defense 
(21 January 2016) <https://breakingdefense.com/2016/01/the-terminator-conundrum-vcjcs-selva-on-
thinking-weapons/> accessed 4 October 2018. 
56 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 
1125 UNTS 3. 
57 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 12th August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). 
58 Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research at Harvard University, Commentary on the 
HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (v2.1, Harvard College, 
2010) (hereafter, AMW Manual Commentary). 
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1.3.1 Limitations of Methodology and Sources 
It should be emphasised that neither the AP I Commentary nor the AMW Manual or its 
Commentary are sources of law, hence they do not have normative status. The 
authoritative approach to determining the sources of international law is set out in 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.59 This recognises three 
distinct sources. 
• Treaty law,60 which is defined as “an international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law”.61 The focus 
is on “rules expressly recognized by…States”, irrespective of the particular 
name or designation of the document.62  
• Customary law,63 which arises when there is sufficient evidence of State 
practice (by a critical mass of affected States over a sufficient period of time) 
coupled with opinio juris; that is, a belief on the part of the State that such 
practice is required by a rule of international law.64 
• General principles of law,65 which are broad legal concepts derived from 
national legal systems. Hence, they are so fundamental that they transcend 
national boundaries, and they may be used to fill gaps in the law.66  
 
The above reflects the fact that only States can make international law, not 
commentators or experts acting in their personal capacity. Thus, within this thesis only 
AP I and other cited treaties enjoy normative status (see below on customary law). 
 
                                                          
59 See Article 38(1)(a)-(c), Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered 
into force 24 October 1945) 145 BFSP 832 (hereafter, ICJ Statute).  
60 Article 38(1)(a), ICJ Statute.  
61 Article 2(1)(a), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS, 331.  
62 Article 38(1)(a), ICJ Statute. Hence, titles such as ‘annex’, ‘protocol’, ‘convention’, or ‘statute’ – all 
of which will be encountered in this thesis – are merely terms, which do not affect the normative status 
of the document. 
63 Article 38(1)(b), ICJ Statute.  
64 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, ¶ 77. 
65 Article 38(1)(c), ICJ Statute.  
66 Lord Lloyd-Jones (Justice of the UK Supreme Court), ‘General Principles of Law in International 
Law and Common Law’, Speech Delivered to the Conseil d’Etat, Paris (16 February 2018) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-180216.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019. 
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On the other hand, Article 38(1) also recognises “the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists…as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”.67 
Namely, the scholarly writings of experts may act as learned viewpoints from which 
the substance of the treaty and customary law rules may be extracted. Arguably, this 
is also where treaty commentaries and LOAC Manuals (and their commentaries) fit 
in.68 The former constitutes major references for the interpretation and application of 
treaties, and they are often written by experts acting in their personal capacity.69 The 
latter are restatements of the law that reflect the consensus of large groups of experts, 
also acting in their personal capacity.70 None of these emanate from State entities, 
much less do they have binding force, though they are highly influential as ‘subsidiary’ 
means to ‘determine’ the substance and application of the law.71 As noted above, they 
will provide interpretive guidance for applying treaty and/or customary law. 
 
A more controversial document, which will inform some of the analysis in Chapter 6, 
is the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities issued 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).72 The project behind it 
started with a substantial group of experts, but as consensus did not emerge on key 
matters, the ICRC issued the Guidance as an institutional document.73 Importantly, the 
Guidance seeks to provide recommendations concerning the interpretation of LOAC 
in a specific context,74 thus its legal status is arguably like that of a LOAC Manual. 
However, the absence of expert consensus and the abundance of scholarly criticism 
(see 6.5.2.3) will undoubtedly affect its persuasiveness, which can be expected to be 
lower and more variable than that of a LOAC Manual or its commentary. 
 
                                                          
67 Article 38(1)(d), ICJ Statute (emphasis added). 
68 William H. Boothby, Conflict Law: The Influence of New Weapons Technology, Human Rights and 
Emerging Actors (TMC Asser Press, 2014), 85-87. 
69 See, for example, Foreword to the AP I Commentary, xiii (stating “the ICRC…allowed the authors 
their academic freedom, considering the Commentary above all as scholarly work, and not as a work 
intended to disseminate the views of the ICRC”). 
70 Boothby (n 68), 86. 
71 For example, the AMW Manual Commentary notes, at 3, that the Manual itself “does not have binding 
force, but hopefully it will serve as a valuable resource for armed forces in the development of rules of 
engagement, the writing of domestic military manuals, the preparation of training courses and – above 
all – the actual conduct of armed forces in combat operations”. 
72 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law (ICRC, 2009). 
73 Boothby (n 68), 78. 
74 ICRC (n 72), 9. 
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An important point should be made concerning customary international law. This is 
one of the recognised sources of international law,75 but independently researching it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. The most rigorous approach would be to find real-
world evidence of State practice and, separately, of corresponding opinio juris from 
which to determine specific norms. Alternatively, opinio juris “can be tested by 
induction based on an analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing [State] 
practice”.76 This, however, is not the focus of the thesis; instead, the ICRC’s 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study77 will be cited and cross-referenced 
with treaty law. The ICRC Study is arguably one of the most extensively researched 
and relevant restatements of the customary law of armed conflict, for which it provides 
valuable evidence of custom.78 Yet, it is not an actual normative source of custom and, 
being a largely scholarly endeavour, its legal status is like that of a LOAC Manual.79 
Thus, while the Study is a useful aid to determining customary law, it is not definitive, 
and its methodology, rules, and statements are all open to criticism by commentators.80 
 
Finally, a document that will be cited in parts of Chapters 3, 6 and 7 is the national 
military manual. These are prepared by individuals employed for that purpose – 
usually within a State defence bureaucracy – and they will tend to express the view of 
the relevant State on the rules of international law that bind it, and on how those rules 
should be interpreted.81 Thus, national military manuals represent the opinio juris and, 
potentially, the State practice of the issuing State. In that sense, the manuals do not in 
themselves have any normative status, though they may contribute to the formation of 
customary international law. For the purpose of this thesis, they will also provide 
interpretive insight, albeit as restatements of the law issued by an individual State.  
                                                          
75 Article 38(1)(b), ICJ Statute. 
76 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America) 
[1984] ICJ Rep 246, ¶ 111. In practice, however, the ICJ has used a mixture of induction, deduction, 
and assertion, with an apparently greater reliance on the latter. See Stefan Talmon, ‘International Law: 
The ICJ’s Methodology Between Induction, Deduction and Assertion’ (2015) 26 The European Journal 
of International Law 417. 
77 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 
1: Rules (CUP, 2005). 
78 Boothby (n 68), 76-77. 
79 Namely, in Article 38(1), ICJ Statute, the Study is recognised under Sub-Paragraph (d), not (b). 
80 See, for example, Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, US Dept. of State and William J. 
Haynes, General Counsel, US Dept. of Defense, to Dr Jakob Kellenberger, President, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Regarding Customary International Law Study [3 November 2006] (2007) 
46 ILM 514. For broader commentary, see Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds.), Perspectives 
on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (CUP, 2011). 
81 Boothby (n 68), 65-66. 
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1.3.2 Disciplinary, Factual and Legal Scope of Analysis 
1.3.2.1 Disciplinary Scope 
As noted in 1.1, the technology of LAWS will raise some novel issues affecting legal 
compliance, and this arguably calls for a strongly interdisciplinary analysis. 
Accordingly, this thesis will draw on substantial insights from computer science, 
robotics, psychology, philosophy, human-machine interaction, and military targeting 
doctrine. These non-legal contributions will serve to contextualise the analysis of the 
black-letter rules, and to evaluate more effectively how LOAC compliance can be 
secured in the light of the new technologies. This is to be distinguished from 
‘international law and [subject X]’ methods,82 which are not the focus of this thesis. 
The latter often displace the black-letter approach by proposing different ways of 
perceiving the law, hence they are arguably more suited to policy and lex ferenda 
arguments.83 By contrast, this thesis is concerned with an accurate application of the 
lex lata, albeit in a specific technological and military procedural context. 
1.3.2.2 Factual Scope 
As the central thesis of this study concerns the formal targeting process as a conduit 
for meaningful human control (MHC), the legal analysis will be applied in the context 
of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) targeting doctrine. This is 
justified on the basis that many of the States within NATO are expected to be major 
LAWS developers and/or users, and because their elaborate targeting cycles arguably 
provide a model of best practice for other States to emulate.84 As will be argued in the 
thesis, the US/NATO targeting process offers particular value in ensuring the safe and 
lawful deployment of LAWS. 
1.3.2.3 Legal Scope 
The scope of the legal analysis itself is confined to the conduct of hostilities in 
international armed conflict (IAC), and this raises three immediate limitations. First, 
                                                          
82 See Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories: An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking (OUP, 
2017) (outlining 14 different approaches to international law, including positivism, the New Haven 
School, critical legal studies, international relations theory, feminist jurisprudence, and the law and 
economics perspective, amongst others). 
83 See, for example, Stephen Ratner and Ann-Marie Slaughter, ‘Appraising Methods of International 
Law: A Prospectus for Readers’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 291 (using a fictional 
LOAC problem to reveal different modes of analysis and different outcomes from seven of the 
international law approaches). 
84 Geoffrey S. Corn, ‘War, Law, and the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary Measure’ 
(2015) 42 Pepperdine Law Review 419. 
27 
 
there will be no focus on the jus ad bellum which, while potentially important, raises 
a very different set of legal and practical concerns.85 Second, as the LOAC rules are 
assumed to be the lex specialis in an IAC, there will be no analysis of international 
human rights law, much less the complex interplay between that and LOAC. Third, 
the thesis will not apply the LOAC rules governing non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC) either. The latter two exclusions are justified by the likely limitations of near-
term LAWS technologies, which will demand the relatively simpler and more 
machine-perceptible environment of an IAC.86 In any event, the return to Great Power 
Competition noted in 1.2.2, above, makes it likely that there will be sufficient military 
utility from, hence demand for, LAWS that are designed for IAC deployments.  
 
Two further limitations should be noted. First, as commanders can safely assume all 
weapons in their arsenal are lawful per se, subject to prescribed restrictions on use, 
there will be no examination of weapons law, save for a brief note in Chapter 6. 
Second, as the legal analysis will assume the ‘good faith commander’, there will be no 
consideration of international criminal law, except for a brief mention in Chapter 7, 
purely for interpretive purposes. 
 
All information contained in the thesis is correct as at 1 May 2018, shortly following 
the second GGE meeting in April. Where possible, however, a few more recent 
developments have been included. 
1.4 Research Question 
This thesis will seek to address the following research question: “To what extent can 
US/NATO forces apply the existing LOAC targeting rules, to ensure the lawful 
deployment and use of near-term LAWS?”  
 
In doing so, the thesis will also examine the extent to which machines may be expected 
to operate reliably on decisions that would be taken by a human operator, in a 
counterfactual scenario of manned or remotely-piloted targeting; bearing in mind, 
however, that any shortfalls will likely be addressed within the Joint Targeting process. 
                                                          
85 See Paul Scharre, ‘Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk’, CNAS Ethical Autonomy Project 
(February 2016) <http://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-
operational-risk.pdf> accessed 22 September 2018 (discussing unanticipated interactions between 
adversarial systems during peacetime, and the risk of triggering a ‘flash war’). 
86 See Chapter 2, especially 2.4.4 on the ‘crawl-walk-run’ approach to LAWS development. 
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1.5 The Research Puzzle 
Currently, a great deal of the LAWS IHL/LOAC literature applies a selective sample 
of the legal rules, often with vastly different assumptions on the nature of technology. 
Consequently, pro- and anti-LAWS positions tend to become more entrenched. As 
Scharre points out: 
 
Some envision autonomous weapons as more reliable and precise than 
humans, the next logical evolution of precision-guided weapons, 
leading to more humane wars with fewer civilian casualties. Others 
envision calamity, with rogue robot death machines killing 
multitudes.87 
 
The former position is taken by Arkin,88 Schmitt89 and Sassóli,90 amongst others;91 
while the latter position is taken by the ban proponents.92 However, Scharre continues: 
 
It is entirely possible that both [visions] come true, with autonomous 
weapons making war more precise and humane when they function 
properly, but causing mass lethality when they fail.93 
 
For the positive outcome to materialise, it is arguably necessary for LAWS-deploying 
forces to understand both capacities and limitations and, crucially, to avoid 
anthropomorphising LAWS; lest they put too much faith in brittle technologies that 
are prone to failure, when poorly deployed.94 Indeed, this point was emphasised by the 
third GGE meeting in August 2018, which included vigilance against 
anthropomorphisms as one of its guiding principles.95 
 
                                                          
87 Scharre (n 54), 347. 
88 Arkin (n 29). 
89 Schmitt (n 30). 
90 Sassóli (n 29). 
91 For example, Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Adapting the Law of 
Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 90 International Law Studies 386. 
92 See the various works cited in n 23. 
93 Scharre (n 54), 347 (emphasis added). 
94 See Chapter 3, especially 3.2. 
95 Report of the 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (31 
August 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/3, ¶ 26(h) 
<https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/20092911F6495FA7C125830E003F9A5B/
$file/2018_GGE+LAWS_Final+Report.pdf> accessed 4 October 2018 (“In crafting potential policy 
measures, emerging technologies in the area of [LAWS] should not be anthropomorphized”). 
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Accordingly, the original contribution made by the following thesis is two-fold. 
(1) To address the anthropomorphism concern with an in-depth review of relevant 
technologies, how they differ from human qualities, and an application of 
these to broad LOAC targeting requirements.96 
(2) An in-depth application of the LOAC targeting rules to LAWS, with a greater 
level of detail than seen in other works, and with a relatively more considered 
application to technological and operational targeting realities. This will offer 
a more representative and contextual analysis of the potential lawfulness of 
LAWS deployments.97 
1.6 Thesis and Thesis Structure 
The thesis of this study is that the existing LOAC targeting rules are likely to be 
sufficient for regulating LAWS deployments by US/NATO forces; assuming the rules 
are applied within a formal targeting process, in which tasks that require deliberative 
thinking can be undertaken by humans before or during deployment.  
 
The thesis is divided into six substantive chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 will provide a detailed introduction to the technical foundations of military 
robotics and AI. It will define weapons autonomy and LAWS, and it will explain what 
kinds of weapon systems are likely to emerge as ‘autonomous’ in the near-term. 
Crucially, this chapter also demonstrate that LAWS will follow a set of technical 
processes, which may operate with super-human accuracy and precision (in 
circumstances for which they were designed); or with brittleness and potential failure 
(in unexpected situations, or in circumstances that fall outside their design envelope). 
 
Chapter 3 will build on this, to examine the broad legal implications of weapons 
autonomy. Here, it will be argued that only accountable humans can have legal 
obligations and, more importantly, the prevalence of standards/principles over rules in 
LOAC means that machines cannot ‘apply’ the law of war either. That said, it is 
possible for machines to execute technical processes that commanders will have 
anticipated in their legal assessment of a planned attack, and this will form the outer 
boundaries of lawful weapons autonomy.  
                                                          
96 Chapters 2-4. 




Chapter 4 examines the MHC concept, and argues that not only is this a practical 
necessity for the safe operation of a weapon system, but it is also a structural legal 
requirement in relation to an ‘individual attack’. Equally important, MHC is not 
restricted to the point of weapons release, but occurs at seven ‘touchpoints’, both 
upstream (far before deployment) and downstream (closer to, or during deployment). 
Crucially, this chapter also details the elements of MHC and argues that – to preserve 
the military necessity-humanity balance – the concept is best regarded as an 
interpretive aid, rather than a distinct legal concept. 
 
Chapter 5 provides an in-depth examination of the US/NATO targeting process, and it 
draws a practical distinction between targeted strikes (against specific and unique 
targets) and tactical-level combat (against broader target sets). Importantly, this 
chapter demonstrates how the targeting process distributes human decision-making 
across six distinct phases and provides a basis for MHC over individual attacks. 
Accordingly, it may be appropriate to reconceptualise the ‘critical functions’ from the 
narrow technical phenomenon of target recognition, to the broader human-led 
targeting process. 
 
With all the foregoing analyses in mind, Chapters 6 and 7 apply the LOAC targeting 
rules to potential LAWS deployments, focusing on the principles of distinction, 
proportionality and precautions in attack. Here, it will be seen that there are ample 
opportunities to deploy and use autonomous weapons in compliance with the 
individual LOAC rules, so long as there is an effective ‘division of labour’ between 
man and machine, in accordance with their respective cognitive strengths. Concretely, 
commanders will have to ensure that a) appropriate systems are deployed, b) in a 
suitable operational environment, c) to undertake machine-feasible tasks, along with 
d) appropriate precautionary measures to sufficiently mitigate civilian risk. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes and provides some final thoughts, along with a brief consideration 




Chapter 2  
Technical Foundations of Military Robotics, 
Artificial Intelligence and Weapons Autonomy  
2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter contains four main sections, which will lay down some 
technical concepts, definitions and assumptions that are necessary for a more valid 
legal analysis. First, 2.2 explains the foundations of autonomy and the control systems 
that are an integral part of military robotics. Here, it will be seen that when undertaking 
autonomous attack, LAWS will execute highly sophisticated, albeit technical 
processes that preclude these devices from having any agency. Hence, they cannot 
‘apply legal rules’ as such, and it will be necessary for humans to constrain their 
actions. Second, 2.3 examines the various dimensions of autonomy, and it develops a 
working definition of ‘lethal autonomous weapon systems’ (LAWS). As will be seen, 
autonomy in weapon systems narrowly concerns stochastic behaviour in the critical 
functions of selecting and engaging targets, and this necessarily has a humanitarian 
impact. Other forms of autonomy may have humanitarian effects, but not necessarily 
or directly so. With this in mind, 2.4 delineates the kinds of weapon systems likely to 
emerge as ‘autonomous’ in the near-term. These will mostly be wide-area search-and-
attack platforms and munitions, deployed at sea, in the air, and on land, respectively. 
Initially, they will focus on anti-material targeting in uncluttered environments, but 
will gradually take on broader attack missions in a ‘crawl-walk-run’ approach. Finally, 
2.5 provides a detailed account of the most important technologies necessary for 
autonomous attack: artificial intelligence and automatic target recognition. This 
section will demonstrate that while LAWS are expected to outperform humans in many 
narrow tasks, such as object recognition, the systems will remain brittle and unable to 
adapt when the environment or context for action changes. Accordingly, it will be vital 
to keep a human somewhere in the loop, to ensure that as machine autonomy is 
harnessed, it is also kept in check by deliberative human control, which can employ 
‘common sense’ to adapt to the situation at hand. More concerning is the ‘black box’ 
nature of the complex software that will control many LAWS, yet will behave in 
inexplicable and counterintuitive ways that will be open to exploitation by the 
adversary. The implications will be explored in subsequent chapters.  
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2.2 Technical Foundations of Autonomy and Control Systems 
Any assessment of the legal consequences of weapons autonomy must be based on a 
clear understanding of what this concept entails: how it is achieved, and its main 
characteristics and guises.1 The in-depth technical analysis is less important than the 
impact that autonomy has on the assignment, timing and character of operational 
decisions; and on the interactions between a LAWS, its operators/supervisors and 
those subject to its effects.2 The following will therefore sketch an overview of the 
technical aspects of machine autonomy, as a primer for the analysis of legal 
implications in Chapter 3 and human control in Chapter 4. 
2.2.1 Landmines as a Simple Model of ‘Autonomy’ 
While LAWS will be vastly more sophisticated than landmines, the two share an 
essential characteristic that arguably justifies (cautious) comparison: lack of 



















                                                          
1 Tim McFarland, ‘Factors Shaping the Legal Implications of Increasingly Autonomous Military 
Systems’, (2015) 900 International Review of the Red Cross 1313. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Richard Moyes, ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems Policy’, Talk Delivered for MIT Course 6.S099: 
Artificial General Intelligence (17 April 2018) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U6lJI-
NSfBY&t=2847s> accessed 8 May 2018. 
Figure 2.1: Operation of an anti-personnel mine. Source: Adapted from Moyes (n 3). 
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• A person steps on the mine, providing an input signal consisting of a ‘weight 
force of mass’ in kilograms. 
• Pressure plates within the mine are pressed down (P). A basic mechanical 
algorithm consisting of a minimum pressure threshold (X) operates to 
determine a response. 
• Should P > X, the mine delivers an output by way of an explosion, which kills 
or seriously injures the person providing the input signal. 
 
Fundamental to an understanding of LAWS is that the weapon will operate a simple 
loop, being victim-activated with no other person intervening.4 Moreover, the entire 
process is mechanical (input→algorithm→output) and offers no immediate input of 
human reasoning or judgment, despite this being necessary when a civilian weighing 
enough to trigger P > X walks into the mined area. That said, precautionary human 
judgment can be involved in deciding where to lay the mines; for how long before 
demining the area; and in deliberate design features, for example, in setting an 
appropriate X value, or integrating features that cause the mines to self-destruct or self-
deactivate.5 
 
To be sure, landmines are ‘automatic’ rather than ‘autonomous’ weapons, hence the 
above model may be overly simplistic.6 Nonetheless, it provides a useful entry point 
for understanding the challenges that may arise with LAWS deployments, as well as a 
justification to seek insights and ideas from the landmines regime.7 
2.2.2 The Instruments of Autonomy and How Autonomy is Achieved 
Modern control theory “deals with the behavior of dynamical systems8 with inputs, 
and how their behavior is modified by feedback”.9 In this (interdisciplinary) branch of 
engineering and mathematics, autonomous systems are regarded as a control system 
which consists of two separate components:10 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 See 7.3.6.1 on front-loading. 
6 See 2.3 on the levels of autonomy. 
7 See 7.3.6.4-7.3.6.5 on spatio-temporal restrictions and target parameters. 
8 That is, a system or process exhibiting internally dynamic behaviour. See S. Simrock ‘Control Theory’ 
in Daniel Brandt (ed.), CAS CERN Accelerator School (CERN, 2008), 73 
<https://cds.cern.ch/record/1100534/files/p73.pdf> accessed 8 May 2018. 
9 Laurence Buen Suarez, Control Theory Fundamentals (Delve, 2017), Preface. 
10 Ibid. See also Zdzislaw Bubnicki, Modern Control Theory (Springer, 2005). 
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• the plant, which is the system or process to be controlled; and  
• the controller, which is a device consisting of both hardware and software or, 
more precisely, an executor and a control algorithm. 
 
In a LAWS context, the control system is the overall weapon system. The plant might 
be a drone or a gun turret – equipment which, if not autonomous, would be controlled 
by a human operator. The controller would be the combination of hardware and 
software that manages this equipment, in accordance with parameters programmed by 
a developer.11 Before elaborating on how this may operate, first consider how a 









In Figure 2.2, above, the solid arrows show typical interactions between the various 
components. The combatant/weapons operator (WO) monitors both the target and the 
operational environment; and he operates the weapon, which only engages the target 
after direct human input. Accordingly, the entire decision-making cycle is conducted 
by the individual WO.12 
 
In air combat, pilots often discuss Boyd’s ‘observe, orient, decide, act’ (OODA) loop 
as the cognitive process they undertake when engaging enemy aircraft.13 By ‘getting 
inside’ the enemy’s OODA loop – reacting while he is still trying to assess the situation 
                                                          
11 McFarland (n 1), 1318. 
12 Subject to mission Rules of Engagement. 
13 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (Norton, 2018), 23. 
Figure 2.2: Manually-operated weapon system. Source: adapted from Figure 1, McFarland (n 1). 
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– a fighter pilot forces the enemy to restart their own OODA loop and remain in a state 
of perpetual “confusion and disorder”. This causes the enemy “to over and under react 
to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or 
misleading.”14 Importantly, where a manned weapon system is used, this OODA loop 












By contrast, Figure 2.3 conceptually outlines how a control system may be expected 
to operate in a LAWS context. The human WO activates the weapon system and issues 
high-level commands; much like a commander issuing orders to ground troops, but 
without the agency or capacity for moral reasoning often seen in the latter. The 
WO’s/system developer’s understanding of how to control the weapon is expressed in 
software codes programmed into the controller.15 To some extent, the software 
controller then “steps into the shoes” of the WO, operating the weapon system as well 
as monitoring the target, the environment and the weapon system itself, via a series of 
distinctly technical processes.16 Accordingly, the system takes over a large part of the 
human combatant’s OODA loop,17 with a speed advantage that may compress this into 
micro or nanoseconds, thus moving OODA towards becoming a “perceive and act” 
                                                          
14 John R. Boyd, ‘Patterns of Conflict’ in Chet Richards and Chuck Spinney (eds.), Defense and the 
National Interest (January 2007), 7 <http://www.dnipogo.org/boyd/patterns_ppt.pdf> accessed 8 May 
2018. 
15 McFarland (n 1), 1324. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See 3.3 on the impact of reassigning the OODA loop on the legal analysis of operational decisions. 
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vector.18 This it does via the ‘sense-think-act’ paradigm, in which the robot proceeds 
in three consecutive, yet rapid steps.19 
• Sense: perceives its environment, using a range of sensory hardware and 
software.20 
• Think: processes the raw data in accordance with its software and 
programming.21 
• Act: interacts with and disturbs its environment, potentially taking kinetic 
action.22 
2.2.3 Two Essential Corollaries of Autonomy and ‘Sense-Think-Act’ 
2.2.3.1 An Essentially Technical Process 
Much of the above clearly demonstrates a series of technical processes that rely on 
statistical correlations. In particular, sensing software, such as those tasked with 
computer vision, undertake pattern recognition via pixel-by-pixel analysis of raw data 
and a comparison with image patterns stored in memory.23 There is little or no 
equivalence with human sensory perception and processing, and the more complex the 
software artefact, the more unpredictable is the output. As will be seen in 2.5.6, this 
may lead to inexplicable and counterintuitive errors, which – in a safety-critical 
context – could have catastrophic consequences. 
2.2.3.2 Two Essential Characteristics for Reliable Autonomy  
Another consequence of following a technical process is that any tasks assigned to a 
machine must meet certain minimum criteria based on precision (how well-defined 
the task is, and whether it can be specified in programmable rules) and tangibility (how 
quantifiable the expected outcomes are).24 Two further factors affecting the 
complexity or viability of the task are: dimensionality, in terms of requiring a single 
action to complete the task, or numerous sequential decisions and actions; and the level 
                                                          
18 US Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan, 2009-2047 (USAF HQ, 18 May 2009), 41. 
19 See, for example, Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy 
in Weapon Systems (SIPRI, November 2017), 8-11. 
20 For example, video camera and computer vision; radar, infrared and sonar sensors; and GPS. 
21 See 2.5.1-2.5.2. 
22 This occurs using actuators (robotic ‘muscles’), which power the robot’s effectors (physical devices 
that manipulate the environment). Examples of actuators include electric motors and hydraulic 
cylinders, while effectors include wheels, legs, wings, grippers, or weapons. 
23 Boulanin and Verbruggen (n 19), 8-9. 
24 Ibid., 13. 
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of interaction with other autonomous agents, which may become difficult to model, as 
(especially human) behaviour can be unpredictable.25 
 
The environment also affects the viability of achieving autonomy. Important 
considerations include whether the environment is fully observable or only partially 
observable through sensors; structured or unstructured; uncluttered or cluttered; static 
or dynamic; deterministic or stochastic; cooperative or adversarial.26 In each pairing, 
the first adjective tends towards a simple environment, which is more easily modelled 
in advance and amenable to autonomous action; the second tends towards a more 
complex environment, which poses challenges for autonomous attack. The only 
constant in warfare is its adversarial nature. Beyond that, both attack tasks and 
operational environments can be very diverse, posing a range of challenges of varying 
degrees of difficulty for compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC), or 
international humanitarian law (IHL). 
 
This overview of military robotics suggests two opposing realities. While LAWS will 
undoubtedly be sophisticated machines, able to undertake a range of warfighting roles 
with super-human senses, speed, accuracy and precision, they will nonetheless be 
mechanical and electronic devices that merely apply technical processes. This latter 
point strikes a similarity with the operation of landmines, and it underscores two 
realities: one factual, the other legal. Factually, LAWS acting alone will likely remain 
brittle and will lack the sophistication of deliberative human judgment.27 As 
Cummings points out, “The best operating conditions for [LAWS] are those that 
promote a high-fidelity world model with low environment uncertainty”. 28 This will 
be further illustrated in 2.5.4-2.5.5, in the context of automatic target recognition. 
Legally, the technical nature of a LAWS underscores the lack of agency in these 
systems, though it does affect the assignment and character of operational decisions, 
as well as the machine-operator relationship, thereby reallocating some legal 
responsibilities. The broader legal effects of this point will be revisited in Chapter 3. 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. These are not all mutually exclusive pairings, and some of them will tend to overlap. 
27 This point on brittleness – technical proficiency in narrow domains but weakness in understanding 
the broader context – will be further illustrated in 2.5.3, 2.5.5 and 2.5.6. 
28 ML. Cummings, ‘Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare’, Chatham House Research Paper 
(January 2017), 4 <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-and-future-
warfare> accessed 10 May 2018. 
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2.3 Defining ‘Autonomy’ in Weapon Systems 
Arriving at a satisfactory definition of ‘weapons autonomy’ and ‘LAWS’ is more than 
merely an academic exercise. A legal definition will have jurisdictional consequences, 
as it will determine precisely which weapon systems are subject to a LAWS regulation 
treaty or a LOAC Manual; and whether we are discussing future systems only, or are 
looking to include existing ones too.29 A working definition, which is the focus here, 
will set the boundaries of the current analysis. In that regard, this thesis will define 
weapons autonomy as a concept that applies only to near-future weapon systems. 
Indeed, given the purpose of LAWS legal and policy discussions is to bring potentially 
‘problematic’ weapon systems under a specific governance regime, it would arguably 
serve little practical use – and needlessly expend much analytical and regulatory effort 
– to catch existing systems that operate well without any specifically applicable 
regulation.30 Likewise, to define LAWS in a way that only catches hypothetical and 
distant-future systems would be to miss the point of regulating weapons for 
humanitarian impact.31 
2.3.1 The Many Faces of ‘Autonomy’ 
In its purest form, ‘autonomy’ is a broad concept, deriving from the Greek ‘auto’ (self) 
and ‘nomos’ (law) to mean self-ruling or self-governing.32 This has different meanings 
in different disciplines, with at least five possible variants: political, philosophical, 
legal, moral33 and technical.34 In a LAWS context, it is only the technical sense of the 
word that matters, at least as a starting point. However, even ‘technical autonomy’ is 
not defined in any single way, and it is possible to discern two broad but interrelated 
                                                          
29 Michael C. Horowitz, ‘Why Words Matter: The Real World Consequences of Defining Autonomous 
Weapons Systems’ (2016) 30 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 85. 
30 Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, ‘An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems’, CNAS 
Ethical Autonomy Series Working Paper (February 2015) 
<https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Ethical-Autonomy-Working-
Paper_021015_v02.pdf> accessed 10 May 2018 (arguing, at 17, that it may even be inimical to the aims 
of IHL if an overly broad definition is adopted, which prohibits or restricts the use of precision-guided 
munitions (PGMs) that tend to reduce civilian casualties in war).  
31 See, for example, UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30.2: Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, August 2017), 13 (defining ‘autonomous 
system’ as one that “is capable of understanding higher level intent and direction”) (emphasis added).  
32 Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons (Ashgate, 2009), 
43. 
33 D. Gracia, ‘The Many Faces of Autonomy’ (2012) 33 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 57. 
34 ‘Technical autonomy’ is specific to robotics and the computer sciences. 
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groups of definitions here:35 the first focuses on the human-machine relationship;36 the 
second focuses on the system’s internal manipulation of its own capabilities.37 As will 
be seen below, ‘weapons autonomy’ incorporates both of these dimensions, but must 
also integrate at least one more aspect (the task being performed) to account for the 
specific military context, and the humanitarian focus of the rules that will govern the 
development, deployment and use of these systems. 
2.3.2 The Dimensions of ‘Weapons Autonomy’ 
In line with the above, Scharre and Horowitz consider that there are three distinct 
‘dimensions of autonomy’,38 which this thesis will use to frame a working definition 
of LAWS. First, there is the level of human control, which concerns the relationship 
between the machine and its human operator, as well as task allocation between the 
two. This also finds reflection in the seminal Human Rights Watch report, Losing 
Humanity,39 which distinguished between three categories.40 
• ‘Human-in-the-Loop Weapons’, where the human both selects and engages the 
target, albeit via the medium of the machine. 
• ‘Human-on-the-Loop Weapons’, where the machine selects and engages the 
target, but under human oversight and with the option of manual override. 
• ‘Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons’, where the machine selects and engages 
the target without any further human interaction.41 
 
The concept of autonomy gravitates towards humans being out-of-the-loop, although, 
as will be seen below, lower forms of autonomy may well be associated with the other 
categories.42 Furthermore, while the ‘level of human control’ accords with some of the 
broader definitions of technical autonomy alluded to above, weapons autonomy is a 
much narrower and more specific term. Namely, to fully capture the essence of 
                                                          
35 Henry Hexmoor et al., ‘A Prospectus on Agent Autonomy’ in Henry Hexmoor et al. (eds.), Agent 
Autonomy (Springer, 2003), 3-4. 
36 See, for example, Michael A. Goodrich and Alan C. Schultz, ‘Human-Robot Interaction: A Survey’ 
(2007) 1 Foundations and Trends in Human-Robot Interaction 203. 
37 See, for example, Defense Science Board, US Department of Defense (DoD), The Role of Autonomy 
in DoD Systems (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for ATL, July 2012), 1. 
38 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30), 6-7. 
39 Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots (Human Rights Watch, 
2012). 
40 Ibid., 2.  
41 Ibid. Note that human-out-of-the-loop systems still require initial activation by a human. 
42 See (note and text accompanying) n 139. 
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machine autonomy in a weapons context, it is necessary to qualify the ‘level of human 
control’ with internal system features and a sense of lethality.  
 
Accordingly, a second dimension that should also be considered is machine 
complexity. This refers to the ‘intelligence’ of the system, and is also often divided 
into three broad categories.43 
• Automatic implies that the system exhibits a simple, mechanical response to 
environmental input, such as how a basic thermostat works. In a military 
context, a landmine or trip-wire would be considered ‘automatic’, as these 
involve a direct linear relationship between cause (triggering of a pressure 
threshold) and effect (explosion), with no real decision-making process in 
between. 
• Automated weapons take several environmental inputs into a decision-making 
process, which is relatively complex, yet grounded in a predictable rules-based 
system.44 These typically operate on IF-THEN-ELSE functions, to determine 
a response, similar to a computer spreadsheet. In a military context, air and 
missile defence systems are considered ‘automated’; or, more precisely, they 
can be set to operate in automated mode in relation to selecting and engaging 
specific targets.45 
• Autonomous systems are those that “execute some kind of self-direction, self-
learning or emergent behavior that is not directly predictable from an 
inspection of its code”.46  
 
Wagner points out that, in contradistinction to the first two categories, autonomous 
systems will exhibit two unique features.47 First, they will have the capacity to make 
                                                          
43 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30), 6. 
44 See (notes and text accompanying) nn 170-174. 
45 Alternatively, these systems can be set to operate with a human-in-the-loop in these critical functions. 
If so, the system reverts to being ‘automatic’, in that a human-launched missile (e.g. from the Patriot 
missile battery) senses the speed and trajectory of its target and automatically alters its flight path to 
keep in line with the target. This is similarly true of a system like the Phalanx, which automatically 
adapts the direction of its Gatling gun, but only to keep its stream of ammunition aiming towards the 
human-selected target. 
46 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30), 6 (emphasis added to highlight that these are alternatives; namely, 
machine learning is an option, but not a requirement to meet the ‘threshold’ for an autonomous system). 
47 Markus Wagner, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (2016) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e2134> accessed 10 May 2018. 
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“discretionary decisions”;48 hence, they will be able to “react, independently, to a 
changing set of circumstances without necessitating the interference of a human 
operator”.49 Second, autonomous systems will require no human input on which 
specific target to select and engage; with which specific munition to engage that target; 
or on the timing of weapons release.50 Accordingly, LAWS will be ‘goal driven’ 
systems that undertake complex decision-making processes and – in complex 
operational environments – will be able to react to concrete situations that neither their 
designers nor deploying commanders may have anticipated. 
 
The above classification also finds reflection in the ICRC’s report,51 which 
distinguished between ‘remotely controlled’ systems (tele-operated devices with some 
automatic features, to support human control by the pilot), ‘automated’ and 
‘autonomous’ systems;52 the latter two approximating more closely to Scharre and 
Horowitz’s categories of the same designation. 
 
Finally, there is the task to be performed by the machine. This is crucial for 
determining whether or not machine autonomy can be used in accordance with the law, 
as different actions will carry different levels of risk if systems malfunction, or are 
poorly designed or deployed.53 For example, both a mechanical thermostat and an anti-
tank mine have humans ‘out-of-the-loop’; but if the sensors become over-sensitive, the 
latter may kill civilians, whereas the former will be a mere inconvenience. More 
recently, there are the autonomous take-off and carrier landing capabilities of the US 
X-47B stealth drone, hailed as a technical breakthrough when they were successfully 
demonstrated in 2013.54 Under the ‘machine complexity’ dimension, these may be 
considered ‘autonomous’. However, neither take-off nor landing involve any lethal 
                                                          
48 Ibid., ¶ 6. On the meaning of LAWS ‘discretion’, see (notes and text accompanying) nn 77-82. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.; Markus Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and 
Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 1371, 1383. 
51 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, 
Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects (Expert Meeting of 26-28 March 2014) (ICRC, November 
2014), 62. 
52 Ibid., 62 and 64. 
53 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30); Cummings (n 28).  
54 Brandon Vinson, ‘X-47B Makes First Arrested Landing at Sea’, Navy News Services (10 July 2013) 
<http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75298> accessed 10 May 2018 (emphasising the 




engagement or damage to property, and both usually occur far away from any actual 
or potential contact zone; alone, they offer no warfighting capability and pose no perils 
for civilians or other protected persons or objects. Hence, they are unlikely to qualify 
as ‘weapons autonomy’ for IHL/LOAC purposes. By contrast, the critical functions of 
selecting and engaging targets for attack – including the secondary critical tasks of 
selecting the munition and the timing of weapons release – all have very real 
humanitarian impacts.55  
 
To illustrate the point, it is instructive to consider the work of the US Department of 
Defense (DoD) Working Group on Autonomous Weapon Systems.56 Prior to drafting 
Directive 3000.09,57 the Working Group analysed a selection of existing (mostly 
supervised or semi-autonomous) technologies and case studies of past catastrophic 
errors, as well as measures that could have prevented them.58 These included the 
following. 
• The wrongful shooting down of Iran Air flight 655 by the Aegis Combat System 
(on board the USS Vincennes) in 1988, which killed all 290 passengers and 
crew members on board.59  
• Two fratricide (‘friendly fire’) incidents in 2003 – one against a Royal Air 
Force Tornado GR4 jet and another hitting a US Navy F/A 18 Hornet jet. Both 
incidents involved the MIM-104 Patriot missile battery, and they killed both 
pilots and the Tornado navigator.60  
                                                          
55 For example, selecting the wrong target may violate the principle of distinction. Releasing a munition 
with an unnecessarily large blast radius, or releasing it while civilian heat signatures are still visibly 
dispersing, may violate the proportionality principle; almost certainly the obligation to take feasible 
precautions in attack. See Chapters 6 and 7 for further. 
56 This was established by the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, to formulate the official US 
definition of ‘autonomous weapon system’ and, more generally, to draft US policy on LAWS by way 
of Directive 3000.09. 
57 US DoD, Directive No. 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (21 November 2012, incorporating 
Change 1, 8 May 2017) 
<http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf> accessed 10 May 
2018. 
58 Colonel Richard Jackson, ‘Autonomous Weaponry and Armed Conflict’, ASIL Panel Discussion (10 
April 2014) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=duq3DtFJtWg> accessed 10 May 2018. 
59 Gene I. Rochlin, ‘Iran Air Flight 655 and the USS Vincennes: Complex, Large-Scale Military Systems 
and the Failure of Control’ in Todd R. La Porte (ed.), Social Responses to Large Technical Systems: 
Control or Anticipation (Springer Science + Business Media, 1991) (pointing to ‘scenario fulfilment’, 
whereby personnel under pressure carry out standard training scenario responses, and ignore 
contradictory information that should lead to a different outcome). 
60 See John K. Hawley, ‘Patriot Wars: Automation and the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System’, 





In each case, it was found that it was in the selection and engagement of the target – 
namely, those functions most closely related to lethality – where human judgement 
and the LOAC both applied, yet the potential for catastrophe was the greatest; and 
indeed where fatal mistakes were actually made, but with no clear lines of 
accountability.61 Accordingly, to maintain the humanitarian focus of IHL/LOAC, the 
relevant tasks that should warrant a legal or (self)-regulatory response are exclusively 
the (primary and/or secondary) critical functions discussed above.62 Again, this 
approach is strongly reflected in the ICRC report, which itself distils this focus on the 
critical functions from a number of other definitions of weapons autonomy.63  
 
Furthermore, as Scharre and Horowitz point out, autonomy may be a broad concept in 
that it can apply to any function within a weapon system but, as mentioned above, 
‘autonomous weapon’ is an inherently narrower term and can only refer to the critical 
functions.64 Here, the authors are acknowledging that the whole purpose of a weapon 
system is to attack a target, be that in offence or defence. Hence, to autonomise non-
critical functions, while the selection and engagement of targets remain manually 
operated, should preclude that autonomy – however technically advanced – from 
making the system an ‘autonomous weapon’ as such. Autonomous weapons are 
necessarily autonomous in the critical functions. That said, as will be seen in Chapter 
5, in the case of US and NATO forces the ‘critical functions’ should arguably be 
reconceptualised from the narrow technical phenomenon of target recognition, to the 
broader human-led targeting process. This is both to take into account the vastly more 
deliberative process of target selection, with its meaningful checks and balances; as 
well as the creeping autonomy in areas like intelligence and target development, which 
may undermine this. 
 
                                                          
FINAL.pdf> accessed 10 May 2018 (detailing the causes of the fratricides as a complex mix of failures, 
of which machine autonomy was only one).  
61 Jackson (n 58). But see Chapter 4 on meaningful human control, and Chapter 5 on reconceptualising 
‘critical functions’ to the entire Joint Targeting process. 
62 See Chris Jenks, ‘The Distraction of Full Autonomy and the Need to Refocus the CCW LAWS 
Discussion on Critical Functions’ in Robin Geiß (ed.), Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: 
Technology, Definition, Ethics, Law & Security (German Federal Foreign Office, 2016) (advocating the 
same narrow focus discussed here, specifically to maintain a humanitarian focus). 
63 ICRC (n 51), 62-64. Again, see Chapter 5, which challenges this received wisdom on such a narrow 
focus. 
64 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30). 
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Three final points should be noted. First, there is a fourth possible dimension of 
autonomy: ‘complexity of operational environment’, which was presented in 2.2.3.2 
as a determinant of reliable autonomy. This is not included in Scharre and Horowitz, 
yet it is implicit in some existing definitions,65 and even singled it out as a separate 
‘dimension’ of weapons autonomy.66 Clearly, the operating environment will affect 
the level of risk to civilians and other protected persons and objects, all else being 
equal; thus, it should be part of the definition and, even more so, it should form one of 
the bases for deployment restrictions and pre-deployment precautions.  
 
Second, while the above has conveniently divided each of the dimensions into three or 
so sub-categories, the reality is more complex and each one is actually a spectrum of 
infinite possibilities.67 At the very least, there are other models that provide more than 
three levels, like Sheridan and Verplank,68 OSD69 and, more recently, Sharkey.70 This 
will complicate the task of drawing objective boundaries between ‘human-controlled 
and ‘autonomous’ systems, by offering more options that may conceivably fall into 
both categories, depending on how they are applied in practice. 
 
Finally, the three (or four) dimensions are largely independent of each other and it is 
possible, for instance, to have a human totally ‘out-of-the-loop’, yet with such low 
‘machine complexity’ as to effectively negate the concept of ‘autonomy’:71 a landmine 
is a prime example. Furthermore, a given weapon system will simultaneously sit 
                                                          
65 For example, Patrick Lin, George Bekey and Keith Abney, ‘Autonomous Military Robotics: Risks, 
Ethics, and Design’, US Department of Navy, Office of Naval Research (2008), 103 
<http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=phil_fac> accessed 10 
May 2018 (referring to the “capacity to operate in the real-world environment”) (emphasis added). See 
also Wagner’s definition, (text accompanying) n 49. 
66 See Christian Alwardt and Martin Krüger, ‘Autonomy of Weapon Systems, IFSH/IFAR Food for 
Thought Paper (February 2016) <https://ifsh.de/file-IFAR/pdf_english/IFAR_FFT_1_final.pdf> 
accessed 10 May 2018. 
67 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30). 
68 TB. Sheridan and WL. Verplank, Human and Computer Control of Undersea Teleoperators (Man-
Machines Systems Laboratory, MIT, 1978), 8.17-8.19 (explaining the ‘Levels of Autonomy’ model, 
which consists of ten levels of automation, going from complete human control through to complete 
machine control). 
69 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 (DoD, 2005), 
D-10 (illustrating ten Autonomous Capability Levels, at Figure D-5). 
70 Noel Sharkey, ‘Staying in the Loop: Human Supervisory Control of Weapons’ in Nehal Bhuta et al. 
(eds.), Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (CUP, 2016), 28 (applying Sheridan and 
Verplank’s model in a more explicit military context, and focusing on human-machine collaboration, 
specifically for designing systems with greater humanitarian impact. This leads the author to suggest 
five discrete levels of human supervisory control of weapons). 
71 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30), 7; Lin, Bekey and Abney (n 65), 103, authors’ n 8. 
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somewhere along all three (four) dimensions; thus, its designation will depend on its 
combined positioning along all spectrums. 
2.3.3 Towards a Working Definition of ‘Weapons Autonomy’ and LAWS 
Taken together, the above points to ‘weapons autonomy’ as a feature that encompasses 
humans being out of the loop; in the (primary and/or secondary) critical functions of a 
weapon system; with those functions being performed by software controllers that are 
able to exercise discretion; in a potentially complex and unstructured environment. 
With these in mind, the following working definition of LAWS is proposed: 
 
A weapon system which, once activated, can select and engage targets 
without further human intervention and usually without any human pre-
selecting those specific targets; and, in the process, to exercise 
discretion and self-direction to operate in a potentially complex and 
unstructured environment.72 
 
At first sight, this may seem like a highly restrictive definition which, if all elements 
are to be cumulatively met, might overly narrow the scope of weapons autonomy. As 
mentioned above, however, an underlying concern is to maintain a humanitarian focus; 
together with the italicised words in the definition, this arguably provides appropriate 
flexibility. Thus, even in a targeted strike,73 where the specific target is pre-selected 
by humans, residual machine ‘discretion’ on choice of munition and timing of weapons 
release will retain the autonomous nature of the deployment, thereby requiring 
appropriate precautions by deploying commanders.74  
2.3.4 Three Clarifying Comments 
2.3.4.1 The Technical Nature of LAWS ‘Discretion’ 
First, ‘discretion’ is not used here to refer to anything like human-level intelligence, 
deliberative reasoning or true free will, these all presupposing certain human traits that 
machines inherently lack.75 The software-based controllers of a LAWS will essentially 
be deterministic tools running on special-purpose computers that, however 
                                                          
72 Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘Assessing the Sense and Scope of ‘Autonomy’ in Emerging Military 
Weapon Systems’, TLI Think! Paper 76/2017 (2017), 15 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3027540> accessed 
10 May 2018. 
73 This is not a legal term, but is used in this thesis to denote an attack on preselected targets that have 
been developed through a human-led targeting process. See 5.2.5.1 
74 See also 2.4.3 on systems with lower levels of autonomy, which contradistinguish LAWS. 
75 See Chapter 3, especially 3.2.2 on the absence of human qualities in machines. 
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sophisticated, remain founded on the ‘stored program’ concept.76 Namely, LAWS will 
be ‘calculating machines’, where “instructions entered by a human programmer are 
stored in the machine’s memory and drawn upon to govern its operation”.77 Thus, 
‘discretion’ is used here in a technical sense, in that the weapon system’s controllers 
will a) collect (input) data, b) process it, and c) in accordance with that data and pre-
programmed instructions, select one or more (output) options from a range of possible 
outcomes78 that may or may not have been foreseeable to deploying commanders. The 
option chosen will always be a logical consequence of ex ante programming and 
sensed data, and this remains true even when machine learning comes into play.79 Yet, 
as the opacity and learning ability of algorithms rise, and as the complexity of the 
battlefield increases – hence, the range of sensed data become less predictable – there 
may be the appearance of machine discretion. Certainly, autonomous systems will 
undertake stochastic (probability-based) reasoning,80 which introduces greater 
uncertainty over their precise actions in a dynamic battlefield.81 This is significant for 
those deploying LAWS, in that they may need to take stronger, additional and earlier 
precautions before any deployment, to safeguard against the risk of unintended 
engagements.82  
2.3.4.2 Prioritising the Dimensions for Administrability 
Second, there is the question of how administrable the working definition is, and which 
dimension of autonomy is the most useful. A potential problem identified by several 
authors is that it can be very difficult and subjective to draw a line between ‘automated’ 
and ‘autonomous’ systems,83 especially based on any notion of apparent ‘discretion’. 
                                                          
76 William Aspray, ‘Back to Basics: The Stored Program Concept’ (1990) 27 IEEE Spectrum 51. 
77 McFarland (n 1), 15. 
78 In this regard, see Rebecca Crootof, ‘The Killer Robots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications’ 
(2015) 36 Cardozo Law Review 1837, 1854 (differentiating ‘autonomous’ from ‘automated’ systems 
by including in her definition of LAWS that the weapon system’s critical actions will be “based on 
conclusions derived from gathered information and preprogrammed constraints…”). 
79 McFarland (n 1), 16 (noting that while it is not immediately obvious, even a learning machine 
essentially executes instructions formulated by its developer. There is of course “an extra layer of 
abstraction between the developer and the weapon firing”, which consists of new rules and algorithmic 
changes that originate not in the developer’s mind, but in the data on which the system is subsequently 
trained. This extra layer of abstraction complicates the process of matching specific (attack) outcomes 
to specific (developer) commands, but it does not alter the fact that both the algorithmic changes and 
the final act of weapons release will involve the machine logically “executing instructions formulated 
by its developer”).  
80 Cummings (n 28). 
81 ICRC (n 51), 13. 
82 See Chapter 7, especially 7.3.5 and 7.3.6. 
83 For example, Crootof (n 78); Scharre and Horowitz (n 30). 
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They contend that while ‘machine complexity’ provides a useful framework for 
thinking, it ultimately does not lend itself to legal definition, and thus it should not be 
applied beyond simple thought experiments or working definition status.84 More 
recently, States at the April 2018 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) meeting have 
argued for a move away from the automated/autonomous distinction due to its limited 
practical utility, and for a stronger focus on the type and degree of human control over 
weapon systems.85 The main focus of discussions, therefore, seems to be the absence 
of direct human control over the narrow critical functions,86 though machine 
complexity can and should arguably remain a feature of academic analysis.87 
2.3.4.3 The Role of Humans 
The final clarifying comment concerns the role of the human. To be sure, humans will 
not be totally ‘out-of-the-loop’ in the use of any LAWS that may be fielded in the near-
term. Rather, commanders will retain full control of a number of important variables, 
which will be programmed into the systems.88 At a bare minimum, these will include 
target parameters,89 geographical boundaries and temporal boundaries.90 This leaves 
the weapon system to select and engage specific targets that fall within these general 
constraints;91 save in the case of targeted strikes.92  
                                                          
84 Ibid.; Email from Paul Scharre to Maziar Homayounnejad (16 August 2016), on file with author 
(noting that machine complexity is a useful discussion tool, especially when addressing the ‘black box’ 
problem, but difficult to draw the line between ‘automated’ and ‘autonomous’ in practice; and preferring 
a legal definition of LAWS that “hinges upon what the machine is doing, agnostic to how smart it is”, 
for clarity and legal certainty). 
85 See the various State contributions at the Second GGE on LAWS, 9-13 April 2018 
<https://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/7c335e71dfcb29d1c1258243003e8724?
OpenDocument&ExpandSection=-2#_Section2> accessed 10 May 2018. 
86 ‘Narrow’ in this context referring to target recognition by the weapon system’s sensory hardware and 
control software, rather than the broader targeting process discussed in Chapter 5. 
87 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), ‘The Weaponization of Increasingly 
Autonomous Technologies: Concerns, Characteristics and Definitional Approaches’, UNIDIR 
Resources, No. 6 (2017), 21-22 <http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-weaponization-of-
increasingly-autonomous-technologies-concerns-characteristics-and-definitional-approaches-en-
689.pdf> accessed 10 May 2018 (discussing the ‘sequencing’ proposal of prioritising a human-centric 
approach, before specifying the critical tasks and, finally, having a tech-centric discussion). 
88 See Chapter 4 on meaningful human control. 
89 That is, the exact categories (types) of targets that may be engaged, such as ‘tank’ or ‘attack 
helicopter’. 
90 Article 36, Killing by Machine: Key Issues for Understanding Meaningful Human Control (6 April 
2015) <http://www.article36.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/KILLING_BY_MACHINE_6.4.15.pdf> accessed 10 May 2018. 
91 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30). This includes discretion over the secondary critical functions. 
92 Where, as mentioned above, human commanders will pre-select the specific target, and machine 
discretion is limited to the secondary critical functions, to achieve the mission objective while 




Only within these limiting parameters will a LAWS be capable of offering genuine 
military utility, by enabling commanders to remain accountable for its actions and 
responsible for the overall outcome of operations in their own area of command and 
control. Concretely, such limiting parameters enable commanders to: fulfil mission 
objectives, in compliance with LOAC norms and mission Rules of Engagement, with 
full situational awareness,93 and in pursuit of the broader strategic/political and 
military purpose of the operation.94 
 
Accordingly, humans will remain in the ‘wider loop’ of (strategic and operational) 
control, while the weapon system operates with relative autonomy within the (tactical) 
‘narrow loop’.95  As a corollary, “many key targeting decisions will…be made in 
earlier phases of the targeting cycle and at locations further removed from the 
intended strike site”.96 Thus, deliberative human reasoning on the actions of a LAWS 
will potentially be made in a more abstract setting, with less accurate knowledge of 
concrete threats or specific civilian risks. Again, this may require that commanders 
take stronger, additional and earlier precautions in their deployment and use of 
LAWS at the operational level, all else being equal. 
2.4 Weapon Systems Likely to Emerge as LAWS 
Horowitz points out that there are generally two kinds of weapon systems: munitions 
and platforms.97 Munitions are physical and non-returnable/inherently one-way 
weapons designed to destroy a single target;98 examples include missiles, bombs and 
rifle rounds. By contrast, platforms are inherently returnable systems that launch other 
munitions;99 examples include combat aircraft, tanks and warships. Both types of 
weapon system can be autonomised with the integration of appropriate sensors, 
                                                          
93 This includes the status and movements of own and allied forces, enemy forces, and the civilian 
population. 
94 I am grateful to Wolfgang Richter for pointing out these linkages. 
95 AIV and CAVV ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems: The Need for Meaningful Human Control’ Report 
No. 97 AIV/No. 26 CAVV (AIV/CAVV, October 2015). See Chapter 5. For a concrete application, see 
7.2.3.4. 
96 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems’ in Paul AL. Ducheine, 
Michael N. Schmitt and Frans PB. Osinga (eds.), Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare (TMC 
Asser Press, 2016), 178 (emphasis added).  
97 Horowitz (n 29), 94-97. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. The author points to a potential third category (operational system), but this is unlikely to be 
developed in the near-term, both for technical feasibility and military command and control reasons. 
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processing hardware and control software; either by original design, or via retrofit. 
Accordingly, the kind of weapon system that can be expected to emerge as 
‘autonomous’ in the near-term is the ‘wide-area search-and-attack’ loitering munition 
and (drone) platform.100 These will operate either as standalone units,101 or as part of 
a swarm,102 where collective behaviours can bring yet more dramatic and disruptive 
change to military operations.103 Presently, a rather rudimentary autonomous munition 
exists in the Israeli Harpy. This detects and engages specific radar-emitting objects, 
with the option of negative visual confirmation,104 and all within tight spatial and 
temporal boundaries within which deploying commanders believe lawful targets 
exist.105 That said, the Harpy consists of many of the same technologies in today’s 
semi-autonomous homing munitions, but with greater range and aerial persistence;106 
thus, it is mostly ‘LAWS by usage’.107  
2.4.1 Development of Standalone LAWS 
Scharre notes that much of the technology for basic autonomous loitering munitions 
has existed for decades, but has not been widely developed or fielded.108 A notable 
exception was the Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM), which was in service in the 
US Navy from 1982 to 1994.109 However, the TASM was retired and never actually 
fired in battle because Navy commanders were reluctant to launch a high-cost, limited-
supply and non-returnable munition without concrete evidence that an actual warship 
was in the loitering area.110 The advent of recoverable drone platforms arguably 
                                                          
100 Scharre and Horowitz (n 30); Horowitz (n 29). 
101 Ibid.  
102 David Hambling, Swarm Troopers: How Small Drones Will Conquer the World (Archangel Ink, 
2015). 
103 Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm (CNAS, 2014) 
<https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_TheComingSwarm_Scharre.pdf> 
accessed 10 May 2018 (discussing how swarms of robotic systems can bring greater mass, coordination, 
intelligence and speed to the battlefield, thereby increasing the chance of gaining a decisive advantage 
over adversaries). 
104 Namely, there is the option to visually zoom-in on the radar-emitting object, compare the image with 
a database of known ‘friendly’ sites; if no match is recognised, the Harpy proceeds to dive-bomb into 
its target. 
105 Paul Scharre, ‘Autonomy, “Killer Robots,” and Human Control in the Use of Force – Part I’, Just 
Security (9 July 2014) <https://www.justsecurity.org/12708/autonomy-killer-robots-human-control-
force-part/> accessed 10 May 2018. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Horowitz (n 29) points out, at 92-94, that the operator’s usage can make semi-autonomous weapons 
fully autonomous. 
108 Scharre (n 13), 49. 
109 Ibid., 53.  
110 Ibid., 54.  
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changes this: these can be sent on missions with less accurate intelligence, and if no 
specific targets are detected, the drone can return to base with no loss of capacity.111 
This alone can be expected to increase their appeal relative to autonomous munitions. 
That said, the latter is still likely to be fielded for targeted strikes on fixed objects, 
where the munitions can carry out a similar function to cruise missiles, but with 
machine discretion on the timing of attack. 
 
Accordingly, we can expect future LAWS – both munitions and platforms – to build 
on the current state of the art: to be more sophisticated with stronger artificial 
intelligence (AI) and automatic target recognition capabilities;112 and to have longer 
loitering times and greater loitering areas. This will enable the systems to engage a 
wider range of targets with improved target accuracy; for example, by loitering longer 
for more multisensory and cross-cueing opportunities.113 Stronger AI will also endow 
systems with the intelligence to detect, recognise and mitigate some civilian risk; for 
example, by varying the exact timing of attack in accordance with circumstances on 
the ground. 
 
In addition to these, platform-based LAWS can be expected to have even longer 
loitering capabilities and a choice of munitions in attack. This may include a variety of 
different blast radiuses, which the control software may be able to match to its 
immediate environment before weapons release (to further mitigate civilian risk);114 
and also less-lethal/non-lethal munitions, to warn civilians to flee and/or incapacitate 
combatants rather than kill them, should this be consistent with mission goals.115 
2.4.2 Development of Swarms 
Perhaps even before standalone systems, swarming munitions will be developed, 
fielded and deployed first, if only for cost and strategic reasons.116 This seems all the 
more likely, given recent occurrences of makeshift swarm attacks in Syria and Yemen, 
                                                          
111 Ibid., 56. As opposed to a munition, which must either engage a target, self-destruct or dump itself 
at sea. 
112 See 2.5.1-2.5.4 on AI and automatic target recognition. 
113 See 2.5.4.1 on multisensor approaches and cross-cueing. 
114 See 7.3.2.2 on minimising collateral damage. 
115 See 7.3.2.4 on providing effective advance warning. 
116 Hambling (n 102); Scharre (n 103), 16-18 (discussing the contrasting effects of Augustine’s Law, 
where linear budget rises are met with exponential cost increases versus Lanchester’s Square Law, 
where reducing the size and increasing the quantity of combat assets will enable US forces to ‘double 
up’ on attacking enemy units). 
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and the gathering State and non-State competition to develop swarm systems for future 
deployment.117 There are even suggestions that swarming may become the mainstay 
of future wars.118 Generally, swarms can be utilised in three ways: offensive attack; 
defence; or in a support role, like providing intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR).119 In all cases, they involve “large numbers of dispersed 
individuals or small groups coordinating together and [operating] as a coherent 
whole”.120 Within these, the individual agents follow simple rules, from which the 
swarm collectively exhibits emergent intelligence, and complex and unified 
behaviours.121 Accordingly, attack swarms will offer two distinct advantages over 
unitary systems: first, there is a quantitative element in which large numbers of micro-
drones aim to saturate and overwhelm the enemy; second, there is a 
qualitative (collaborative) element, which aims to outsmart the enemy with rapid 
and unpredictable manoeuvres.122 This can be seen as a modern application of the 
centuries-old military doctrine of mass and manoeuvre.123 However, even before it 
approaches the target, an attack swarm will be able to jam enemy radar, and it has the 
advantage of potentially avoiding radar altogether (because of the small size and 
limited airspeed of each micro-drone unit);124 it may disaggregate to avoid detection 
and concentrated attack, before reaggregating at the last moment to take the enemy by 
surprise.125 
 
                                                          
117 See Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘Drone Swarming and the Explosive Remnants of War’, Opinio Juris 
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122 Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems, Drone Swarming and the Explosive 
Remnants of War’, TLI Think! Paper 1/2018 (2018), 8 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3099768> accessed 
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<https://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/air-force-seeks-swarms-of-versatile-mini-drones> 




Human controllers will supervise missions and instruct the broader goals, while 
individual autonomous units manoeuvre and perform various tasks unaided at the 
micro level.126 Thus, swarms may tend closer towards human-on-the-loop systems, 
where unlawful behaviours can usually be manually overridden. Conversely, where 
they are deployed in a communications-denied environment, swarms will need the 
capability to operate in fully autonomous mode for at least part of the mission. This is 
likely to be the case in symmetric (high-intensity) conflict, and is the principal 
motivation behind DARPA’s127 Collaborative Operations in Denied Environment 
(CODE) program.128 
 
An example of swarming – albeit in an ISR context – is the recent testing of 103 Perdix 
micro-drones, which demonstrated collective decision-making, adaptive formation 
flying and self-healing, all with a human operator defining broad tasks but not 
instructing any of these specific behaviours.129 An obvious benefit of ISR swarming is 
to fuse together images from multiple viewpoints, for more accurate intelligence. 
Crucially, this may carry over into lethal autonomy: one of the stated benefits of the 
CODE program is “[p]roviding multi-modal sensors and diverse observation angles to 
improve target identification”.130 From this and other program goals, Scharre 
concludes that CODE may act as a gateway into lethal autonomy.131  
 
The US Navy’s LOCUST program (Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology) goes a 
step further than the Perdix test flights, and aims to utilise swarming munitions (Coyote 
drones132) for ship defences;133 while those designed for offensive attack will have the 
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<https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=260d113392090305f63b281cf20bfea9> accessed 10 May 2018. 
131 Scharre (n 13), 72-76. 
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133 David Hambling, ‘US Navy Plans to Fly First Drone Swarm this Summer’, DefenseTech (4 January 
2016) <https://www.defensetech.org/2016/01/04/u-s-navy-plans-to-fly-first-drone-swarm-this-
summer/> accessed 10 May 2018.  
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advantage of saturating and overwhelming enemy defences, such that even counter-
measures and heavy defensive fire will not prevent a few ‘leakers’ from getting 
through to take out their target.134  
 
Swarming concepts also extend to larger platforms. In 2014, the US Navy successfully 
tested 13-boat swarms via a retrofit system, both for maritime defence and for 
offensive attack on hostile vessels.135 More recently, a Chinese company attracted 
media attention by demonstrating a 56-boat swarm in the South China Sea, which 
could “provide an asymmetric advantage in a conflict with the United States”.136 
2.4.3 Distant-Future and Existing Autonomy 
Of course, autonomy is not a static concept, but is an incrementally advancing 
capability. Thus, LAWS will continue to develop into much more advanced (bipedal) 
systems in the longer term, as current projects in both the public sector137 and private 
sector138 suggest. However, because of the more distant time horizons, these will be 
excluded from the scope of this thesis. Equally, there is a plethora of currently-fielded 
weapon systems that incorporate autonomy to a greater or lesser degree in various 
functions. Again, these will be excluded from the scope of this thesis, but for the reason 
that they already operate under existing LOAC. These systems include: 
• Remotely-piloted systems, such as the Predator and Reaper drones, which 
have a ‘man-in-the-loop’ both for selecting and engaging targets. 
• Semi-autonomous weapons, such as precision-guided munitions, which 
automatically engage specific targets that have been pre-selected by humans. 
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• Automated weapon systems, such as the (ship-borne) Phalanx CIWS and the 
(land-based) Patriot air and missile defence systems. These select and engage 
incoming threats, but usually on simple rules-based criteria that work in a 
predictable manner.139  
2.4.4 A Three-Part Chronology 
The foregoing approximates to Farrant and Ford’s ‘three-wave’ taxonomy of LAWS 
development.140 According to the authors, ‘first-wave’ autonomous weapons are ‘point 
defence systems’,141 such as the Phalanx CIWS and the Patriot. As just mentioned, 
however, this thesis will classify these as ‘automated’ systems, whose predictability 
and simplicity of algorithms do not necessitate additional regulation, or any 
restatement of laws.  
 
‘Second-wave’ systems are “exemplified by the spate of unmanned combat aerial 
vehicles currently under development”,142 the clearest examples being the Dassault 
nEUROn and the BAE Systems Taranis. These systems – which Scharre imagines as 
“a Predator drone [with] as much autonomy as a Google [driverless] car”143 – will 
operate on the wide-area loitering concept, and are of the kind that this thesis will 
address. As Farrant and Ford point out, however, second-wave systems are not limited 
to aerial vehicles, but will also include a range of ground-based144 and maritime145 
autonomous systems, which will loiter or patrol over relatively narrower areas.146 
Examining the development trajectory of these LAWS, Jenks explains there will be a 
                                                          
139 Often, these systems can also be set to operate in supervised-autonomous mode, where there is a 
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142 Ibid. 
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‘crawl-walk-run’ approach, initially focusing on anti-material targeting in uncluttered 
environments where the civilian risk factor is relatively low, or non-existent.147 
Accordingly, autonomous maritime systems are likely to be developed and fielded in 
the largest numbers at an early stage,148 as evidenced by recent military spending 
figures,149 development plans150 and project milestones.151 This will be followed by 
developments in aerial LAWS152 and, lastly, ground-based systems.153 Subsequently, 
LAWS development will expand into more complex environments to undertake a 
broader range of attack missions, and this includes ground-based systems.154  
 
Finally, Farrant and Ford refer to ‘third-wave’ systems, which will incorporate 
significantly increased autonomy and machine learning capabilities, thus will only be 
viable in the longer-term. Citing the DoD’s 2013 Unmanned Systems Roadmap,155 the 
authors refer to a movement from autonomous mission execution to autonomous 
mission performance. The difference is that second-wave systems will be goal-
directed within pre-programmed parameters, whereas third-wave systems will focus 
on broader mission outcomes. Importantly, mission outcomes can vary during a 
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mission, thereby requiring autonomous changes to human-set parameters.156 Again, 
the longer time horizons will exclude these systems from the scope of the thesis. 
 
To conclude, the autonomous systems that are likely to enter the battlespace and raise 
LOAC compliance issues in the near-term are ‘second-wave’ loitering munitions and 
platforms, operating either as standalone units or within swarms. While many of these 
will be maritime and aerial vehicles designed for uncluttered environments – the so-
called Predator with Google car capabilities – this will not invariably be the case as 
States will also field a number of ground systems. These near-term LAWS will almost 
certainly target large military objects, but they may also be designed to engage enemy 
combatants. Initially, second-wave systems will likely be a step-up from cruise 
missiles (in a targeted strike) or sensor-fused weapons (in tactical combat). Over time, 
they can be expected to grow in sophistication, and be fit for deployment in 
increasingly complex operational environments. 
2.5 Artificial Intelligence and Automatic Target Recognition 
Having delineated the kinds of weapon systems likely to emerge as near-term LAWS, 
it is worth examining in more detail some of the key enabling technologies of 
autonomous attack. This will allow a clearer understanding of potential LAWS 
capacities and limitations, especially in relation to the rules and principles of targeting 
law (Chapters 6 and 7). 
2.5.1 Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the very foundation of machine autonomy and it forms 
the basis for numerous weapons features and technologies. Essentially, AI is a 
“software endeavour”,157 which enables machines to replace some human judgment in 
warfare.158 Accordingly, it has broadly been defined as “the capability of a computer 
system to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence”,159 which it does 
via knowledge representation and reasoning, to act as a rational agent.160  
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157 Defense Science Board, US DoD (n 37), 22. 
158 For example, to exercise battlefield ‘discretion’ (see 2.3.4.1) in areas that largely require automatic 
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2.5.1.1 Narrow AI versus General AI  
AI is broadly divided into narrow (‘weak’) and general (‘strong’) AI. Narrow AI has 
a limited range of cognitive abilities and specialises in one particular task, where it 
often equals or exceeds human performance at that specific task only; examples 
include driving a car,161 playing Go,162 or even competing in an aerial dogfight.163 By 
contrast, general AI (or AGI) “can be applied to problems in many different domains, 
as human intelligence can”.164 So far, virtually all applications of AI – both civilian 
and military – are narrow, and this will likely remain true for the foreseeable future.165 
Indeed, as the working definition of LAWS emphasises,166 near-term systems will 
autonomise a narrow range of combat functions.167 Namely, the primary critical 
functions of finding, tracking, prioritising, selecting and engaging targets; along with 
the secondary functions regarding the choice of munition and the timing of weapons 
release. As will be seen in 2.5.3, this narrowness of AI and its limitation to precise and 
tangible tasks in a narrow range of environments168 is the main cause of brittleness. 
This in turn will demand human control and stringent precautionary measures. 
2.5.1.2 Top-Down (Rules-Based) versus Bottom-Up (Learning) Approaches 
Another vital distinction concerns ‘top-down’ (rules-based) versus ‘bottom-up’ 
(learning) approaches to AI. A Top-down system has the programmer defining not 
only the problems to be solved by the software, but also the way they are to be solved. 
This results in long computer codes, often based on simple ex ante rules, which tell the 
system what it shall do or what it can conclude in specific situations.169 Not 
surprisingly, this approach is suitable for precise, well-defined tasks in a relatively 
simple environment, where all or most variables can be easily expressed in code. 
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Automated weapons like air and missile defence systems170 work in this way, because 
a) they are often deployed on a warship sailing the high seas, or on remote land near a 
forward-operating base, and b) they serve the sole purpose of defending said military 
objects against unambiguous and relatively clearly-defined incoming threats.171 An 
example of a top-down code for a Phalanx CIWS may be:  
 
IF (object sited <= 2000 metre radius) + (approaching at >= 200 mph) + (descending altitude) 
THEN (aim) + (fire) 
ELSE (remain on standby)  
 
Further code may specify slightly more detailed tasks, though in all instances these 
remain relatively simple, and are often based on predictable rules rooted in the laws of 
physics.172 Significantly, top-down/rules-based programming is limited by the 
constrained ability of humans to model complex environments,173 and this clearly 
makes it unsuitable as the primary mode of programming a LAWS.174  
 
This brings us to the bottom-up approach to AI, which relies primarily on machine 
learning; this is broadly defined as “the ability of a program to learn from experience, 
that is, to modify its execution on the basis of newly acquired information”.175 
Accordingly, learning machines are adaptive systems and, as such, are potentially 
suitable for complex and dynamic battlefields. Domingos succinctly explains the 
difference between the two approaches:  
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Every algorithm has an input and an output: the data goes into the 
computer, the algorithm does what it will with it, and out comes the 
result. Machine learning turns this around: in goes the data and the 
desired result and out comes the algorithm that turns one into the other. 
Learning algorithms…are algorithms that make other algorithms. With 
machine learning, computers write their own programs, so we don’t 
have to.176 
 
A common form of machine learning is the artificial neural network (ANN), which 
is loosely modelled on the neuronal structure of the human brain; in particular, the 
cerebral cortex.177 In a human context, this consists of billions of neurons (nodes) 
firing electrical charges at one another, each one generated by thoughts and 
perceptions. The result is a structural change in the brain, and new or updated ‘rules’ 
upon which it will perceive and classify future events.178 
2.5.1.3 Machine Learning Methods 
Similarly, an ANN learns by being fed data (e.g. images, or real-world visuals of tanks) 
from which it derives conclusions (e.g. recognising a ‘tank’). With a critical mass of 
data, the ANN develops detailed algorithmic rules, which enable it to draw correct 
conclusions in the field.179 This can be done through supervised learning, whereby 
human agents feed the machine labelled input data and the desired result,180 after 
which learning is effectuated from both correct predictions and backpropagation of 
errors.181 Namely, when an incorrect output is provided (e.g. misidentifying a bus for 
a tank) an error value is generated, which reflects the divergence between the correct 
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and incorrect answer.182 The error value is then backpropagated through the ANN, 
which updates the input-output weights/connections between the nodes, to correctly 
output ‘tank’ when an image of a tank is next shown.183 Thus, the algorithm learns to 
generalise its training data to new instances of ‘tank’. Supervised learning is the most 
common method thus far, and is suitable for training an algorithm in the laboratory.  
 
Another method is unsupervised learning, where unlabelled datasets with no known 
answers are fed into the system.184 The system then searches for hidden patterns, and 
this often leads to ‘clustering algorithms’, where the inputs are separated into “natural 
groups” exhibiting some discernible characteristic.185 For example, a sample of battle-
damage assessment data may reveal that collateral damage tends to be lower with 
delayed-fusing.186 The program would cluster the inputs into ‘low’ and ‘high’ 
collateral damage, without explicitly being introduced to this concept.  
 
Finally, there is reinforcement learning, where the program interacts with the real-
world, and is supplied with reward functions.187 Every time the system’s action leads 
to a desired result a positive reward is provided to reinforce that behaviour; whereas 
an undesired result leads to a negative reward or ‘error-signal’.188 The algorithm then 
decides which actions led to the specific reinforcements and adjusts itself accordingly, 
without any further human input.189  
 
It is expected that most future ANNs will utilise a combination of all three learning 
methods, depending on context and circumstances,190 and this is likely to be true with 
LAWS.191 
                                                          
182 Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio and Geoffrey Hinton, ‘Deep Learning’ (2015) 521 Nature Review 436. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Russell and Norvig (n 160), 694. 
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191 For example, a LAWS will undergo supervised learning in relation to known target categories, where 
there is an abundance of training data. Unsupervised learning may uncover new intelligence from 
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2.5.1.4 Modes of Machine Learning 
In addition, algorithms can be trained ‘online’ or ‘offline’, using sequential or 
simultaneous (batch) data inputs, respectively.192 Online learning sees the program 
learning incrementally from new external data, as and when these are collected by its 
sensors.193 This enables the system to exploit growing volumes of data, where these 
are unknown, or represent changes to existing datasets.194 In a LAWS context, this 
would mean learning from interactions in a live battlefield, which would enable the 
system to: 
• adapt to new backgrounds and climatic conditions; 
• refine its warfighting tactics, for greater targeting accuracy and precision;  
• keep pace with changing enemy tactics in real-time, for example, by 
developing more effective evasive/defensive manoeuvres or new methods of 
attack; and 
• generalise new target sets that may have been missed during the formal 
targeting process. 
 
Offline learning is where the program is restricted to its original training data.195 For 
a LAWS, this largely refers to laboratory training, which takes place during product 
development, and will be subject to human scrutiny via verification and validation 
procedures before the algorithmic changes are finally integrated into the system. 
 
It can be expected that in a warfighting context, offline learning will be preferred for 
the greater predictability and human control that it affords. However, as online data 
enable algorithms to remain up-to-date and combat-effective, they are still likely to be 
recorded by a LAWS on deployment, before being reviewed by human programmers 
and selectively uploaded during system updates. It is also possible that limited forms 
of online learning will be allowed, for example, to refine the machine’s targeting 
functions but without undertaking whole new tasks or methods of warfare that were 
not anticipated by deploying commanders. 
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2.5.2 Deep, Convolutional and Recurrent Neural Networks 
Building on the above (ANN) approach to machine learning is a more recent 
development, deep learning, which is effectuated through a deep neural network 
(DNN).196 This has become increasingly viable with a) the exponential rise in 
computing power, and b) the availability of ever-larger datasets, partly as a result of 
the proliferation of internet-enabled devices.197 The outcome of this twin phenomena 
has seen newer ANNs superseding previous ones by a factor of ten or more.198 With 
so many nodes and connections between them, AI researchers are now able to take 
another cue from the biological brain: namely, to organise those nodes into distinct, 
hidden hierarchical layers, with each successive layer identifying higher level abs-
tractions. Thus, after feeding input data (e.g. images of a tank), the first hidden layer 
of the network identifies individual pixels, and their brightness and colour. The second 
may identify edges, shadows and shape outlines, which identify specific features like 
‘tank treads’ or ‘gun barrel’. This continues until the final layer, which identifies the 
object (‘tank’).199 Figure 2.4, below, illustrates this model.200 
 
                                                          
196 LeCun, Bengi and Hinton (n 182). 
197 Domingos (n 176). 
198 Jeremy Hsu, ‘Biggest Neural Network Ever Pushes AI Deep Learning’, IEEE Spectrum (8 July 2015) 
<http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/software/biggest-neural-network-ever-pushes-ai-deep-
learning> accessed 13 May 2018. 
199 ‘Artificial Intelligence: Rise of the Machines’, The Economist Briefing (9 May 2015). 
200 Bart Haar Romeny, ‘Tutorial: Deep Learning in Human and Computer Vision’ (30 August 2017) 





It is the use of these interlinked layers that gives this approach to machine learning its 
‘deep’ characteristic. Adding more layers between input data and output makes the 
network more complex, enabling it to handle more sophisticated tasks with greater 
detail and accuracy.201 The result is significantly lower error rates in such tasks as 
object, voice and (potentially) activity recognition by DNNs, relative to smaller 
ANNs.202 Consequently, DNNs – or, in the case of image recognition, convolutional 
neural networks (CNNs)203 – are now able to detect subtle distinctions that humans 
typically miss.  
 
More recently, facial appearances have been correlated with human emotional states, 
resulting in a greater prediction accuracy achieved by a machine learning algorithm, 
                                                          
201 Scharre (n 13), 87. 
202 Kaiming He et al., ‘Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition’ (10 December 2015), 2 
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.03385.pdf> accessed 13 May 2018 (detailing an image recognition 
algorithm with 152 layers, which achieved an error rate of 3.57% compared with the human error rate 
of 5.1%). 
203 CNNs are essentially DNNs that are optimised for image recognition.  
Figure 2.4: Deep neural network and its hidden layers. Source: Romeny (n 200). 
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than by human subjects.204 This may have implications on the battlefield, for example, 
in detecting persons hors de combat.205 
 
All of this, however, relates to individual faces and objects in isolation. Karpathy and 
Fei-Fei describe the next stage of object recognition as a computer vision system that 
is able to recognise multiple objects in a single picture, and to label specific parts of 
that picture using a recurrent neural network (RNN).206 Their ultimate goal is to 
generate dense, free-form image descriptions that simultaneously recognise the 
contents of an image and the overall context;207 hence, (partially) addressing the 






                                                          
204 Carlos F. Benitez-Quiroz, Ramprakash Srinivasan, and Aleix M. Martinez, ‘Facial Color is an 
Efficient Mechanism to Visually Transmit Emotion’ (2018) 115 Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 3581 <http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/115/14/3581.full.pdf> accessed 21 May 2018. 
205 See 6.5.2.4. 
206 Andrej Karpathy and Li Fei-Fei, ‘Deep Visual-Semantic Alignments for Generating Image 
Description’ (CVPR, 2015) <https://cs.stanford.edu/people/karpathy/cvpr2015.pdf> accessed 13 May 
2018. 
207 Ibid. 
Figure 2.5: A RNN’s take on breakfast. Source: Figure 1, Karpathy and Fei-Fei (n 206). 
65 
 
Figure 2.5, above, illustrates the authors’ concept. The system is shown a single image, 
in response to which it identifies individual items such as the fork, a person sitting at 
the table, a plate of fruit and even banana slices within that plate. It also identifies the 
‘bigger picture’ (dining table with breakfast items), although the authors found this 
more abstract capability for pinpointing the overall context was imperfect and prone 
to error.208  
 
Significantly, deep learning is not limited to images but is a general-purpose technique 
for statistical pattern-recognition. In principle, this can apply to any activity for which 
there are sufficient datasets,209 and it has been argued that the “potential military 
applications are virtually unlimited”.210 In particular, DNNs in their various guises 
may enable such capabilities as accurately identifying enemy combatants, high-value 
individuals from a variety of angles, or even persons hors de combat; precise and 
accurate weapons release; activity recognition and prediction of hostile actions;211 and 
navigating highly complex terrain.212 These capabilities are all critical in situations 
where milliseconds count,213 and where a mistake in target identification, the detection 
of protected status, or collateral damage estimation may have dire humanitarian 
consequences. Accordingly, DNNs will form an integral part of future automatic target 
recognition (see 2.5.5.4), as well as intelligence and target development (see 5.5.3).  
 
However, machine learning is not without its problems,214 and there are challenges 
such as ‘overfitting’ to the data,215 as well as a dearth of useful data.216 Moreover, the 
emphasis on replicating the human brain structure does not necessarily mean that 
DNNs ‘think’ like humans. On the contrary, the networks display brittleness and have 
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209 For some examples of its diverse applications, see Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, Y and Geoffrey 
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211 Chandler P. Atwood, ‘Activity-Based Intelligence: Revolutionizing Military Intelligence Analysis’ 
(2015) 77 Joint Force Quarterly 24. 
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some strongly counterintuitive properties that remind us of the essentially technical 
nature of any LAWS that will utilise them. 
2.5.3 The Inherent Brittleness of AI 
As noted in 2.5.1.1, current and near-future AI are narrow, in that they have a limited 
range of cognitive abilities and specialise in one or a few tasks. This in turn is a 
significant cause of brittleness, whereby systems do precisely but only what they are 
programmed/trained to do.217 Thus, while they typically exceed human performance 
in narrow domains – e.g. object recognition, or fast, accurate and precise responses to 
clearly-defined stimuli – they lack the ‘common sense’ to understand the broader 
context, and to adjust their outputs and behaviours accordingly. Consequently, when 
unexpected events occur, or the environment or context for action changes, errors and 
system failures often follow.218 Unlike humans, autonomous systems cannot discard 
their ‘instruction book’ and use ‘common sense’ to adapt to the situation at hand. 
Indeed, any programming based on such a premise will necessarily lack the precision 
and tangibility to be machine-executable.219 Accordingly, as a primer for the legal 
analysis in Chapters 3, 6 and 7, the following will highlight some of the main sources 
of AI brittleness. 
2.5.3.1 Brittleness in Context 
In a LAWS context, brittleness can manifest itself in several mutually non-exclusive 
ways, including the following. 
• Perceiving an object or a signal that normally triggers an attack response, but 
without recognising qualitative factors, or taking into account other 
contradictory signals. The result is often a false positive target identification, 
thus a risk of unlawful engagement. This is a drawback of many current target 
recognition technologies.220 
• Being thrown off-track by minor perturbations, like a change in the weather221 
or irrelevant changes in the image or physical appearance of an object.222 
                                                          
217 Scharre (n 13), 145. 
218 Ibid., 146. 
219 See 2.2.3.2. 
220 See 2.5.5.2. 
221 See 2.5.5.1. 
222 See 2.5.6. 
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• Failing to take correct action in a particular instance for lack of quality training 
data.223 
• ‘Perverse instantiation’ of final goals, whereby the system fulfils the narrow 
criteria of its programmed objectives, but in unanticipated ways that violate the 
programmer’s broader intentions,224 and possibly the LOAC rules.225 This is 
because algorithms solve via constrained optimisation, whereby one or a few 
objectives (those that have been programmed) are focused upon at the 
exclusion of all else.226  
 
Brittleness is expected to be a pervasive problem affecting LAWS and their associated 
AI. While this generally does not mean the systems should be banned, it does counsel 
in favour of human control and suitable precautionary measures. 
2.5.3.2 Brittleness and the Risk of Learning ‘Wrong Lessons’ 
It was noted in 2.5.1.4 that machine learning can occur offline (in the laboratory) or 
online (in the battlefield), and that the former will be preferred, for the greater control 
that it affords. Namely, to avoid situations where a LAWS may learn the ‘wrong 
lessons’, which in turn may lead to target generalisation towards civilian objects, or 
even a perverse instantiation of final goals. The civilian world has numerous examples 
of ‘wrong lessons’ being learnt. These include the following. 
• The Microsoft Tay chatbot, which learnt the worst of human nature after 24 
hours on Twitter.227  
• The Playfun algorithm, which was given the goal of ‘not losing’ at Tetris, and 
technically achieved this by pausing the game indefinitely just before the last 
(losing) block fell in place.228  
                                                          
223 See 2.5.5.3. 
224 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (OUP, 2014), 146-49 (providing some 
hypothetical examples in the context of an AGI). See also (notes and text accompanying) nn 228-231, 
for some real-world examples.  
225 See (notes and text accompanying) nn 232 and 244-245, for some IHL/LOAC-relevant examples. 
226 Stuart Russell, ‘Of Myths and Moonshine’, Edge (14 November 2014) 
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227 Daniel Thomas, ‘Microsoft Pulls Twitter Bot Tay after Racist Tweets’, Financial Times (24 March 
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228 Tom Murphy VII, ‘The First Level of Super Mario Bros. is Easy with Lexicographic Orderings and 
Time Travel…After That it Gets a Little Tricky’ (1 April 2013) 
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• An evolution strategy algorithm tasked with maximising its score at the Q*bert 
video game, and achieving this by learning to cheat.229  
• An early AI tasked with developing ‘rules of thumb’ for gameplay. One of 
these (H59) learnt to maximise its score ‘fraudulently’, by finding other high-
scoring rules and putting itself down as the originator, thereby taking credit 
without adding any value.230  
• Fears have now emerged that market trading algorithms may learn to collude 
and spoof each other on-the-fly, to manipulate market outcomes and maximise 
profits.231  
 
Clearly, the last example is the most concerning, as it poses a risk of significant 
economic harm. Yet, it is likely that online learning in a military context would be 
even more perilous, due to the safety-critical context; the canonical example being a 
LAWS that might ‘learn’ it is quicker and more efficient to defeat the enemy by killing 
all humans in sight, rather than just those meeting target parameters.232 While this may 
be a stylised example, the real-world instances of ‘wrong lessons’ all counsel against 
the idea of online learning by a LAWS in principle, perhaps subject to narrow 
functional and/or contextual exceptions;233 even then, with meaningful human 
control.234  
2.5.3.3 Transparency, Opacity and the ‘Black Box’ of Machine Learning 
It is worth distinguishing some known from unknown elements in machine learning. 
Assuming offline learning will be the predominant form of training a LAWS 
algorithm, the first known element will be data input, in that the programmer will 
                                                          
<https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~tom7/mario/mario.pdf> accessed 13 May 2018 (noting that Playfun 
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231 See Ian Allison, ‘When Intelligent Algorithms Start Spoofing Each Other, Regulation Becomes a 
Science’, International Business Times (29 June 2016) <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/machine-learning-
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accessed 13 May 2018. 
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Security (10 August 2015) <https://www.justsecurity.org/25333/regulating-autonomous-weapons-
smarter-banning/> accessed 13 May 2018. 
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deliberately select and feed-in the data, training scenarios and reward functions from 
which he wants the program to learn. These choices will invariably be constrained by 
the LOAC rules and they eliminate the need for algorithms to determine their own data 
sources or target parameters; save in the case of online learning, which in the near-
term will likely be circumscribed.  
 
The second known element is the probability thresholds set by the programmer. As 
the machine learning features noted above suggest,235 data pass through a stochastic 
system, which transforms inputs into probable outputs. Concretely, the program finds 
the probability distribution that explains the training data, then it runs inference on that 
distribution to label new inputs. Whether the probability/confidence attached to a new 
input is high enough to proceed with a certain categorisation (e.g. positive 
identification of a ‘tank’) or action (‘engage’) is predetermined by the programmer.236  
 
Yet, despite these human-controlled elements, the overall decision-making process in 
machine learning is fundamentally a ‘black box’,237 and this represents its greatest 
unknown element. As noted above, machines write their own algorithms to achieve a 
human-defined result,238 but it is often unclear which characteristics within the data 
sets are chosen to be the focus of learning, and how their respective weightings are 
determined.239 This may lead to unanticipated outputs, which no human in-the-loop 
would have authorised. For example, in the case of supervised learning of ‘tank’ 
images, a program that weights the tank treads disproportionately may risk identifying 
agricultural or construction vehicles with caterpillar tracks as a ‘tank’. Without a 
human in-the-loop, the system may then open fire on these civilian vehicles. 
 
Moreover, utility functions are often used to optimise certain criteria;240 for example, 
to maximise target hits within a ten-metre radius, or to minimise collateral damage. 
                                                          
235 See n 178. 
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This clearly aims to replicate human discretion, particularly in situations where value 
judgments are made in order to resolve conflicting interests; the application of 
IHL/LOAC in armed conflict being a canonical example.241 However, while utility 
functions are written by the programmer and nominally within his control, they are 
very difficult to specify in the abstract, due to the need for precision and tangibility242 
in the face of bounded rationality.243 Namely, the programmer selects the objectives 
and utility criteria, but cannot cover every eventuality or predict exactly how these will 
be applied in the field. The result could be any number of unforeseen consequences, 
which may amount to a perverse instantiation of final goals, due to the inherent 
brittleness and lack of ‘common sense’ in AI systems.244 For example, a LAWS tasked 
with maximising target hits, while minimising civilian casualties, might do so in a way 
that collaterally destroys a piece of infrastructure (e.g. a water treatment plant). This 
may directly kill fewer civilians than any of the alternative attack options, but with 
potentially greater reverberating effects (longer-term civilian deaths, due to the loss of 
vital infrastructure). Conversely, a human in-the-loop may have been better-placed to 
consider the full effects, as circumstances unfolded, and in the particular context of 
that mission. Accordingly, Russell and Norvig argue: 
 
[W]ith AI systems…we need to be very careful what we ask for, 
whereas humans would have no trouble realizing that the proposed 
utility function cannot be taken literally.245 
 
To summarise, programmers control data input and provide a utility function to the 
best of their abilities, and within constraints. Beyond that, the machine learning 
process is a ‘black box’, which remains inscrutable (difficult to grasp and validate its 
processes) and often non-intuitive (difficult to understand its output). Moreover, such 
is the complexity of the decision-making process that even a forensic analysis often 
fails to deconstruct and specify its elements.246  
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To be sure, programmers may try to build-in software tools for observability of internal 
processes and directability if these make errors,247 so that systems are more transparent 
and predictable, and end-users have greater control over their behaviours. A recent 
example is ‘Explainable AI’ (XAI), which is an ongoing DARPA project. This aims 
to produce a suite of tools and techniques that enable commanders and other users to 
understand, appropriately trust, and manage an emerging generation of AI machine 
partners.248 If its project goals are met, XAI may offer a solution to the black box 
problem, though it is too early to draw any conclusions.249 For now, the twin problem 
of inscrutability and non-intuitiveness continues to aggravate the long-standing issue 
of AI brittleness; an issue to which we will return in 2.5.6-2.5.7 below,  
2.5.4 Automatic Target Recognition  
Automatic target recognition (ATR) refers to the “automatic (unaided) processing of 
sensor data to locate and classify targets”.250 In principle, this is essential for enabling 
a LAWS to distinguish legitimate military objectives from civilians and other 
protected persons and objects, and from background clutter. In this sense, ATR will be 
essential for the ‘Find, Fix, Track’ parts of the kill chain, as well as ‘Assess’, so a 
LAWS may determine whether it needs to re-engage.251  
2.5.4.1 Standard ATR Approaches 
ATR packages comprise potentially vast combinations of hardware and software, 
which are designed for particular operational environments.252 Examples include video 
cameras, light (LIDAR), electro-optical/infrared (including thermal imaging) sensors; 
acoustic (sonar and ultrasonic) sensors; radar and electromagnetic sensors; DNNs, and 
the Global Positioning System (GPS). These constellations enable object recognition 
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of large military objects by ‘nature’ or by ‘location’,253 via a quantitative assessments 
of easily-recognisable characteristics, like image, size, shape, sound, heat, velocity, 
material content and GPS coordinates.254 These are derived from a ‘multisensory 
phenomenology’ of a number of predefined target signatures,255 which are cross-cued 
with data on geolocation and distance from target.256 Once these characteristics are 
reconciled with a template stored in the system’s target identification library, the 
weapon system is able to lawfully attack.257 In the case of multiple target detections, 
the ATR will also prioritise between targets based on strict predefined criteria.258 Thus, 
consistent with 2.2.3.1 on the sense-think-act paradigm, current ATR relies on pattern 
recognition techniques and it lacks any deliberative qualities; hence, some 
commentators argue that it enables not autonomous, but automated targeting at 
most.259  
 
Consequently, ATR systems are mostly employed to detect large and well-defined 
military objects, such as tanks, aircraft, warships, submarines, or any radar-emitting 
objects. Robot sentry weapons like the Samsung SGR-A1 can detect human targets via 
heat signatures, but cannot currently determine whether these are military personnel 
or civilians.260 Accordingly, robot sentries have only been deployed in very simple 
environments, such as demilitarised zones where civilians should generally not be 
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present.261 There are suggestions that ATR may in the near-term be able to recognise 
traditional combatants,262 and while this is feasible in principle, it will require 
significant improvements in ATR technologies.263 
2.5.4.2 Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Targets 
There is an important distinction between ‘cooperative’ and ‘non-cooperative’ 
targets.264 Cooperative targets emit a signal, which makes them easier to detect; 
examples include any radar-emitting objects, or submarines emitting acoustic signals. 
These are typically detected with passive sensors such as radar receivers, which 
distinguish them from civilian and friendly forces via IFF (Identification Friend or 
Foe) systems, before homing-in to destroy the target.265 By contrast, non-cooperative 
targets do not broadcast any signal; examples include vehicles with their radars 
switched off, submarines running silently; tanks, mobile missile launchers or artillery 
pieces. These have to be detected with active sensors, such as cameras, which pick up 
light and process these for image recognition; radar transmitters, which send out 
electromagnetic energy and ‘see’ reflected signals from the target; or sonar sensors, 
which send out sound waves and ‘hear’ echoes bouncing off the target.266  
 
LAWS will generally operate more effectively and reliably against cooperative targets. 
However, this is not guaranteed in cluttered environments where there may be large 
numbers of radar-emitting objects in close proximity, which do not all transmit 
appropriate IFF squawks. In such circumstances, target indication (see below) and/or 
multisensory phenomenologies will be needed for detection-confirmation, similar to 
how the Harpy operates.267  
2.5.4.3 Target Indication versus Target Identification 
ATR can perform both target indication and target identification. The latter is the main 
capability described above, which would potentially enable a LAWS to operate 
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autonomously. By contrast, target indication is a mode of operation of a radar that 
enables the user to discriminate between a potential target and background clutter.268 
This is further subdivided into stationary target indication (STI) and moving target 
indication (MTI).269 On its own, target indication generally needs a human in-the-loop, 
to provide contextual reasoning before launching an attack. 
 
Another meaning of ‘target indication’ is seen in the optical and acoustic sensing 
technologies, which generate initial leads for further action. A recent example is the 
Boomerang III, which pinpoints the location and direction of hostile gunfire in less 
than one second,270 and which has also been miniaturised into a wearable device for 
individual soldiers.271 Both detection systems have been successfully deployed by US 
and UK ground forces.272  
 
Like STI and MTI, optical/acoustic sensing generally needs a human in-the-loop for 
contextual reasoning. However, the technology can arguably be integrated in a LAWS, 
to generate initial leads for ‘tipping and cueing’, in order to hasten target 
identification.273 
2.5.4.4 GPS Guidance Systems 
One specific component of ATR – its GPS guidance system – can, in some 
circumstances undertake the bulk of the target recognition task. GPS pinpoints the 
exact coordinates of a weapon system’s current geographical location, and the location 
of external sites and landmarks.274 Thus, it is vital for navigation (be that manned, 
remote or autonomous), and is a primary source of ‘Position, Navigation and Timing’ 
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(PNT)275 data. Accordingly, GPS enables location recognition for engaging fixed 
targets such as a bridge, a permanent command post, or any other building that is 
prioritised for attack;276 and for avoiding fixed protected objects, like medical facilities 
or cultural property.277 As an additional check that the correct target is being selected, 
GPS/PNT data can be combined with the object recognition capability of the ATR.278  
 
However, being transmitted from satellites that are 12,000 miles from Earth, GPS 
signals are notoriously weak and fragile, especially at low altitudes.279 Hence, they are 
vulnerable to jamming, hacking and spoofing,280 and this is what enabled Iran’s mid-
air commandeering of a US stealth surveillance drone in 2011.281 Moreover, the return 
to Great Power Competition suggests that near-peer adversaries will continue to step 
up their investments in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks.282 This counsels 
against any over-reliance on satellite-based communications, especially in the context 
of symmetric (high-intensity) conflict, if the strategic value of LAWS is to be 
retained.283 
2.5.4.5 Vision-Based Guidance Systems 
That said, recent advances in (vision-based) electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) guidance 
systems are sharpening location recognition capabilities, while eliminating the risk of 
GPS hacking.284 These systems use a scene-matching correlator, which pinpoints the 
weapon system’s location and its intended target by comparing real-time images of the 
current terrain (and fixed objects) with an onboard database of stored maps and 
                                                          
275 Kevin M. Coggins, ‘Position, Navigation and Timing and What it Means for the Soldier’, DoD 
Armed with Science (27 February 2016) <http://science.dodlive.mil/2016/02/27/staying-on-course-
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277 See 6.5.3.4.1, 6.5.3.4.3 and 6.5.3.4.4. 
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279 ‘Comments of the National PNT Advisory Board’, Jamming the Global Positioning System – A 
National Security Threat: Recent Events and Potential Cures (4 November 2010), 3 
<http://www.gps.gov/governance/advisory/recommendations/2010-11-jammingwhitepaper.pdf> 
accessed 18 May 2018.  
280 Ibid., 4-6.  
281 Jeff Hecht, ‘Did Iran Capture US Drone by Hacking its GPS Signal?’ New Scientist (16 December 
2011); ‘Iran Shows ‘Hacked US Spy Drone’ Video Footage’, BBC News (7 February 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21373353> accessed 18 May 2018.  
282 See 1.2.2. 
283 But see 7.2.3.4, specifically on new developments, which aim to augment or replace GPS signals in 
the face of A2/AD networks. 
284 See ‘Smart Weapons: The Vision Thing’, The Economist (3 December 2016). 
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images.285 Accordingly, EO/IR scene-matching enables secure fixed object 
recognition286 for targeted strikes in GPS-denied areas. 
2.5.5 The Brittle Nature of ATR and Potential Solutions 
The above suggests that current ATR systems are proficient at detecting a limited 
number of military objects in a limited number of scenarios. Accordingly, the 
technology remains brittle and this is true for at least four reasons.  
2.5.5.1 Sensitivity to Environmental Conditions 
First, systems can be very sensitive to battlefield smoke and weather conditions: as 
soon as these degrade the machine’s sensory perception, false-alarm rates have been 
found to increase significantly.287 Thus, any LAWS equipped with near-term ATR 
cannot be deployed in all operational environments, or for extended periods of time. 
That said, there are three possible solutions. First, reliability rates can be improved 
with distributed sensors via swarming,288 and indeed this is one of the stated benefits 
of the DARPA CODE program.289 Second, in some specific missions, like a targeted 
strike on a fixed object, EO/IR scene-matching may cut through the weather problems. 
Finally, the broader problem may change in future with developments such as ‘ghost 
imaging’.290  
2.5.5.2 Narrow Domains versus the Broader Context 
Second, being a narrow form of AI, ATR systems merely recognise predefined target 
types based on pre-programmed criteria,291 but generally cannot discern the 
surrounding context.292 This is crucial, as a recognisable object like a rifle may have a 
                                                          
285 Ibid. 
286 That is, to recognise specifically targetable buildings, infrastructure or terrain, but without relying 
on fragile and deniable communications links. 
287 James A. Ratches, ‘Review of Current Aided/Automatic Target Acquisition Technology for Military 
Target Acquisition Tasks’ (2011) 50 Optical Engineering 1. 
288 Prithviraj Dasgupta, ‘Distributed Automatic Target Recognition Using Multi-Agent UAV Swarms’, 
Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 
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289 See 2.4.2. 
290 Ghost imaging is an application of quantum physics, which derives an artificially-generated, but 
vastly improved holographic image of an object that might be two or so miles away on a smoky 
battlefield. See ‘The Newest Thing in Quantum Imaging’, DoD Armed with Science (3 January 2014) 
<http://science.dodlive.mil/2014/01/03/the-newest-thing-in-quantum-imaging> accessed 14 May 2018. 
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number of contrasting uses, from perfectly innocuous ones293 through to offensive 
attack. Assessing which of these applies in a given scenario requires an understanding 
of context and intuition, which currently only humans have.294 As Schachter points 
out, “determining the gist of a scene and doing so as well as an experienced image 
analyst is proving difficult to automate”.295 The situation is even more acute where 
foreign cultures and customs present additional sources of misunderstanding.296 
 
Such narrowness of object recognition highlights the fact that ATRs perform 
quantitative interpretations of observed data, but they do not understand the underlying 
reality or context that produces those data. This counsels against any over-reliance on 
ATR and it points to the need for human input,297 either to supervise the system with 
a man-on-the-loop, or to restrict its autonomous operation to relatively simple 
environments and tasks.298  
2.5.5.3 Scarcity of Quality Data 
The third reason for ATR brittleness is a chronic data-shortage problem. While the 
above limitations may all be resolved with a critical mass of training and test data, in 
many cases these are unique to each mission scenario.299 For example, training samples 
need to include appropriate data not just on each target category, but also on mission-
specific variations like different backgrounds and climatic conditions.300 Because of 
the potentially transient nature of such variables, this problem is often difficult to 
resolve in practice. Online learning may seem to offer a potential solution, but in the 
near-term the results are arguably too unpredictable for a safety-critical mission.301 
                                                          
293 For example, for recreational sport, lawful self-defence, or simply for cultural reasons, such as 
celebratory gunfire, which is not uncommon in parts of the Middle East. 
294 Cummings (n 28). 
295 Schachter (n 250), 245. 
296 Wagner (n 50), 1392-93 (discussing a hypothetical counter-insurgency operation, where a confluence 
of factors leads to ambiguity. As soldiers approach a house where they suspect an insurgent may be 
hiding, child inhabitants playing with a ball kick it towards the gate and run after it. Adult male 
inhabitants carrying a kirpan dagger for religious reasons scream at the children to stay away from the 
gate, and begin running towards them. Such a scenario may be easy to interpret for a human soldier, but 
an ATR may perceive the rapid approach of multiple males carrying a dagger to be a sign of impending 
attack). 
297 Ibid.; Schachter (n 250). See also Chapter 4. 
298 Ibid.; Scharre (n 13), 146. 
299 Boulanin and Verbruggen (n 19).  
300 Ibid. Consistent with Wagner’s kirpan scenario, Schachter (n 250) adds, at 244, that learning local 
cultural traits is also vital if an ATR is to target persons (even if only in a reactive or self-defence 
capacity), to avoid misconstruing innocuous behaviours.  
301 Boulanin and Verbruggen (n 19).  
78 
 
Moreover, rare and unexpected combinations, as above, are – by definition – not 
amenable to machine learning. 
2.5.5.4 Structural ATR Weaknesses and the Proposed TRACE Solution 
A particular problem with trying to detect targets in a cluttered environment is the 
abundance of signals and the performance-degrading effects on ATRs of decoys and 
background traffic.302 Even where genuine signals can be separated from the noise, 
this often requires significant computing power, which thus far has been unviable for 
mobile platforms.303 An alternative is to use Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), which 
is an active sensor that sends out multiple radar pulses and collects the returning signals 
to construct an image of objects within range.304 However, the images are grainy and 
difficult enough for humans to interpret.305 Thus, for ATR systems designed for 
autonomous attack, current SAR techniques will offer little input value.306 
 
In this connexion, DARPA is currently trying to solve the ATR problem under its 
Target Recognition and Adaptation in Contested Environments (TRACE) program. 
This aims to “develop algorithms and techniques that rapidly and accurately identify 
military targets using radar sensors on manned and unmanned tactical platforms”.307 
Concretely, TRACE intends to combine the most advanced DNNs and other machine 
learning techniques with SAR, to enable clearer images of a target to be constructed 
from standoff ranges; for these to be amenable to ATR detection and classification 
amid background traffic and decoys; and, crucially, to achieve all of this with lower 
computing power and energy consumption than current systems.308 DARPA 
summarises the TRACE program goals as follows.309 
 
                                                          
302 John Gorman, ‘Target Recognition and Adaptation in Contested Environments (TRACE)’, DARPA 
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303 Ibid. 
304 Schachter (n 250), 63. 
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Environments (TRACE)’, Strategic Technology Office: DARPA BAA-15-09 (1 December 2014), 6 
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(1) Military target recognition on low-power airborne platforms. 
(2) Low false-alarm rates for targets deployed in complex environments. 
(3) Rapid learning of new targets with sparse or limited measured training data. 
 
Whether or not this will actually be used for autonomous attack, it will certainly 
provide an important building block for LAWS development. For if the program goals 
are realised, TRACE will construct ATR systems that can identify non-cooperative 
targets like tanks, mobile missile launchers and artillery pieces, with at least human-
level proficiency.310 This will technically remove the need for humans in the critical 
functions narrow loop.  
 
Scharre also notes that the TRACE program is likely to harness the recent advances in 
computer vision and image recognition, noted above.311 If successful, this would 
enable yet more accurate identification of non-cooperative targets at closer range, 
potentially including uniformed combatants. 
2.5.6 Fooling the ATR with Adversarial Examples 
However, the accuracy and reliability of image recognition depends not only on the 
sophistication of computer vision systems, but also on their robustness. On the one 
hand, current DNNs and CNNs are highly advanced in relation to undistorted images, 
where the systems exhibit human-level312 or super-human-level313 performance in 
object classification. On the other hand, those same systems get rapidly confused when 
there are image degradations caused by, for example, additive noise, heat, or other 
environmental distortions.314  
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312 Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever and Geoffrey E. Hinton, ‘ImageNET Classification with Deep 
Convolutional Neural Networks, Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Neural 
Information Processing Systems (2012) 1097. 
313 Kaiming He et al. (n 202); Kaiming He et al. ‘Delving Deep into Rectifiers: Surpassing Human-
Level Performance on ImageNET Classification’, Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International 
Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV) (2015) 1026.  
314 Robert Geirhos, et al., ‘Comparing Deep Neural Networks Against Humans: Object Recognition 




2.5.6.1 The Nature of Adversarial Examples 
More specifically, systems are easily ‘spoofed’ by minor deliberate changes to the 
image,315 which are largely imperceptible to humans, but enough to fool the system 
into misclassifying the object with a high degree of confidence (see Figure 2.6, below). 
In some instances, it takes no more than a single-pixel alteration to successfully spoof 
the network.316 It is true that the ATR of a LAWS will not typically view static images, 
but will sense three-dimensional persons and objects in the physical world, where a 
multilook approach with viewpoint shifts will support detection-confirmation.317 Yet, 
even this is no guarantee against spoofing: as Athalye et al. demonstrate, carefully-
designed yet minor changes to physical objects can consistently fool a computer vision 





                                                          
315 Christian Szegedy et al, ‘Intriguing Properties of Neural Networks’ (19 February 2014) 
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.6199.pdf> accessed 16 May 2018. 
316 Jiawei Su, Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas and Kouichi Sakurai, ‘One Pixel Attack for Fooling Deep 
Neural Networks’ (22 February 2018) <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.08864.pdf> accessed 16 May 2018. 
317 As opposed to two-dimensional images, which offer a single viewpoint. Note also the possibility to 
utilise distributed sensors via swarming, for enhanced ATR accuracy. See (note and text accompanying) 
n 288. 
318 Anish Athalye et al., ‘Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples’ (30 October 2017) 
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.07397.pdf> accessed 16 May 2018. 
Figure 2.7: Adversarial objects. Actual 3D printed 
turtle classified as a rifle, and a baseball classified as an 
espresso, even when viewed from multiple angles.  
Source: Adapted from Figures 13 & 14, Athalye et al. 
(n 318). 
 
Figure 2.6: Adversarial images. The left and right 
columns look identical to humans, but were perceived 
differently by the DNN. The undistorted images (left 
column) were correctly identified by the network. 
Adversarial static (middle column, with 10x 
magnification) was added to create the distorted 
images (right column), causing the DNN to identify all 
three as an ‘ostrich’.  
Source: Figure 5(b), Szegedy et al. (n 315). 
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These distorted images and objects are known as ‘adversarial examples’,319 as they 
“exploit [DNNs’] vulnerabilities to trick them into confidently identifying false 
images”.320 Importantly, such distortions are relatively robust, as many of the 
vulnerabilities are common to most DNNs, regardless of their parameters, or even their 
training data.321 This means that an attacker need not know the specific internal 
structure of a target DNN, nor have any other proprietary knowledge about it in order 
to fool the system. In a twist of irony, improved DNNs and CNNs that further enhance 
object classification will not necessarily resolve the spoofing problem, as it is often 
that same technology which finds more subtle ways to fool the improved algorithms 
into misclassifying images and objects.322  
 
Not surprisingly, such spoofing tactics will be a significant problem in adversarial 
settings such as armed conflict, where opposing parties have an incentive to send each 
other confusing signals. Whether such actions amount to a lawful ruse of war, a 
perfidy, or a violation of any other obligation will be briefly addressed in 6.5.2.1.2. 
For now, it is worth noting that this vulnerability casts doubt on using the current class 
of visual object recognition and other similar DNNs for military applications, unless 
commanders can take adequate active precautions to mitigate the associated risks. 
2.5.6.2 The Apparent Unavoidability of Adversarial Risk 
The underlying problem is that complex software artefacts appear to classify images, 
as well as sound and other activity,323 in highly counterintuitive and fragile ways. In 
the case of DNNs, these are strongly linear at the micro-level, even if non-linear at the 
macro-level, and this turns out to be a major source of vulnerability.324 It becomes 
particularly significant when the networks operate on high-dimensional manifolds 
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consisting of millions (or even billions) of dimensions, where there are always pockets 
that are misclassified and which can be easily exploited to fool the system.325 
Consequently, DNNs can falsely identify objects from the addition of meaningless 
static in ways that humans generally do not, if such static is carefully designed to 


















To illustrate via a simplified example,326 Figure 2.8 depicts a two-dimensional 
manifold consisting of either ‘panda’ images (green data points) or ‘gibbon’ images 
(red data points). If the DNN is trained on this data alone and asked to predict whether 
a given data point is likely to be a panda or a gibbon, it will draw a line (or ‘decision 
boundary’) through the data points to derive two image domains. The network would 
then predict that new points to the north/west of the boundary are likely to be gibbons, 
while those to the south/east are likely to be pandas; recognising also that some overlap 
exists. Asked to predict the most likely image of a gibbon, the DNN would put it 
‘infinitely far to the north/west’, even though the network has no data on any points 
                                                          
325 JASON, Perspectives on Research in Artificial Intelligence and Artificial General Intelligence 
Relevant to the DoD (JSR-16-Task-003, January 2017), 28-31 <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/ai-
dod.pdf> accessed 16 May 2018. 
326 The following is adapted from Scharre (n 13), 183-85. 
Figure 2.8: A simplified two-dimensional manifold. Source: Figure 14, JASON (n 325). 
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that far away. Worse still, because of the extreme northerly position of the hypothetical 
data point, the DNN would classify it as a gibbon with very high confidence. Hence, 
the simple linear representation of data at this micro-level, as the network assumes the 
further one moves upwards/leftwards, the more likely the image is of a gibbon; 
adversarial examples exploit this vulnerability. 
 
However, as Clune points out, real-world images – which DNNs classify more 
accurately than humans – are “…a very, very small, rare subset of all possible 
images”.327 The above represents weakness on the extremes, in an actual space of 
virtually infinite possible images. Accordingly, the real problem is more complex than 
Figure 2.8 depicts, and it exists in a very high-dimensional manifold where boundaries 
between numerous image domains are not always clear, or even correct.328 
2.5.6.3 Can an AI Be Inoculated Against Spoofing? 
Numerous researchers have successfully used ‘adversarial training’ to tweak a DNN, 
to recognise a specific false image.329 However, this mostly “expands the instruction 
book”, and it does not comprehensively train the DNN to “recognise the underlying 
pattern in the instruction book and to process new examples correctly”.330 Thus, 
Goodfellow, Shlens and Szegedy found that while DNNs typically became more 
robust with adversarial training, the remaining error rate and misclassification of false 
images was still too high to be acceptable for safety-critical systems.331 Concretely, 
adversarial training builds robustness against the specific kinds of attacks used during 
training, but not towards whole new categories of attacks.332 Again, the reason is that 
the space of all possible images in a high-dimensional manifold is virtually infinite, 
“vastly…complicated and impossible to fully characterise”.333 Regardless of what is 
learnt, an attacker will be able to generate more (unexpected) adversarial distortions, 
with a large subset of these slipping through the net and spoofing the system.334 
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2.5.7 Broader Implications for the Military Use of AI 
Aside from image classification, this issue reminds us more broadly that learning 
machines are essentially ‘black boxes’, which exhibit “counterintuitive and 
unexpected forms of brittleness”,335 and this makes it very difficult for commanders – 
indeed, even software engineers – to accurately predict the circumstances in which a 
network might fail.336 As Szegedy et al. put it, the current class of DNNs have 
“nonintuitive characteristics and intrinsic blind spots, whose structure is connected to 
the data distribution in a non-obvious way”;337 namely, the networks are inherently 
inscrutable and non-intuitive. The JASON group of scientific experts, which recently 
reported on the implications of AI for the US DoD, similarly concluded: 
 
[T]he sheer magnitude, millions or billions of parameters (i.e. 
weights/biases/etc.), which are learned as part of the training of the 
net…makes it impossible to really understand exactly how the network 
does what it does. Thus the response of the network to all possible 
inputs is unknowable.338 
 
Consequently, Clune argues that DNNs for lethal autonomous targeting may be 
unacceptably vulnerable to adversarial hacking;339 not only to conceal legitimate 
targets but also to draw lethal firepower towards protected persons and objects,340 
perhaps in a propaganda war.  
 
However, the solution is not necessarily to ban the use of AI, or even a more narrowly-
tailored ban on DNNs in military applications. As the JASON group noted, despite 
being inherently prone to both error and adversarial attack, DNNs may still be 
incorporated as components within a larger/hybrid system, where other pieces of the 
system have a “supervisory role”.341 This may enable robust validation and verification 
by proxy, in relation to the entire system.342  
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This chapter has proposed a working definition of LAWS that incorporates four 
relevant dimensions: human-machine interaction; the task being delegated; machine 
complexity; and complexity of the operational environment. It has also delineated the 
relevant near-term LAWS as wide-area loitering systems, operating standalone or in 
swarms. Given the risk constraint on development and deployment, it is likely that 
such systems will initially be fielded in the maritime area, followed by aerial and 
ground-based systems; first for anti-material targeting, then expanding into anti-
personnel targeting and more varied attack missions as the technology, the Concepts 
of Operations, and the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures all develop. 
 
Crucially, the chapter has also demonstrated an inherent paradox: while LAWS will 
be sophisticated machines employing various forms of advanced AI that may appear 
to replicate human thought processes, the systems will essentially be executing 
technical processes, with no more ‘understanding’ of their actions than the landmine 
depicted in Figure 2.1. This is epitomised by the fact that autonomous systems will act 
as ‘optimisers’, potentially resulting in “one objective being pursued relentlessly 
despite other common-sense values being salient”;343 again, not too different from the 
landmine responding only to a P > X constraint. In such instances, perverse results are 
a real risk, unless humans carefully program and meaningfully supervise the systems. 
There are numerous other sources of brittleness that also suggest the need for human 
control in autonomy, the most vivid being the adversarial examples that so easily spoof 
otherwise sophisticated computer vision systems. These difficulties, which arise from 
the inscrutable and non-intuitive nature of machine learning, are in addition to 
limitations in sensing and GPS/communications technologies. Accordingly, LAWS 
and its associated AI will be rather brittle by nature. 
 
Even if this characteristic can be mitigated over time with better components, 
programming and testing and evaluation, it still indicates a fundamental difference 
between human and machine cognition. Hence, the International Panel on the 
Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW) considers that the terms AI and 
machine learning inappropriately anthropomorphise these safety-critical systems, and 
may lull people into a) a false sense of security regarding their capabilities, and b) a 
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false impression of ‘intention and purpose’.344 Instead, iPRAW recommends the terms 
‘computational methods’ (in place of AI) and ‘evolving algorithms’ or ‘data-driven 
algorithms’ (in place of machine learning).345 While this thesis will continue to use the 
traditional terms for their familiarity, it nonetheless acknowledges the validity of the 
reasoning that led to iPRAW’s preferred terminology. 
 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that LAWS should be banned. As the JASON 
group noted, above, hybrid systems may provide a solution, and this includes systems 
integrating a human operator who can bring deliberative thinking into the process. 
Accordingly, Chapter 3 will consider the broad legal implications of weapons 
autonomy and Chapter 4 will examine the ‘meaningful human control’ concept at the 
high level, and as a precursor for the more detailed application of the LOAC rules that 
will follow in subsequent chapters.
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Broad Legal Implications of Weapons Autonomy 
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter contains two main sections, which will examine in broad terms 
the legal implications of autonomous attack. First, 3.2 builds on Chapter 2 to argue 
that lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) will be mere tools: both technical in 
nature, and devoid of any of the human qualities required to have legal obligations, or 
to exercise broad legal judgment. Hence, they will not ‘apply the law’ as such, so 
academic analyses and State parties at the current diplomatic process in Geneva err 
when they query whether LAWS can ‘comply with IHL’. International humanitarian 
law (IHL) obligations are addressed exclusively to humans; namely, engineers, 
programmers, commanders and weapons operators (WOs), who will have to ensure 
legal compliance in their design, development, deployment and use of LAWS. 
Accordingly, the relevant question is whether LAWS can be designed, developed, 
deployed and used in compliance with IHL, or the law of armed conflict (LOAC). 
Second, 3.3 sketches the contours of how we might expect the fielding of LAWS to 
affect the legal analysis of targeting. Here, it will be seen that autonomy will reassign 
some operational decisions between human actors and it will necessitate their earlier 
timing, thus making them more general in character. This may be expected to weaken 
the causal nexus between deliberative human decisions, and specific actions and 
outcomes on the battlefield. Consequently, there will be a need for appropriate and 
meaningful human control, to mitigate the harshness of full autonomy – an issue that 
will be addressed in Chapter 4.  
3.2 LAWS Will Be Mere Tools, Not Persons 
There has long been a tendency to anthropomorphise relatively simple devices and 
systems, which in reality have very little in common with human beings.1 This is even 
more common with computers2 and, arguably, can be expected to a far greater extent 
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with robotic devices – particularly those designed to interact with humans.3 On the 
battlefield, soldiers are reported to have anthropomorphised their tele-operated 
PackBot Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) robots, often attributing personality 
quirks to the machines, giving them names and incorporating them into their units.4 
Furthermore, when PackBots are destroyed during a military operation, soldiers have 
shown visible signs of grief and a sense of loss,5 in some cases insisting on a military 
‘funeral’ for their ‘fallen comrade’.6  
 
Such anthropomorphisms are very common: indeed, some have argued that “humans 
are wired to anthropomorphize”,7 and that this will frequently shape their interactions 
with machines.8 For example, whether such devices are regarded as a ‘friend’ or a ‘part 
of the family’ in a civilian context; or as a ‘comrade’ or, potentially, a ‘war criminal’ 
in a military context.9 Yet, this tendency to humanise inanimate objects can have 
catastrophic effects in safety-critical systems, especially when combined with the 
inherent brittleness of artificial intelligence (AI) seen in Chapter 2. Along with the risk 
of ‘automation bias’,10 and the distance and psychological detachment that often occur 
in unmanned systems, the result may be an apparent reassignment of moral agency to 
machines, thereby creating a “moral buffer” and a perception amongst WOs that they 
are not accountable for their decisions.11  
 
For legal purposes, however, LAWS are decidedly machines, not persons; only the 
latter can be accountable and held responsible for battlefield decisions. Despite 
academic analyses that typically query whether LAWS will be able to ‘comply with 
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2009), 337-38. 
6 Springer (n 4), 189. 
7 Neil M. Richards and William D. Smart, ‘How Should the Law Think About Robots?’ in Ryan Calo, 
A. Michael Froomkin and Ian Kerr (eds.), Robot Law (Edward Elgar, 2016), 20. 
8 Ibid.; Kate Darling, ‘“Who’s Johnny?” Anthropomorphic Framing in Human-Robot Interaction, 
Integration, and Policy’ in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and Ryan Jenkins (eds.), Robot Ethics 2.0 (OUP, 
2017). 
9 Ibid. 
10 This is where human decision-makers over-trust automated systems and either disregard, or do not 
notice erroneous/contradictory information, hence uncritically implementing computer-generated 
recommendations. 
11 ML. Cummings, ‘Creating Moral Buffers in Weapon Control Interface Design’, IEEE Technology 
and Society Magazine (Fall 2004) 28, 31-33. 
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IHL’,12 and the many calls by States parties in Geneva to ensure this,13 the real question 
is whether LAWS can be designed, developed, deployed and used in compliance with 
IHL/LOAC. This legal reality is based on two distinct but related strands of argument: 
the technical nature of LAWS, and the absence of human qualities. 
3.2.1 The Technical Nature of LAWS 
First, as was seen in Chapter 2, even the most advanced weapon systems are merely 
inanimate devices that follow technical processes based on the ‘sense-think-act’ 
paradigm;14 there is no ‘free will’ in the philosophical sense. This will remain true 
even as advances in AI and machine learning bring ever-greater levels of sophistication 
to weapon systems. As mentioned in 2.2.2, and especially in relation to Figure 2.3, 
LAWS will entail software-based controllers ‘stepping into the shoes’ of the human 
soldier, both to operate the weapon and to monitor the target, the environment and the 
weapon system itself. Yet, these controllers are merely special-purpose computers 
running on the ‘stored program’ concept.15 Namely, they are ‘calculating machines’ 
that store instructions (entered by a human programmer) and data in the same internal 
memory unit.16 Subsequently, both are processed together by the central processing 
unit’s arithmetic sub-unit, so that in the course of a computation, the instructions are 
not just executed but also modified at electronic speeds, to effectively govern the 
controller’s operation.17 Assuming no major technological shift on the horizon, 
autonomous systems will employ essentially the same technology: controllers run by 
software, which in turn is written by human programmers. Accordingly, Richards and 
Smart note that: 
 
Robots are, and for many years will remain, tools. They are 
sophisticated tools that use complex software, to be sure, but no 
different in essence than…a word processor, a web browser, or the 
braking system in your car.18 
                                                          
12 For example, Robin Geiss, The International Law Dimension of Autonomous Weapons Systems 
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Study, October 2015), 13-17. 
13 See the various statements and working papers of States parties at the 2018 Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) 
<https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/7C335E71DFCB29D1C1258243003E8724?
OpenDocument> accessed 21 May 2018. 
14 Tim McFarland, ‘Factors Shaping the Legal Implications of Increasingly Autonomous Military 
Systems’, (2015) 900 International Review of the Red Cross 1313. 
15 William Aspray, ‘Back to Basics: The Stored Program Concept’ (1990) 27 IEEE Spectrum 51. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 




This is axiomatic of the simpler rules-based systems, where it may be easy to see that 
the machine is not acting independently in any legally significant way. However, even 
with the more complex future LAWS, which will be goal-directed and will exercise 
‘discretion’ and ‘self-direction’, the programs running such machines are still just sets 
of pre-defined instructions.19 Consequently, as discussed in 2.3.4, an identical set of 
inputs (programming, operator commands and battlefield conditions) should lead to 
the same output (selection and engagement of a specific target) every time. Yet with 
subtle variations in those inputs sometimes leading to large differences in the ‘choices’ 
being made by the machine, observers may perceive different behaviours in apparently 
identical situations, which in turn may be seen as ‘free will’ on the part of the 
machine.20 Arguably, this would be an erroneous way to think about a weapon system, 
which will always remain a tool of the individual commander or operator.21 Again, 
Richards and Smart capture the essence of the argument, by asserting: 
 
As the autonomy of the system increases, it becomes harder and harder 
to form the connection between the inputs (your commands) and the 
outputs (the robot’s behavior), but it exists and is deterministic.22 
 
A fortiori, there may be a strong perception of ‘free will’ in the case of a machine 
learning LAWS, which may alter part of its own algorithm in relation to its critical 
functions, thereby actually leading to different system behaviours at the low-level. 
Even so, there is arguably still no reason to see this as any more than an exercise in 
software development – one that is controlled by humans, similar to the simpler and 
more clearly deterministic programming. In both instances, the developer defines 
some desired behaviour for the system and writes a program designed to impart that 
behaviour to the machine.23 The only real distinction is in the algorithm employed: 
instead of directly encoding actions to be taken, as would the developer of a relatively 
simple program, the designer of a learning machine specifies desired outputs, 
activation functions and learning functions intended to formulate an optimum set of 
                                                          
19 McFarland (n 14), 14-15. 
20 Richards and Smart (n 7), 18. 
21 William Boothby, ‘Dehumanization: Is There a Legal Problem Under Article 36?’ in Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg, Robert Frau and Tassilo Singer (eds.), Dehumanization of Warfare: Legal 
Implications of New Weapons Technologies (Springer, 2018). 
22 Richards and Smart (n 7), 18. 
23 McFarland (n 14), 15. 
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actions in response to environmental stimuli.24 Accordingly, there is an extra layer of 
abstraction between the developer and the selection and engagement of the target.25 
This may obscure the process of matching specific (attack) outcomes to specific 
(human developer) commands, but it does not change the fact that even a machine 
learning LAWS will only be executing (at the broad level) ex ante instructions 
formulated by its developer.26  
 
The above references to computing technology are included purely to underscore the 
fact that LAWS – even the most sophisticated ones – will likely follow a deterministic 
path, based on the physical manipulation of symbols (digital data). This should counsel 
against any tendency to be misled by manufacturer references to ‘choice’ or ‘truly 
autonomous’ features27 – terms which may hold marketing sway, but arguably no real 
technical or legal significance. It should also discourage any notion that LAWS may 
become an ‘intermediate category’ between weapon systems and combatants.28 To 
reiterate: computers do not choose whether or not to run a program stored in memory; 
nor do they decide whether or not to execute a particular instruction within a 
program.29 Any appearance of ‘choice’ is the result of an intricate web of instructions 
within a complex software code and a cluttered environment. The only function of a 
computer – LAWS included – is to run whatever software is installed on it.  
3.2.2 The Absence of Necessary Human Qualities 
The second strand of the argument relates to the common assumption that LAWS will 
be neither sentient nor self-aware,30 and they will not be able to exercise any 
metacognition.31 To an extent, this may be inferred from the first strand, in that being 
limited to technical capacities a priori means LAWS cannot possess any of the human 
qualities noted above. Yet, it is worth expanding on these points for their 
                                                          
24 See 2.5.1.2-2.5.1.3 on machine learning and its methods. 
25 McFarland (n 14), 15. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Gary E. Marchant et al., ‘International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots’ (2011) 12 
Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 272. 
28 Cf. Hin-Yan Liu, ‘Categorization and Legality of Autonomous and Remote Weapons Systems’ (2012) 
94 International Review of the Red Cross 627. 
29 McFarland (n 14), 15. 
30 For example, Boothby (n 21). 
31 Eliav Lieblich and Eyal Benvenisti, ‘The Obligation to Exercise Discretion in Warfare: Why 
Autonomous Weapons Systems are Unlawful’ in Nehal Bhuta et al. (eds.), Autonomous Weapons 
Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (CUP, 2016), 250. 
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contradistinguishing features and as further justification of the need for human control 
in autonomy.  
3.2.2.1 LAWS Will Be Neither Sentient nor Self-Aware 
3.2.2.1.1 Sentience 
Sentience refers to “the capacity to experience pleasure or pain”.32 It is a prerequisite 
for having subjective interests;33 and, therefore, is a ground for moral status,34 which 
in turn gives rise to moral obligations.35 This leads to a number of legal protections 
afforded to the entity enjoying moral status.36 While LAWS will certainly process 
sensory information, which is a prerequisite for sentience, this will only be to 
determine such activities as navigation; and the tracking, prioritisation, selection and 
engagement of targets. It is assumed there will be no capacity to feel pleasure or pain 
as such,37 and this highlights the illogicality of soldiers anthropomorphising their 
PackBots. 
3.2.2.1.2 Self-Awareness 
Self-awareness (SA) goes significantly beyond sentience, and broadly refers to the 
capacity for introspection. On some views, SA is neither static nor singular, but is a 
dynamic process, the most advanced stage of which is where “[t]he self is now 
recognized not only from a first person perspective, but also from a third person’s”.38 
Accordingly, self-aware entities “are not only aware of what they are, but how they are 
in the minds of others: How they present themselves to the public eye”.39 This is a 
prerequisite for the mens rea element of criminal liability, where this requires specific 
intent.40 
                                                          
32 Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum, ‘The Grounds of Moral Status’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/grounds-moral-status/> accessed 21 May 2018. 
33 To have ‘interests’ depends on being “capable of suffering and enjoyment” or on having “desires, 
preferences, or concerns”: David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status 
(CUP, 1996), 40. 
34 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (2nd ed., CUP, 1993). 
35 James G. Dwyer, Moral Status and Human Life (CUP, 2010), 9. 
36 Ibid., Chapter 1. 
37 Mark Bishop, ‘Why Computers Can’t Feel Pain’ (2009) 19 Minds and Machine 519. 
38 Philippe Rochat, ‘Five Levels of Self-Awareness as They Unfold in Early Life’ (2003) 12 
Consciousness and Cognition 717, 722. 
39 Ibid. 
40 John Buyers, ‘Liability Issues in Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Systems’, Osborne Clarke 





Both sentience and SA (SSA) are distinctly human and animal qualities, with which it 
is assumed no artificial machine will be endowed,41 at least in the foreseeable future.42 
This is different to the question of whether machines can perform at human or super-
human levels of visual intelligence, or whether they can sense human emotional 
states.43 Such capacities are merely the result of formal computational tasks, and are 
qualitatively different to SSA. 
3.2.2.1.3 Legal Consequences 
Yet SSA are necessary characteristics for an entity to be recognised as a (natural) legal 
person capable of personal responsibility. As Solum points out, humans are legally 
recognised as ‘persons’ because of their intuitions and shared experiences.44 
Matambanadzo builds on this, focusing on the embodied human being and arguing that 
such embodiment allows a legal entity to “draw[] on shared intuitions about who 
counts in our community of legal persons and how we should take account of them”.45 
Thus, while being human is not necessary for ‘personhood’, the average adult human 
has the capacity to exercise rights and to owe duties, and this is a strong driver towards 
ascribing legal personhood.46 However, without the common human traits of SSA and 
autonoetic metacognition (see below) it is impossible to ascribe personhood for 
accountability and responsibility to a LAWS. Thus, Sassóli asserts “[t]he difference 
between a weapon system and a human being is not quantitative but qualitative; the 
two are not situated on a sliding scale, but on different levels – subjects and objects”.47 
 
                                                          
f6f90f396256/itech_law.pdf> accessed 21 May 2018. See also Deborah W. Denno, ‘A Mind to Blame: 
New Views on Involuntary Acts’ (2003) 21 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 601, 611 (discussing the 
absence or impairment of self-awareness as a prerequisite for a finding of involuntariness, thereby 
negating mens rea). 
41 Richard H. Schlagel, ‘Why Not Artificial Consciousness or Thought?’ (1999) 9 Minds and Machines 
3. 
42 Riccardo Manzotti, ‘The Computational Stance is Unfit for Consciousness’ (2012) 4 International 
Journal of Machine Consciousness 401. 
43 See 2.5.1-2.5.2 on artificial intelligence and deep learning. 
44 Lawrence B. Solum, ‘Legal Personhood for the Artificial Intelligences’ (1992) 70 North Carolina 
Law Review 1231, 1285. 
45 Saru M. Matambanadzo, ‘The Body, Incorporated’ (2013) 87 Tulane Law Review 1, 50. 
46 Alexis Dyschkant, ‘Legal Personhood: How We Are Getting it Wrong’ (2015) University of Illinois 
Law Review 2075, 2080. 
47 Marco Sassóli, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open 
Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified’ (2014) 90 International Law Studies 308, 323. 
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More specifically and relevant to LAWS – the actions of which may potentially violate 
IHL/LOAC and international criminal law (ICL) – is the question of personhood for 
criminal liability.48 In this connexion, it is worth noting that there are four general 
purposes of punishment for a criminal offence: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation 
and incapacitation.49 While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into these, a 
few brief reflections on the first two are worth making. First, retribution arguably 
presumes the ability to feel pain and suffering; without sentience, however, this is 
negated in a LAWS. Second, deterrence is also arguably negated, given the automatic 
and non-discretionary running by a LAWS of whichever software is installed on it, 
free from any self-awareness or fear. Clearly, without the capacity to make conscious 
choices, there can be no deterrent effect of any criminal laws or threat of punishment.  
 
Thus, it is highly unlikely that in the near-term LAWS will acquire a separate legal 
identity capable of being held accountable for violations of IHL or ICL. Arguably, no 
AI system will possess the kinds of capacities that would justify such a jurisprudential 
change in the LOAC.50 Of course, this sort of change may be possible – even desirable 
from a policy perspective – in civilian fields such as manufacturing and commercial 
services: there, personhood will enable robotic systems to be identified with distinct 
revenue streams, much like corporations are; and possibly for similar reasons. But such 
reasoning arguably does not extend to battlefield robots, which are decidedly objects 
not subjects. As Sassóli succinctly puts it: “[a] combatant is a human being, only he or 
she is an addressee of legal obligations”.51 
 
To conclude, it is necessary to guard against anthropomorphising LAWS. As Richards 
and Smart have argued, albeit in the context of humanoid robots, failure to heed this 
warning may mean that “we might hold the designers less responsible for [the robot’s] 
actions”,52 because if “it seems to have some limited form of free will…how can we 
expect the designers to cover every eventuality?”  
 
                                                          
48 See, more generally, Mohamed Ellewa Badar, The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal 
Law: The Case for a Unified Approach (Hart Publishing, 2015). 
49 Gabriel Hallevy, Liability for Crimes Involving Artificial Intelligence Systems (Springer International, 
2015), 185. 
50 Cf. Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons (Ashgate, 2009), 
105. 
51 Sassóli (n 47), 323. 
52 Richards and Smart (n 7), 18. 
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We must avoid the Android Fallacy. Robots, even sophisticated ones, 
are just machines. They will be no more than machines for the 
foreseeable future, and we should design our legislation accordingly. 
Falling into the trap of anthropomorphism will lead to contradictory 
situations…53  
 
Arguably, this reasoning applies more strongly in the case of LAWS, where battlefield 
errors can have particularly catastrophic consequences, yet would not be adequately 
dealt with by assuming machine personhood, or any form of intermediate category. 
Some have argued that this will leave a lacuna in the law, by way of an accountability 
and responsibility (A&R) gap,54 and that this justifies a pre-emptive ban.55 However, 
there is a strong body of academic opinion that rebuts such a claim. Some argue that 
the legality of a weapon system has never hinged on issues of personal 
accountability,56 instead focusing on the liability of weapons designers and 
procurement teams (in developing and fielding the systems);57 or on commanders and 
WOs (in deploying and using LAWS on the battlefield).58 Others argue that A&R 
problems are rather isolated and have practical workaround solutions.59 Alternatively, 
where current law is seen not to be fit for purpose, some have argued for a parallel 
legal regime to plug the gap via the law of torts.60 Consequently, even if LAWS do 
give rise to some A&R challenges, these are likely to be “far smaller than some critics 
of military robots believe”.61 As will be seen in Chapter 4, so long as there is 
meaningful human control during the design, development, deployment and use of 
LAWS, there is arguably no reason to believe that an unavoidable A&R gap will take 
hold. 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 20. 
54 For example, Human Rights Watch, Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015); Markus Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian 
Law: Legal, Ethical, and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 1371, 1399-1409. 
55 Human Rights Watch, ibid. 
56 Charles J. Dunlap Jr., ‘Accountability and Autonomous Weapons: Much Ado About nothing?’ (2016) 
30 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 63, 65-66. 
57 Geoffrey S. Corn, ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems: Managing the Inevitability of ‘Taking the Man 
Out of the Loop’’ in Bhuta et al. (eds.) (n 31). 
58 Dunlap (n 56), 68-73; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and International 
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics’ (2013) Harvard National Security Journal Features 1, 33. 
59 For example, Sassóli (n 47), 325 (arguing that the restrictive temporal field of application in ICL can 
be addressed by treating programmers of a ‘war crime algorithm’ as indirect perpetrators, or as 
guarantors obliged to intervene once armed conflict begin). 
60 Rebecca Crootof, ‘War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons’ (2016) 164 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1347. 
61 Krishnan (n 50), 105. 
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3.2.2.2 Might LAWS Have the Capacity for Metacognition?  
Metacognition refers to “…one’s knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive 
processes and products or anything related to them”.62 At its simplest, this refers to the 
higher-order process of “thinking about thinking”63 or “knowing about knowing”.64 At 
a more advanced level, metacognition enables key critical thinking skills, and it 
comprises two distinct components: knowledge about cognition; and regulation and 
orchestration of cognition.65 Thus, metacognition takes on an ‘executive role’, which 
enables humans to a) diagnose their current state of knowledge, and b) to actively 
control their learning, to acquire further skills and knowledge in a relatively more 
efficient way.66 As will be seen below, these competences are key to the effective 
application of LOAC norms.  
 
Concretely, a metacognitive entity knows what it knows and what it does not know; 
but beyond this, it has the potential, through education, training, and personal 
experience, to attain a variety of key evaluative skills.67 For example, it can be trained 
to: 
• know how and why it arrived at a particular answer; 
• exploit means and develop ways to acquire missing information needed to get 
to an answer, or to perform a task; 
• interrogate the validity and reliability of sources, and prioritise between them.  
• connect newly-gathered information to its existing knowledge base and 
personal experience, and to adapt each in light of the other, with appropriate 
weighting given to each one; and 
• make generalisations and analogies, to transfer knowledge from one instance 
or subject area to another. 
                                                          
62 John H. Flavell, ‘Metacognitive Aspects of Problem Solving’ in Lauren B. Resnick (ed.), The Nature 
of Intelligence (Erlbaum Associates, 1976), 232. 
63 Deanna Kuhn and David Dean, ‘Metacognition: A Bridge Between Cognitive Psychology and 
Educational Practice’ (2004) 43 Theory into Practice 268, 270. 
64 Ruth Garner and Patricia Alexander, ‘Metacognition: Answered and Unanswered Questions’ (1989) 
24 Educational Psychologist 143. 
65 Gregory Schraw, ‘Promoting General Metacognitive Awareness’ (1998) 26 Instructional Science 
113, 114. 
66 Accordingly, it is one of the hallmarks of general intelligence. See 2.5.1 on narrow versus general AI. 
67 “I am engaging in metacognition if I notice that I am having more trouble learning A than B; if it 
strikes me that I should double-check C before accepting it as a fact;…if I become aware that I am not 
sure what the experimenter really wants me to do; if I sense I had better make a note of D because I may 




These cognitive actions must meet two structural preconditions: agents must be able 
to assess whether the task considered is within their reach and solvable within the given 
time span; and once the action is performed, they must be able to reliably evaluate its 
success or failure.68 Moreover, the extent to which an agent is willing to expend time 
and effort over such actions, and the threshold of confidence sufficient for triggering 
an overt action, will often be influenced by perceptions of how critical the main task 
is.69 As LOAC-based decisions often occur in a strongly safety-critical context, the 
extent of metacognitive probing by commanders, their battle staffs, and individual 
soldiers in the field can be expected to be relatively high.70 
3.2.2.2.1 A Distinctly Human Trait, Necessary for Applying the LOAC 
At first sight, these higher-order skills appear to be distinctly human traits, and this is 
underscored by much of the literature being in the area of educational psychology. 
Crucially, a number of key LOAC obligations, as articulated in Additional Protocol I71 
(AP I), would seem to presuppose metacognitive thinking. For example, the 
requirement to take “constant care” to spare civilian lives and property;72 to give 
‘effective advance warning’ of attacks “unless circumstances do not permit”;73 the 
pervasive requirement for “feasibility” in the circumstances;74 or, indeed, the 
obligation to presume civilian status in situations of ‘doubt’.75 Arguably, the most 
‘cerebral’ and abstract judgment that calls for metacognitive thinking is the principle 
of proportionality: this prohibits attacks in which the estimated ‘collateral damage’ is 
“excessive” in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,76 and 
is considered to be a profoundly “human qualitative…decision”.77 
 
                                                          
68 Joëlle Proust, The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness (OUP, 2013). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Though it is acknowledged that with a battlefield soldier facing an imminent mortal threat, instinct 
and urgency will often substitute metacognitive probing. 
71 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 
1125 UNTS 3. 
72 Article 57(1), AP I. 
73 Article 57(2)(c), AP I. 
74 Article 57(2)(a)(i) and (ii), AP I. 
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76 Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(b), AP I. 
77 Noel E. Sharkey, ‘The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare’ (2012) 94 International Review of 
the Red Cross 787, 789-90. 
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Common to many of these obligations is that they are framed as ‘principles’ or 
‘standards’, rather than ‘rules’78 (as distinct from ‘legal rule’ in the broader sense of 
referring to all legal norms). The difference between the specific categories hinges not 
on their normative status, which in all cases is equally binding, but on whether the 
precise content of the norm is determined before (rules) or after (standards/principles) 
relevant facts have materialised.79 Thus, standards/principles are written in relatively 
vague language, so when applying them to specific facts difficult value judgments are 
inevitable.80 By contrast, rules are drafted more precisely and the process of matching 
these with concrete facts is more technical,81 hence more amenable to ex ante 
programming and application to machine-perceptible facts. 
 
Giving content to a norm requires effort to “analyze a problem [and] resolve value 
conflicts”,82 very much in line with the metacognitive traits bullet-pointed above. Yet, 
resolving value conflicts is almost impossible for a machine to do, save for a rapid 
mathematical solution which humans will be unlikely to identify as ‘sound 
judgment’.83 Machines apply rules or procedures, which must “specify every element 
in sufficient detail for a computer to be able to operate on it”.84 In this connexion, 
Asaro contrasts chess with LOAC: AI systems have long outperformed humans at 
chess, because it is “a fairly well-defined rule-based game that is susceptible to 
computational analysis”.85 The same applies to the game of Go, which is vastly more 
                                                          
78 Louis Kaplow, ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal 557.  
79 Ibid., 568-86 (discussing the notion of “ex ante versus ex post creation of the law”).  
80 While standards and principles are used interchangeably here, it is acknowledged that some scholars 
see a distinction between the two, depending not on their normative status for those who have to follow 
them, but on the “extent to which they constrain those who are charged with applying them”. See 
Lawrence Solum, ‘Legal Theory Lexicon: Rules, Standards and Principles’, Legal Theory Blog (6 
September 2009) (emphasis added) <http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/09/legal-theory-
lexicon-rules-standards-and-principles.html> accessed 18 September 2018. 
81 Ibid. (summarising the distinction in that a rule is “cast in the form of a bright-line”; a standard is 
usually “in the form of a balancing test” with an “exhaustive set of considerations for adjudication”; 
while a principle provides “mandatory [but non-exhaustive] considerations for judges” and it acts as 
“guidance for the interpretation or application of a rule or standard”).  
82 Kaplow (n 78), 621. 
83 See the hypothetical example on minimising civilian casualties with reverberating effects in Chapter 
2 (notes and text accompanying) nn 244-245. See also UNIDIR, ‘The Weaponization of Increasingly 
Autonomous Technologies: Concerns, Characteristics and Definitional Approaches’, UNIDIR 
Resources, No. 6 (2017), 11 <http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-weaponization-of-
increasingly-autonomous-technologies-concerns-characteristics-and-definitional-approaches-en-
689.pdf> accessed 21 May 2018. 
84 Sharkey (n 77), 789. See also 2.2.3.2 on the need for precision and tangibility in task execution. 
85 Peter Asaro, ‘On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the 




complex but still underpinned by precise rules and tangible outcomes in relation to 
which AI systems have outperformed humans.86 By contrast, LOAC requires “a great 
deal of interpretive judgment to be applied appropriately in any given situation”, and 
it is to a great extent “a matter of social norms”,87 “situational awareness” and “the use 
of common sense”;88 all of which will very likely elude a software algorithm.89 This 
is because the “strategic vagueness” of broad standards and principles presupposes 
certain cognitive capabilities, which are required to map the conditions assumed by 
those standard to concrete situations;90 yet, most of these capabilities cannot be 
specified in machine-executable code.91 Asaro also points to the stability of rules in 
chess versus the shifting and competing/conflicting interpretations of LOAC from day 
to day, and even within the same day inside the same conflict.92 The author concludes 
that it is incumbent upon persons applying lethal force to take all these perspectives 
into account and to draw insight from them, before making life and death decisions.93 
This is necessary in order to question the LOAC standards and the appropriateness of 
their application in a given factual scenario, thereby minimising error in perilous and 
irreversible situations.94 As noted above, such a duty to consider and potentially 
reconcile shifting/conflicting viewpoints arguably calls for the most probing of 
metacognitive thinking: to assess the state of knowledge in the ‘fog of war’,95 
understand where there are gaps preventing a reasoned conclusion, and either to locate 
the required information and integrate it into the overall assessment (time permitting); 
                                                          
86 Dan Silver et al., ‘Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge’ (2017) 550 Nature 354. 
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the result that legal advice has been successfully automated. See, for example, Samuel Gibbs, ‘Chatbot 
Lawyer Overturns 160,000 Parking Tickets in London and New York’, The Guardian (28 June 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/28/chatbot-ai-lawyer-donotpay-parking-tickets-
london-new-york> accessed 21 May 2018.  
90 Lucy Suchman, ‘Situational Awareness and Adherence to the Principle of Distinction as a Necessary 
Condition for Lawful Autonomy’ in Robin Geiß (ed.), Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: 
Technology, Definition, Ethics, Law & Security (German Federal Foreign Office, 2016), 279 (referring 
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awareness’ for indeterminate environments). 
92 Asaro (n 85), 699. 
93 Ibid., 700-03. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Carl von Clausewitz (author), FN. Maude (ed.), On War, Book I, Chapter III (Wordsworth Classics, 
1997), 42 (“War is the province of uncertainty: three-fourths of those things upon which action in war 
must be calculated are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty”). 
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or to go ahead with a ‘satisficing’ decision in the circumstances (where time-
pressured).96 Such judgment calls presuppose not only metacognitive thinking but, 
specifically, one that is informed by human instincts as developed through 
experience.97 
 
This prevalence of standards over rules in the LOAC is not just a recent phenomenon 
but also looks set to rise in the foreseeable future,98 thereby posing greater difficulties 
for any putative application of LOAC by machines. Accordingly, Lieblich and 
Benvenisti argue that LAWS will – almost by definition – be unable to discharge 
numerous legal obligations during the conduct of hostilities, as these require battlefield 
actors to exercise unfettered discretion, which in turn requires metacognitive 
thinking.99 In contradistinction, LAWS embody the pre-bound discretion of their 
programmers and deploying commanders. Such discretion will be operationalised in 
precise rules that will often preclude ‘fresh thinking’ or experiential insight as new and 
specific circumstances arise.100 
3.2.2.2.2 Is There an Emerging Machine Metacognition? 
Notwithstanding, the concept of metacognition has been making its way into the 
computer science literature,101 and has even been explicitly applied in machine 
learning. For example, Babu and Suresh present an algorithm for a ‘metacognitive 
neural network’ (McNN) classifier,102 which consists of a cognitive component and a 
metacognitive component.103 The latter adapts learning strategies by deciding what, 
when and how to learn,104 with the result that the McNN classifier exhibits superior 
                                                          
96 Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (Wiley, 1957), 204-05. 
97 Dan Saxon, ‘What is ‘Judgment’ in the Context of the Design and Use of Autonomous Weapon 
Systems?’ in Geiß (ed.) (n 90). 
98 Amichai Cohen, ‘Rules and Standards in the Application of International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 
41 Israel Law Review 41 (noting the growing acceptance of international courts applying IHL/LOAC, 
which lends itself to the standards approach and decisions being taken ex post. In turn, more interpretive 
judgment may be expected from battlefield commanders and their legal advisers). 
99 Lieblich and Benvenisti (n 31) (assuming war to be a form of governance, and applying a global 
administrative law approach to argue for a legal requirement for ‘unfettered discretion’ on the 
battlefield, which can only be carried out by fully metacognitive persons. Hence, the authors argue that 
LAWS are per se unlawful by reason of the pre-bound discretion the machines will necessitate). 
100 Ibid. 
101 For a general overview, see Michael T. Cox, ‘Metacognition in Computation: A Selected Research 
Review’ (2005) 169 Artificial Intelligence 104. 
102 G. Sateesh Babu and Sundaram Suresh, ‘Meta-Cognitive Neural Network for Classification 
Problems in a Sequential Learning Framework’ (2012) 81 Neurocomputing 86. 
103 Ibid., 88. 
104 Ibid., 88, 89. 
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performance when compared with standard machine learning classifiers.105 
Subsequently, this same metacognitive approach was applied to ‘extreme learning 
machines’,106 resulting in a ‘metacognitive extreme learning machine’ (McELM) that 
outperformed existing McNN classifiers, with less computational effort.107 In the 
broader field of robotics, metacognition has been applied to the concept of the ‘robot 
baby’ in a room. This starts life without a robust self-model, but has the primary goal 
of learning about itself and exploring its environment.108 In turn, a Metacognitive Loop 
(MCL) autonomously guides the creation of sub-goals and plans that contribute to 
achieving the primary goal.109 The MCL also coordinates the various types of learning 
(supervised, unsupervised or reinforcement) that the robot will undertake: both internal 
(learning about its own state and processes); and external (learning about its 
environment).110 
 
Accordingly, metacognition does have applications in AI and robotics and, by 
extension, may be applied to LAWS; for example, to enable some online (battlefield) 
learning, so a LAWS can refine its warfighting tactics for greater targeting accuracy 
but without learning ‘wrong lessons’. On the other hand, the above examples appear 
to go no further than simply having two separate algorithms or components: a ‘core’ 
and a ‘meta’.111 Human metacognition of the kind that applies vague legal standards 
and resolves conflicting human values arguably goes further than this. As Metcalfe 
and Son argue, there is a distinction between anoetic, noetic and autonoetic 
metacognition.112 
• Anoetic metacognition involves stimulus-driven judgements of objects and 
events that are present in time and space, and with no requirement for self-
awareness. 
                                                          
105 Ibid., 94. 
106 R. Savitha, S. Suresh and HJ. Kim, ‘A Meta-Cognitive Learning Algorithm for an Extreme Learning 
Machine Classifier’ (2014) 6 Cognitive Computation 253. 
107 Ibid., 261-62. 
108 Preeti Bhargava et al., ‘The Robot Baby and Massive Metacognition: Future Vision’, 2012 IEEE 
International Conference on Development and Learning and Epigenetic Robotics, IEEE Xplore (2012) 
1 <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6400837> accessed 21 May 2018. 
109 Ibid., 1-2. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Indeed, software suppressors such as Arkin’s Ethical Governor may be considered to be a 
rudimentary metacognitive algorithm. 
112 Janet Metcalfe and Lisa K. Son, ‘Anoetic, Noetic, and Autonoetic Metacognition’ in Michael J. 
Beran et al. (eds.), Foundations of Metacognition (OUP, 2012), 293-98. 
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• Noetic metacognition involves making judgements about internal 
representations that are no longer present in time and space – again, with no 
requirement for self-awareness. 
• Autonoetic metacognition involves making self-referential judgements about 
internal representations and, in addition, having the self-awareness that one is 
intimately involved. This enables a cognisance of one’s remembered past and 
projected future; of what has happened and what will, or at least might happen, 
upon taking a particular course of action. 
3.2.2.2.3 Machine Metacognition Reconsidered 
These three types of metacognition are in ascending order of sophistication. Of 
particular note is the fact that neither anoetic nor noetic metacognition imply self-
awareness, whereas autonoetic metacognition does. This is important, as the 
metacognitive skills outlined above113 for their relevance in applying legal 
standards/principles presuppose a degree of introspection, self-awareness and 
consciousness, for their effective application in a safety-critical context. For example, 
in understanding the seriousness of civilian harm, commanders and combatants will 
not only have consulted the Rules of Engagement (which are like LAWS 
programming), but will also have empathy for fellow humans; recollections of how 
seriously more senior commanders and their military legal advisers regard civilian 
harm;114 an understanding of how the media, and how their own family and peer-
groups view the killing of non-combatants,115 hence how broader/longer-term civilian 
harm may cast a shadow on the commander/combatant and his unit.116 These may all 
drive a more advanced and probing metacognitive effort to ensure that safety-critical 
attacks will substantively minimise civilian harm, with intentionality and in line with 
human values. 
 
                                                          
113 See (note and bullet-pointed text accompanying) n 67. 
114 Laura A. Dickinson, ‘Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International 
Law Compliance’ (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 1. 
115 Robert Johns and Graeme AM. Davies, ‘Civilian Casualties and Public Support for Military Action: 
Experimental Evidence’ (forthcoming) Journal of Conflict Resolution 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717729733> accessed 21 May 2018 (presenting consistent empirical 





Thus, with the above (negative) assumption on machine self-awareness,117 it is 
arguable that a LAWS will not be metacognitive to LOAC standards. Lacking 
intentionality, its analytical processing is likely to stop at any formalistic solution that 
maximises military advantage while minimising civilian harm in the narrow 
circumstances of an attack, and within the limits of machine perception; even if this 
causes longer-term civilian harm in a way that no reasonable commander would deem 
to be a reasonable application of LOAC principles.118 That said, Metcalfe and Son 
suggest that machines can, at least in principle, become self-referential by being 
programmed to remember their past, to project into their own future and to take 
account of things they themselves do and see as they move around their 
environment.119 This may permit a form of ‘automated introspection’, from which a 
LAWS may better assess its current state of knowledge, the implications of given 
actions, along with any knowledge gaps and ways to address these, before making 
lethal force decisions.  
 
A counter-argument, however, is that such ‘self-referential’ capabilities merely 
involve the encoding and tagging of data in a way that enables the machine to mimic 
the thought processes of a self-aware human, but without actually being self-aware;120 
thus remaining “a world away from human thinking for IHL purposes”.121 This 
compelling point is analogous with Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ critique122 of the Turing 
Test,123 which posited that a person or machine that merely follows explicit 
instructions does not necessarily ‘understand’ his/its task.124 Accordingly, the ease 
                                                          
117 See 3.2.2.1.2. 
118 See 7.2.3 on the importance of human-machine interaction in the context of proportionality 
assessments. 
119 Metcalfe and Son (n 112), 298. 
120 Ibid. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2 (note and text accompanying n 160), AI merely mimics human 
intelligence via knowledge representation and reasoning, in order to act as a rational agent. 
121 Email from Eliav Lieblich to Maziar Homayounnejad (14 August 2016), on file with author. 
122 John Searle, ‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’ (1980) 3 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 417 (arguing 
that symbolic representations of the Chinese language, along with a set of instructions on how to 
manipulate these, would at best enable a non-Chinese speaker to engage in a syntactic process. This 
might give rise to ‘correct’ answers and perhaps even a ‘human-like’ conversation between the non-
Chinese speaker and a fluent Chinese speaker; yet it would not imply that the former has a true 
understanding of the semantic contents of the language, as formal symbol manipulations by themselves 
do not have any intentionality).  
123 Alan M. Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (1950) 59 Mind 433 (positing that if a 
human operator chats simultaneously online with both a computer and another human, but cannot 
determine which is which, then the computer has human-level AI and, therefore, has human-level 
understanding). 
124 Searle (n 122).  
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with which the adversarial examples discussed in Chapter 2 – each being minor 
perturbations, yet outside the network’s training process – were able to spoof the 
systems, suggests a priori that deep neural networks do not ‘understand’ their image 
classification task.125 The same can be said about perverse instantiation of final goals, 
in which unconstrained variables are set to extreme values.126 In both instances, 
machines clearly do not understand that extreme actions are outside the bounds of 
human notions of reasonableness, unless this becomes an explicit part of their 
‘instruction book’.127 
 
More specifically, the ‘encoding and tagging’ critique is based on Humphrey’s 
argument that the internalised concept of a ‘self’ results in an individual who has both 
a mind and a concept of his own physical body; such an individual will therefore strive 
to preserve and protect the physical body, with a consequent evolutionary 
advantage.128 Accordingly, a machine may well be programmed to encode and tag data 
in a way that displays autonoetic metacognition; but it does not follow from this that 
said machine possesses the “deep and meaningful characteristics of what self-reference 
means to humans and to their survival”.129 Significantly, this negative conclusion finds 
support in Arkin’s Ethical Governor, whose proof-of-concept suggests that robots can 
be programmed for “self-sacrifice to reveal the presence of a combatant”.130 This is 
because, unlike humans with their internalised concept of a ‘self’, robots do not 
necessarily have a self-preservation instinct, thus they do not need to protect 
themselves.131 Lending further support to this reasoning is Vanderelst and Winfield, 
whose recent experiments with ‘ethical robots’ demonstrated how quickly and easily 
these can turn into the polar opposite – exhibiting inverse, thus unethical behaviour – 
merely by reversing the assignment of maxima and minima functions within the 
                                                          
125 Ian Goodfellow, Presentation at Re-Work Deep Learning Summit (24 February 2015) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pq4A2mPCB0Y> accessed 21 May 2018. 
126 See Chapter 2, (notes and text accompanying) nn 227-232 and 244-245, for examples of perverse 
instantiation. 
127 In which case, the machine still does not ‘understand’, it merely recognises that the specified extreme 
actions are prohibited by its programming. 
128 Nicholas Humphrey, Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness (Harvard University Press, 2006). 
129 Metcalfe and Son (n 112), 298. This is arguably the basis for Walzer’s familiar quote that “[f]ear and 
hysteria are always latent in combat, often real, and they press us towards fearful measures and criminal 
behavior”. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (5th ed., Basic Books, 2015), 250. 
130 Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour in Autonomous Robotics (Chapman & Hall/CRC, 
2009), 46. 
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robot’s cognitive machinery.132 While human soldiers are also known to have their 
‘internal ethical codes’ corrupted, this usually occurs gradually over time, and is often 
preceded with significant mental degradation.133 Arguably, broader, human-levels of 
self-awareness and understanding cannot allow such rapidly incongruous behavioural 
changes to occur at the ‘flip of a switch’. Moreover, without these deeply-ingrained 
human values, it is unlikely that a LAWS will be able to apply LOAC to the standard 
required of humans. 
3.2.2.2.4 Legal Consequences 
With the above in mind, Schachter’s brief analysis of the “hypothetical metacognitive 
ATR” (automatic target recognition) focuses on sophisticated goal-directed 
behaviours, yet all seem to be essentially technical processes.134 Even so, and within 
this broadly technical framework, the author concludes that no ATR is fully 
metacognitive:  
 
Certain ATRs have some aspects of metacognition, but none so far have 
a comprehensive ability to strategize, plan, monitor, evaluate, repair, 
and control itself and its performance.135 
 
A fortiori, no ATR or AI can be deemed autonoetically metacognitive, thus no LAWS 
will be able to apply legal standards to the extent required by the laws of war. However, 
this does not necessarily negate the lawfulness of narrower forms of lethal autonomy. 
As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has noted: 
 
                                                          
132 Dieter Vanderelst and Alan Winfield, ‘The Dark Side of Ethical Robots’ (AIES 2018, February 2018) 
<http://www.aies-conference.com/wp-content/papers/main/AIES_2018_paper_98.pdf> accessed 21 
May 2018. 
133
 See Maziar Homayounnejad and Richard E. Overill, ‘Preventing Autonomous Weapon Systems 
from Being Used to Perpetrate Intentional Violations of the Laws of War’, TLI Think! Paper 8/2018 
(2018), 12-13 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123254> accessed 21 May 2018 (discussing the Haditha 
massacre of 2005 and the Mahmudiyah gang rape of 2006). 
134 Bruce J. Schachter, Automatic Target Recognition (3rd ed., SPIE Press, 2018), 254 (referring to an 
ATR’s ability to understand its capabilities and limitations; the problem it is trying to solve; the 
availability and quality of input data; and the ability to assign confidence bounds on its conclusions. 
The ability to monitor its own health, detect component failures and take these offline, while 
maintaining system performance. The ability to self-regulate and adjust internal parameters if it detects 
too many false alarms; or to reduce reliance on a particular sensor if the weather is distorting the quality 




[M]achines can and do effectively take decisions that have been 
delegated to them by humans through their computer programming, 
and without the need to be ‘conscious’ or to have human-like 
intelligence.136 
 
To be sure, machines can lawfully execute technical processes that commanders and 
their battle staffs will have anticipated in their legal assessment of a planned attack. It 
is the human element in such a system that applies the requisite metacognitive 
thinking, so long as the autonomous ‘choices’ on the battlefield remain predictable and 
within lawful boundaries. 
3.2.2.3 The Irrelevance of Human Emotion 
Proponents of a LAWS ban tend to emphasise the need for real-time human emotion 
in applying the LOAC.137 The reason is two-fold: to identify targetable persons by 
sensing the emotional states of others (mostly in the case of conduct-based 
targeting);138 and to exercise compassion in the broader application of the rules.139 
Both of these points are debatable. First, if ever needed for target identification, 
sensing human emotional states can now be done more accurately via computational 
processes, which can be integrated into a LAWS.140 In any event, emotional states are 
at most a useful cue, which a soldier may wish to take into account.141 They are legally 
irrelevant for target identification,142 which hinges more on “the objective risk of 
harm…based upon objective indicators”;143 or, in the case of status-based targeting, 
membership of a State’s armed forces.144 Moreover, human emotion is practically (as 
                                                          
136 ICRC, ‘Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon 
Systems’, Working Paper Submitted to the CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS (11-15 April 2016), 3 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/21606/ccw-autonomous-weapons-icrc-april-2016.pdf> 
accessed 21 May 2018. 
137 Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots (Human Rights Watch, 
2012). 
138 Ibid., 29, 31 (assuming only humans can empathise with other humans, in order to detect emotional 
states). 
139 Ibid., 38 
140 See 2.5.1-2.5.2 on AI and deep learning, especially (note and text accompanying) nn 204-205 therein. 
141 It is acknowledged that in a counterinsurgency setting, emotional cues often take on greater 
significance, and may be specifically included in the Rules of Engagement. Even so, these are 
operational, not legal requirements. 
142 Article 51(3), AP I, permits direct attacks against civilians while they “take a direct part in 
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143 Sassóli (n 47), 333. 
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well as legally) irrelevant to anti-material targeting, to which a LAWS can always be 
restricted.145  
 
Second, the LOAC rules merely have to be applied in accordance with their content 
and the circumstances at hand.146 There is no obligation to exercise compassion over 
and above that which is already contained in the substance of the rules.147 Besides, the 
‘compassion’ argument overlooks the negative impact of human emotion,148 such as 
fear and hysteria,149 as well as prejudice and the instinct for revenge;150 all of which 
can lead to serious civilian harm. Consequently, assumptions about human nature tend 
to be “mutually offsetting and likely to remain inconclusive” in policy debates.151 In 
any event, there is no legal requirement for human soldiers to utilise their emotional 
senses on the battlefield, nor to require the use of real-time emotional intelligence 
when appraising the lawfulness of a weapon system. 
3.2.2.4 Conclusion on the Absence of Human Qualities  
Three broad conclusions can be drawn from the absence of the above human qualities. 
First, the lack of sentience and self-awareness means that LAWS will not be capable 
of bearing legal personhood for criminal responsibility, or any kind of individual 
accountability. As the US Department of Defense (DoD) states in its Law of War 
Manual “[t]he law of war rules…impose obligations on persons…not…on the 
weapons themselves”.152 This, however, is assumed not to pose an A&R gap, so long 
as accountable humans develop, deploy and operate the machines. 
 
                                                          
145 As noted in 2.4.4, the ‘crawl-walk-run’ approach will see LAWS deployments begin with anti-
material targeting in uncluttered environments. See also the ‘division of labour’ argument in 6.5.5. 
146 Sassóli (n 47), 318 (“IHL does not seek to promote ‘love’, ‘mercy’ or ‘human empathy’, but respect 
based upon objective criteria”). 
147 Schmitt (n 58) (noting the importance of observing the military necessity-humanity balance). 
148 See Offices of the Surgeon General, Multinational Force – Iraq and US Army Medical Command, 
Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV: Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07: Final Report (17 
November 2006), 34-41 <http://www.combatreform.org/MHAT_IV_Report_17NOV06.pdf> accessed 
21 May 2018. 
149 Walzer (n 129), 250 (noting that this often presses soldiers into fearful measures and criminal 
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150 Homayounnejad and Overill (n 133), 12-13 (discussing the Haditha massacre of 2005 and the 
Mahmudiyah gang rape of 2006). 
151 Lieblich and Benvenisti (n 31), 256. 
152 US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (Office of General Counsel, DoD, 2015, December 
2016 Update) (hereafter, US DoD Manual), §6.5.9.3 (emphasis added). 
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Second, the absence of autonoetic metacognition means that LAWS will be incapable 
of interpreting and applying LOAC standards to the extent ordinarily required of 
human combatants and commanders, and this capability gap will likely persist into the 
foreseeable future.153 However, this does not mean that autonomous attack can never 
be lawful;154 just that its role will have to be constrained to relatively narrow technical 
processes, which will approximate to an application of specific LOAC rules, in 
relatively predictable circumstances. Again, the DoD reflects both parts of this position 
by stating: 
 
The law of war does not require weapons to make legal determinations, 
even if the weapon (e.g. through computers, software and sensors) may 
be characterized as making factual determinations, such as whether to 
fire the weapon or to select and engage a target.155 
 
Namely, those deploying and using LAWS must ensure that an attack is lawful, though 
they may delegate to a weapon system specific targeting actions, which amount to 
technical processes that have been anticipated in the legal assessment of a planned 
attack.156 Holding system reliability constant, the more sophisticated and 
‘metacognitive’ the control software, the more complex and varied the targeting 
decisions that may be delegated, in more diverse operational environments. Yet, 
without a capacity for autonoetic metacognition, LAWS cannot ‘apply IHL/LOAC’ on 
behalf of any other person, even if the latter retains principal responsibility.  
 
Finally, the absence of real-time human emotion will have no bearing on the 
lawfulness of LAWS per se, though it may necessitate some operational restrictions. 
3.3 Implications of Weapons Autonomy for Legal Analysis 
Having sketched a detailed account of the technical aspects of machine autonomy in 
Chapter 2, as well as what this does not imply for LAWS in 3.2, it is now necessary to 
consider what weapons autonomy does imply for the legal analysis of LAWS. The 
                                                          
153 James A Reggia, Derek Monner and Jared Sylvester, ‘The Computational Explanatory Gap’ (2014) 
21 Journal of Consciousness Studies 153, 158 (discussing the persistent “lack of understanding of how 
high-level cognitive information processing can be mapped onto low-level neural computations”). 
154 Cf. Lieblich and Benvenisti (n 31). 
155 US DoD Manual, §6.5.9.3 (emphasis added). 
156 In that regard, see 4.2 on human-machine teaming, and 7.3.6.1 on front-loading. 
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following will be in two sub-parts, focusing on the assignment, timing and character 
of operational decisions; and the machine-operator relationship.  
3.3.1 The Effect of Autonomy on the Assignment, Timing and Character 
of Operational Decisions 
Autonomy in the narrow critical functions157 of a weapons system will have some 
legally significant effects on warfare. The underlying reason, and the key legal 
distinction between LAWS and other complex military hardware, is that weapons 
autonomy operates on the tactical decision to perform a lethal action, whereas other 
complex (non-autonomous) systems have an effect only after a decision is made by an 
accountable WO,158 or before it.159 Thus, machine autonomy will lead to a) the 
(re)assignment of operational decisions, b) the earlier timing, and c) changes to the 
character (namely, the specificity and basis) of those decisions. 
 
To put these in context, recall Boyd’s ‘observe, orient, decide and act’ (OODA) loop, 
which is the model of a combatant’s recurring decision-making cycle.160 Namely, a 
soldier or WO on the battlefield first observes the target and the environment around 
him, using all of the human senses. Second, he orients himself in terms of interpreting 
the information gathered. Third, he decides how to act by weighing the potential 
courses of action, based on the knowledge accumulated. Finally, the WO acts, or 
‘executes’, the decision made.161 In short, the OODA model “describes the ongoing 
mental and physical processes involved in observing one’s environment and 
responding to changes therein in pursuit of some goal”.162 In a manually-operated 
weapon system, all steps in this loop are undertaken by a single human WO. By 
contrast, the purpose of machine autonomy is to reassign part or all of the loop to a 
machine, to realise some operational advantage.163 Indeed, it only takes a moment’s 
reflection to see the OODA loop as an expression of the familiar ‘sense-think-act’ 
                                                          
157 Recall that ‘narrow’ means target recognition by the weapon system’s sensory hardware and control 
software, rather than the broader targeting process that will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
158 McFarland (n 14), 21. For example, precision-guided missiles utilise guidance technologies only 
after the WO selects a specific target and activates a ‘fire’ command. 
159 For example, decision-support systems may decide which potential targets to present to the WO, 
who then selects between them. See 5.5.3 on Project Maven. 
160 This was briefly introduced in 2.2.2.  
161 William C. Marra and Sonia K. McNeil, ‘Understanding ‘The Loop’: Regulating the Next Generation 
of War Machines’ (2013) 36 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1139. 
162 McFarland (n 14), 13. 
163 Ibid. See 1.2.2 on the advantages of machine autonomy. 
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paradigm of robotics. This now raises the question as to how the substitution of robot 
for human (or of ‘sense-think-act’ for OODA) will affect the assignment, timing and 
character of operational decisions. 
3.3.1.1 Autonomy Reassigns Operational Decisions  
Recall that machine autonomy involves software-based controllers ‘stepping into the 
shoes’ of the human soldier on the battlefield. This effectively transfers part of the 
burden of the OODA decision-making cycle to the machine, thereby reducing human 
input in the form of lowered physical and mental interaction.164 This relieves the 
human WO, who would otherwise have had to make sense of battlefield intelligence, 
decide what course of action to take, and to take that action in a timely manner.165 Yet, 
this does not mean that no human is making any legally relevant decisions and, given 
the above technical account of the stored program concept, nor does it mean that the 
LAWS itself is taking any legally relevant decisions. Instead, decisions involving the 
narrow critical functions of the weapons system are embodied in software written by 
developers and programmers, who exercise a form of ‘pre-bound discretion’. Legally 
relevant decisions are also taken by commanders and their battle staffs who deploy the 
LAWS, and by WOs who activate and potentially monitor its operation.166 As will be 
argued in subsequent chapters, such pre-bound discretion is capable of affording the 
necessary protections demanded by LOAC, if informed by effective programming and 
a highly deliberative targeting process that incorporates stronger, additional and earlier 
precautions, before and during deployment.167 
 
To summarise: autonomy reassigns the battlefield OODA loop from soldier/WO to 
LAWS; but since LAWS are incapable of making legally recognised ‘decisions’, such 
operational decisions concerning the critical functions of a weapon system are, in 
effect, made by non-traditional decision-makers. These include programmers, 
commanders and the battle staffs. 
3.3.1.2 Autonomy Necessitates Earlier Timing of Operational Decisions 
Reassigning operational decisions from those on the battlefield to those who define the 
behaviour of the LAWS and deploy it will necessarily mean that key targeting 
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167 See Chapters 5-7. 
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decisions are made earlier in the targeting cycle and at locations further away from the 
‘hot battlezone’.168 Specifically, these decisions (on whether and how to perform the 
narrow critical functions) will have to be made at the time the relevant behaviour is 
programmed into the machine and at the time the decision is made to deploy the 
LAWS;169 not necessarily at the time that a concrete situation calling for lethal attack 
arises.170 That is, decisions on the use of lethal force can only be made while human 
programmers, commanders and WOs have the opportunity to adjust system 
parameters. This is important as it assumes concrete situations arising in armed conflict 
will not substantially differ from those envisioned at the time the machine was 
developed, tested and deployed.171 However, where situations do run the risk of 
substantially differing, suitable restrictions and precautionary measures should be put 
in place to prevent unintended engagements on the battlefield.172 
3.3.1.3 Autonomy Changes the Underlying Character of Operational Decisions 
The reassignment of operational decisions will also change the character of those 
decisions by way of their generality and basis. On ‘generality’, human-made decisions 
that are normally carried out in real-time will be replaced with (or supplemented by) 
more general programmatic instructions that are fed into the machine’s software in 
advance.173 This effectively means that individual decisions on the use of lethal force 
are substituted by broader policy-like choices, which are applicable to the range of 
situations matching the pre-programmed parameters.174 
 
Second, in terms of ‘basis’, lethal attack ‘decisions’ taken via a LAWS cannot be based 
on the observation of concrete situations arising on the battlefield.175 Instead, they will 
have to be based on the experience and foresight available at the time the machine is 
programmed, which is then supplemented with the knowledge and intelligence of the 
                                                          
168 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems’ in Paul AL. 
Ducheine, Michael N. Schmitt and Frans PB. Osinga (eds.), Targeting: The Challenges of Modern 
Warfare (TMC Asser Press, 2016), 178, 193 and 194. 
169 McFarland (n 14), 23. But see 7.2.3.4 on real-time human involvement during battle. 
170 The exception being when there is a dial-in capability for real-time human control. See 7.2.3.4 for a 
hypothetical example. 
171 McFarland (n 14), 23. 
172 See 6.5.5, 7.2.3 and 7.3. 
173 McFarland (n 14), 23. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Of course, lethal attacks will be triggered by visual, radar, sonar and other data-based observations, 
which meet the parameters for kinetic force; but these will be machine-triggered responses, rather than 
decisions based on contemporaneous human judgement.  
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commander, as well as the technical expertise of his battle staffs, when deciding to 
deploy the weapon.176 
3.3.1.4 Consequence: Autonomy Weakens the Causal Nexus Between Human 
Decisions, and Specific Actions and Outcomes 
One important consequence of the aforementioned changes is that the causal link 
between a specific human decision and a specific action or outcome (such as a 
particular target being engaged or the extent of collateral damage that results) will very 
likely be weakened when that decision is implemented via an autonomous platform. 
To reiterate, LAWS will entail decisions on lethal attack being taken by non-traditional 
decision-makers; in advance of an actual conflict scenario; on the basis of ex ante 
knowledge, intelligence, experience, expertise and foresight; and framed in relatively 
broad and general terms. Arguably, this leaves much potential for a break in the chain 
of causation, hence a degree of unforeseeability in the behaviour of a LAWS. 
 
This weakening of the causal link raises the possibility that weapons autonomy will – 
if not appropriately developed, tested and deployed – lead to unintended engagements 
and excessive collateral damage on the battlefield. As noted above, the problem will 
find its solution in the various forms of human control that narrow-loop autonomy will 
demand,177 along with a broader notion of precautions in attack178 incorporated in the 
broader targeting process.179 
3.3.2 The Machine-Operator Relationship: ‘Delegation’, Not Abdication 
As detailed above, autonomy on the battlefield requires the human decision-making 
cycle (the OODA loop) to give way, at least partially, to the ‘sense-think-act’ paradigm 
of robotics. A highly autonomous weapon system will execute relatively more of the 
OODA loop, using only the WO’s high-level instruction as guidance in the ‘decision’ 
stage of a loop;180 the result is that the ‘nearest’ human assumes a ‘commander-like’ 
role.181 Accordingly, autonomy can be seen as shaping the relationship between the 
WO and the machine.  
                                                          
176 McFarland (n 14), 23. Again, there are exceptions, such as that described in 7.2.3.4. 
177 See Chapter 4, especially 4.4 and 4.5. 
178 See Chapter 7, especially 7.3.5 and 7.3.6. 
179 See Chapter 5, especially 5.3. 
180 McFarland (n 14), 13. 




However, this does not imply any formal command responsibility, which itself is partly 
based on the capacity of another legal entity to commit a violation of LOAC.182 As 
explained above, LAWS will be mere tools and no different in law to any other weapon 
system. Concretely, the WO does not – either in fact or in law – abdicate his LOAC 
obligations by reason of using a LAWS in combat; rather, part of his combat role is 
performed by the machine, which executes the WO’s high-level instructions. This 
follows from the above account of LAWS as deterministic machines, which are not 
truly autonomous entities in a human sense. 
 
As a corollary, LAWS are assumed not to be completely ‘independent’ machines that 
operate without any human control: the human-machine relationship is “not severed, 
it is only modified”.183 Choices made by developers and programmers; by commanders 
and their battle staffs; and by front-line operators, will all impose constraints on each 
mission.184 Accordingly, and despite a lack of narrow-loop supervision, human 
guidance to a lesser or greater extent will exist to ensure no abdication of control by 
responsible human beings. 
3.4 Conclusion 
While Chapter 2 demonstrated the sophisticated, yet technical and brittle nature of 
LAWS, this chapter has argued that such characteristics will have important legal 
consequences and non-consequences. Specifically, there are three distinct and broad 
implications of weapons autonomy during the execution of an attack. 
• Lack of agency and legal personhood, for establishing A&R. 
• Lack of autonoetic metacognition, for applying broad legal standards and 
principles. 
• Legal assessments and potentially accountable human decisions on lethal force 
having to be taken earlier, on a more generalised basis, and by non-traditional 
decision-makers. 
                                                          
182 Chantal Meloni, ‘Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or 
Separate Offence of the Superior?’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 619; Cf. Peter 
Margulies, ‘Making Autonomous Targeting Accountable: Command Responsibility for Computer-
Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts’ in Jens David Ohlin (ed.), Research Handbook on Remote 
Warfare (Edward Elgar, 2017). 





The combined result will be a potential weakening of the causal nexus between human 
decisions and specific LAWS actions and battlefield outcomes. Accordingly, retaining 
A&R and ensuring the lawfulness of the use of lethal force will depend on the type and 
degree of human control over the actions of a LAWS. With this in mind, Chapter 4 
will now examine the ‘meaningful human control’ concept, as a precursor for the more 






‘Meaningful Human Control’ in Autonomy 
4.1 Introduction 
As the two previous chapters have argued, lethal autonomous weapon systems 
(LAWS) will neither assume legal obligations/bear legal responsibility, nor have the 
capacity to draw legal judgments on behalf of their users, in relation to international 
humanitarian law (IHL)/law of armed conflict (LOAC) targeting rules. Moreover, 
near-term systems will often operate at the margins of performance: either with super-
human accuracy and precision, or with brittleness and potential failure (depending on 
context and circumstances). These inevitably lead to the question of human control in 
autonomy; specifically, the type and degree of such control that will be required in 
relation to LAWS.  
 
Currently, States parties in Geneva have expressed near-unanimous support for the 
idea that there must be human control over LAWS, but there is no consensus on what 
exactly this should entail. Yet, such considerations are important in light of the 
reassignment, earlier timing and more general character of operational decisions, as 
these changes risk weakening the causal nexus between human decisions and specific 
battlefield outcomes. Accordingly, notions of human control have moved centre stage, 
to ensure militaries and their personnel remain accountable and responsible over the 
use of force. Whether ‘meaningful human control’ should become a legal standard in 
and of itself is, however, a different matter. 
 
The following chapter contains four main sections. First, 4.2 explains the practical 
need for human judgment and control in autonomy, focusing on the different cognitive 
attributes of humans and machines. Second, 4.3 outlines the structural legal argument 
for human judgment and control over each ‘individual attack’, and it further argues 
that this obviates any need to codify a distinct legal requirement for human control; in 
fact, such a move would distort the crucial military necessity-humanity balance. Third, 
4.4 identifies the human-machine interaction ‘touchpoints’ that have emerged from the 
current Geneva process, and it considers some of their practical and legal implications. 
Finally, 4.5 distils the substantive elements of human control from several existing 
contributions. These broadly comprise predictability and reliability; setting 
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operational constraints; and stipulating the conditions of judgment. Again, it will be 
argued here that human control – while undoubtedly useful for the application of the 
LOAC rules – should not be regarded as a distinct concept, lest this blurs the clarity of 
existing legal obligations. 
 
While there are many variant terms for human control,1 the one that has garnered most 
attention – both in the academic literature and at the current Geneva process – is the 
Meaningful Human Control (MHC) concept.2 For consistency, the following will 
mostly adopt this term. 
4.2 The Practical Need for Human Judgment and Control  
Humans and computers have different cognitive strengths and weaknesses, and this is 
brought into sharp focus when we consider the distinction between automatic and 
controlled processing.3 The former refers to the fast processing of routine data for 
deductive reasoning; computers generally perform this better than humans.4 The latter 
refers to slower deliberative processing for inductive reasoning, recognising novel 
patterns, autonoetic metacognition and meaningful judgment; as was apparent from 
3.2.2.2, humans perform this better than machines.5 Sharkey argues that only when 
these attributes are in optimal balance with ‘human-machine collaboration’ can the 
weapon system have superior humanitarian impact.6 Writing with a slightly different 
focus, Scharre draws a similar conclusion, advocating the idea of a ‘centaur warfighter’ 
that will “leverage the precision and reliability of automation without sacrificing the 
robustness and flexibility of human intelligence”.7 Similar findings are also apparent 
in other works, specifically on warfare.8  
                                                          
1 For example, ‘appropriate levels of human judgment’ (US), ‘intelligent partnership’ (UK), and 
‘minimum standards for meaningful control (International Committee for Robot Arms Control). 
2 See Article 36, Killing by Machine: Key Issues for Understanding Meaningful Human Control (6 April 
2015) <http://www.article36.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/KILLING_BY_MACHINE_6.4.15.pdf> accessed 10 May 2018. 
3 Noel Sharkey, ‘Staying in the Loop: Human Supervisory Control of Weapons’ in Nehal Bhuta et al. 
(eds.), Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (CUP, 2016), 30-34.  
4 Ibid. See also Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin, 2012). 
5 Ibid. Recall from 2.2.3.2 that machines need assigned tasks to be both precise and tangible. 
6 Sharkey, ibid. Although the author does not comment on military utility, it is assumed that in many 
scenarios the humanitarian benefit is coterminous with the military advantage.  
7 Paul Scharre, ‘Centaur Warfighting: The False Choice of Humans Vs. Automation’, (2016) 30 Temple 
International & Comparative Law Journal 151, 152. 
8 ML. Cummings, ‘Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare’, Chatham House Research Paper 




4.2.1 Human Control Over the Machine 
Within this framework and in a military weapons context, the human performs three 
roles.9 
(1) Essential operator, without which the weapon system cannot accurately and 
effectively complete engagements. 
(2) Fail-safe, ready to intervene and alter or halt the weapon system’s operation, 
if it begins to fail or if circumstances change such that the engagement is no 
longer appropriate. 
(3) Moral agent, making value judgments on the appropriateness of the use of 
force in a particular attack. 
 
Only the first of these roles can be reliably delegated to a technical process, while the 
latter two are assumed to be uniquely human domains.10 That said, in limited 
circumstances, the ‘fail-safe’ function can arguably be automated via rudimentary 
metacognitive algorithms, which can override the main control system;11 this is the 
intention behind software suppressors, such as Arkin’s Ethical Governor.12 By 
contrast, the ‘moral agent’ role will require more sophisticated traits like autonoetic 
metacognition and the ability to identify with human values, especially to avoid a 
perverse instantiation of final goals.13  
 
Consequently, while the mechanics of force execution will gradually give way to 
algorithmic decision-making, two practical realities will need to hold true. First, the 
wider (deliberate) targeting process will need to embed sufficient checks and balances 
in which deliberative and professional human judgment shapes all LAWS 
deployments.14 Second, for the narrow (dynamic) targeting process, user interface 
designs and data connectivity should be optimised to enable controlled processing to 
                                                          
intelligence-future-warfare-cummings-final.pdf> accessed 9 May 2018 (distinguishing skills, rules, 
knowledge and expertise along a cognitive continuum in which the first two are easily automated, while 
the latter two demand human judgment to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity). 
9 Scharre (n 7), 154. 
10 Ibid., 156. Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the inherently brittle nature of narrow AI will mean 
human judgment and control are needed whenever the context for action risks moving outside system 
parameters, or whenever value judgments are likely to be needed.  
11 See 3.2.2.2.2-3.2.2.2.3. 
12 Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour in Autonomous Robotics (Chapman & Hall/CRC, 
2009). 
13 See 2.5.3.1 and 2.5.3.3. 
14 See Chapter 5, especially 5.3. 
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pervade the application of lethal force.15 This is especially important in complex and 
unpredictable battlefields, which often play to the weaknesses of automatic 
reasoning;16 though it may not be possible when actions are required faster than 
humans can react, or when operating in a communications-denied environment.17  
4.2.2 Machine Assistance to Enhance Human Control 
In delegating more of the ‘essential operator’ role to a machine, there is a distinction 
between control and direct manipulation.18 While the two may overlap with simple 
weapons like standard issue rifles or hand grenades, they tend to diverge with more 
complex systems, and those operating in relatively unpredictable environments. For 
example, semi-autonomous weapons like precision-guided munitions utilise automatic 
processing capabilities as an ‘intervening mechanism’ to counteract adverse 
environmental conditions, which are objectively programmable, yet move too fast for 
(human) controlled processing.19 This ensures the human-selected target is accurately 
engaged, despite strong winds or evasive manoeuvres by the target. In this sense, 
human control may be enhanced by an automatic mechanism that decreases the 
operator’s physical manipulation of the weapon’s aiming system.20 Accordingly, direct 
manipulation is only contingently related to the degree of control, and much will 
depend on the nature and extent of external/intervening factors.21 Should these be too 
numerous and too fast, effective human control is likely to be enhanced by delegating 
more physical/execution processes to the machine, while freeing the human operator 
to exercise more deliberative reasoning and controlled processing in relation to 
targeting.22 This of course is the essence of the ‘centaur warfighter’ approach, which 
seeks to harness the respective human-machine cognitive strengths. 
                                                          
15 Sharkey (n 3), 34.  
16 Ibid., 32. 
17 Scharre (n 7), 159 (giving the example of defending against saturation attack from missiles and 
rockets, which are likely to overwhelm human operators; and offensive attacks using swarming 
munitions). 
18 International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW), ‘Focus on the Human-
Machine Relations in LAWS’, “Focus on” Report No. 3 (March 2018), 13. 
19 See also Chapter 2 (n 45), explaining a similar function on the Phalanx CIWS and the Patriot missile 
battery. 
20 iPRAW (n 18), 13. 
21 Ibid. For example, the time-lag between trigger-pull and kinetic effects; how unpredictable weather 
conditions are in the meantime; whether the target itself will move before kinetic effects, and how fast 
or unpredictable such movements are likely to be. 
22 This same principle applies in civilian fields, with fly-by-wire and electronic stability programs 
enhancing the control of aircraft pilots and car drivers, respectively, despite reducing their direct 
manipulation of the vehicle. 
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4.2.3 Machine Restrictions on Human Action 
Yet, the hybrid focus of the ‘centaur warfighter’ model should counsel against any 
misplaced faith in the human, even in relation to controlled processing. While the 
MHC concept resists the myth of technological infallibility, it risks entrenching a myth 
of human infallibility instead.23 Thus, to more effectively combine the cognitive 
strengths, we should keep in mind that both humans and machines are flawed, albeit 
in different ways.24 Accordingly, it is not just human control over a LAWS and the 
latter’s assistance to the operator, but also appropriate technical restrictions on human 
action that will give fuller effect to lawful human intentions.25 Hence, ‘fail-safe’ 
mechanisms like the Ethical Governor are aimed not just at preventing inadvertent 
machine action, but also unsafe or erroneous deployments by human commanders.26 
Likewise, user interface designs should not just be optimised for controlled processing, 
but also for automatic vetoes on unsafe or unlawful human action.27 This has long been 
the approach in the civilian sector, for example, with Flight Envelope Protection in 
commercial aviation.28 
 
Accordingly, while there is clearly a practical need for human judgment and control in 
some contexts, there is an equally compelling need for machine action and technical 
veto in others. As Smith argues, in a well-functioning weapon system “human and 
machine both empower and limit each other”, such that “the fundamental functional 
question is whether such a system…can remain robust when human or machine 
elements fail”.29 
                                                          
23 Bryant Walker Smith, ‘Controlling Humans and Machines’ (2016) 30 Temple International & 
Comparative Law Journal 167, 172. 
24 Ibid., 173. 
25 Ibid., 171-73 (giving the examples of sensor-fused weapons, whose submunitions explode only under 
technically defined conditions). 
26 Arkin (n 12). 
27 iPraw (n 18), 14-15 (discussing ‘control by design’, which may “create deliberate technical limitations 
on range or effect as ways to maintain control”). 
28 Flight Envelope Protection is a set of technical limits embedded in the control system of a commercial 
aircraft, which overrides pilot commands that would otherwise force the system beyond its safe 
operating limits. 
29 Smith (n 23), 176. 
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4.3 The Structural Legal Argument for Human Judgment and 
Control Over an ‘Individual Attack’ 
This argument builds on 3.2, in that only human beings can be the addressees of 
IHL/LOAC.30 While machines apply a technical process that commanders will have 
anticipated in their legal assessment of a planned attack, those machines do not have 
agency (hence, they cannot assume legal obligations); and they lack autonoetic 
metacognition and broader deliberative thinking (hence, they cannot apply LOAC 
principles on behalf of persons using/deploying them).  
4.3.1 Individual Rules Requiring ‘MHC’ 
By contrast, Article 57(2)(a), AP I, which imposes precautionary obligations on “those 
who plan or decide upon an attack”,31 clearly refers to human judgment governing the 
execution of a single attack. Sub-Paragraph (b) of the same provision stipulates that 
“an attack shall be cancelled or suspended” where it becomes apparent that this 
has/will become unlawful; the same is written in the restatement of customary law, 
where the obligation is aptly entitled “Control during the Execution of Attacks”.32 
Even before these specific rules are articulated, Article 57(1) sets the tone for an 
‘individual attack’ limitation by requiring that in all military operations, “constant care 
shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects”.33 
Moreover, Article 52(2) stipulates that a targetable military objective must offer “a 
definite military advantage” in “the circumstances ruling at the time”,34 while Article 
51(4)(a)-(b) prohibits as indiscriminate any attack that is not, or cannot be, “directed 
at a specific military objective”.35 Sub-Paragraph (c) of that same provision prohibits 
any weapon “the effects of which cannot be limited”;36 namely, those that “have 
                                                          
30 Marco Sassóli, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open 
Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified’ (2014) 90 International Law Studies 308, 323-
24. 
31 Emphasis added. These precautionary obligations are also enshrined in the ICRC’s restatement of 
customary law. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules (CUP, 2005) (hereafter, CIHL), Rules 15-18. Rules available at: 
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul> accessed 10 June 2018. 
32 CIHL, Rule 19. 
33 Emphasis added. See also CIHL, Rule 15. 
34 Emphasis added. See also CIHL, Rule 8. 
35 Emphasis added. ‘Directed’ is arguably synonymous with ‘controlled’, and ‘specific’ clearly indicates 
an individual target. The difference between the two Sub-Paragraphs is that (b) focuses on the weapon, 
while (a) points to how it is used. See also CIHL, Rules 11, 12 and 71. 
36 Emphasis added. See also CIHL, Rules 12 and 71. 
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uncontrollable effects”.37 Accordingly, human judgment and control over an 
‘individual attack’ are assumed and required by law; in principle and irrespective of 
the technical sophistication of a machine. Notwithstanding, this argument certainly 
chimes with the current state of the art: as discussed in Chapter 2, machine perception 
is now relatively advanced in narrow domains, yet it remains brittle in assessing the 
wider context and in applying ‘judgment’. This lends additional (practical) support to 
the idea that human judgment and control must be exercised over individual attacks. 
4.3.2 A Broad Standard, Not a Bright-Line Rule 
Yet, this legal assumption and requirement does not mean that LOAC imposes specific 
ex ante restrictions on the actions that a LAWS may take. Such restrictions are likely 
to be contextual, determined (in part) by the technical sophistication of the machine, 
and the complexity of both its assigned task and the operational environment. Instead, 
the structural legal requirement merely implies that there are certain boundaries to 
independent machine operation, based on the notion of an ‘individual attack’.38 That 
said, an individual attack may potentially comprise multiple acts of violence against 
multiple specific targets.39 This is apparent from Article 49, AP I, which defines an 
‘attack’ as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence”.40 
The use of the plural suggests that an attack can comprise multiple specific 
engagements,41 so long as each one is directed at a specific target as per Article 
51(4)(a). Indeed, as Anderson explains: 
 
The size of something that constitutes an attack…doesn’t include an 
entire campaign. It’s not a war…[but] an attack is broader than simply 
the firing of any particular weapon…[it] is going to very often involve 
many different soldiers, many different units, air and ground forces.42 
 
                                                          
37 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply 
to the Critics’ (2013) Harvard National Security Journal Features 1, 14 (referring to a biological 
contagion, which can initially infect a combatant, before spreading to civilians beyond the 
commander’s/operator’s control). 
38 Article 36 (n 2); Article 36, ‘Key Elements of Meaningful Human Control’, Background Paper to 
Comments Prepared by Richard Moyes for the CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS (11-15 April 2016) 
<http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-2016-FINAL.pdf> accessed 10 June 
2018. See also 5.5.2 on the risk of this being eroded by developing capabilities. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Also acknowledged in the ICRC’s restatement of customary law, CIHL, Rule 1. 
41 Indeed, there are several currently-fielded systems that operate in this way, like the sensor-fused 
weapon and the multiple-launch rocket system. 
42 Kenneth Anderson, cited in Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of 
War (Norton, 2018), 269-70. 
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Thus, how many acts of violence may be considered a single attack is also highly 
contextual, and will depend partly on the machine’s technical sophistication, partly on 
some of the elements of MHC outlined below, such as the spatio-temporal limits. This 
is reinforced by the ICRC’s AP I Commentary, which notes that an attack relates to “a 
specific military operation limited in time and place”.43  
4.3.3 The Structural Nature of MHC and the Non-Necessity of Additional 
Rules 
Accordingly, the MHC concept does not add anything substantive to the law, and some 
argue that it should not be seen as a new concept, much less a distinct legal concept.44 
Conversely, some of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) cited in 1.1 are 
explicitly calling for a LAWS ban via codification of the MHC concept, in a Protocol 
to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).45 Several authors have 
also argued for MHC to be codified as a separate IHL/LOAC principle,46 both to 
increase its normative power47 and to enhance its legal power,48 via amendments to 
AP I49 and the preamble of the CCW.50 However, as appealing as this may sound, it 
would disturb the crucial military necessity-humanity (MN-H) balance, and risk 
                                                          
43 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 12th August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987),          
¶ 4783 (emphasis added). 
44 See ‘Chair’s Summary of the Discussion on Agenda item 6(a) 9 and 10 April 2018, Agenda item 6(b) 
11 April 2018 and 12 April 2018, Agenda item 6(c) 12 April 2018, Agenda item 6(d) 13 April 2018’, 
Chair’s Documents at the 2018 GGE Meeting on LAWS (9-13 April 2018), 5 
<https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/DF486EE2B556C8A6C125827A00488B9E
/$file/Summary+of+the+discussions+during+GGE+on+LAWS+April+2018.pdf> accessed 5 July 
2018 (summarising State views on MHC at the April 2018 GGE, where some had “pointed out that 
while terms such as human control did not create an obligation under IHL, their use could be derived 
from the requirement for compliance with IHL in the application of lethal force”). See also 4.5.6. 
45 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (adopted 10 October 1980, 
entered into force 2 December 1983, amended on 21 December 2001) 1342 UNTS 137.  
46 For example, Sharkey (n 3); Elvira Rosert, ‘How to Regulate Autonomous Weapons: Steps to Codify 
Meaningful Human Control as a Principle of International Humanitarian Law’, PRIF Spotlight 6/2017 
(November 2017) <https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/Spotlight0617.pdf> 
accessed 10 June 2018. 
47 Rosert, ibid. (for example, by formalising greater considerations of humanity, by raising its 
prominence via inclusion in key IHL documents, and by allowing it to benefit from the strength of other 
key IHL principles). 
48 Ibid. (for example, by requiring States to formally consider MHC in their legal reviews of new 
weapons). 
49 Ibid. (specifically arguing for an amendment to Article 35, to “prohibit…weapons operating without 
[MHC]”; and to Article 57, to require that “[MHC] is ensured in the conduct of military operations at 
all steps”). 




undermining both administrability and respect for IHL/LOAC by the armed forces that 
have to implement it.51 Indeed, issues of humanity (as well as necessity) already 
undergird all the individual rules, and it is not appropriate to supplement the latter with 
any further norms that swing the balance in favour of humanity. As Schmitt argues, 
“the requisite balancing has already taken place”,52 and any further shift in emphasis 
“risks destabilizing the delicate balance that preserves the viability of IHL in a state-
centric normative architecture”.53 Reeves and Thurnher make similar points, 
specifically in relation to LAWS and the push by NGOs for a pre-emptive ban.54 In 
particular, the authors argue that organisations like Human Rights Watch are “focused 
solely on humanitarian considerations”, and with limited military expertise, this 
“hinders their ability to assess properly where the appropriate balance lies”.55 
Consequently, NGOs have an “inherent inclination to blindly support humanitarian 
principles”, and “States should not be pressured into foreclosing [LAWS development 
or deployment] options without conducting a comprehensive review”.56  
 
Concerns regarding the erosion of the MN-H balance mostly emanate from 
international courts and tribunals, and from undue pressures exerted by United Nations 
(UN) bodies, or misinformed but well-mobilised NGOs.57 Purely State-driven 
codification towards greater humanitarian concern is, by definition, in keeping with an 
appropriate MN-H balance, as States are directly affected by both prongs.58 In a LAWS 
context, the more likely risk of a disruptive codification is undue pressure from NGOs 
on States. However even this may be unlikely, as treaty amendments are procedurally 
                                                          
51 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: 
Preserving the Delicate Balance’ (2010) 50 Virginia Journal of International Law 795 (explaining that 
both military necessity and humanity exist in a “fragile equipoise” in IHL, undergirding every individual 
rule). 
52 Ibid., 839. 
53 Ibid., 796. 
54 Shane R. Reeves and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘Are We Reaching a Tipping Point? How Contemporary 
Challenges are Affecting the Military Necessity-Humanity Balance’, Harvard National Security 
Journal Features (24 June 2013), 6-9 <http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/HNSJ-
Necessity-Humanity-Balance_PDF-format1.pdf> accessed 10 June 2018 (arguing that the current 
LAWS debate “illustrates the aggressive attempts to contravene the principle of military necessity by 
those who are singularly focused on humanitarian considerations”). 
55 Ibid., 8. 
56 Ibid., 8-9. 
57 Schmitt (n 51), 816-29. 
58 Ibid., 838 (arguing that this makes States uniquely placed to perform the balancing task, whereas 




difficult to pass,59 and with the current CCW membership strongly in disarray over 
how to move forward with LAWS (and some States rather unresponsive to NGO 
pressures),60 proposals to codify an MHC principle are arguably unlikely to 
materialise. 
4.4 Human-Machine Interaction ‘Touchpoints’ 
To focus discussions at the 2018 GGE meeting, the Chair synthesised the various State 
contributions on human-machine interaction ‘touchpoints’, and derived the following 
main points:61  
• Research and development. 
• Testing and evaluation (T&E), verification and validation (V&V), and legal 
reviews of new weapons. 
• Deployment, command and control. 
• Use and abort.  
 
In each one, it is expected that some deliberative human judgment can be exercised 
over (actual or potential) weapon systems. After discussions on the floor, States added 
three more touchpoints: the political level, training, and battle-damage assessment.62 
This derives the following illustrative list, in chronological order. 
 
Touchpoint Personnel Illustrative Activities 
The Political 
Level 
• Political leaders 
• Secretaries of 
Defence 
• North Atlantic 
Council 
• Deciding on defence procurement 
priorities 
• Providing political direction to Joint 
Force Commanders, to kick-start a 
deliberate targeting process (see 5.3.1) 
Research and 
Development 
• Project managers • To be fully informed by legal obligations, 
which should be decisive in 
programming, weapons design and user 
                                                          
59 See Article 97, AP I, which requires consultation with all State parties just to decide whether a 
conference should be convened to consider any amendment. 
60 See, for example, Denise Garcia, ‘Governing Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems’, Ethics & 
International Affairs (13 December 2017) 
<https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/governing-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/> 
accessed 10 June 2018 (explaining that State parties are split along three major lines: those wanting a 
ban or moratoria; those opposing a ban, or even any specific regulation; and those advocating a 
politically binding agreement based on MHC concepts, but no legal solution). 
61 See ‘Chair’s Summary’ (n 44), 4. 
62 Ibid., 5; author’s notes, April 2018 GGE Meeting on LAWS (11 April 2018). 
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• Engineers from both 
defence contractors 
and ministries of 
defence 
• Military personnel, 
especially in T&E  
interface designs (e.g. specific 
instruments and software procedures to 
enable human input and intervention; 
recordability, auditability and 
explainability) 
• Collaboration between software and 
hardware designers, to ensure 
compatibility and reliability 
• Conduct T&E and V&V procedures, fit 
for autonomous systems and in realistic 
settings 
The Legal 










• Consider T&E and V&V results 
• Imposing deployment and use restrictions 
in line with the testing and technical data 
• Assessing the system’s capacity to be 
used in accordance with the LOAC 
Training 
• Human resource 
personnel 
• Training personnel 
(e.g. instructors) 
• Training of existing personnel: 
commanders, legal advisers, battle staffs 
and weapons operators; to ensure their 
ability to use a given system in 
compliance with international law (see 
7.3.6.7) 
• Inclusion of new personnel in battle 
staffs, e.g. software engineers and 




• Joint Force 
Commanders  
• Unit commanders 
• Military legal 
advisers 




• Deliberate targeting process (see 5.3.1) 
• Double principle of command and 
subordination 
➢ Framing, re-definition and adjustment 
of a weapon system’s mission to be 
done by humans only 
➢ Concrete decisions on ‘when and 
where’ of lethal force to be taken only 
by humans 
• Communications links – even if 
intermittent – must be maintained 
between the chain of command and the 
weapon system, to maintain sufficient 
control and ensure humans take ultimate 
decisions on the use of force 
Use and Abort  
• Weapons operators • Activate the LAWS: know the system’s 
characteristics; ensure these are apt for 
the operational environment; have 
sufficient and reliable information on 
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both, to make conscious decisions and 
ensure legal compliance (see 5.3.1.5) 
• Monitor the LAWS operation with a two-
step approach for maintaining control 
➢ Understand situation and context, 
especially when malfunction or battle 
space changes 
➢ Retain the option to intervene/override 
the system at all stages, or at least 
during target selection and engagement 
• All the above implies WO must: 
➢ Provide timely data inputs to ensure 
actions correspond with operator’s 
intention 
➢ Fully utilise user interfaces and ensure 




• Weapons operators 
• Military legal 
advisers 
• Select battle staffs 
• Assess for LOAC compliance (see 5.3.1.6 
and 7.3.6.6) 
• Measure any gaps between T&E and field 
use 
• Discover possible humanitarian 
improvements to the LAWS, even if no 
norms are violated  
 
 
4.4.1 Upstream versus Downstream Touchpoints 
A convenient way to categorise the above stages is to divide them between upstream 
(the first four) and downstream (the last three) touchpoints; or ante bellum and in 
bello.63 Upstream touchpoints occur at times and locations far removed from any 
concrete operation or civilian risk situation (hence, ante bellum), whereas the 
downstream touchpoints all occur during, or at least relatively near to, a battlefield 
situation (in bello). Related to this, the ICRC has noted that it is in the penultimate 
touchpoint – when a LAWS is in use, and it autonomously executes the narrow critical 
functions – that “the important question arises as to whether human control in the 
[preceding] stages is sufficient to overcome minimal or no human control at this last 
                                                          
63 Heather Roff and Richard Moyes, ‘Meaningful Human Control, Artificial Intelligence and 
Autonomous Weapons’, Briefing Paper for Delegates at the CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS (11-15 
April 2016), 3 <http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-
FINAL.pdf> accessed 7 July 2018. 
Table 4.1: Human-machine interaction touchpoints. Source: Author’s expanded notes, April 2018 GGE Meeting. 
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stage”.64 In this connexion, the views of States and other commentators differ widely 
on whether a human should authorise specific actions;65 monitor them with an override 
and abort capability;66 rely on upstream programming or downstream (commander) 
setting of deployment parameters;67 or insist on a combination of all touchpoints.68 As 
will be seen in Chapters 6 and 7, the answer is likely to be context-dependent. 
4.4.2 An Individual, Not a Cumulative Standard 
Two opposing conclusions can be drawn from Table 4.1. On the one hand, the multiple 
stages at which human judgment can come to bear may afford a greater overall 
opportunity to ensure (practical) human control, as implied by the ICRC’s question 
above. On the other hand, the involvement of various actors potentially muddies what 
is (legally) meant by ‘MHC over LAWS’, raising the temptation to regard ‘human 
control’ as being a cumulative standard.69 This would be problematic, as there can be 
no ‘shared responsibility’ over the use of a weapon system,70 much less can there be 
shared liability in international criminal law (ICL), which specifically requires that 
convictions be based on individual criminal responsibility;71 save in cases of joint 
criminal enterprise.72 Moreover, since there is a direct relationship in international law 
between ‘control exercised’ and ‘responsibility’,73 there can be no ‘shared control’ 
                                                          
64 ICRC, ‘Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon 
Systems’, Working Paper Submitted to the CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS (11-15 April 2016), 3 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/21606/ccw-autonomous-weapons-icrc-april-2016.pdf> 
accessed 10 June 2018. 
65 For example, Thompson Chengeta, ‘What Level of Human Control Over Autonomous Weapon 
Systems is Required by International Law?’ EJIL: Talk! (17 May 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-
level-of-human-control-over-autonomous-weapon-systems-is-required-by-international-law/> 
accessed 10 June 2018. 
66 Kjølv Egeland ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Humanitarian Law’ (2016) 
85 Nordic Journal of international Law 89, 102-03. 
67 For example, Schmitt (n 37). 
68 For example, Article 36 (n 38); Roff and Moyes (n 63). 
69 Thompson Chengeta, ‘Defining the Emerging Notion of ‘Meaningful Human Control’ in Weapon 
Systems’ (2017) 49 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 833, 865 (referring 
to the US delegation putting this idea forward at the 2014 CCW Expert Meeting). 
70 Ralph G. Steinhardt, ‘Weapons and the Human Rights Responsibilities of Multinational 
Corporations’ in Stuart Casey-Maslen (ed.), Weapons Under International Human Rights Law (CUP, 
2014), 531-32. 
71 Article 75(4)(b), AP I; CIHL, Rule 102.  
72 Joint criminal enterprise is where a number of persons (e.g. a designer, programmer, commander and 
a weapons operator) form an organised group to make use of a LAWS in a way that violates ICL. So 
long as the crimes are committed within the common plan or purpose, each member of the group is 
individually responsible: Prosecutor v. Tadić, (ICTY Appeals Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999),    
¶¶ 220, 227 and 228. 
73 Kristen E. Boon, ‘Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The Slippage Problem in Attribution 
Doctrines’ (2014) 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law 329; Amy Tan, ‘Responsibility and 
Control in International Law and Beyond’, The Hague Institute for Global Justice (27 June 2013) 
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either. Legally, each actor will have ‘control’ over a LAWS only in their own 
capacity.74 
 
However, this does not mean there cannot be cumulative or collective control within a 
single touchpoint. For example, in ‘deployment, command and control’ (the deliberate 
targeting process) there is often a large number of battle staffs contributing towards 
‘target development’ and ‘capabilities analysis’.75 However, as all their activities occur 
under the same command and control structure, with an identifiable Joint Force 
Commander (or unit commanders), it is appropriate to take a relatively more expansive 
view of MHC here.76  
 
Thus, while all actors at all touchpoints do potentially play an important role in 
ensuring that LAWS are ultimately used lawfully, MHC cannot legally constitute the 
sum total of their activities. Rather, it is a discrete standard that applies to each 
individual entity, albeit collectively within each touchpoint entity.  
4.4.3 Core and Derived MHC in Law 
Nonetheless, in practical terms ‘control’ is more useful as an overall structure than as 
a standalone concept.77 This counsels in favour of seeing complementary discrete 
standards that ensure individual accountability while promoting overall human control 
over LAWS. Arguably, the initial focus (to determine a ‘core’ MHC standard) should 
be on the combatant/weapons operator (WO), for three main reasons. First, most 
writings on the ‘accountability gap’ focus on the WO’s role, arguing that autonomy 
without his control would make it difficult to ascertain intention for the purpose of 
establishing criminal responsibility.78 Thus, beginning with the WO is an important 
step in addressing this gap, and it chimes with the basic legal inquiry for ‘effective 
                                                          
<http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/latest-insights/latest-insights/news-
brief/responsibility-and-control-in-international-law-and-beyond/> accessed 10 June 2018. 
74 Chengeta (n 65); (n 69), 866. 
75 As will be seen in 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.3, these two phases involve distributed decision-making in 
selecting specific targets (or target sets) and matching these to appropriate weapons, such as LAWS. 
76 Merel AC. Ekelhof, ‘Lifting the Fog of Targeting: “Autonomous Weapons” and Human Control 
through the Lens of Military Targeting’ (2018) 71 Naval War College Review 61. 
77 Bryant Walker Smith, Lawyers and Engineers Should Speak the Same Robot Language’ in Ryan 
Calo, A. Michael Froomkin and Ian Kerr (eds.), Robot Law (Edward Elgar, 2016). 
78 This is true of Human Rights Watch and Wagner, both cited in Chapter 3, n 55 therein. 
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control’ in the various branches of international law, which has been suggested as: 
“who is the aggregator of power, who can be held accountable…?”79  
 
Second, as the end-user of a LAWS, the WO makes terminal (‘trigger-pull’) choices 
that have concrete effects on the battlefield.80 By contrast, other actors like designers 
and programmers are far-removed, and their decisions are made in a relatively more 
abstract setting. Hence, much of the structural legal requirement for MHC over an 
‘individual attack’ directly applies to the WO,81 again underscoring why MHC 
standards should begin here.82 
 
Finally, once the WO’s core MHC standard is established this conveniently determines 
the responsibilities of all other actors,83 whose ‘derived’ MHC standards must support 
the WO’s core obligations. For example, if it is deemed that WOs should conduct 
periodic battle-damage assessments to keep a long deployment within the individual 
attack limitation,84 designers will have to ensure this capability, for example, by 
designing-in cameras with full-motion video recording and reliable datalinks. In some 
cases, derived MHC obligations may involve technically ‘enforcing’ the core 
standards through further design features. Thus, if it is determined that some forms of 
online learning85 would violate Article 51(4)(b), AP I, by introducing the risk of 
learning ‘wrong lessons’,86 programmers may have to hard-code a technical 
prohibition against online learning combined with target engagement authority.87 
Alternatively, if the capability for online learning is required (for very narrow 
circumstances), programmers may enable it subject to commander authorisation via 
strict access control mechanisms.88 In short, the standard of MHC that WOs are legally 
                                                          
79 Chengeta (n 69), 876; Tan (n 73) (emphasis added). It should be noted, that ‘effective control’ is 
referred to in the broadest sense. There is no suggestion that effective control tests developed in specific 
settings, such as to establish State responsibility or command responsibility, are applicable to LAWS. 
80 Chengeta, ibid., 868. Namely, he is the ‘aggregator of power’ at the time closest to weapons release. 
81 See 4.3.1. For example, Articles 51(4)(a), 52(2) and 57(2)(b), AP I, all apply just before ‘trigger-pull’. 
82 Note that some MHC-related rules, such as those contained in Article 57(2)(a), AP I, directly apply 
to commanders who also assume ‘core’ MHC obligations. 
83 Chengeta (n 69), 869. 
84 See 7.3.6.6 on upper engagement limits. 
85 See 2.5.1.4 on potential types/outcomes of online learning. 
86 See 2.5.3.2 on brittleness and the risk of learning ‘wrong lessons’. 
87 On technical prohibitions to promote good faith commander intentions, see Arkin (n 12). 
88 Maziar Homayounnejad and Richard E. Overill, ‘Preventing Autonomous Weapon Systems from 
Being Used to Perpetrate Intentional Violations of the Laws of War’, TLI Think! Paper 8/2018 (2018), 
38-39 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123254> accessed 21 May 2018 (describing various access control 
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obliged to exercise should serve as a yardstick and guidelines for the technical 
capabilities and limitations of a LAWS; and for the role of all other actors, which must 
be congruent with the WO’s MHC.89 
4.5 The Elements of MHC 
As noted in 2.3.4.3, a likely form of MHC to moderate weapons autonomy will be 
through human-prescribed target parameters, and geographical and temporal 
boundaries, which are set tightly enough to enable control over an ‘individual 
attack’.90 These ‘building blocks’ were first popularised by UK-based NGO Article 
36,91 which subsequently added the operational environment.92 All else being equal, 
they restrict autonomous lethal targeting to competences in which machines excel and 
are more reliable; namely, those involving automatic processing. Importantly, these 
parameters approximate to some of the criteria and sub-criteria for reliable autonomy 
introduced in 2.2.3.2, thus they may be expected to make LAWS operations more 
predictable and controllable for the human commander/WO.  
4.5.1 Article 36: MHC Building Blocks in More Detail 
Target parameters are (object) characteristics that are amenable to detection by 
automatic target recognition (ATR).93 Accurate detection is achieved through a 
target’s infrared, radar or acoustic signatures;94 and/or its shape and image, among 
other things.95 Such detectable characteristics are proxy indicators of an intended and 
legitimate target, which aim to ensure that no objects other than intended targets are 
selected for lethal attack.96 Accordingly, the number and type of proxy indicators that 
are programmed into a LAWS can affect the degree of MHC afforded to a 
commander/WO. For example, ‘motorised vehicle with engine heat signature’ may be 
                                                          
mechanisms that ensure high-level authorisation and accountability for sensitive adjustments to military 
systems). 
89 Chengeta (n 65). 
90 See 4.3. 
91 Article 36, ‘Structuring the Debate on Autonomous Weapons Systems’, Memorandum for Delegates 
to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (14-15 November 2013) 
<http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Autonomous-weapons-memo-for-CCW.pdf> 
accessed 10 June 2018. 
92 Article 36 (n 2). 
93 See 2.5.4 on the various approaches to ATR. 
94 This is true of cooperative targets. See 2.5.4.2. 
95 Article 36 (n 2), 4. This is potentially true of both cooperative and non-cooperative targets. See 
2.5.4.2. 
96 Article 36 (n 91), 2. 
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intended to select and engage the military vehicles of the enemy. However, with such 
a broad target parameter, commanders may deem the risk of inadvertent attacks on 
civilian and medical vehicles to be unacceptable. By contrast, very specific models of 
military vehicle that are known to be used only by the enemy – for example, ‘T-80 
Tank’ – combined with appropriate image recognition capabilities,97 will narrow down 
the ‘tolerance of error’.98 In turn, this may increase the likelihood that the 
commander’s/WO’s intentions are carried out on the battlefield, thereby increasing the 
degree of MHC over the LAWS. 
 
The geographical area over which, and the time during which, an attack takes place 
can also confer MHC by imposing spatial and temporal limitations on the autonomous 
operation of a LAWS. If the geographical location of the target area is relatively small 
and fixed in space, and the time window is relatively brief, a human commander/WO 
will be more likely to possess the necessary information, at any given moment, to 
determine which objects other than legitimate and intended targets may be at risk of 
being targeted by a LAWS, or incidentally affected by an attack.99 Moreover, narrow 
spatio-temporal boundaries reduce the likelihood that the physical environment will 
change during a deployment, and degrade sensory perception.100 
 
The operational environment in which a LAWS is deployed can also confer MHC 
by affecting the ‘tolerance of error’.101 Thus, in a cluttered environment where there is 
a dense concentration of civilians and civilian objects that potentially match the target 
parameters, and which are sufficiently nearby as to be affected by an attack, 
commanders are likely to have less control over the unintended consequences of a 
LAWS; hence MHC may be undermined. By contrast, in a traditional battlespace – 
air, sea or open desert – civilians are less likely to be present, hence commanders are 
more likely to exercise MHC in the deployment/use of LAWS.102 
 
                                                          
97 See 2.5.2 on object recognition and 2.5.4.1 on standard ATR approaches. 
98 Article 36 (n 2), 4. 
99 Article 36 (n 91), 3. 
100 See 2.5.5.1. 




To summarise, the potential lawfulness of a LAWS deployment hinges on limitations 
being placed on its independent operation. These enable those responsible for the 
planning and conduct of an attack to make informed judgments on its military utility 
and necessity, and on broader issues regarding the legality of the use of force. 
4.5.2 Article 36: Key Elements of MHC 
More recently, Article 36 discussed a more comprehensive and consolidated 
understanding of the ‘key elements’ of MHC.103 These are necessary to allow for the 
effective application of the LOAC rules and to prevent the structure of the law from 
progressive erosion.104 They comprise the following.105 
(1) Predictable, reliable and transparent technology. Together, these imply that 
the technology will follow a discernibly repeatable pattern; will not be prone 
to failure, and will be designed to fail safe; and will be readily understandable 
to those deploying and using it. These characteristics have implications for 
(upstream) design and testing, as well as the legal review of new weapons, and 
their intended result is to increase the level of downstream control exercised 
by commanders/WOs. 
(2) Accurate information for (and understanding by) the user on the outcome 
sought, the technology and the context of use. Focusing on the downstream, 
the crucial issue of predictability is determined not just by the technology itself, 
but also by the commander’s understanding of the technology106 and how it 
will interact with the operational environment. Thus, information on context is 
also needed, especially on the presence and movements of civilians and civilian 
objects. Furthermore, the ability to understand context is directly linked to both 
the size of the area in which a LAWS will operate, and the time during which 
it will operate: for any given environment, a greater area and longer duration 
of autonomous operation reduces predictability and human control. Yet, 
different operational environments – land, air or sea; sparse or cluttered – have 
different characteristics: a large geographical area on the high-seas may afford 
                                                          
103 Article 36 (n 38), 4. 
104 Ibid., 3. This refers to potential pressures arising from autonomous technologies to expand the 
concept of an ‘attack’, and will be explained further in 5.5.2. 
105 All summarised from ibid., 4. 
106 For example, its target profile templates, the nature and extent of its multisensory phenomenologies 
(on which, see 2.5.4.1), how it will apply kinetic force, etc. 
133 
 
greater contextual understanding than a smaller area on land.107 Consequently, 
an understanding of both technology and context should enable the commander 
to assess likely outcomes from an attack, including both the objectives sought 
and the unintended (collateral) effects. This enables the commander and his 
legal advisers to a) assess the validity of a military objective at the time of 
attack, and b) to evaluate and select a proposed attack option within the LOAC 
rules. The final assessed outcome must match the commander’s lawful intent 
with a certain degree of probability. If it does not, then the time and space of 
operation should be reduced until an acceptable degree of certainty can be 
discerned. Ultimately, these all enhance the predictability of outcomes – both 
positive and negative – that form the basis of legal assessments. 
(3) Timely human judgment and action, and a potential for timely intervention. 
Based on the information and understanding gleaned from the second key 
element, human commanders need to apply their judgment – as implied by the 
structural legal analysis in 4.3.1 – and select a specific weapon system, to be 
deployed in a specific way. Timeliness is of vital importance here, as the 
information being acted upon becomes less relevant over time. Also, given the 
often-fast tempo of warfare, timely intervention may be needed to minimise 
the risk of unintended engagements. 
 
While these key elements represent further development of the four parameters of 
MHC articulated by Article 36 in earlier years, they do not provide exact boundaries 
or any bright-line rules. Instead, the MHC elements should be seen as providing a 
framework within which the application of the LOAC rules should be articulated 
within the targeting process.108  
4.5.3 Horowitz and Scharre: Essential Components of MHC 
A similar approach to the above can be seen in Horowitz and Scharre, whose Primer 
on MHC discussed three ‘essential components’ of the concept, which are derived 
from the kind of human control exercised over present-day weapon systems. The 
authors argue this is necessary to ensure MHC reflects the realities of the battlefield 
                                                          
107 Note that this coincides with simpler operational environments being more amenable to autonomous 
action, as explained in 2.2.3.2. 
108 See Chapter 5. 
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and how weapons are actually used, thereby increasing the likelihood that it will be 
taken up by key stakeholders.109 The essential components are: 
(1) Human operators are making informed, conscious decisions about the use of 
weapons. 
(2) Human operators have sufficient information to ensure the lawfulness of the 
action they are taking, given what they know about the target, the weapon and 
the context for action. 
(3) The weapon is designed and tested, and human operators are properly trained, 
to ensure effective control over the use of the weapon.110 
 
The intention is for MHC to ensure that commanders are making conscious decisions, 
with sufficient information to remain legally accountable for their actions.111 
4.5.4 ICRC: Distilling MHC From Current-Day Weapon systems 
The ICRC has also extracted a number of MHC factors from existing weapon systems 
that select and engage targets without human intervention.112 It concludes that human 
control in these systems is determined by:113 
(1) Verified technical performance of the weapon system for its intended use, as 
determined during the development stage. 
(2) Sufficient knowledge and understanding of the weapon system’s 
functioning by the commander/WO, and adequate situational awareness of 
the operational environment, especially in relation to civilian risk. This will 
form the basis of operational parameters, which are largely designed-in at 
the development stage, and further set or adjusted at the activation/deployment 
stage. These include constraints on: 
• The task assigned to the weapon system. 
• The type of target it may attack. 
• The type of force and munitions employed (and their associated effects). 
                                                          
109 Michael C. Horowitz and Paul Scharre ‘Meaningful Human Control in Weapon Systems: A Primer’, 
CNAS Project on Ethical Autonomy Working Paper (March 2015), 10 (emphasis added) 
<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189786/Ethical_Autonomy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf> accessed 10 
June 2018. 
110 Ibid., 14-15.  
111 Ibid., 15. 
112 ICRC (n 64). 
113 The following is summarised from Neil Davison, ‘A Legal Perspective: Autonomous Weapon 
Systems Under International Humanitarian Law’ in UNODA, Occasional Papers No. 30: Perspectives 
on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (United Nations, November 2017), 11-15. 
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• The operational environment in which the weapon system is to operate. 
• The mobility of the weapon system in space. 
• The time frame of its operation. 
• The extent of adaptability permitted. 
(3) The level of human supervision and ability to intervene during the 
operation stage. This supplements the parameters set on deployment, to 
continue retaining MHC. 
 
Much of this overlaps with 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, though four (new) points need elaborating. 
First, constraints on the task assigned can be quantitative (limiting these to one or a 
few tasks), or qualitative (limiting these to the most precise, well-defined tasks with 
tangible outcomes).114 Second, constraints on the type of target refers to whether 
persons, vehicles and/or broader categories of objects are targeted.115 Third, the type 
of force and munitions employed refer to whether lethal or non-lethal force is used; and 
if the former, how large the blast radius and potential collateral effects. Finally, 
adaptability can be of two kinds: a) setting own goals, or adapting human-set goals in 
response to the environment;116 or b) being deployed in online learning mode to refine 
existing tactics, or to develop new targets and tactics on-the-fly.117 
4.5.5 Common Strands and Elements of MHC 
Others have also enumerated MHC elements, much of which overlap with the 
above.118 Overall, the concept arguably comprises three distinct but complementary 
sets of elements: 
• Predictability and reliability of systems and their use, by way of weapons 
design, V&V, T&E, learning parameters, legal review and personnel 
training.119 
                                                          
114 Ibid., 2. See 2.2.3.2. An example of a precise task may be defending against incoming projectiles of 
a defined speed, distance and trajectory. The tangible outcome would be the projectile being destroyed 
or averted. 
115 Ibid.  
116 For example, where an anti-material system comes under attack by a person, it may be authorised to 
assess the situation and determine whether returning fire (thus, shifting to anti-personnel targeting) is 
warranted. 
117 ICRC (n 64), 3.  
118 For example, iPRAW (n 18), 14-15;  and UNIDIR, ‘The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous 
Technologies: Considering How Meaningful Human Control Might Move the Discussion Forward’, 
UNIDIR Resources, No. 2 (2014), 5-7 <http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/considering-how-
meaningful-human-control-might-move-the-discussion-forward-en-615.pdf> accessed 10 June 2018. 
119 While weapons law is outside the scope of this thesis, see 6.3 and n 30 therein. 
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• Operational constraints on time and space,120 targets,121 nature and quantity 
of tasks,122 the type of force and munitions employed,123 the operational 
environment,124 and the extent of adaptability;125 all to keep within the 
‘individual attack’ limitation. 
• Conditions of judgment, in particular, requiring informed and conscious 
decision-making, based on sufficient information about the applicable law, the 
target, the weapon, the operational environment, the context for action and the 
interaction between these.126 This includes incorporating a feedback loop that 
enables a commander/WO to detect when deployment and use are straying 
from lawful boundaries, and to abort the mission.127 
 
The last two bullet points concern downstream MHC, which applies during the 
targeting process. The first bullet point is concerned with upstream MHC, which 
generally occurs far from any contact zone, but is vital for enabling MHC during 
combat. Importantly, there is no ‘one size fits all’ formulation. The extent of human 
control required in any given mission must be adapted to the specific task and 
environment at hand, and it must allow the human to make meaningful decisions that 
comply with the LOAC rules.128 
4.5.6 An Interpretive Aid, Not a Distinct Legal Concept 
Despite its importance for legal compliance, MHC should arguably not be seen as a 
distinct concept. In fact, it may be harmful if it is treated discretely, lest it becomes the 
primary object of a weapons deployment and potentially misapplied in a way that 
conflicts with LOAC norms. To be sure, the concept is useful in that it brings to the 
fore issues that are crucial to the lawful use of LAWS, but which have been 
unnecessary to consider with manned and remotely-piloted systems. Namely, it 
provides a suitable lens through which to evaluate how a given deployment will meet 
LOAC norms. Moreover, MHC is “intuitively appealing” to all States in the Geneva 
                                                          
120 See 7.3.6.4 on spatio-temporal limits. 
121 See 7.3.6.5 on target parameters. 
122 See 7.3.6.6 on upper engagement limits. 
123 See 6.5.5 on Canning’s proposal. 
124 See 6.5.5 and 7.2.3.1 on restricting deployments to benign operational environments. 
125 See 7.3.6.3 on a precautionary approach to online learning. 
126 See 7.3.6.7 on training, and 7.3.6.8 on staffing. 
127 See 7.2.3.4 on real-time communication links. 
128 ‘Chair’s Summary’ (n 44), 6. 
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process,129 as it affords a degree of latitude that accommodates different views while 
identifying bipolar extremes for consensus.130 Importantly for LAWS, the flexibility 
of the term allows for adaptive interpretations over time, while ruling out extreme and 
dangerous developments, and this makes it particularly useful for addressing new 
technology.131  
 
However, there are concerns that if MHC was to evolve into a new legal standard in 
and of itself, it may risk blurring the clarity of existing laws, and this scepticism is 
shared by both academics132 and States133 alike. The argument is similar but distinct to 
the one raised in 4.3.3, which focused on MN-H distortions in future. The current 
argument concerns how a distinct MHC concept may cause uncertainty of existing 
legal standards, to the extent that civilian risk and force casualties may increase. For 
example, consider the ‘minimum necessary standards for meaningful control’ put 
forward by the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC): 
 
First, a human commander (or operator) must have full contextual and 
situational awareness of the target area and be able to perceive and react 
to any change or unanticipated situations that may have arisen since 
planning the attack. 
 
Second, there must be active cognitive participation in the attack and 
sufficient time for deliberation on the nature of the target, its 
significance in terms of the necessity and appropriateness of attack, and 
likely incidental and possible accidental effects of the attack. 
 
                                                          
129 UNIDIR (n 118), 2. 
130 Rebecca Crootof, ‘A Meaningful Floor for “Meaningful Human Control”’ (2016) 30 Temple 
International & Comparative Law Journal 53, 56 (noting that this can be beneficial for securing early 
State support, so long as consensus on the details does later materialise). 
131 Colin B. Picker, ‘A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of Technology’ 
(2001) 23 Cardozo Law Review 149, 184-87 (discussing the glacial pace of law-making in technology-
related fields). 
132 For example, Horowitz and Scharre (n 109); Crootof (n 130); Thilo Marauhn, ‘Meaningful Human 
Control – and the Politics of International Law’ in von Heinegg, Frau and Singer (eds.) (n 21); Kenneth 
Anderson and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, their Ethics, and their 
Regulation under International Law’ in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford and Karen Yeung (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (OUP, 2017). 
133  See, for example, Report of the 2015 Informal Meeting of Experts on LAWS (2 June 2015) UN Doc. 
CCW/MSP/2015/3, ¶¶ 39 and 51(a)(iv) <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/111/60/PDF/G1511160.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 24 June 2018 
(“Several [States] expressed scepticism over the utility of [MHC], assessing it as being too vague, 
subjective and unclear…[MHC] may be useful as a policy approach to address shortcomings in current 
technology. However, it should not be applied as a legal criterion as this could undermine existing 
targeting law by introducing ambiguity”). 
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Third, there must be a means for the rapid suspension or abortion of the 
attack.134  
 
Horowitz and Scharre criticise this as being an “idealized version of human control 
divorced from the reality of warfare and the weapons that have long been considered 
acceptable”.135 Certainly, on a literal interpretation this definition would prohibit most 
fire-and-forget munitions that remain in flight for any appreciable length of time, and 
this includes a large number of precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Yet, PGMs have 
existed for over 70 years and are now used by nearly every modern military,136 thus 
their use is arguably lawful under customary international law.137 Moreover, since their 
adoption and growth, PGMs have been instrumental in reducing civilian casualties,138 
as well as public and political tolerance towards such casualties.139 Indeed, the 
substitution of PGMs for unguided munitions in an urban area may even turn what 
would otherwise be a war crime into a legitimate attack.140 Arguably, the ICRAC 
definition would – if codified or seen as a distinct concept – at least lead to uncertainty. 
At worst, it would encourage a supplanting of less precise weapons merely by reason 
of having a human in-the-loop for longer, and this may needlessly sacrifice combatant 
and civilian lives.141 A similar argument applies in relation to purely defensive 
systems, such as the Phalanx, which are effective precisely because they select and 
engage incoming threats before any human even knows of the latter’s existence.142 
                                                          
134 Frank Sauer, ‘ICRAC Statement on Technical Issues to the 2014 UN CCW Expert Meeting’, ICRAC 
News (14 May 2014) <https://www.icrac.net/icrac-statement-on-technical-issues-to-the-2014-un-ccw-
expert-meeting/> accessed 24 June 2018. 
135 Horowitz and Scharre (n 109), 9. 
136 Barry D. Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects 
(CSBA, March 2007) <http://csbaonline.org/publications/2007/03/six-decades-of-guided-munitions-
and-battle-networks-progress-and-prospects/> accessed 3 July 2018. 
137 See the examples of State practice in CIHL, Rule 17 <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule17> accessed 3 July 2018.  
138 Michael C. Horowitz and Paul Scharre, ‘Do Killer Robots Save Lives?’ Politico Magazine (19 
November 2014) <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/11/killer-robots-save-lives-113010> 
accessed 3 July 2018 (noting that in World War II, air-dropped bombs only had a 50% chance of landing 
inside a 1.25-mile diameter. By Vietnam, this reduced to 50% falling inside an 800-foot diameter; now 
the diameter is as little as five feet. Consequently, smaller warheads and fewer munitions are required 
per target-hit, hence less collateral damage). 
139 Hugh White, ‘Civilian Immunity in the Precision-Guidance Age’ in Igor Primoratz (ed.), Civilian 
Immunity in War (OUP, 2010). 
140 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Ukraine: Unguided Rockets Killing Civilians’, Human Rights Watch 
News (24 July 2014) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/24/ukraine-unguided-rockets-killing-
civilians> accessed 3 July 2018 (commenting on the indiscriminate use of unguided Grad rockets in 
Donetsk and how that may have amounted to a war crime, if done intentionally or recklessly). 
141 Crootof (n 130), 62 (comparing the use of PGMs with the deployment of a human-piloted bomber). 




Accordingly, MHC should not be seen as a distinct legal concept, lest it dominates the 
legal analysis and blurs the clarity of existing rules.143 Instead, it usefully draws 
attention to relevant considerations when applying the law to autonomous weapons, 
and it helps to clarify the limits to be prescribed on such systems. Thus, MHC may 
facilitate the application of existing rules as they currently stand; for example, in a 
LOAC Manual.144 As will be seen through Chapters 5-7, the human factor is either 
already implicit in how LOAC compliance is secured,145 or it is one of several ways to 
ensure such compliance.146  
 
Moreover, as the above has demonstrated, MHC is open to variable criteria and even 
conflicting interpretations, which render it inherently imprecise.147 Evolving these into 
a discrete legal standard, as opposed to encouraging their contextual application, risks 
blurring the clarity of existing laws.148 Much worse, should this imprecision lead to 
human action supplanting machines in areas where automatic processing is more 
effective149 – as noted in the PGM and Phalanx examples, above – this may risk both 
combatant and civilian lives, hence undermining LOAC norms.150 Thus, Anderson and 
Waxman argue: 
 
[A]lthough some of its proponents view the MHC standard as flowing 
from LOAC, in some important respects it is quite at odds with the 
fundamental structure of LOAC, and its core principles of necessity, 
distinction, proportionality, and humanity.151 
 
                                                          
143 Ibid.; Marauhn (n 132). 
144 To reiterate: MHC provides a suitable lens through which to evaluate how a LAWS deployment will 
meet LOAC norms, but this does not mean it should become the primary object of such a deployment. 
145 Marauhn, (n 132), 216-17 (discussing the principle of proportionality, where the need for nuanced 
and contextual assessment mean human judgment and control emerges from within the norm, not from 
the MHC concept per se. Hence, human control is not a legal requirement in itself, but an approach to 
ensure compliance).  
146 Ibid., 214-15 (discussing the principle of distinction and target verification, where in many scenarios 
involving large military objects by nature, either human-led or automated means of target identification 
may suffice). 
147 Anderson and Waxman (n 132), 1113-14 (discussing the “strategic ambiguity” of the concept, and 
the broad interpretation given to it by the US versus the narrow interpretation adopted by States allied 
with NGOs). 
148 Ibid; Marauhn (n 132). 
149 See 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 on the need for machine assistance and restrictions on human action. 
150 Crootof (130), 61-62. 
151 Anderson and Waxman (n 132), 1114. 
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The authors argue that the rules and principles of LOAC are concerned with intended 
or estimated effects on the battlefield, whereas MHC as presented in some definitions 
focuses on a certain mode of weapons and attack. Anderson and Waxman continue: 
 
It is not a law of nature…that weapons that put a human being 
‘meaningfully’ in control of it, in some fashion, necessarily do the best 
job at minimizing battlefield harms. It is not beyond possibility that at 
some point, in some circumstances, a machine might do it better, on its 
own.152 
 
To reiterate, the MHC concept is useful in that it draws attention to various LAWS-
relevant issues. However, those issues are arguably better addressed with a contextual 
application of LOAC as it stands,153 with the established content of the current rules 
and principles serving as an “interpretive floor”.154 Namely, priority must be accorded 
to the correct application of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack, with 
MHC considerations serving to enhance the former’s application. Any approach to 
MHC that prioritises human involvement in the use of force at the expense of human 
lives is inimical to the aims of LOAC and must, therefore, be rejected. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the practical need for human judgment and control in 
autonomy, as well as the legal requirement for this in the use of force. Consequently, 
it is difficult to imagine any use of LAWS that operates beyond human control 
complying with LOAC. However, this does not mean MHC should be codified or even 
treated as a distinct concept, as this may distort the crucial MN-H balance and 
emasculate the law. Instead, MHC should serve as an aid to the interpretation and 
application of LOAC in the context of LAWS; priority should be accorded to the 
substance of the LOAC rules and principles, which can act as an ‘interpretive floor’. 
States and militaries should therefore identify the elements of MHC, as noted in this 
chapter, and integrate these into their national military manuals, training and the legal 
advice they provide to commanders. Of course, these same elements can also inform 
the drafting of a LOAC Manual by a group of experts. 
 
                                                          
152 Ibid. 
153 Marauhn (n 132). 
154 Crootof (n 130). 
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A crucial point that has come out of this chapter is that LAWS will have an extensive 
life-cycle, with potentially seven human-machine interaction touchpoints. Thus, 
contrary to much academic analyses on LAWS, the focus of MHC should not be 
narrowly confined to force execution, where the system selects and engages targets. 
Instead, MHC may permeate the entire life-cycle in such a way that ‘narrow loop’ 
autonomy will potentially become less problematic. Perhaps the clearest example of 
such wider human control acting as a check on narrow loop autonomy – at least in a 




US and NATO Joint Targeting Doctrine as an 
Expression of Meaningful Human Control  
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that there is a structural legal requirement to exercise 
human judgment and control over each ‘individual attack’. Thus, inadequately 
restrained deployments of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) will a priori 
violate international humanitarian law (IHL)/law of armed conflict (LOAC). More 
specifically, there is a concern that if LAWS deployments do not benefit from a 
meaningful human control (MHC), the weapons may ‘run amok’ on the battlefield, 
and attack protected persons and objects in ways that will amount to more substantive 
violations of the LOAC rules. While many States and other commentators 
acknowledge that human-machine interaction occurs both upstream and downstream, 
those advocating a LAWS ban (or codification of MHC) tend to focus squarely on the 
weapon itself, and its critical functions at the point of weapons release. However, as 
will be seen in this chapter, such a narrow focus is inadequate on two grounds. First, 
it erroneously considers targeting to be a mere action, and fails to account for the 
elaborate (downstream) targeting process in which human judgment and control are 
pervasive.1 Second, by focusing so narrowly on autonomy at the point of weapons 
release, LAWS critics lose sight of other (non-weapon) autonomous technologies, 
which apply no direct violent effects but are still highly influential in the critical 
function of target selection. 
 
Accordingly, the following chapter contains four main parts.  
• First, 5.2 lays down some key targeting definitions and target categories. Here, 
it will be seen that prioritised targets are of two types: a) specific targets, and 
b) targets belonging to a broader set. This crucial distinction affects how a 
LAWS will operate, the type of engagement, and the type and degree of human 
control in autonomous attack; yet most LAWS legal literature tends to ignore 
it.  
                                                          
1 Hence, most literature that discusses LAWS ‘targeting’ are actually referring to the technical 
phenomenon of target recognition, as opposed to the human-led and deliberative targeting process. 
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• Second, 5.3 takes a more detailed look at the US and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) targeting cycles, where it will be seen that human 
judgment and control has long been an integral feature of operational planning. 
The implication is two-fold. First, ‘critical function’ should be understood not 
just as a technical process at the point of attack, but as a highly deliberative 
human-led process, with multiple checks and balances at key points throughout 
the decisional pathway. Second, US and NATO forces are – save for some 
necessary adjustments – well-placed to deploy and use LAWS in a lawful 
manner.  
• This is complemented by 5.4, which examines the ‘central decision’ in 
targeting; that is, the point of ‘trigger-pull’, after which humans can no longer 
influence the direct violent effects. Yet, before reaching this point, an entire 
operational planning process will have been undertaken, which can be expected 
to put the weapons operator in an informed position whether or not to launch 
the system/authorise further engagements, or cancel/suspend and re-plan the 
attack.  
• Finally, 5.5 directly applies the MHC concept to the US/NATO targeting 
cycles. Here, two contrasting arguments are put forward. On the one hand, as 
a strongly human-centred processes, US/NATO targeting doctrine is likely to 
afford a high level of MHC to LAWS deployments; so long as States and their 
militaries resist the temptation to broaden the notion of an ‘individual attack’. 
On the other hand, there is a risk that deliberative human control may be 
undermined by emerging autonomous technologies within the targeting 
process. Namely, the greater use of algorithms in military intelligence and 
target development may supplant human judgment in ways that will undermine 
MHC in LAWS (and other) deployments. Much will depend on how well such 
wider loop autonomy is tested, evaluated and integrated into the process. 
5.2 Some Key Targeting Definitions and Categories 
5.2.1 Target 




[A]n area, structure, object, person or group of people against which 
lethal and non-lethal capability can be employed to create specific 
psychological or physical effects.2 
 
US military doctrine uses a similar definition, though with an explicit requirement of 
incurring a loss to the adversary.3 Unquestionably, all targets must in the first instance 
be valid military objectives under Additional Protocol I4 or its customary equivalent;5 
be they objects,6 traditional combatants7, or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.8 
Moreover, in all cases, targets should be attacked in support of the commander’s intent, 
objectives and guidance.9 
5.2.2 Targeting and the Targeting Process 
In both NATO and US doctrine, Joint Targeting10 is: 
 
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the 
appropriate response to them, taking account of operational 
requirements and capabilities.11 
 
This can be seen to have three key elements: a process orientation, an awareness of 
one’s own capabilities, and a link back to specific requirements.12 As above, this must 
logically begin with an objective, which drives the subsequent processes.13 The 
                                                          
2 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), AJP-3.9: Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting 
(Edition A Version 1, NATO Standardisation Office, April 2016) (hereafter, AJP-3.9), 1-2. 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Targeting (JCS, 31 January 2013) (hereafter, JP 3-
60), I-1 (“A target is an entity (person, place, or thing) considered for possible engagement or action to 
alter or neutralize the function it performs for the adversary”). 
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 
1125 UNTS 3 (hereafter, AP I). 
5 Restated in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules (CUP, 2005) (hereafter, CIHL). All Rules available at: <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul> accessed 10 June 2018. 
6 Article 52(2), AP I; CIHL, Rule 8. 
7 Articles 43(2), AP I; CIHL, Rule 3.  
8 Article 51(3), AP I; CIHL, Rule 6. 
9 AJP-3.9, 2-2; JP 3-60, I-7. See also Geoffrey S. Corn and Gary P. Corn, ‘The Law of Operational 
Targeting: Viewing the LOAC Through an Operational Lens’ (2012) 47 Texas International Law Jour-
nal 337, 349. 
10 ‘Joint’ in this context refers to the joint effort between all components of the armed forces: Army, Air 
Force and Navy. 
11 AJP-3.9, LEX-7; JP 3-60, I-1. 
12 Phillip R. Pratzner, ‘The Current Targeting Process’, in Paul AL. Ducheine, Michael N. Schmitt and 




specifics of these processes are detailed in 5.3, and are informative on the deliberative 
nature of US/NATO targeting. 
 
In practice, the Joint Targeting process is split into two categories:  
• Deliberate Targeting, which focuses on future, scheduled plans, usually on a 
24-72-hour time horizon.14  
• Dynamic Targeting, for targets identified too late for deliberate targeting, and 
which are employed in current operational planning (usually the current 24-
hour period).15 
 
The time horizons are just one of the differences between deliberate and dynamic 
targeting. Pratzner points out that both are underpinned by four distinct steps: 
objectives and guidance, planning, execution, and assessment.16 However, each 
targeting process applies a different set of specific phases or steps, to derive its own 
Joint Targeting Cycle; again, the details of each one are explained further below, in 
5.3. There, it will be seen that military deployments typically involve a strong element 
of human decision-making. The result is arguably that machine discretion is largely 
bounded in favour of deliberative human control, and is restricted to (automatic 
processing) competences in which machines typically outperform humans. 
5.2.3 Levels of Warfare and Command 
There are three levels of warfare to which the above targeting cycles and their 
respective command structures relate. 
• Strategic level: where higher national or multinational strategic security 
objectives and guidance are determined, then national resources are developed 
and used to achieve those objectives.17 
• Operational level: where campaigns and major operations are planned and 
conducted, deploying tactical forces to achieve strategic objectives within 
specific theatres.18 
                                                          
14 AJP-3.9, 1-2; JP 3-60, II-1. See (notes and text accompanying) nn 54-126, for detailed steps of the 
deliberate cycle. 
15 AJP-3.9, 1-3; JP 3-60, II-2. See 5.3.2.1, for detailed steps of the dynamic cycle. 
16 Pratzner (n 12), 80-87. See also Corn and Corn (n 9), 351. 
17 See DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS, August 2018), 219, 
<http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf> accessed 30 August 2018. 
18 Ibid., 173. 
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• Tactical level: where individual battles and engagements are planned and 
executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task 
forces.19 Those operating on the battlefield are said to be at the ‘tactical edge’. 
 
These progress from the broad and general, to the focused and specific; from higher-
level political officials right down to individual soldiers in combat. As will be seen 
below, the strategic/operational/tactical distinction is crucial for allocating roles and 
responsibilities within the targeting process,20 and it impacts the utility of 
proportionality assessments – both in general21 and in a LAWS context.22   
5.2.4 The Joint Targeting Cycles and Target Categories 
First, under the ‘deliberate’ process, there are planned targets, which are subdivided 
into those that are scheduled or on-call.23 ‘Scheduled’ targets are engaged at a specific 
time, which will often be selected to maximise the military advantage of the attack.24 
‘On-call’ targets have actions planned, but not for a specific delivery time; the 
commander expects to locate these targets in sufficient time to execute planned 
actions.25 
 
Second, under the ‘dynamic’ process, there are targets of opportunity, which are 
subdivided into unplanned and unanticipated targets.26 ‘Unplanned targets’ are known 
targets that were included on the target list, but not initially selected for engagement, 
for various reasons.27 Subsequent changes in target status (priority, access, or 
permission) could result in the need or opportunity to engage such targets during the 
current cycle.28 ‘Unanticipated targets’ are unknown or not expected to be present in 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 226. 
20 See 5.3.  
21 See 7.2.1.  
22 See 7.2.3.4. 
23 AJP-3.9, 1-2; JP 3-60, II-2.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 JP 3-60, II-2–II-3. Similarly, AJP-3.9 links dynamic targeting to ‘unexpected targets’, at 1-3. It also 
recognises ‘time-sensitive targets’ at I-2, which may be “fleeting targets of opportunity”. 
27 JP 3-60, II-3 (noting that they may not have been nominated; were nominated but did not make the 





the operational environment; thus, they are not included on the target list and an 
evaluation of the target is needed, to determine engagement requirements and timing.29 
 
In addition, the dynamic process is used to prosecute Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs), 
which merit prioritisation and special consideration. These are specific targets 
designated either at the political level, or at the operational level by the Joint Force 
Commander (JFC), which: 
 
Require[e] an immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) 
a danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of 
opportunity whose successful engagement is of high priority to achieve 
campaign or operational objectives.30 
 
Accordingly, the JFC will either allocate new intelligence collection and engagement 
assets to the TST, or will divert assets away from other (lower priority) targets, in order 
to subject it to the dynamic targeting process.31 
 
These target types and their categorisation are summarised in Figure 5.1, below.  
 
 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 AJP-3.9, 1-2.  
31 JP 3-60, I-9. 
Figure 5.1: Targeting categories. Source: US Army, Field Manual 3-60: The Targeting Process (2010), 1-6. 
148 
 
Three more types of targets should be mentioned. 
• High-Value Targets (HVT) are targets that an enemy commander requires for 
the successful completion of his mission.32 Accordingly, HVTs are determined 
by the value they offer to the adversary.33 
• High Pay-Off Targets (HPT) are a subcategory of HVT, whose loss to the 
enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of 
action.34 HPTs are determined by the value they offer to friendly forces, rather 
than the adversary.35 
• High-Value Individuals (HVI) are a subcategory of HVT, which consist of 
enemy personnel such as members of its leadership structure; or other 
personnel with particularly rare skills that are of high value to the adversary, 
such as bomb-makers. 
 
HVTs and HPTs do not necessarily lean towards one or the other targeting cycle, and 
are potentially subject to either. HVIs, on the other hand, have tended to be prosecuted 
via the dynamic cycle36 – albeit with extensive pre-strike deliberation37 – because of 
their mobility and unpredictability as to when they might appear. 
 
All of the above are specific targets, which are individually prioritised for engagement 
by the JFC or the political leadership (e.g. bridge X at location Y).38 In 
contradistinction are targets belonging to a set (e.g. ‘tanks’ or ‘artillery pieces’), 
which as a whole has been selected for attack, but within which specific targets have 
not been ascertained in advance, and will only be ‘selected’ during tactical combat.39 
This latter kind of engagement will see the dynamic targeting cycle largely 
autonomised and compressed, with deliberative human input occurring at a relatively 
high level of abstraction. 
                                                          
32 Ibid.  AJP-3.9, 1-2. 
33 AJP-3.9, 1-2. 
34 JP 3-60, I-9; AJP-3.9, 1-2. 
35 AJP-3.9, 1-2. 
36 Pratzner (n 12), 82. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Mark Roorda, ‘NATO’s Targeting Process: Ensuring Human Control Over (and Lawful Use of) 
‘Autonomous’ Weapons’ in Andrew P. Williams, and Paul Scharre (eds.), Autonomous Systems: Issues 




5.2.5 Engagement Categories 
With the above target categories in mind, there are three types of engagements that a 
LAWS may undertake. 
5.2.5.1 Targeted Strike 
In a LAWS context, a ‘targeted strike’ is broadly defined as: 
 
Any engagement by a LAWS that goes through a human-led deliberate 
or dynamic targeting cycle, to engage a specific and unique target.40 
 
Such targets are usually HVTs, be they planned targets prosecuted via the deliberate 
process, or targets of opportunity under the dynamic process. Or, they may be 
extensively deliberated HVIs prosecuted under the dynamic process. 
 
Hence, targeted strikes often involve attacks on fixed objects and pieces of 
infrastructure, like bridges and tunnels; and attacks on lucrative moving targets, such 
as warships. They also include attacks on HVIs that may suddenly appear during a 
mission,41 though the relatively long time-horizon for biometric target recognition42 
will exclude autonomous targeted killing from the scope of this thesis. 
 
When undertaking a targeted strike, a LAWS will arguably be analogous to a cruise 
missile,43 but with the benefit of longer loitering times and technical discretion.44 This 
enables it to vary the munition and blast radius (in the case of a platform) and the exact 
timing of attack, in accordance with perceptible circumstances on the ground. This will 
potentially enable those deploying and operating the system to meet certain 
precautionary obligations.45 
                                                          
40 Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘The Lawful Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems for Targeted Strikes 
(Part 1): Concepts, Advantages and Technologies’, TLI Think! Paper 11/2018 (2018), 10 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158170> accessed 7 July 2018.  
41 See Gregory S. McNeal, ‘Targeted Killing and Accountability’ (2014) 102 The Georgetown Law 
Journal 681, especially 701-730. (on advance deliberations and the development of kill lists).  
42 Ami Rojkes Dombe, ‘Biometric Target Recognition’, Israel Defense (16 March 2017) 
<http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/28881> accessed 7 July 2018.  
43 ‘Explained: How Cruise Missiles Work’, DefenCyclopedia (1 August 2014) 
<https://defencyclopedia.com/2014/08/01/explained-how-cruise-missiles-work/> accessed 7 July 2018. 
44 See 2.3.4.1. 
45 See 7.3. 
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5.2.5.2 Tactical-Level Combat 
This is where units undertake combat engagement (or pre-empt enemy attack) based 
on broad target categories that are approved during the deliberate cycle, and listed in 
mission Rules of Engagement (ROE); however, they do not require approval for 
individual attack.46  
 
In contradistinction to targeted strikes, tactical-level combat involves attacks on 
numerous specific targets that belong to a broader set. Examples include ‘uniformed 
enemy combatants’, or routine military objects such as ‘tanks’, ‘attack helicopters’, or 
‘artillery pieces’. In a LAWS context, every such engagement will conform to 
generalised parameters programmed into the system’s control software, and stored in 
its target identification library.47 
 
When undertaking tactical-level combat, a LAWS will arguably be analogous to a 
more sophisticated sensor-fused weapon,48 though it will operate with far greater levels 
of autonomy and discretion, a significantly longer time-of-flight, and multiple target 
sets, munitions and blast radiuses (in the case of a platform). Again, some of these 
additional technical features are useful devices for discharging the JFC’s/weapons 
operator’s precautionary obligations. 
5.2.5.3 Platform-Defence 
A third kind of engagement is when a LAWS comes under attack whilst on deployment 
and responds in self-defence or, more precisely, ‘platform-defence’. While it is not yet 
certain that deploying militaries will authorise their systems to do this,49 and there may 
be good reasons not to allow it,50 platform-defence should still be considered in view 
of the tactical and operational imperative to preserve combat capability. This will be 
further discussed at 5.3.2.2. 
 
                                                          
46 Roorda (n 38), 158. 
47 See 2.5.4.1 on standard ATR approaches. 
48 ‘CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon: USAF’s Ultimate Tank-Buster’, DefenCyclopedia (12 June 2015) 
<https://defencyclopedia.com/2015/06/12/cbu-105-sensor-fuzed-weapon-usafs-ultimate-tank-buster/> 
accessed 7 July 2018 (providing a step-by-step account of the operation of the US Sensor-Fuzed 
Weapon). 
49 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (Norton, 2018), 328. 




The engagement categories are summarised in Figure 5.2, below, and linked to their 
various features and characteristics that will be discussed throughout this chapter. 
 
 
5.3 A Closer Look at the Joint Targeting Cycles 
Turning now to a more detailed look at the Joint Targeting Cycles, the following will 
describe these with application to situations where the deployment of LAWS may be 
an option. 
5.3.1 The Deliberate Joint Targeting Cycle 
Before the deliberate targeting process formally begins, there is first political 
direction from the President and the Secretary of Defense (US), or the North Atlantic 
Council (NATO), by way of a) strategic military goals issued to the Joint Force 
Commander (JFC), b) guidance on campaign execution, c) approved target sets, 
including possible priority/time-sensitive targets (TSTs), and d) guidance on how 
specific targets within the broader sets will be selected for attack.51 The JFC then 
formulates operational-level goals with which all subsequent (tactical) activities must 
conform. If he wishes to appoint target sets that have not been approved at the political 
                                                          
51 AJP-3.9, 3-1, B-1 (listing examples of potential target sets). See also Roorda (n 38), 155. 
Figure 5.2: The engagement continuum. Source: Adapted from Figure 1.1, AJP-3.9, 1-4. 
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level, explicit approval must be sought.52 Accordingly, while the strategic goals issued 
at the political level are often very general and the target sets relatively broad, it is 
clear that target selection is largely human-controlled, from top to bottom.53 
 
Once the JFC begins formulating operational goals, the deliberate targeting cycle 
formally kicks off. In both US and NATO doctrine, this contains six specific phases. 
As can be seen in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 below, each of the methodologies is cyclical and 
iterative, and there are substantial similarities between them, with only slight 




















                                                          
52 Roorda, ibid., 156; AJP-3.9, B-1 (noting the particular importance of verifying the military status of 
any civilian objects in accordance with LOAC, before seeking such specific approval). 
53 Even more so with politically-approved TSTs and HVIs. 
Figure 5.3: The NATO Joint Targeting Cycle. Source: AJP-3.9, 2-2. 
Figure 5.4: The US Joint Targeting Cycle. Source: JP 3-60, II-4. 
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5.3.1.1 Phase 1: (End State and) Commander’s Intent, Objectives and Guidance 
Both cycles begin with the commander’s intent, objectives and guidance, which aim 
to achieve the military end state; that is, the desired set of conditions needed to resolve 
the situation or conflict at hand. As mentioned above, this is where political and 
strategic guidance from higher headquarters is methodically translated into an 
operational plan.54 JFCs clearly identify a) what to accomplish, b) under what 
circumstances, and c) within which parameters. Targeting staffs will have to 
understand these goals, guidance and intents in relation to politically-approved target 
sets, in order to translate them into desired effects and concrete tasks that are logically 
related to the end state.55 As emphasised in US doctrine, “[a]ttainment of clear, 
measurable, and achievable objectives is essential to the successful realization of the 
desired end state”.56 The ability to fulfil this with the correct type and extent of combat 
power is the hallmark of effective targeting,57 and this may be an argument for 
including LAWS in military arsenals, as they afford commanders the option of 
autonomous lethal targeting where this is judged to be an objectively superior means 
to achieve the desired end state. 
 
Moreover, these early demands for clear, measurable and achievable objectives are 
necessary (though not always sufficient) where the use of software-controlled LAWS 
is contemplated at a later stage. This is because robots can only undertake tasks that 
are specified in precise programmable detail, with tangible outcomes.58 Clear, 
measurable and achievable objectives are a necessary starting point for setting 
objective and programmable parameters. 
5.3.1.2 Phase 2: Target Development (and Prioritisation) 
In this second Phase, potential targets that can be attacked to achieve JFC objectives 
are identified, developed, nominated and prioritised. In US doctrine, this occurs in 
three stages (NATO carrying out broadly similar tasks, but grouped into five stages59):  
                                                          
54 AJP-3.9, 2-2–2-3; JP 3-60, II-4–II-5. 
55 Roorda (n 38), 156. 
56 JP 3-60, II-4–II-5. 
57 Ibid., II-5. 
58 See 2.2.3.2. 
59 AJP-3.9, 2-3–2-4 (describing target analysis, vetting, validation, nomination, and prioritisation). 
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(1) Target System Analysis (TSA). This is an all-source (intelligence) examination 
of functionally interrelated targets,60 which contribute to adversary capabilities.61 
The TSA is a vital starting point, as the real importance of a nominated target lies 
not only in its own characteristics, but also in its relationship to other targets 
within an operational system.62 Thus, a TSA identifies critical vulnerabilities 
within the adversary’s system which, if targeted by the appropriate capability, 
would achieve JFC objectives.63 This is essential to isolate individual HVTs for a 
more efficient application of force, rather than attempting to attack and destroy an 
entire operational system.64 Equally, the TSA identifies substitutability within the 
adversary’s system, which enables the grouping of targets that must be destroyed 
or neutralised together.65 
(2) Entity-Level Target Development, which builds on the TSA by generating sets 
of essential data on each ‘entity’ (potential target) in three sequential stages: basic, 
intermediate and advanced.66 This progresses an entity from initial identification 
and functional characterisation, through to execution-level detail; at which point 
the target is considered fully developed.67 Once a target is nominated for 
development, an Electronic Target Folder (ETF) is started, which stores entity-
level target intelligence, operational, planning, and legal information.68 Once target 
development reaches ‘intermediate’ stage, the entity is placed on a Candidate 
Target List (CTL), which drives further target development and list management.69 
(3) Target List Management (TLM). This third step begins when an entity is first 
nominated for development, and ends with a prioritised target list. Concretely, it 
                                                          
60 JP 3-60, II-5 (describing a ‘target system’ as “a collection of assets directed to perform a specific 
function or series of functions” within an (adversary’s) operational system. For example, the 
components of a ‘ballistic missile target system’ might include transporter erector launchers, resupply 
vehicles, command and control links and nodes, meteorological radars, missile fuel storage facilities, 
and the supporting transportation network). 
61 AJP-3.9, 2-3 and LEX-8; JP 3-60, II-5–II-11.  
62 JP 3-60, II-5.  
63 AJP-3.9, LEX-8. 
64 JP 3-60, II-9. 
65 For example, where two bridges cross a strategically significant river, destroying one may give no 
military advantage, whereas a coordinated attack on both would. Similar logic applies to alternative 
power sources, such as two electricity generators. 






sees entities on the CTL undergoing vetting and validation processes, which lead 
to target nomination and prioritisation: 
• Target vetting assesses the accuracy of the supporting intelligence, to 
verify that the candidate target performs the specified function for the 
adversary, and also to verify its significance within the operational 
system.70  
• Target validation ensures all vetted targets continue to meet the JFC’s 
objectives, guidance and intent; that they comply with both LOAC norms 
and mission ROE;71 and that they are coordinated and deconflicted.72 
 
All vetting session votes are recorded in the ETF.73 Throughout these processes, two 
distinct sets of staffs work to refine and further specify the broader target sets: 
• Targeteers will a) analyse adversary capabilities, b) determine the best targets 
to engage to achieve the designated goals, and c) using intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, will collect essential information 
on the target to verify its battlefield status and to be able to engage it.74 Early 
issues concerning potential collateral damage and other undesired/collateral 
effects75 are also noted, for further analysis in Phase 3.  
• Concurrently, legal advisors review every proposed target, to ensure 
compliance with both LOAC norms and mission ROE,76 as well as any other 
specific restrictions such as ‘no-strike lists’.77  
 
                                                          
70 AJP-3.9, 2-3; JP 3-60, II-11. 
71 AJP-3.9, 2-3–2-4; JP 3-60, II-11. As Corn and Corn (n 9) explain at 353-57, LOAC sets legal limits 
for defining and engaging lawful targets, while ROE are an additional source of authority from within 
the political and military spheres, which define guidelines for permissible combat action. Thus, while 
ROE must be consistent with LOAC, they are technically not law, but are statements of policy based 
partly on LOAC, and further restrained by diplomatic and political factors, and operational 
requirements.  
72 Coordination with other agencies and operations is necessary to avoid collision, fratricide and 
collateral damage. 
73 JP 3-60, II-11. 
74 Roorda (n 38), 157. 
75 While neither ‘collateral damage’ nor ‘collateral effects’ are legal terms, they are used 
interchangeably here as shorthand for both incidental damage to civilian objects, and incidental death 
and injury to civilians. 
76 Corn and Corn (n 9), 352. 
77 Ibid.; AJP-3.9, 2-3–2-4; JP 3-60, II-5–II-13. 
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Once targets are thoroughly vetted and validated, they are added to the Joint Target 
List (JTL) or the Restricted Target List (RTL).78 From these, individual targets are 
prioritised in accordance with JFC objectives and nominated for the Joint Prioritised 
Target List (JPTL).79 Often, this process benefits from added review and oversight 
from the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB).80  
 
At this stage, it is worth reiterating that there are – conceptually and practically – two 
categories of targets that may emerge in Phase 2. 
• Specific targets, which have been sufficiently developed and validated to be 
individually nominated for attack (e.g. bridge X at location Y). 
• Targets belonging to a set, which as a whole has been selected for attack, but 
within which specific targets have not yet been sufficiently developed and 
validated (e.g. ‘tanks’, ‘artillery pieces’, or ‘uniformed enemy combatant’). 
 
The former category essentially describes planned targets for which there are 
sufficiently detailed target data to directly schedule their engagement, or to hold them 
on-call to be prosecuted if the situation later demands it. Engaging this category is the 
very essence of a targeted strike in which a LAWS will behave like a more 
sophisticated cruise missile.  
 
By contrast, targets belonging to a broader set lead to tactical-level combat and they 
do not require human approval for individual attack. Each target will be selected in 
accordance with generalised parameters programmed into the machine’s control 
software. The LAWS will prosecute each one through an autonomised (and 
compressed) dynamic cycle,81 which enables it to behave like a more sophisticated 
sensor-fused weapon.  
 
                                                          
78 Corn and Corn, ibid.; JP 3-60, II-11. Both lists contain valid targets, the only difference being that 
those on the RTL are subject to specific restrictions (e.g. on attack timing), due to operational 
considerations. 
79 JP 3-60, II-12.  
80 AJP-3.9, 4-7–4-8; JP 3-60, III-3–III-5 (explaining that the JTCB is established by the JFC, and is 
comprised of representatives from the different battle staffs and components (land, air, sea, special 
operations), and sometimes other agencies and multinational partners. The Board synchronises and 
manages Joint Targeting efforts in accordance with JFC objectives at the operational level). 
81 See 5.3.2.1, for detailed steps of the dynamic cycle. 
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Of course, JFCs are not restricted to one or the other, and it is possible that a LAWS 
may be deployed on a multi-strike mission to engage a specific target and broader sets 
of targets. 
5.3.1.3 Phase 3: Capabilities Analysis 
Once targets have been vetted and validated, approved onto the JTL or RTL, and 
nominated for the JPTL, the JFC will undertake a detailed capabilities analysis in 
relation to the desired effects and objectives.82 Collateral damage estimation (CDE), 
which began in the previous stage, remains a critical component of the analysis here.83 
Consequently, no mean or method of attack will be considered or launched where it is 
expected to cause ‘excessive’ collateral damage in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated,84 and some may be discarded altogether if others would 
better avoid or minimise collateral damage.85 In practice, the JFC and his battle staffs 
will begin with a rigorous focus on specific ‘precautions in attack’, rather than the 
amorphous notion of ‘proportionality’ and ‘excessiveness’ of collateral damage.86 
Once all such precautionary measures have been explored, it is more likely that 
proportionality compliance – highly elusive when attempted in the abstract – will be 
more easily secured.87 Moreover, a mean or method will be rejected for particular 
targets if it is judged unlikely to achieve the desired effects.88 Conversely, if there are 
no apparent concerns, the weapon will be included among the options for the JFC to 
decide upon. 
 
Thus, it is during this Phase where the advantages of autonomous attack will be 
considered in more detail, to ensure that a LAWS is able to engage the target in a way 
that generates the desired effects, to achieve the objectives in accordance with 
operational and legal standards.89 For example, will an autonomous drone destroy or 
neutralise the prioritised target, while maximising the employment efficiency of 
                                                          
82 AJP-3.9, 2-4; JP 3-60, II-13–II-16. 
83 AJP-3.9, 2-4. 
84 Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(iii), AP I; CIHL, Rule 14. See also 7.2. 
85 Article 57(2)(a)(ii), AP I; CIHL, Rule 17. See also 7.3.2.2. 
86 Geoffrey S. Corn, ‘War, Law, and the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary Measure’ 
(2015) 42 Pepperdine Law Review 419, 435-40. See also 7.3, especially 7.3.5.1. 
87 Ibid. See 7.3.5.1. 
88 Roorda (n 38), 159. 
89 AJP-3.9, 2-4; JP 3-60, II-13. See also 1.2.2 on the advantages of LAWS. 
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forces, and minimising collateral effects?90 Specific, relevant characteristics that JFCs 
may consider include the superior data-processing capabilities and the greater 
responsiveness of machine action, relative to humans.91 These may give a LAWS the 
upper hand in engaging an unanticipated but fleeting target, or in 
cancelling/suspending an attack within a split-second of civilians unexpectedly 
appearing on the scene.92 Part of the analysis will also include mitigating features, such 
as the likely performance of software suppressors in the proposed operational 
environment.93  
 
In addition, the capabilities analysis stage involves extensive weaponeering (for 
prioritised targets)94 and consideration of non-lethal capabilities,95 to proactively avoid 
or minimise the CDE.96 An example of such a capability is the CBU-107 Passive 
Attack Weapon, which dispenses non-explosive penetrator rods aimed at destroying 
‘soft’ (non-armoured) targets, without causing incidental injury or damage to 
surrounding structures.97 Non-lethality is becoming increasingly important in 
contemporary targeting practice, not just for civilian risk mitigation, but also to reduce 
opportunities for adversary propaganda and for cost reasons.98 For a LAWS, this may 
require the use of a platform rather than a munition, as the former is potentially more 
amenable to delivering a range of capabilities, including non-lethal ones. Moreover, 
where non-lethality is desired in a relatively dangerous area, LAWS may be an overall 
better option because of the absence of mortal risk.99 
                                                          
90 Ibid. 
91 See 1.2.2 and 4.2. 
92 See the Grdelica incident in 7.3.2.3, (notes and text accompanying) nn 204-209 therein; and the 
inadvertent bombing incidents in 6.5.3.4.5, n 323 therein. 
93 Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour in Autonomous Robotics (Chapman & Hall/CRC, 
2009). 
94 JP 3-60, II-14–II-15. Weaponeering is the process of ‘designing an attack’ by selecting a specific 
weapon, tailoring the type and amount of warhead, and tailoring the fusing mechanism. The aim is to 
inflict the desired damage to the intended target, while minimising collateral effects. 
95 AJP-3.9, 2-4; JP 3-60, II-15–II-16. 
96 Article 57(2)(a)(ii), AP I; CIHL, Rule 17.  
97 See Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq 
(Human Rights Watch, 2003), 46-49 (explaining how, in March 2003, US forces planning at attack on 
the Iraqi Ministry of Information switched from the Hellfire missile to the CBU-107 ‘rods from God’ 
weapon. The aim was merely to destroy the antennae on the roof of the building, thereby denying any 
broadcast capability to the Iraqi Government, but without destroying the facility itself, or any of the 
nearby churches, mosques or civilian dwellings). 
98 Pratzner (n 12), 93 (noting that, when compared with complex weapon systems, non-lethal 
capabilities are “pennies on the dollar in comparison”). 
99 Non-lethal munitions can also provide an effective precautionary measure, by way of advance 
warning under Article 57(2)(c), AP I, and customary norm restated in CIHL, Rule 20. See also 7.3.2.4. 
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5.3.1.4 Phase 4: Commander’s Decision, Force Planning and Assignment 
The fourth stage involves the commander’s decision, force planning and 
assignment, where the outputs of the previous stage are integrated with any further 
operational considerations.100 Namely, there is a fusion of the capabilities analysis with 
available forces; intelligence and ISR sensors; and weapon systems.101  
 
Put simply, the JFC, often supported by a JTCB, will match capabilities against targets 
and assign those capabilities accordingly.102 For example, consider the situation where 
multiple fixed HVTs must all be engaged simultaneously, yet there is also a shortage 
of aircrews. In such a case, a remotely-piloted drone would be relatively inefficient 
and ineffective,103 thus possibly necessitating the deployment of multiple autonomous 
drones all overseen by a single operator. Therefore, a capability is matched to a 
selected target or targets, to achieve the desired effect within resource constraints. In 
practice, however, scarcity of resources may mean that targets are often selected based 
on the available weapons and their characteristics.104  
 
Either way, matching a given capability to a given target is a conscious decision, and 
is taken with the benefit of additional human oversight and scrutiny from the JTCB. 
Once it is done, the JFC issues final approval for prioritised targets, thereby deriving 
the JPTL. Subsequently, tasking orders are prepared and released to executing 
components and forces.105 Any relevant constraints, restraints and precautions that 
have emerged during these first four Phases are passed onto the assigned units, and 
they can be adapted to be more or less strict, depending on the unit’s ability to ensure 
compliance with the relevant obligations.106  
 
                                                          
100 AJP-3.9, 2-4. 
101 JP 3-60, II-16 (pointing out that this process links theoretical planning with actual operations). 
102 Roorda (n 38), 159. 
103 Merel Noorman, ‘Responsibility Practices and Unmanned Military Technologies’ (2014) 20 Science 
and Engineering Ethics 809, 818 (noting that it can take up to 168 people to keep an armed Predator 
drone airborne for 24 hours). 
104 Roorda (n 38), 159. Consider a situation where it is desired to kill or disrupt a given HVI and there 
are cruise missiles available, but no drones. Commanders may opt to destroy the HVI’s compound 
instead, as this can be done via cruise missile, whereas a targeted killing will likely require a drone.  
105 JP 3-60, II-20. 
106 Roorda (n 38), 160. 
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Accordingly, the ‘commander’s decision’ in this Phase is to approve the draft JPTL; 
to approve individual targets to be added/removed from it; and/or to approve a 
particular way of engaging a given target, if needed.107 
5.3.1.5 Phase 5: Mission Planning and Force Execution 
The fifth Phase is in two parts. First, mission planning (5a) is carried out by 
unit/component commanders who largely replicate Phases 1-4, but on a more detailed 
and tactical level.108 Goals are re-evaluated, additional intelligence is collected, targets 
are further refined, and means and methods are chosen from within the assigned unit 
that are best suited to achieve the goals.109 It is during this Phase that targeting staff 
obtain final positive identification (PID) and combat identification (CID) of targets, 
before engaging.110 Accordingly, final precautionary measures are taken to:111 
• verify that targets are in fact lawful military objectives;112 
• ensure all feasible steps have been taken in the choice of means and method of 
attack, to avoid or minimise collateral damage;113  
• provide effective advance warning to the civilian population, to further reduce 
collateral effects, unless circumstances do not permit;114 and  
• refrain from launching the attack if the expected collateral effects are 
‘excessive’ in relation to the military advantage anticipated.115  
 
Phase 5a planning to comply with the above legal norms will become very granular, 
and will include assessments of the:  
 
[L]ocation, type, size and material of target; civilian pattern of life; time 
of attack (day or night); weapon capabilities; weapon effects; direction 
of attack; munition fragmentation patterns; secondary explosions; 
infrastructural collateral concerns, personnel safety; and battlespace 
deconfliction measures.116 
                                                          
107 JP 3-60, II-19–II-20. 
108 Roorda (n 38), 160. 
109 Ibid. 
110 For the detailed steps, see AJP-3.9, 2-5–2-6; JP 3-60, II-20–II-30; and 5.3.2.1. 
111 See 7.3.2 for more detail on the legal norms obligating these precautionary measures. 
112 Article 57(2)(a)(i), AP I; CIHL, Rule 16. 
113 Article 57(2)(a)(ii), AP I; CIHL, Rule 17. 
114 Article 57(2)(c), AP I; CIHL, Rule 20. An example of such circumstances may be where an element 
of surprise is needed to maximise the military utility of the attack. 
115 Article 57(2)(a)(iii), AP I; CIHL, Rule 19.  




Subsequently, a unit commander will approve the operation, as well as the use of a 
particular mean or method – be that manned, remotely-piloted or autonomous – against 
a specific target or target set.  
 
Moving into the force execution stage (5b), precautionary measures continue to be 
applied.117 Indeed, key to success here is flexibility, as combat operations are 
inherently dynamic.118 During force execution, the operational environment constantly 
changes because of actions taken by the Joint Force, by the adversary, and by other 
actors.119 Thus, constant attention must be paid to PID, CID and target validation.120 
Should there be a change of circumstances that makes continuation of the attack 
unlawful, it must be cancelled or suspended.121 Concretely, during this stage, both US 
and NATO forces utilise the F2T2EA methodology, or the ‘kill chain’ as it is often 
known. That is, Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess.122 This is effectively a 
‘targeting cycle within a targeting cycle’, to accommodate the battlefield changes 
mentioned above. Importantly, it is identical to the dynamic targeting cycle, the 
individual components of which are detailed below.  
 
One crucial moment during force execution, which will be further explained below, is 
worth flagging up here: the point at which a human decision is made, which leads to 
potentially irreversible violent action.123 In most cases, this is the decision to fire or 
launch a weapon; for example, when a sniper pulls the trigger.124 As the above clearly 
demonstrates, this vital ‘decision point’ comes after a long series of preparatory 
analysis and decisions by multiple other staffs and the JTCB. Yet, it is a crucial point 
of focus here, as it effectively is the point of ‘no return’; the last opportunity to ensure 
deliberative human judgment in the application of lethal force, for effective 
accountability and adherence to operational and legal requirements.  
                                                          
117 Ibid. 
118 AJP-3.9, 2-4. 
119 JP 3-60, II-20.  
120 Ibid., II-21.  
121 Article 57(2)(b), AP I; CIHL, Rule 19. See also 5.4 on ‘The Central Decision in Targeting’. 
122 AJP-3.9, 2-5–2-6; JP 3-60, I-8 and II-21–II-30. NATO also includes ‘Exploit’ after ‘Engage’. 




5.3.1.6 Phase 6: Assessment 
The final stage is assessment, which seeks to measure if, and to what extent, the 
planned effects have been realised, after tactical activities have been executed.125 This 
is done largely via battle-damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness 
assessment (MEA) and collateral damage assessment (CDA).126 On an operational 
level, this stage is vital to the iterative nature of the targeting process, as it contributes 
to wider campaign assessment and assists JFCs in future decision-making.  
 
Overall, the US and NATO deliberate targeting cycles both represent detailed 
planning, fully informed by legal obligations and ROE constraints; careful alignment 
of targeting efforts with both internal capabilities, and broader political/strategic 
priorities; and post-attack assessment, to enable an iterative approach that brings about 
continuous improvement in targeting efforts. It is, without doubt, a human-centred 
process, which benefits from extensive professional judgment and a sequential 
approach to target development, nomination and prioritisation.  
5.3.2 The Dynamic Joint Targeting Cycle 
As mentioned above, the dynamic targeting cycle has a dual role: to engage planned 
targets at Phase 5b (the tactical stage) of the deliberate cycle; and to prosecute targets 
of opportunity (including TSTs), which are identified during a tactical mission, when 
it is too late for their inclusion in the deliberate cycle.  
5.3.2.1 Dynamic Targeting Steps 
The dynamic targeting cycle comprises the F2T2EA steps (the ‘kill chain’), as 
follows:127 
• Find: ISR assets (sensors) search for, and detect, potential targets that meet the 
initial criteria (as set by JFCs) in the designated areas. Once detected, potential 
targets trigger actions to determine whether further attention (Fix), or deviation 
from existing plans (as is the case with TSTs) is necessary. In the case of the 
latter, the result of a Find is a (time-sensitive) target nomination for further 
refinement, and a reallocation of resources. 
                                                          
125 For full detailed steps, see AJP-3.9, 2-6–2-7; JP 3-60, II-31–II-36. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Summarised from AJP-3.9, 2-5–2-6. 
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• Fix: focused sensors allow staff to identify and geolocate the target via cross-
cueing and intelligence-fusing. An initial risk assessment is also done on the 
target and, in the case of a TST, there is a determination of the target’s window 
of vulnerability. 
• Track: sensors are assigned and prioritised to track a target; to maintain contact 
and monitor the target as it moves through the environment. This continues 
until an engagement decision is finalised, and the next two steps are fully 
prosecuted. 
• Target: all restrictions (including LOAC, ROE, no-strike lists and 
deconfliction) are satisfied; engagement capabilities are aligned with the 
desired effect; the risk assessment is complete; force packaging is complete 
(determining the weapon-to-target match); and final engagement approval is 
granted. 
• Engage: target is struck with the approved weapon, and from the pre-
determined attack geometry. Both the target and its engagement continue to be 
closely monitored, to maintain situational awareness.128 
• Assess: the engagement is reviewed, to determine whether the desired effects 
have been created, and the objectives achieved. If not, then the outcome of this 
step may be a decision to re-engage, using either the same or a different 
capability. In the case of TSTs, HVTs and HPVs a rapid initial assessment is 
vital for any re-engagement to go ahead. 
 
The above steps are used in manned or remotely-piloted targeting to prosecute specific 
targets (be they planned, or of opportunity), but not targets belonging to a broader set. 
The latter implicates tactical-level combat which does not need approval for individual 
attack. Conversely, a LAWS will be likely to autonomise (and compress) an adapted 
F2T2EA cycle when prosecuting any of its target categories, including those belonging 
to a broader set.129  
                                                          
128 As noted above, there is a central ‘decision point’ here, after which irreversible violent action will 
take place. The implications of this for deliberative human control of a weapon system are further 
examined in 5.4. 
129 While this is not explicitly stated in any authoritative document, it is arguably a necessary assumption 
for a LAWS that will operate autonomously throughout the dynamic process.  
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5.3.2.2 Inverting the Dynamic Targeting Steps for ‘Platform-Defence’ 
When an attacking LAWS is on a mission, it may be subject to a risk of attack by the 
adversary’s weapon systems, which will also apply F2T2EA, or a similar approach 
derived from Pratzner’s four common steps.130 If so, then the former (attacking) 
LAWS will also need to defend itself, possibly using an inverse set of capabilities. 
Howis suggests HELD2O, which is Hide (to counter the adversary’s Find capability), 
Evade (Fix), Lose/Manoeuvre (Track), Deceive (Target), Defend (Engage) and 
Obscure (Assess).131 While the exact details of this ‘defensive chain’ may be subject 
to some debate and will certainly need developing, the main point is indisputable: even 
without presenting any direct mortal risk to attacking forces, a LAWS will need these 
defensive capabilities to preserve friendly combat capability. 
 
The importance of this point should not be underestimated: preserving combat 
capability is an integral feature of US doctrine on Joint Operations,132 and is a distinct 
tactical and operational imperative.133 It is also a “central component of mission 
accomplishment”,134 and is indispensable for bringing about the prompt submission of 
the enemy. Not only is this a clear military advantage, it is also consistent with civilian 
risk mitigation,135 as ‘mission accomplishment’ may bring forward a complete end to 
armed conflict. As a corollary, preserving combat capability is focused on protecting 
operational capacity, not just the lives of friendly forces.136 Thus, the concept 
undoubtedly applies to autonomous systems, which will be expensive items in limited 
supply and vulnerable to seizure;137 notwithstanding the absence of mortal risk when 
these are snatched or destroyed in combat. On a practical note, effectuating the 
                                                          
130 Pratzner (n 12), 80-87. 
131 Comments of Digby Howis, 18 December 2017, at: 
<https://twitter.com/DigbyHowis/status/942861600356155392> accessed 7 July 2018. 
132 JP 3-0, III-35–III-42 (detailing the three elements of the Protection Joint Function, of which ‘force 
protection’ is the most relevant, as it incorporates the preservation of combat capability). 
133 Ibid., VIII-18 (stating that in seizing the initiative, “JFCs must strive to conserve the fighting potential 
of the joint/multinational force at the onset of combat operations”) (emphasis added). 
134 Geoffrey S. Corn and James A. Schoettler, ‘Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation: The Essential 
Role of Precautionary Measures’ (2015) 223 Military Law Review 785, 824-25. 
135 Ibid., 825-26; US Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations (US 
Department of the Army, May 2012), ¶ 1-7 (linking the attainment of “operational advantages” in 
combat to “destroying the enemy with minimal losses to friendly forces as well as civilians and their 
property”) (emphasis added). 
136 Corn and Schoettler, ibid., 826. 
137 Emily Tamkin and Paul McLeary, ‘China Seizes US Navy Drone in South China Sea’, Foreign 
Policy (16 December 2016) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/16/china-seizes-u-s-navy-drone-in-in-
south-china-sea-raising-stakes-president-trump/> accessed 7 July 2018. 
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preservation of combat capability may be done through active or passive means,138 and 
it is arguably for JFCs to determine the best combination of defensive actions. 
 
With this in mind, most of the HELD2O ‘defensive chain’ – Hide, Evade, Lose, 
Deceive –consists of passive defensive measures, analogous to those mentioned in JP 
3-0, such as camouflage, concealment, deception, and dispersion.139 A particularly 
effective measure for an autonomous system would be to pull off “genuinely random 
and unpredictable manoeuvres”,140 which an untethered LAWS – unencumbered by 
GPS latency, and endowed with the speed and precision of automatic processing – may 
carry out to confuse an opponent challenging it with direct fires. Such passive 
capabilities are likely to be uncontroversial, as they aim to avoid kinetic attack. 
However, to ensure its effective preservation, a LAWS may also need active defensive 
capabilities; that is, “direct defensive actions…to destroy, nullify, or reduce the 
effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats”.141 Accordingly, Defend (to counter the 
enemy’s Engage step) may well need to include a capability to return fire against any 
person or object attacking or threatening to attack the LAWS. This is likely to be 
controversial, as such defensive attacks will not have benefitted from any human-led 
targeting process, except being considered in the abstract, as a possible risk arising 
from the operational environment; thus, they will be almost completely dependent on 
sensory hardware and control software.142  
 
In that connexion, and in view of the absence of any direct mortal threat, it is important 
that deploying forces determine and clarify in advance the exact parameters for 
‘platform-defence’. On the one hand, Arkin’s ‘conservative use of lethal force’ 
concept, in which a LAWS will return fire only after being fired upon, may be too 
little, too late for an aerial drone.143 Arguably, a defensive but ‘anticipatory’ capability 
is needed. The inherent right of individual self-defence accorded to human soldiers 
cannot be applicable to LAWS, as this would be a category error. Moreover, the 
                                                          
138 JP 3-0, III-35. 
139 Ibid., III-38.  
140 Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, ‘Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems’, Military 
Review (May-June 2017), 73. 
141 JP 3-0, III-38. 
142 As noted in 5.2.5.3, this raises the possibility of fratricide, unintended escalation of a crisis, and 
civilian casualties due to adversaries manipulating defensive fires before hiding behind human shields. 
143 Arkin (n 93), 29, 46. This kind of “self-sacrifice to reveal the presence of a combatant” is arguably 
more apt for ground robots interacting with humans in a cluttered environment. 
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notions of ‘hostile act’ or ‘hostile intent’ arguably provide no help: as Gaston 
demonstrates, these ROE concepts – while conceptually reactive and threat-based – 
are in practice relatively time-distant.144 Thus, they are often triggered by non-
imminent threats, which may include threats to the broader operation, rather than the 
specific LAWS unit or its immediate strike mission.145 Even more problematic is how 
ambiguous ‘hostile intent’ and ‘hostile act’ can be to apply, with the result that 
programming these concepts into nearer-term LAWS will make the latter prone to 
targeting errors.146 Thus, an appropriate middle-ground will have to be sought, and it 
is for weapons designers to determine this based on the prevailing technology. At the 
very least, Electronic Warfare Capabilities may be installed and optimised for a given 
LAWS unit.147  
5.3.3 Preliminary Conclusion on the Joint Targeting Cycles 
As the above clearly demonstrates, both targeting cycles adopt a methodical, step-by-
step approach, to maximise the chance of striking only legitimate targets, and to 
eliminate or minimise collateral effects. Moreover, lawyers are an integral part of the 
process to ensure compliance with LOAC norms and mission ROE.148 As former 
General Counsel to the US Department of Defense Jennifer O’Connor recently pointed 
out, even when commanders need to make “rapid-fire decisions” in a dynamic cycle, 
a military lawyer will always be nearby to advise on issues of legality.149 There are 
also major differences between the deliberate and dynamic cycles, which are most 
clearly seen in the time available for each one. To be sure, it works the other way 
around: the amount of time available determines which targeting cycle is to be used. 
As O’Connor puts it: 
                                                          
144 See EL. Gaston, ‘When Looks Could Kill: Emerging State Practice on Self-Defense and Hostile 
Intent’, Global Public Policy Institute Research Paper (22 June 2017) 
<http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2017/gaston_2017_hostile-intent_web.pdf> 
accessed 7 July 2018. 
145 Ibid. Such broader threats are arguably best left to human deliberative thinking/controlled processing. 
146 Ibid., 11, 13, 16, 20-21 (giving the examples of talking into a phone, shining a light at attacking 
forces, moving in range of combat assets, or even running away (hostile intent); or, digging a hole in 
the ground, driving through a perimeter, or speeding towards attacking forces (hostile act)).  
147 See Tony Gillespie and Robin West, ‘Requirements for Autonomous Unmanned Air Systems Set by 
Legal Issues’ (2010) 4 The International C2 Journal 23 (discussing Electronic Surveillance Measure 
(ESM) sensors and Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) jammers, to enable active and passive defences, 
respectively).  
148 Jennifer M. O’Connor, ‘Applying the Law of Targeting to the Modern Battlefield’, Speech Delivered 
by DoD General Counsel to New York University School of Law (28 November 2016) 
<https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Applying-the-Law-of-Targeting-to-the-Modern-
Battlefield.pdf> accessed 7 July 2018. 




When there is time to plan in advance for a particular target, we [use] 
deliberate targeting. When we are reacting to an immediate need or 
attacking a target that is on the move to cause harm, we [use] dynamic 
targeting.150 
 
Accordingly, another difference between the two targeting cycles that is implicit in 
O’Connor’s comments is the type of target being pursued: whether it is a planned target 
(prosecuted via the deliberate cycle), or a target of opportunity (dynamic cycle).  
 
For a LAWS deployment, however, both of these count as one from a total of three 
categories: 
(1) Specific and unique targets (either planned or of opportunity) that have been 
individually prioritised for engagement through one of the targeting cycles.  
(2) Targets belonging to a broader set, where the set has been approved through 
one of the targeting cycles, and will be executed through an autonomised (and 
compressed) dynamic cycle. 
(3) Persons or objects attacking or threatening to attack the LAWS, which in 
turn drive the application of kinetic force in platform-defence, to preserve 
combat capability. 
5.4 The Central Decision in Targeting 
Roorda discusses the ‘central decision’ which, as briefly introduced above, occurs 
immediately before the moment where humans can no longer influence the direct 
violent effects.151 This point of ‘no return’ varies from one weapon system to the 
next,152 and may be effectuated by commission or by omission.153 For a LAWS 
operating with a man out-of-the-loop, this will usually occur by commission at the 
point of launching the weapon system. For a system with ‘remote check-in’ it may 
occur by omission, where the weapons operator (WO) is satisfied with all engagements 
and allows the system to continue.154 For multiple LAWS overseen by a single WO 
                                                          
150 Ibid., 3. 
151 Namely, during force execution in the deliberate cycle, or the engage stage of the F2T2EA (dynamic) 
cycle. 
152 For a sniper rifle, the ‘point of no-return’ is the pulling of the trigger. For a fire-and-forget missile, 
it is the pressing of the launch button. For a cruise missile that is ‘reprogrammable in flight’, it is not 
the launch point, but the point at which reprogramming is no longer feasible. 
153 The sniper rifle and the fire-and-forget missile reach this point with positive activation; the 
reprogrammable cruise missile reaches it with no further action on the part of the WO, after activation. 
154 See 7.3.6.6. 
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who remains on-the-loop, the point of ‘no return’ is also passed by omission when the 
system is in flight, has ‘positively identified’ a target and is not manually 
overridden.155 In all cases, the person making that final judgment must consider 
whether the expected attack will comply with operational and legal requirements.156 
His knowledge of the following five factors will influence this:157 
(1) The situation at the time of the decision. 
(2) The expected functioning and effects of the LAWS (including the WO’s ability 
to provide the system with appropriate parameters). 
(3) The possible changes in the situation between the decision and the kinetic 
effects. 
(4) The accuracy of the intelligence used for these assessments. 
(5) The operational and legal requirements. 
 
For a decision to proceed with the attack, the combination of these factors must lead 
to the conclusion that the expected effects will remain within operational and legal 
boundaries.158 Importantly, this also implicates the vast array of preparatory work and 
decisions made by JFCs and their battle staffs, as overseen and reviewed by JTCBs, 
during the first five phases of the deliberate targeting cycle. Should the WO/decision-
maker at that point of ‘no return’ not be convinced that the expected effects will be 
operationally and legally compliant, he must either postpone the attack and re-plan it, 
or cancel it altogether.159  
 
In the event that re-planning occurs, Roorda points to 13 specific options, of which the 
following are the most relevant to those deploying a LAWS:160 
                                                          
155 Though it is acknowledged that the likely speed and responsiveness with which a LAWS will 
prosecute targets may effectively negate any meaningful decision by omission on the part of the WO. 
If so, then the true point of no return will be blurred, even if it still occurs mid-flight. 
156 Roorda (n 38), 161 (arguing that the moment at which control is relinquished over the direct outcome 
– and the human decision that allows the process to surpass this point – should be scrutinised more 
closely). 
157 Ibid., 161-62. 
158 Ibid., 162. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid.  
169 
 
• Limiting operations that lead to dynamic targeting. 
• Decreasing the spatial and temporal boundaries of operations. 
• Increasing intelligence collection and imposing measures that provide clarity 
on the accuracy of the intelligence. 
• Limiting operations to uncluttered environments, in which intelligence on the 
situation is more easily collected. 
• Imposing measures that prevent changes to the current situation. 
• Giving advance warning to the civilian population 
• Testing and, if necessary, reprogramming the assigned LAWS. 
• Operating the LAWS in remotely-piloted mode, or opting for other means. 
 
Arguably, the combined effect of the detailed targeting cycles and the ‘central 
decision’, with its ‘final judgment’ factors and re-planning options, is to marshal a 
strong element of human judgment and control in US/NATO targeting, irrespective of 
the weapon system used. 
5.5 Is There Meaningful Human Control Over Attacks Planned 
Under the Joint Targeting Cycles? 
Recall that a LAWS will select and engage specific targets in Phase 5b (force 
execution) of the deliberate cycle, or through the entirety of the (compressed) dynamic 
cycle. The first of these two critical functions (select) will vary in nature depending on 
whether the mission is exclusively a targeted strike, or one that aims to attack targets 
belonging to a broader set. The former involves unique target parameters, hence little 
or no machine discretion to ‘select’; the latter entails relatively broader target 
parameters with correspondingly wider machine discretion in ‘discharging’ the 
JFC’s/WO’s distinction obligation. In both cases, the machine is unsupervised at the 
point of kinetic attack, and this has raised concerns that human judgment and control 
are inherently lacking,161 despite being a structural requirement of the law. 
                                                          
161 Most prominently, Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots (Human 
Rights Watch, 2012), 7 (arguing that “[i]f this trend [of growing weapons autonomy] continues, humans 
could start to fade out of the decision-making loop, retaining a limited oversight role – or perhaps no 
role at all”); see also, Markus Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, 
Ethical, and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1371, 1405 (arguing that “the use of AWS creates a number of complications 
precisely because individuals are removed from the decision-making process”). Others who oppose the 
removal of narrow-loop human judgment include those cited in Chapter 1, nn 21-23 therein. 
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5.5.1 A Strongly Human Element Within the Joint Targeting Cycles 
Yet, as 5.3 reveals, this point of kinetic attack is preceded by a strongly deliberative 
process, the hallmark of which is extensive human-led planning.162 The entire process 
is guided by in-depth technical expertise, combat experience and legal advice,163 which 
becomes progressively granular as we move through the targeting cycle. This 
continues until the ‘central decision’ point, by which time the human WO will need to 
be satisfied that the launch of (or permission to continue with) an attack will be legally 
and operationally compliant; or else he must either postpone and re-plan, or cancel the 
attack. 
 
Accordingly, while LAWS will be narrowly autonomous during the force execution 
stage, they will not be truly autonomous in the overall targeting process, which may 
be regarded as the ‘wider loop’ of human control.164 It is during this process, and within 
the commensurate wider loop of decision-making, that meaningful and deliberative 
human control is exercised by the JFC and his battle staffs (and overseen by the JTCB). 
As mentioned in 4.5.5, they achieve this by a) imposing operational constraints, and 
b) setting conditions for their own judgment. This leaves the weapon system to pursue 
narrowly-defined targets with all the advantages and efficiency of automatic 
processing. Significantly, even some proponents of a LAWS ban share this view – at 
least in relation to targeted strikes – and have framed their approach to LAWS 
regulation to require weapon systems to be: 
 
[D]esigned to only attack particular [i.e. specific] acquired targets or 
specified locations known to the commander authorizing and the 
operator aiming and triggering the weapon.165 
 
The corollary is again that LAWS per se will not ‘comply with IHL/LOAC’, in that 
the system itself will not necessarily (and will certainly not need to) distinguish 
                                                          
162 Roorda (n 38), 163 ; Merel Ekelhof, ‘Human Control in the Targeting Process’ in Robin Geiß (ed.), 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Technology, Definition, Ethics, Law & Security (German Federal 
Foreign Office, 2016), 73. 
163 O’Connor (n 148). 
164 Ekelhof (n 162), 73; Roorda (n 38), 163.  
165 Mark A. Gubrud, ‘The Ottawa Definition of Landmines as a Start to Defining LAWS’, 1.0 Human: 
Mark Gubrud’s Weblog (April 2018), 4 <http://gubrud.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Landmines_and_LAWS.pdf> accessed 7 July 2018 (expressly stating, at 5, 
that MHC underpins the author’s approach, by requiring that specific targets are already determined at 
the trigger (‘central decision’) point). 
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civilians from military objectives, nor to undertake proportionality assessments or any 
precautions in attack. Arguably, there is no legal requirement for a weapon system to 
do this.166 LOAC merely mandates compliance with the above principles and is silent 
as to the mode of compliance, which can occur via system capabilities and/or the 
manner of employment and use.167 A distinct but related point is that there is no legal 
distinction between effecting control of a weapon system through physical 
manipulation (e.g. soldier manually pointing a rifle at a target) or through a computer 
program (e.g. programmer setting parameters on when, where and what the system can 
engage).168 So long as the required span of control can be expressed through a software 
program, and the system will operate with a reasonable degree of certainty in a given 
environment, it is potentially legally and operationally compliant.169 Accordingly, it is 
possible for a system with relatively basic distinction capabilities to be deployed in a 
sparse battlefield, to engage a column of tanks or a bridge.170 In such a scenario, the 
machine will certainly not ‘select’ tanks based on any deliberative understanding of 
the threat posed by such military objects, or of the operational value to be gained from 
destroying them. Instead, it will target a particular heat and shape profile, along with 
any other relevant signatures that are programmed into the system’s control software, 
which the JFC and battle staffs (overseen by the JTCB) and the operator have 
determined will be unique to enemy tanks in the particular operational environment. 
 
The real question must therefore be: “how well has the person deciding on the 
employment of a [LAWS] assessed the implications of its use?”171 This again goes 
back to the targeting cycle and the central decision, and demands that those who plan 
and execute an attack are: 
                                                          
166 In contrast with the views and analysis put forward by Human Rights Watch (n 161); and Noel E. 
Sharkey, ‘The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red 
Cross 787. 
167 See, for example, Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and International 
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics’ (2013) Harvard National Security Journal Features 1, 12; 
Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘Examining Autonomous Weapon Systems from a Law of Armed Conflict 
Perspective’ in Hitoshi Nasu and Robert McLaughlin (eds.), New Technologies and the Law of Armed 
Conflict (TMC Asser Press, 2014), 219. 
168 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Ford, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Law’ (2017) 69 
South Carolina Law Review 413, 454.  
169 Ibid. Indeed, as was argued in 4.2.2, technical manipulation may practically enhance human control. 
170 Ibid.; Schmitt (n 167); Thurnher (n 167). See also 6.5.5. 
171 Roorda (n 38), 164. 
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(1) Fully informed on both legal and operational constraints. 
(2) Familiar with the technical characteristics of the LAWS, as well as the 
complexity of the tasks being delegated to it.172 
(3) Aware of the (civilian) risks presented by that system in the particular 
operational environment.173 
(4) Have implemented all feasible precautionary measures to mitigate those 
risks.174  
 
Consequently, the term ‘critical functions’ may be reconceptualised from the narrow 
technical process of target recognition, to the more deliberative human-led process of 
















5.5.2 A Note on the ‘Individual Attack’ Limitation 
Recall from 4.3 that operational parameters – time and space of operation, quantity 
and complexity of tasks/engagements – must be set tightly enough to ensure MHC 
over ‘individual attacks’. While the application of this concept is highly contextual 
                                                          
172 Recall from 2.2.3.2 that task complexity depends on precision, tangibility, dimensionality and 
interaction. 
173 See 2.2.3.2 on environmental complexity. 
174 For example, pursuant to Article 57, AP I, and the customary norms restated in CIHL, Rules 15-21, 
or the more detailed list put forward by Roorda at (note and text accompanying) n 160. 
Figures 5.5-5.8: Various targeting activities undertaken by a range of battle staffs, for US Special 
Operations Command. At all stages, metacognitive thinking, human judgment and due diligence are key. 
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05.2, 21 May 2003, I-1, I-4, II-12 and III-1. 
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and will depend on a number of other factors,175 Roff and Moyes argue that it requires 
human judgment and control to be exercised on the tactical level of warfare, not just 
the strategic and operational levels: 
 
Broadening the concept of an ‘attack’ [beyond the tactical level] risks 
diluting the information available to human commanders as a basis for 
their legal and operational judgments to the point where their ability to 
predict outcomes becomes either non-existent or minimal.176  
 
Accordingly, the authors consider that an ‘attack’ is a single “unit of analysis” in which 
human judgment and control is applied.177 Breaching this will not only undermine the 
structure of LOAC, but will also mean LAWS deployments fail to take into account 
situational changes between weapons launch (the ‘central decision’) and kinetic 
effects.178 Namely, such expansive deployments will likely fail the third of Roorda’s 
five ‘final judgment’ criteria.179 Moreover, they may lead to a situation where large 
operations are determined lawful on the basis of broad strategic/anticipated outcomes, 
while containing multiple actions that are individually unlawful.180 This would be 
contrary to the spirit and purpose of Phases 1 and 5 of the deliberate targeting cycle, 
where broader goals are handed down and operationalised. For both of these reasons, 
the idea of an ‘individual attack’ does not conceptually add anything to current US and 
NATO targeting practice in relation to targeted strikes; so long as these are launched 
while the contextual information they rely upon remains relevant, to avoid 
unanticipated situational changes.181 However, it does arguably reinforce these 
practices in the face of possible pressures to dilute the law, as autonomous technologies 
and loitering capabilities develop.182 
                                                          
175 For example, it may also depend on the complexity of the battlefield, the sophistication of the weapon 
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‘Meaningful Human Control, Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Weapons’, Briefing Paper for 
Delegates at the CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS (11-15 April 2016), 4 





179 See criteria at (note and text accompanying) n 157. 
180 Article 36, ‘Key Elements of Meaningful Human Control’, Background Paper to Comments 
Prepared by Richard Moyes for the CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS (11-15 April 2016), 3 
<http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-2016-FINAL.pdf> accessed 10 June 
2018. 
181 Roff and Moyes (n 175), 3. 




Importantly, an ‘individual attack’ may still involve multiple acts of violence against 
multiple specific targets, so long as these are within sufficiently tight spatio-temporal 
bounds as to ensure predictability of outcomes.183 Not only does this permit several 
targeted strikes in a single deployment, it also means the individual attack limitation 
is potentially consistent with tactical-level combat against broader target sets. So long 
as the JFC and the WO are reasonably confident that the contextual information being 
relied upon remains valid, and there is timely human action and a capacity for 
intervention, such that every engagement reasonably accords with their attack 
intentions. The parameters to ensure this are likely to vary from case to case, and it is 
arguably best left to the judgment of the commander who is closest to a given LAWS 
deployment.184 Potential ‘control systems’185 to ensure autonomy does not go beyond 
an individual attack are discussed at 7.2.3 and 7.3.6. In addition to target parametric 
and spatio-temporal limits, they include upper engagement limits, remote dial-in, 
deployment restrictions and an open-ended category of ‘workarounds’.186 
 
Accordingly, the ‘individual attack’ limitation is potentially satisfied in both types of 
engagement, but is more likely to be an issue with tactical-level combat because of the 
focus on broader target sets. By definition, these lead to multiple attacks on numerous 
specific targets that conform to generalised parameters; often, the exact time and 
location of specific attacks are not known when planning. Thus, tactical-level combat 
may need to be controlled with a more conscious ‘individual attack’ limitation, to pre-
empt the risk that it continues after situational changes have occurred. By contrast, a 
targeted strike involves extensive planning focused on a specific, unique and (often) 
fixed target, which is likely to count as an ‘individual attack’, subject to temporal 
restrictions to avoid unanticipated situational changes. 
                                                          
183 Ibid. Current systems that fit this description include the sensor-fused weapon and the multiple-
launch rocket system.  
184 Assuming the commander acts in good faith, which is a safe assumption in the case of US and NATO 
forces, as these often incorporate civilian risk mitigation in their strategic, operational and tactical 
mission goals. 
185 Article 36 (n 180), 3 (pointing out that restricting autonomous operation to individual attacks 
demands “some form of control system”, to ensure a) human legal judgment is applied in each attack 
and b) the capacity for that judgment to be acted upon in a timely manner). 




5.5.3 Is there a Risk of Autonomising the ‘Wider Loop’? 
So far, the analysis has focused on MHC in the ‘wider’ targeting process, with tactical 
or ‘narrow’ autonomy only during force execution and restricted to ‘individual 
attacks’. However, rapid technological change may well see machines and software 
algorithms taking over the entire deliberate targeting cycle, from formulating strategic 
goals to deciding when and where to strike.187 Accordingly, Horowitz briefly considers 
the possibility of an ‘autonomous operational system’, which would involve LAWS 
planning military operations in a way that “completely replaces the human staff 
systems that plan military operations today”.188 Roff offers a more in-depth and 
speculative account of autonomising the wider loop by way of the Strategic Robot 
Problem where numerous self-contained, independently-targeting LAWS fail to 
coordinate, and cause command and control failures.189  
 
However, while Roff’s analysis focuses on the dystopian possibilities of wider loop 
autonomy, Horowitz largely dismisses the idea as being akin to science fiction, at least 
for the foreseeable future. More importantly, he argues that militaries are unlikely to 
even pursue such technologies, since States want to maintain control over the use of 
force. 
 
As the decision-making distance between the person activating the 
[autonomous operational] system and the system selecting and 
engaging targets increases, it makes fair accountability harder and 
makes a responsibility gap more likely…what that [L]AWS would do 
might be highly uncertain, disconnecting the person from the actual 
selection/engagement of targets…This is the situation where 
meaningful human control…would be most at risk.190 
 
To be sure, Roff and Horowitz are discussing two different types of systems, with the 
former presenting greater command and control challenges. Nonetheless, both types 
of system will almost certainly undermine MHC and, as Horowitz points outs, human 
control in the wider loop is coterminous with military utility. This fact alone, which is 
                                                          
187 Ekelhof (n 162), 74. 
188 Michael C. Horowitz, ‘Why Words Matter: The Real World Consequences of Defining Autonomous 
Weapons Systems’ (2016) 30 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 85, 96. 
189 Heather M. Roff, ‘The Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War’ (2014) 13 
Journal of Military Ethics 211. 
190 Horowitz (n 188), 96 (emphasis added). 
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supported by other authors with military experience,191 will very likely militate against 
the fielding of any such systems.  
 
Yet, none of this detracts from the possibility of a machine-dominated targeting 
process that gradually supplants human control in the wider loop.192 Such ‘creeping 
autonomy’ is more likely to replace individual tasks that are currently undertaken by 
humans in Phases 1 to 5a of the deliberate cycle, with possible automation bias eroding 
MHC.193 As Ekelhof argues, the possibility of autonomy with complex reasoning and 
machine learning should be considered in light of the broader targeting process, to 
assess how humans can remain in control in the event that such technologies are 
eventually adopted.194  
 
In that regard, the US DoD’s Project Maven195 is a potential concern. This seeks, 
amongst other things, to refine AI and machine learning algorithms for computer 
vision, to detect and identify specific objects in 38 categories, especially in the fight 
against Islamic State.196 More generally, Maven is tasked with automating the 
Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) of the ever-increasing volumes of 
full-motion video (FMV) drone feeds at Phase 2 of the deliberate targeting cycle, to 
reduce the burden on human analysts.197 This is intended to increase actionable 
intelligence, and speed up decision-making through the rest of the targeting cycle, 
partly because analysts freed from routine object classification tasks are able to use 
their talents to perform higher-end analysis.198 More generally, the greater speed, 
precision and accuracy of big data-processing stands to uncover relationships and 
                                                          
191 For example, Ford (n 168), 451 (“As a matter of practice, militaries and commanders spend 
considerable time and money to maximize control over their weapon systems. Indeed, control is 
arguably the very essence of a military – whether control of troops, units, weapons, or munitions”). 
192 Ekelhof (n 162), 74. 
193 See Chapter 3, (note and text accompanying) n 10 therein. 
194 Ekelhof (n 162), 74. 
195 See Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, ‘Establishment of an Algorithmic Warfare Cross-
Functional Team (Project Maven)’ (26 April 2017) 
<https://www.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/establishment_of_the_awcft_project_maven.pd
f> accessed 7 July 2018. 
196 Marcus Weisgerber, ‘The Pentagon’s New Algorithmic Warfare Cell Gets Its First Mission: Hunt 
ISIS’, Defense One (14 May 2017) <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/05/pentagons-new-
algorithmic-warfare-cell-gets-its-first-mission-hunt-isis/137833/> accessed 7 July 2018. 
197 Ibid. (noting that up to 80% of analysts’ time is normally spent on mundane administrative tasks, 
like staring at FMV feeds, manually labelling objects and entering data into spreadsheets; yet all of this 
can be automated). 
198 Weisgerber (n 196). 
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dependencies that humans would likely fail to recognise. Thus, Maven is not a weapon 
as such, but is a decision-support system for target development and enhanced 
situational awareness. Its rapid success is illustrated by the fact that one week into 
trials to identify people, vehicles and types of buildings, the accuracy of its algorithms 
improved from 60% to 80%.199 Consequently, a move towards greater levels of 
autonomy in the wider loop may not be unrealistic, both in the US200 and beyond.201  
 
Clearly, if the project goals are realised as described, Maven will enhance human 
judgment and control in the wider loop. On the other hand, as was seen in Chapter 2, 
complex algorithms tend to behave like ‘black boxes’, with inscrutable and non-
intuitive outputs.202 Should this lead to sub-optimal or erroneous selections for human 
analysts to see, this will deteriorate situational awareness and may undermine human 
control within the wider targeting process.203 Worse still, object classification remains 
inherently vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can fool systems into 
misclassifying objects.204 Should this brittleness be exploited by adversaries to 
manipulate target development and to direct attacking forces towards protected 
persons and objects, this may weaken human control to catastrophic levels. Much will 
depend on how well such wider loop autonomy is tested, evaluated and integrated 
before formal rollout.205 
                                                          
199 Marcus Weisgerber, ‘The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists, 
Defense One (21 December 2017) <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-
artificial-intelligence-already-hunting-terrorists/144742/> accessed 7 July 2018. 
200 Jack Corrigan, ‘Three-Star General Wants AI in Every New Weapon System’, Defense One (3 
November 2017) <https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/three-star-general-wants-
artificial-intelligence-every-new-weapon-system/142239/?oref=defenseone_today_nl> accessed 7 July 
2018 (citing Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, who is in charge of the AWCFT, describing Maven as the 
“pathfinder” that will “spread AI techniques to the rest of the DoD”). 
201 See ‘Intelligence Technology to Keep Joint Force Command One Step Ahead of Adversaries’, 
Ministry of Defence News (17 July 2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/intelligence-
technology-to-keep-joint-force-command-one-step-ahead-of-adversaries> Accessed 18 July 2018 
(reporting on Phase 2 development of the ‘predictive cognitive control system’ for the UK’s Joint Force 
Command. The project goal is to “take[…] a broad range of incredibly complex data, beyond the ability 
of analysts to simultaneously comprehend, and through the use of Deep Learning based neural 
networks…make confidence-based predictions of future events and outcomes of direct operational 
relevance to Defence Users”). 
202 See 2.5.3.3 and 2.5.6. 
203 See Dustin Lewis, Naz Modirzadeh and Gabriella Blum, ‘The Pentagon’s New Algorithmic-Warfare 
Team’, Lawfare (26 June 2017) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/pentagons-new-algorithmic-warfare-
team> accessed 7 July 2018 (“Of particular concern are technologies whose ‘choices’ may be difficult 
– or even impossible – for humans to anticipate or unpack or whose ‘decisions’ are seen as ‘replacing’ 
human judgment”). 
204 See 2.5.6. 
205 Merel AC. Ekelhof, ‘Lifting the Fog of Targeting: “Autonomous Weapons” and Human Control 
through the Lens of Military Targeting’ (2018) 71 Naval War College Review 61, 82-85. 
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5.5.4 MHC in Weapons Design and Development 
As was apparent in Chapter 4, the extent of MHC during downstream/in bello targeting 
processes is necessarily influenced by the design, development and testing of weapon 
systems upstream. Such ante bellum decisions can facilitate MHC in the targeting 
process by making systems more predictable, reliable and transparent, thereby 
helping to mediate the commander’s/WO’s intentions and actions.206 This was 
discussed at 4.5, in relation to the elements of MHC. Moreover, as discussed in 4.2, 
system design may effectuate downstream actions,207 or it may prohibit those actions 
in line with human judgment and control.208 
 
Upstream design decisions may also entail technical and legal considerations about 
distinction proxies; for example, the robustness of image matches, the number and 
quality of signatures that must be reconciled with pre-programmed parameters,209 and 
the statistical ‘confidence thresholds’ that must be satisfied for weapons release.210 All 
these decisions heavily influence the degree of MHC that can be properly exercised 
during the targeting process. 
 
Accordingly, MHC undoubtedly plays a role in upstream processes. Yet, there is no 
common agreement at present on the form of human control that designers and 
developers should embed into systems. As argued in 4.4.3, however, determining the 
‘core’ MHC obligations of WOs – a much easier starting point – may generate fruitful 
leads for designers and developers. In turn, this would bring other, more formal legal 
decision-making processes into play; most notably, those involved in the legal review 
mechanism under Article 36, AP I.211 
                                                          
206 Noorman (n 103), 812. 
207 Via user interface designs and data connectivity (4.2.1), or automated processes that execute human 
instructions relatively more accurately and precisely (4.2.2). 
208 Via software suppressors that automatically veto unsafe or unlawful human action (4.2.3). 
209 See 2.5.4.1 on standard ATR approaches. 
210 Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson, ‘New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary 
Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 Weapons 
Reviews’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 483, 495, 508-512. 
211 Ekelhof (n 162), 75; Article 36, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems : Evaluating the Capacity for 
‘Meaningful Human Control’ in Weapon Review Processes’, Discussion Paper for the Group of 
Governmental Experts Meeting on LAWS (13-17 November 2017) <http://www.article36.org/wp-




This chapter has examined targeting practices under US and NATO doctrine, and has 
linked these to three distinct categories of target and engagement:  
(1) Specific and unique targets that have been individually authorised for 
engagement, and which drive targeted strikes. 
(2) Targets belonging to a broader set, which drive tactical-level combat that 
does not need engagement authority for each specific target. 
(3) Persons or objects attacking or threatening to attack the LAWS, which in 
turn drive the application of kinetic force in platform-defence, to preserve 
combat capability. 
 
Going forward into Chapters 6 and 7, the first two of these crucial distinctions will 
inform the application of specific targeting rules to the deployment and use of LAWS. 
As will be seen there, both categories are potentially legally compliant but targeted 
strikes will clearly afford the greatest level of MHC; thus, they present the greater 
likelihood of LOAC compliance, ceteris paribus.  
 
As a structural requirement of the law, MHC plays a strong role in both the (upstream) 
design, development and legal review processes, and the (downstream) Joint Targeting 
Cycles. With the latter encompassing numerous sequential steps to develop, nominate 
and prioritise targets, and further steps for mitigating civilian risk, there are clear 
operational and legal safeguards to ensure that human judgment and control is not 
displaced in the wider loop. This permits narrow loop autonomy during Phase 5b (force 
execution), subject to the ‘individual attack’ limitation, which is also a structural 
feature of the law, and cannot be abrogated. Concretely, the Joint Targeting Cycles 
will effectuate MHC in a LAWS context by setting operational parameters and the 
conditions of judgment, to ensure the technology that has been approved as 
predictable, reliable and transparent in various upstream processes, is put to a lawful 
use downstream. 
 
Yet, two problems remain. First, as noted above, autonomy will not be limited to Phase 
5b, but is becoming a more pervasive influence throughout the targeting process. This 
includes Phase 2, which raises questions about the nature and extent of human 
judgment during the crucial target development process. Namely, whether such 
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judgments are being enhanced and utilised in the most productive manner; or truncated 
and supplanted by potentially erroneous algorithmic selections. Much will depend on 
how effectively projects such as Maven are tested, evaluated and implemented to 
optimise the human-machine team. Second, the concept of ‘individual attack’ is 
potentially challenging: it may constitute multiple acts of violence against multiple 
specific targets, and its application is likely to be context-specific. Thus, it does not 
offer any bright-lines, and it may well give rise to a penumbra of uncertainty. As noted 
above, autonomous and loitering technologies are likely to develop and push the notion 
of an ‘attack’ towards being conceptualised at broader levels. It is therefore important 
that commanders are guided by ‘predictability of outcome’ in the circumstances, and 
not ‘technological viability’, when determining an individual attack. Of course, this 
challenge will be relatively easier to meet with targeted strikes, save for any remaining 





Targeting Law I: Can LAWS Be Deployed in 
Compliance with the Principle of Distinction? 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous four chapters have developed the following argument. 
• Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) will follow a set of technical 
processes, which may operate with super-human accuracy and precision, or 
with brittleness and potential failure, depending on context and circumstances 
(Chapters 2 and 3).  
• In contradistinction, international humanitarian law (IHL)/law of armed 
conflict (LOAC) presupposes sentience and self-awareness, for imposing legal 
obligations; and human (autonoetic) metacognition, for its effective application 
in armed conflict. LAWS will possess none of these characteristics in the near-
term. (Chapter 3). 
• Accordingly, LAWS may only be lawfully deployed with a contextual 
application of meaningful human control (MHC),1 to ensure structural and 
substantive compliance with the LOAC targeting rules (Chapter 4).  
• The targeting process – at least in a US/NATO context – affords substantial 
opportunity to ensure MHC, because of its highly deliberative planning 
processes; so long as autonomy does not supplant human judgment in the wider 
loop, and the ‘individual attack’ limitation is maintained over and above mere 
technical viability (Chapter 5). 
 
In addition, ‘narrow loop’ autonomy will reassign some targeting decisions between 
human actors, requiring them to be made relatively earlier and at locations further 
removed from the intended strike site. All things being equal, this will weaken the 
causal nexus between human decisions and specific battlefield outcomes (Chapter 3). 
Again, the US/NATO targeting process addresses this, as it incorporates substantial 
precautionary steps in order to minimise civilian risk.  
                                                          
1 Namely, MHC should be applied in a way that facilitates compliance with the existing LOAC norms. 
‘Human control’ should not become the object of a LAWS deployment, lest it weakens compliance with 




With these in mind, the following two chapters will apply the LOAC targeting rules to 
LAWS deployments, in a US/NATO context. After an introduction to the normative 
LOAC framework in 6.2, there is a brief note on weapons law in 6.3 and an overview 
of targeting law at the high level in 6.4. Subsequently, the chapter moves onto a more 
detailed application of the principle of distinction, both generally (6.5.1) and separately 
to persons (6.5.2) and objects (6.5.3). Throughout, it will be seen that legal compliance 
is primarily a concern for commanders and weapons operators (WOs), not the machine 
itself. This is underscored in 6.5.4, which addresses a crucial presumption in favour of 
civilian protection: the rule of ‘doubt’. Namely, the ‘fog of war’, which gives rise to 
incomplete or inconclusive information, will sometimes demand metacognitive 
thinking to recognise when there is enough doubt to hold fire. Hence, outside relatively 
concrete situations, the requisite level of doubt to presume civilian status may have to 
be assessed by a human somewhere in the loop. Finally, 6.5.5 provides some closing 
thoughts on ensuring that LAWS deployments will comply with the principle of 
distinction, mainly through human-machine teaming and a ‘division of labour’.  
6.2 The Normative IHL/LOAC Framework 
IHL/LOAC largely regulates the conduct of hostilities on the battlefield.2 According 
to Sassóli, Bouvier and Quintin,3 its principal aim is to limit human suffering during 
armed conflict by: 
• protecting persons who are not, or who are no longer, directly participating in 
hostilities; and  
• restricting the means and methods of warfare to those which are necessary to 
achieve the legitimate aim of the conflict, namely, to weaken the military 
potential of the enemy. 
 
From this, we see a key overarching theme of LOAC, which was discussed in Chapter 
4: the ‘compromise’ between military necessity and humanity (MN-H).4 The former 
permits all lawful measures intended to engage and defeat the enemy as quickly and 
                                                          
2 This is in contrast to jus ad bellum, which seeks to regulate the resort to war.  
3 Marco Sassóli, Antoine A. Bouvier and Anne Quintin, How Does the Law Protect in War?: Cases, 
Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law, 
Vol. I (3rd ed., ICRC, 2011), 1. 
4 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving 
the Delicate Balance’ (2010) 50 Virginia Journal of International Law 795. 
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as efficiently as possible.5 The latter forbids the infliction of any further suffering, 
injury or destruction that is not necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose;6 
thus, humanity may be seen as the ‘logical inverse’ of military necessity.7 Furthermore, 
the MN-H balance represents a categorical rejection of the 19th Century German 
doctrine of Kriegsraison,8 which held that necessity in war overrules the manner of 
warfare.9 Yet, the net result of combining the two principles is not necessarily a 
compromise, as each one may complement the other to reinforce military 
effectiveness;10 this is certainly true in some areas of LOAC,11 though not in all.12 As 
discussed in 4.3.3, neither of these principles exists as a separate LOAC norm, but 
rather they pervade and undergird all other rules that regulate the conduct of 
hostilities.13 These rules are mostly contained in Additional Protocol I14 (AP I) and in 
the corresponding rules of customary law,15 a large proportion of which converge 
around the principles of distinction and proportionality. The current chapter will focus 
on the former principle, while Chapter 7 will address the latter.  
6.3 A Brief Note on Weapons Law 
Any complete legal analysis of a weapon system under LOAC will comprise two 
distinct strands: whether the weapon itself is lawful (weapons law); and whether its 
                                                          
5 US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (Office of General Counsel, DoD, 2015, December 
2016 Update) (hereafter, US DoD Manual), §2.2; UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of 
Armed Conflict (OUP, 2004) (hereafter, UK MoD Manual), §2.2; United States v. List (Wilhelm) et al. 
(The Hostage Case) Case No. 7, 19 February 1948 (1950) 11 TWC 1230, 1253-56. 
6 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict (3rd ed., 
CUP, 2016), 8-12; Schmitt (n 4). See also UK MoD Manual, §2.4; US DoD Manual, §2.3.1. 
7 US DoD Manual, §2.3.1.1. 
8 The Hostage Case, 1256.  
9 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts 
(Methuen, 1983), 172-79 (discussing the controversial rise of the doctrine in the writings of Carl 
Lueder).  
10 For example, sparing the incapacitated enemy combatant affords him a chance to recover outside of 
hostilities, and it conserves ammunition for attacking more active combatants. 
11 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 12th August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 
(hereafter, AP I Commentary), ¶ 1958 (noting that in relation to the principle of distinction and the 
targeting accuracy of long-range missiles, “military interests and humanitarian requirements coincide” 
to ensure that the “margin of error is gradually reduced”).  
12 For example, the principle of proportionality is, by definition, a case of compromise. See 7.2. 
13 Schmitt (n 4). 
14 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 
1125 UNTS 3. 
15 Restated in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules (CUP, 2005) (hereafter, CIHL). All Rules available at: <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul> accessed 10 June 2018. 
184 
 
actual use is lawful (targeting law).16 The focus of this thesis is on targeting law and 
practice, by which point US/NATO commanders can safely assume all weapons in 
their arsenal are lawful, subject to prescribed restrictions on use. Weapons law will 
generally not pose a significant barrier to the adoption of LAWS, though it is worth 
briefly addressing this area for the sake of completeness.  
 
Article 35(2), AP I, prohibits weapons that are “of a nature to cause superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering”; Article 51(4)(c) prohibits those the effects of which cannot 
be limited, and are likely to spread from combatants to civilians without distinction; 
and Article 35(3) prohibits weapons that “are intended, or may be expected, to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”.17 Crucially, 
these norms relate to the effects of the munition or projectile that a weapon system 
fires or launches, not to its guidance system.18 Namely, autonomy is a manner of 
engagement and cannot in itself be ‘of a nature’ to inflict the above unlawful effects.19 
Hence, the aforementioned rules are inapplicable to LAWS, unless the system is 
deployed to fire or launch the offending munitions.20 
 
Article 51(4)(b), AP I, prohibits weapons that are ‘inherently indiscriminate’, in that 
they amount to a “means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective”.21 This rule also concerns the “very nature or design” of a weapon, not its 
use in a given engagement.22 Such weapons are unlawful per se as they will routinely 
strike combatants, civilians, military objectives and civilian objects without 
distinction.23 The Commentary on the Air and Missile Warfare Manual24 specifically 
                                                          
16 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Reports 226 
(hereafter Nuclear Weapons AO). The two legal regimes roughly correspond with the 
upstream/downstream (or ante bellum/in bello) distinction introduced in Chapter 4. 
17 Articles 35(2)-(3) and 51(4)(c), AP I; CIHL, Rules 70, 44 and 12. 
18 William Boothby, ‘Dehumanization: Is There a Legal Problem Under Article 36?’ in Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg, Robert Frau and Tassilo Singer (eds.), Dehumanization of Warfare: Legal 
Implications of New Weapons Technologies (Springer, 2018), 38-39. 
19 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply 
to the Critics’ (2013) Harvard National Security Journal Features 1, 9. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Article 51(4)(b), AP I; CIHL, Rules 12 and 71 
22 Dinstein (n 6), 72. 
23 Schmitt (n 19), 10.  
24 Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research at Harvard University (HPCR), Commentary 
on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (v2.1, Harvard 
College, 2010) (hereafter, AMW Manual Commentary). See also the Manual to which this commentary 
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affirms that the principle of distinction (see 6.5) and its application to weapons design 
extends to autonomous systems.25 Accordingly, Article 51(4)(b) cannot mean that 
‘autonomy’ as a concept is inherently unlawful. So long as a given system can be 
supplied with sufficiently reliable and accurate data on target parameters as to enable 
it to pursue a specific military objective in the operational environment for which it is 
intended, it will not be indiscriminate by nature; thus not unlawful per se.26  
 
Therefore, much depends on whether the guidance and target recognition systems in a 
given LAWS reach a legally acceptable standard of discrimination. Namely, the main 
weapons law issue is in the realms of testing and evaluation, and legal review under 
Article 36, AP I:27 to determine when a given combination of (multi)sensed data 
indicates the presence of a military object; and to determine whether an individual 
system has reached the required degree of confidence, with an acceptable failure rate 
for a LAWS to positively identify such an object.28 In this connexion, it should also be 
emphasised that as a matter of law autonomous systems need not perform better than 
manually-operated systems.29 A risk of targeting error, which is at least common to 
man and machine, will not in itself render a LAWS unlawful.30 
                                                          
relates: HPCR, HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (Harvard 
College, 2009) (hereafter, AMW Manual). 
25 Ibid., Rule 17(a), ¶ 3 (“The sensors and computer programs [of a LAWS] must be able to distinguish 
between military objectives and civilian objects, as well as between civilians and combatants”). 
26 Ibid., Rule 39, ¶ 4. 
27 Or under the corresponding rules of customary law. For an application of the legal review criteria to 
LAWS, see Boothby (n 18), 38-45. 
28 Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson, ‘New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary 
Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 Weapons 
Reviews’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 483, 508-09. 
29 Schmitt (n 19), 12; Marco Sassóli, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: 
Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified’ (2014) 90 International Law 
Studies 308, 320. See also AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 4 (“In case of autonomous 
systems…The performance of the sensors and the program identifying lawful targets must be 
comparable to that of manned aircraft or to that of remotely-piloted (i.e. non-autonomous) UCAVs”). 
30 While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that problems under Article 36 are less 
to do with the legal review criteria itself, and more about the ‘certification problem’. Namely, the near-
infinite state possibilities of complex autonomous systems make it near-impossible to test every 
interaction that the systems might have in a complex operational environment, and therefore to fully 
evaluate lawfulness. This problem is compounded by the brittleness of AI and the ‘black box’ issue 
highlighted in Chapter 2. That said, there are currently efforts aimed at resolving the certification 
problem, for example, via ‘life-cycle testing and evaluation’; and there is always the option that legal 
review panels may impose deployment restrictions and conditions of use (specific precautionary 
stipulations), where a particular LAWS system cannot be demonstrated to be lawful in a particular 
context. Thus, while acknowledging the practical difficulties brought up by certification and review, the 
current and next chapter will proceed on the assumption that such matters will ultimately be addressed. 
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6.4 Targeting Law: An Overview 
In contrast to weapons law, targeting law determines whether the actual use of a 
weapon in battle and the actual targeting process is lawful. In that regard, Boothby 
defines ‘targeting’ as a broad process encompassing both planning and execution.31 In 
a US/NATO context, this entails the detailed six-phase deliberate targeting cycle (for 
attacks planned more than 24 hours away); or the six expedited steps of the dynamic 
cycle (for attacks being planned within the current 24-hour cycle).32  
 
As above, the law of targeting reflects the military necessity-humanity (MN-H) 
balance, most vividly in the principles of distinction (6.5) and proportionality (7.2). As 
will also be seen in 7.3, even the rules requiring precautions in attack – ostensibly 
stronger expressions of the principle of humanity – are structured to represent this 
delicate balance through the requirement of feasibility. 
 
Hereon, the thesis will apply the LOAC targeting rules – both treaty-based33 and 
customary34 – to potential LAWS deployments, bearing in mind: 
• the technical nature of autonomous weapons;35  
• the obligation to exercise MHC over individual attacks;36 
• the human-machine cognitive differences;37  
• the Joint Targeting process,38 which itself is an extensive form of MHC;39 and 
• the distinction between targeted strikes (TS) and tactical-level combat (TLC);40 
the latter involving relatively more machine discretion, while the former 
affords relatively more human control and human-specification of outcomes. 
                                                          
31 William H. Boothby, The Law of Targeting (OUP, 2012), 4. 
32 See Chapter 5, especially 5.3. 
33 Principally, under AP I. 
34 As restated in the CIHL Rules. 
35 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
36 See Chapter 4. 
37 See 4.2. 
38 See 5.3. 
39 See 5.5. 
40 See 5.2.5. 
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6.5 The Principle of Distinction  
The principle of distinction, “the most fundamental pillar of [LOAC]”,41 requires the 
Parties to an armed conflict to: 
 
…at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly [to] direct their operations only against military 
objectives.42  
 
Thus, the principle imposes a bifurcated and cumulative obligation: to refrain from 
attacking civilians or their objects, and to ensure that all attacks are aimed at military 
objectives.43 This clearly assumes and requires meaningful human control (MHC) over 
individual attacks.44  
 
Distinction has been described by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as an 
“intransgressible” principle of the LOAC.45 While the Court did not elaborate on the 
meaning of this term, it is “more than probable” that it was intended to indicate that 
distinction is a norm of jus cogens.46 That is, it may be a ‘peremptory norm’ of 
international law from which no derogation is ever permitted.47 Not surprisingly, the 
principle also forms part of customary international law, thus it binds all States, 
whether or not they are Party to AP I.48  
                                                          
41 Dinstein (n 6), 72 (adding that the principle reflects the history of LOAC as “a sustained effort to 
ensure that civilians…are protected from the havocs of war”). 
42 Article 48, AP I (emphasis added). This is the ‘Basic Rule’, which is operationalised in subsequent 
Articles. 
43 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 10(a), ¶ 3. 
44 See 4.3 on the structural legal argument. 
45 Nuclear Weapons AO, ¶ 79. 
46 Jean-Françoise Quéguiner, ‘The Principle of Distinction: Beyond an Obligation of Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’, in Howard M. Hensel (ed.), The Legitimate Use of Military Force: 
The Just War Tradition and the Customary Law of Armed Conflict (Routledge, 2016), 171 (though 
noting that this is far from explicit, and requires an element of “reading between the lines” to detect the 
Court’s “implicit yet clear affirmation” of the jus cogens character of the principle of distinction). 
47 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS, 331; Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens: International Law and Social 
Contract (CUP, 2015), 5-8. Independently of the Nuclear Weapons AO, Quéguiner, ibid., argues that 
three other reasons support the idea that distinction is a norm of jus cogens: a) the fact that Article 48 is 
entitled the ‘Basic Rule’, b) its location at the first Section of Part IV, a Chapter devoted to the Section’s 
field of application, c) the fact that Article 48 requires distinction “at all times”. Collectively, these 
demonstrate that the principle of distinction was intended to permeate all of the rules on the conduct of 
hostilities, and at all times. 
48 Nuclear Weapons AO, ¶ 79; Quéguiner, ibid., 164-67. See also the customary rules restated in CIHL, 
Rules 1 and 7. As a corollary, it may be argued that the requirement of MHC over individual attacks is 




In targeting law, the broad principle enshrined in Article 48 is operationalised in a 
number of subsequent AP I rules. These apply to persons and objects, both separately 
and together in some general provisions.  
6.5.1 General Provisions 
On the face of it, the black-letter text of Article 51(4)(a), AP I, would appear to sound 
the death knell for autonomous lethal targeting, in all but TSs. This rule prohibits 
attacks “which are not directed at a specific military objective”.49 Hence, Dill argues 
that “[f]ailure to have a specific military objective in mind and to direct one’s weapon 
against it…is…a violation of the principle of distinction”;50 other commentators have 
taken a similar stance.51 Given that LOAC imposes obligations on humans and not on 
machines,52 Article 51(4)(a) would therefore appear to make any LAWS deployment 
to engage in TLC unlawful, with wording that can arguably be seized upon by ban 
proponents.53 However, on closer examination the prohibition has been interpreted 
differently to this. For example, Dinstein argues that the key to a finding of 
‘indiscriminate attack’ under Article 51(4)(a) is the “nonchalant state of mind of the 
attacker”.54 Boothby illustrates this with the examples of “blind firing” a rifle, or “the 
firing of artillery without making any attempt to direct the munition”.55 Dinstein further 
adds bombing raids from high altitudes, in conditions of poor visibility and inclement 
weather, and utilising no precision guidance mechanism.56 Indeed, the gist of Article 
51(4)(a) seems to be more about the WO’s diligence (or “the attacker’s indifference”57) 
than the technical working of the weapon system.  
 
                                                          
49 Article 51(4)(a), A  P I (emphasis added). 
50 Janina Dill, Legitimate Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing (CUP, 
2015), 75 (emphasis added).  
51 Remarks by Françoise J. Hampson, ‘Proportionality and Necessity in the Gulf Conflict’ (1992) 86 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 45, 49 (asserting there is 
a “requirement that each potential target be examined separately”, thus “[i]t is not possible to have a 
class of targets”) (emphasis added). 
52 See 3.2 and 4.3.1. 
53 See the approach to LAWS taken by Gubrud (a prominent ban proponent), in 5.5.1. 
54 Dinstein (n 6), 147. 
55 Boothby (n 31), 92 (emphasis added).  
56 Dinstein (n 6), 148. 
57 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 13(a), ¶ 2. 
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Accordingly, in programming and deploying a LAWS with generalised but 
appropriate parameters, and with automatic target recognition (ATR) systems that are 
apt for the operational environment, commanders and their battle staffs will arguably 
not be violating Article 51(4)(a). If they intend, and can reasonably expect, that the 
system will ultimately be directed towards a specific and lawful target during TLC,58 
the question of human versus algorithmic determination of that target will be 
immaterial,59 and the attack should not be construed to be indiscriminate. This is also 
underscored in the AMW Manual Commentary in relation to ‘beyond-visual-range’ 
attacks,60 and it highlights the importance of a reasonable interpretation and 
application of the LOAC prohibitions, in accordance with the context at hand.61 
 
Paragraph (5)(a) of the same Article prohibits the World War II practice of ‘target 
area’ bombings. This is defined as:  
 
[A]n attack by bombardment…which treats as a single military 
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives 
located in a[n]… area containing a…concentration of civilians or 
civilian objects.62 
 
On the one hand, compliance with this rule may be a relatively simple matter of 
programming and deployment, which can be satisfied in the context of the deliberate 
targeting cycle. Namely, where it is possible for a manned weapon system to engage a 
number of targets individually (for example, in a series of discrete TSs), this should be 
                                                          
58 The reasonableness of such expectation will partly depend on target parameters and spatio-temporal 
limits. 
59 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems’ in Paul AL. Ducheine, 
Michael N. Schmitt and Frans PB. Osinga (eds.), Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare (TMC 
Asser Press, 2016), 186; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 4. 
60 AMW Manual Commentary, Rules 7(c), ¶ 3 and 13(b), ¶ 8 (pointing out that ‘beyond-visual-range’ 
weapon systems “are lawful”, hence “not as such indiscriminate when their employment permits 
distinguishing military objectives and combatants from civilians and civilian objects…through sensors 
on the weapon itself, or through external guidance”). See also 4.5.6 on the likely customary status of 
precision-guided munitions. 
61 In this connexion, it should be noted that Dill’s comment, (text accompanying n 50), was not focusing 
on LAWS, but was made in the context of the bifurcated obligation inherent in the principle of 
distinction. Seen in this context, the author would not necessarily object to the autonomous selection 
and engagement of a specific military target that a reasonable combatant would also have engaged in 
the case of manned targeting. By contrast, Hampson’s comment (at n 51) was made in the context of 
the temporal aspect of the definition of military objective under Article 52(2), which may in some 
narrow circumstances pose problems for autonomous attack; on which, see 6.5.3.3. Nonetheless, the 
point remains that the black-letter text of the general LOAC provisions must be subject to reasonable 
interpretation and application to LAWS, in light of the underlying goal that the provision aims to 
achieve, or the mischief that it aims to eliminate. 
62 Article 51(5)(a), AP I (emphasis added); AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 13(c), ¶ 3; CIHL, Rule 13. 
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the default programming option for a LAWS, rather than deploying it to engage those 
targets en masse.63 Conversely, Boothby has questioned the ability of ATR 
technologies to detect targets separately, especially in heavily built-up areas where 
tight comingling may require evaluative and metacognitive judgments, to which 
LAWS are not easily suited.64 Concretely, where military targets are in fact separated, 
yet the machine-imperceptibleness of urban clutter causes the ATR to perceive them 
as a single unit, there may be an inadvertent violation of Article 51(5)(a). This is more 
likely to be a risk in TLC, which does not benefit from pre-strike deliberations on 
specific targets. But whether the risk does in fact materialise depends on the 
capabilities of the ATR compared with existing manned systems; the prevailing 
operational environment; and the robustness of the targeting process in matching one 
with the other.  
 
In that regard, recall Figure 2.5 in 2.5.2, which showed a recurrent neural network 
successfully distinguishing neatly laid-out and clearly separated items on a breakfast 
table. Where ATR capabilities are limited to this, they may fail to adequately 
distinguish overlapping objects in a cluttered environment,65 and may possibly violate 
Article 51(5)(a) if deployed. More recent research, however, has improved the 
accuracy of systems by training them to recognise full objects (the ‘ground truth’) and 
to estimate the full physical presence of those objects (as well as their separation from 
each other) more accurately, when partially concealed or obscured.66 An example of 
the results is shown in Figure 6.1, below. 
 
                                                          
63 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Law’, LENS Conference 
2016: Autonomous Weapons in the Age of Hybrid War (27 February 2016) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5mz7Y2FmU4> accessed 11 August 2018. 
64 The author argues that the “clearly separated and distinct” criterion requires the ATR of a machine to 
evaluate the relative positions of military objectives; and to assess the similarity or otherwise of their 
concentration with the concentration of civilians or civilian objects in the same ‘locality’. This involves 
the comparison of dissimilar items – each one being of a different size, significance or value – thus, it 
“presuppose[s] the involvement of a human brain” with metacognitive functions. See William H. 
Boothby, Conflict Law: The Influence of New Weapons Technology, Human Rights and Emerging 
Actors (TMC Asser Press, 2014), 109-10. 
65 Tucker Davey, ‘How AI Handles Uncertainty: An Interview with Brian Zeibart’, Future of Life 
Institute News (15 March 2018) <https://futureoflife.org/2018/03/15/how-ai-handles-uncertainty-brian-
ziebart/> accessed 13 May 2018. 
66 Sima Behpour, Kris M. Kitani and Brian D. Ziebart, ‘ADA: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Data 
Augmentation for Object Detection’ (12 December 2017) <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.07735v2.pdf> 




This kind of training to separate each ‘ground truth’ may help to avoid inadvertent 
target area bombing. Nonetheless, it will be for commanders and their staffs in the 
targeting process to make the appropriate judgments on the technology and context 
when planning multiple TSs in close proximity, or when deploying a LAWS for TLC 
in a cluttered area.67 
6.5.2 Persons 
In line with the bifurcated nature of the distinction principle, LAWS will need to 
categorise persons either as combatants, who may be directly attacked; or as civilians, 
or other protected persons, who must be spared and protected from direct attack.  
6.5.2.1 Active Combatants 
6.5.2.1.1 The General Position 
Combatants are generally members of the conventional armed forces who have the 
right to participate directly in hostilities,68 or members of “other militias 
and…volunteer corps” who meet certain conditions,69 and who will be engaged during 
TLC. These persons may be detectable to ATR via their distinctive uniform and 
                                                          
67 Of course, for such systems to even be available for deployment will first require their technical 
certification and legal review, as per n 30. 
68 Article 43(2), AP I; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 10(b)(i), ¶ 2; CIHL, Rule 3.  
69 Article 1, Annex to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 
January 1910) 36 Stat. 2227 TS 539 (hereafter, Hague Regulations); Article 4A(2), Geneva Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 
October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (hereafter, GC III) (listing subordination, fixed distinctive emblem, 
carrying arms openly, and conduct in accordance with the laws and customs of war). 
Figure 6.1: A relatively complex environment in which the system attempts to classify the full presence (ground truth) 
of each person and object, despite some being obscured. Source: Davey (n 65). 
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insignia,70 which Parties to armed conflict are obliged to wear to remain “recognizable 
at a distance”.71 The underlying aim is to make combatants distinguishable from the 
civilian population, for the latter’s protection,72 but the flipside is to make them 
amenable to machine perception for lethal targeting.73 That said, reliance on uniform 
and insignia alone may lead to distinction failure as combatants may become hors de 
combat;74 civilians may take the clothing of deceased soldiers and unwittingly put 
themselves in the crosshairs of a LAWS;75 or, the enemy may utilise adversarial 
examples to direct attacking forces towards civilians,76 in a propaganda war. All three 
risks counsel in favour of broader criteria and/or multisensory phenomenologies, for a 
more robust verification of combatant status.77 One solution may be to combine 
uniform and insignia with the recognition of specific arms and equipment used 
exclusively by the enemy.78 The fact that combatants are legally required to carry their 
arms openly79 as a second condition of distinction80 supports this. A more effective 
approach may be to detect the ‘metallic footprint’ and the distinctive ‘behaviour and 
movements’, which are a product of military training.81 Together with uniform and 
insignia detection this provides a robust three-part criteria,82 which may also be 
combined with ‘specific arms recognition’ when it is desirable to attain a higher 
                                                          
70 See ‘Camopedia: The Camouflage Encyclopedia’ 
<http://camopedia.org/index.php?title=Main_Page> accessed 11 August 2018. 
71 Article 1(2), Hague Regulations; Article 4A(2)(b), GC III. 
72 Article 44(3), AP I; CIHL, Rule 106; AP I Commentary, ¶ 1578. 
73 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Ford, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Law’ (2017) 69 
South Carolina Law Review 413, 436. 
74 See 6.5.2.4. 
75 Despite the broader risks associated with wearing military clothing, this is still common in warzones 
afflicted with harsh winters and poverty amongst the civilian population. 
76 See 2.5.6 and 2.5.7. In this instance, an adversarial example may be subtle patterns embedded in 
shirts, which are distributed to an unwitting civilian population, and which fool an ATR system into 
perceiving enemy uniform/insignia. 
77 See also 6.5.2.1.2 on the use of adversarial examples in enemy uniform. 
78 Rao Komar, ‘How to Digitally Verify Combatant Affiliation in Middle East Conflicts’, Bellingcat (9 
July 2018) <https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2018/07/09/digitally-verify-middle-east-
conflicts/> accessed 11 August 2018. 
79 Article 1(3), Hague Regulations; Article 44(3), AP I; CIHL, Rule 106. 
80 Dinstein (n 6), 52-56 (discussing the seven cumulative Hague and Geneva conditions of lawful 
combatancy, of which fixed distinctive emblem and carrying arms openly are intended to promote 
distinction, and are both amenable to ATR. The remaining five are: subordination, conduct in 
accordance with LOAC, organisation, belonging to a Belligerent Party, and non-allegiance to the 
detaining power). 
81 William H. Boothby, ‘Autonomous Attack – Opportunity or Spectre?’ in Terry D. Gill (ed.), Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law 2013, Vol. 16 (TMC Asser Press, 2015), 79. 
82 Namely, the combination of a) uniform and insignia, b) metallic footprint, and c) the distinctive 
behaviour and movements, which are a product of military training. 
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confidence threshold.83 Along with the legal status of privileged (enemy) combatants, 
we may expect to see a relatively firm basis for status-based targeting in international 
armed conflict. Namely, once combatant status is established there are no legal grey 
areas: active combatants may be attacked based solely on their status, irrespective of 
the extent of their involvement in hostilities.84 To be sure, while a small subset of 
LOAC scholars argues for a so-called ‘duty to capture’,85 the overwhelming academic 
opinion is for status-based targeting;86 as is the evident legal authority.87 This clearly 
supports administrability by precluding the need for a LAWS to undertake any 
metacognitive conduct-based evaluation, or individualised threat assessment. 
 
However, AP I blurs the ‘combatant’ category by including other persons who are less 
amenable to ATR, such as paramilitary personnel or armed police officers.88 That said, 
the Party integrating such personnel into its armed forces must notify the other Parties 
to the conflict, to avoid confusion.89 This will enable the latter to update the ATR of 
their LAWS, to recognise the relevant uniform and insignia,90 and the specific arms 
being used by the paramilitary/police agency. 
 
Even more challenging is the inclusion of guerrilla fighters wearing no uniform or 
distinguishing sign, and with relaxed rules on the open carriage of their weapons.91 
                                                          
83 Or if advances in nanotechnology make metallic footprint redundant. Note that all these approaches 
would have to pass testing, certification and legal review hurdles before acquisition and deployment. 
84 Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez (ICTY Appeals Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004), ¶ 51. 
85 For example, Ryan Goodman, ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 24 The 
European Journal of International Law 819 (arguing that Articles 35 and 41, AP I, and the general 
structure, rules and practices of modern warfare all impose restraints on the use of lethal force, and an 
obligation to utilise the ‘least restrictive means’, where capture is equally effective and does not 
endanger attacking forces). 
86 For example, Laurie R. Blank et al., ‘Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful 
Means Rule’ (2013) 89 International Law Studies 536 (comprehensively rebutting the so-called ‘least 
restrictive/harmful means’ rule, on the basis that a) it ignores the reality of the corporate identity of 
enemy belligerents, and b) it prevents combatants benefitting from the clarity of presumptions. Namely, 
armed conflict is a contest between organised belligerent groups, where the objective is to bring the 
enemy, in a collective sense, into complete submission).  
87 Ibid. (providing an extensive examination of positive treaty law and its origins, going back to the 
Lieber Code through to the Hague Regulations, the GCs and the APs); Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez 
(Appeals), ¶ 51. 
88 Article 43(3), AP I; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 10(b)(i), ¶ 3; CIHL, Rule 4. 
89 Article 43(3), AP I; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 10(b)(i), ¶ 3; CIHL, Rule 4. 
90 AP I Commentary, ¶ 1683 (affirming that only uniformed units of police agencies can be integrated 
into the armed forces; in line with existing law and State practice, and to avoid confusion). 
91 Article 44(3), AP I (restricting the duty to carry arms openly to the duration of the attack; and to the 




This is a significant drawback for a LAWS-deploying Party as it undermines the 
objective dimension of status-based targeting, which is where machines are likely to 
excel.92 However, not all States that are expected to field LAWS are Party to AP I, or 
bound by any (debatable) equivalent rule in customary law.93 Persistent objectors 
include the US94 and Israel,95 who specifically admonish Article 44(3) and do not 
recognise it as having customary status,96 but instead use the traditional categories of 
combatant found in Article 4A, GC III. Other States that are bound by Article 44(3) 
have generally expressed three limiting factors, which further narrow the exception 
and minimise its negative impact on the utilisation of LAWS.97 In any event, they can 
always restrict their LAWS deployments to traditional battlefields, where uniformed 
combatants are the norm, and which will be relatively more amenable to ATR.98 
                                                          
92 Dinstein (n 6), 56-57, 64, suggests that the seven conditions of lawful combatancy are onerous for 
irregular forces, and that the two focused on distinction – distinctive emblem and open carriage of arms 
– could become alternative rather than cumulative, because “when one is fulfilled the other may be 
deemed redundant”. While this may be true for regular combatants exercising human discretion, a 
LAWS will need as many objective cues as possible to reliably assess combatant status; thus, it is 
desirable to consider both as cumulative conditions. 
93 See CIHL, Rule 106 (discussing Article 44(3) and the conduct of negotiations that led to it). 
94 Beginning with Ronald Reagan’s Letter of Transmittal to the United States Senate (29 January 1987), 
reprinted in (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 910 (specifically objecting to the relaxed 
rules on irregular forces distinguishing themselves from the civilian population, and the consequent 
endangering of civilians). See also the authoritative position of the US on AP I in ‘Memorandum for 
Assistant General Counsel (International), Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implications’ (8 May 1986) 
(identifying the AP I provisions which the US agrees are customary, with a conspicuous absence of 
Article 44(3)); US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (Office of General Counsel, DoD, 2015, 
December 2016 Update) (hereafter, US DoD Manual), § 4.6.1.2 (“The United States has objected to the 
way [Article 44] relaxed the requirements for obtaining the privileges of combatant status, and did not 
ratify AP I, in large part, because of them”). 
95 See ‘Israel, Statement at the Diplomatic Conference Leading to the Adoption of the Additional 
Protocols’, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Vol. VI (Federal Political Department, 
1978), CDDH/SR 40, ¶ 17. 
96 US DoD Manual, § 4.6.1.2 (expressing the US view that Article 44 is not customary law). Even if we 
do assume customary status, persistent objectors are not bound. See Fisheries Case (United Kingdom 
v. Norway) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, 131; Ted L. Stein, ‘The Approach of the Different 
Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard 
International Law Journal 457. 
97 (1) The exception is limited to organised resistance movements in occupied territories or in wars of 
national liberation, (2) ‘deployment’ refers to any movement towards a place from which an attack is 
to be launched, and (3) ‘visible’ includes being detectable via technical means, which is particularly 
important in relation to LAWS deployments. See the various statements in the Official Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference (n 95), CDDH/SR 40-41. 
98 Following this, if LAWS deployments are found to have positive impacts on civilian risk compared 
with manned targeting, this may give fresh impetus to calls for extending combatant immunity to non-
State actors. See Geoffrey S. Corn, ‘Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer Combatant 
Immunity to Non-State Actors?’ (2011) 22 Stanford Law & Policy Review 253. The aim would be to 
incentivise currently ‘unlawful combatants’ to distinguish themselves as a quid pro quo, much to the 
benefit of civilians and the LAWS-deploying side.  
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6.5.2.1.2 The Legal Position on Uniforms and Adversarial Examples99 
Yet, even traditional combatants will not always be a guarantee of adequate distinction. 
For example, adversarial static may be embedded in military uniform to spoof a LAWS 
into perceiving civilian clothing; this may amount to no more than a lawful ruse of war 
if the ‘spoofing’ Party merely diverts the LAWS away from itself to avoid coming 
under attack.100 Indeed, such a move may even be comparable (albeit inversely) to the 
use of chaff and flares, which has long been practiced by military pilots to divert radar-
guided and infrared-guided missiles.101 On the other hand, if the adversarial static 
imitates enemy uniform and insignia (or flags/emblems)102 to shield, favour, protect or 
impede military operations, this would very likely be prohibited under Article 39(2), 
AP I.103 Furthermore, if such misuse extends to static-generated uniforms, signs or 
emblems of the UN or neutral/non-Party States (or civilian clothing patterns) in order 
to feign protected status; and if this leads to the killing, injuring or capture of LAWS-
deploying personnel, it will be deemed to be a perfidy under Article 37(1).104  
 
In this regard, Sassóli poses the question as to whether a machine can be ‘led to 
believe’ that the person or object before it has protected status, or whether it is possible 
to ‘invite the confidence’ of a LAWS – two vital elements of perfidy.105 Arguably, 
such anthropomorphic terms cannot directly apply to a LAWS. On the other hand, any 
manipulation of visual data by an adverse Party that causes a LAWS to hold fire may, 
by extension, invite the confidence of human combatants who rely on ATR 
assessments and/or are led by the actions of their machine ‘partners’. This may 
possibly lead those human combatants to believe that the person or object before them 
enjoys protected status. If such a scenario played out and adverse forces killed, injured 
or captured attacking forces as a result, perfidy would be very likely to be established.  
 
                                                          
99 See 2.5.6 on adversarial examples. 
100 Article 37(2), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 113; CIHL, Rule 57.  
101 See the examples of (especially US) State practice under CIHL, Rule 57 <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule57> accessed 11 August 2018. 
102 ‘Enemy’ in this case being attacking forces. 
103 Article 39(2), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 112(c); CIHL, Rule 62. 
104 Article 37(1), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 111(a)-(b); CIHL, Rule 65. 
105 Sassóli (n 29), 328. 
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There are limitations to this prohibition: property damage (including damage to the 
LAWS unit) is not covered by perfidy,106 even if this does degrade combat capability. 
However, this may not matter in the case of Article 39(2), which is drafted broadly 
enough (“impede military operations”) to catch property damage or any other 
degradation to combat capability.107 The legal difference therefore hinges on whether 
the adversarial examples centre around enemy uniform and insignia (or 
flags/emblems); or whether they imitate civilian clothing, or the uniforms, signs or 
emblems of neutral/non-Party States. 
 
It should be noted that resolving the problem of adversarial examples in uniform is not 
solely dependent on a legal solution. A more pragmatic approach may be for 
intelligence analysts to determine – most likely during Phase 2 of the deliberate 
targeting cycle108 – how adversarial examples are being utilised by the enemy. 
Thereon, systems may be trained to recognise specific examples and even specific 
kinds of adversarial patterns in enemy uniform,109 before being deployed at Phase 5.110 
6.5.2.2 Civilians and Other Protected Persons 
In contradistinction to the above, Article 51(2) prohibits making civilians the object of 
attack,111 as well as acts or threats of violence for the primary purpose of terrorising 
the civilian population.112 Paragraph (6) prohibits attacks against civilians by way of 
reprisal,113 and this is of peremptory importance,114 given how easily reprisals have in 
the past been invoked as a pretext for indiscriminate warfare.115 Arguably, the nature 
and wording of these prohibitions renders compliance relatively simple: a matter of ex 
                                                          
106 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 111(a), ¶ 7 (noting the inherent limitation in “killing, injuring or 
capturing”). 
107 See 5.3.2.2 on preserving combat capability as a tactical and operational imperative. 
108 See 5.3.1.2. 
109 See 2.5.6.3 on inoculating systems against spoofing. 
110 See 5.3.1.5. 
111 Article 51(2), AP I (emphasis added); AMW Manual, Rule 11; CIHL, Rule 1 (“Attacks must not be 
directed against civilians”); Nuclear Weapons AO, ¶ 78 (“States must never make civilians the object 
of attack”). This general rule is subject to an exception under Article 51(3); on which, see 6.5.2.3. 
112 Article 51(2), AP I (emphasis added); AMW Manual, Rule 18; CIHL, Rule 2. 
113 Article 51(6), AP I (emphasis added). See also CIHL, Rule 145. 
114 AP I Commentary, ¶ 1984. 
115 Ibid., ¶ 1982 (referring to the “countless civilian victims” during World War II). But see CIHL, Rule 
145 (restating the customary norm and conditions under which reprisals may be permissible). 
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ante programming and appropriate deployment,116 which should pose no difficulty for 
commanders acting in good faith.117  
 
The issue differs when considering the general civilian protection afforded in 
Paragraph (1),118 Article 48119 and in customary law.120 None of these presume 
deliberate targeting on the part of human participants, and all of them may be violated 
when there is distinction failure on the part of the machine, if this would not occur in 
a counterfactual manned targeting scenario.121 Yet, even here a LAWS is – at least in 
more traditional battlefield contexts – arguably capable of respecting civilian status by 
recognising “any non-positively identified person” as a civilian.122 This kind of 
programming is consistent with the negative definition of ‘civilian’ in Article 50(1), 
AP I,123 and it would entail a technical prohibition on targeting any person not 
satisfying the three-/four-part criteria discussed above. Thus, far from being vague and 
non-executable in machine code, it simply requires programming the inverse of the 
status-based criteria.124 
 
                                                          
116 Schmitt (n 63). 
117 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2198. 
118 Article 51(1), AP I (noting subsequent paragraphs are in addition to the general protection enjoyed 
by civilians). 
119 Article 48, AP I (noting simply that Parties to a conflict “must at all time distinguish between civilians 
and combatants”). 
120 See restatements in CIHL, Rules 1 and 6 (the former replicating the wording of Article 48, AP I; the 
latter restating that civilians are generally “protected against attack”). 
121 Schmitt (n 19), 12; Sassóli (n 29), 320; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 4. 
122 Schmitt (n 63). ‘Respect’ in this context simply means to refrain from attacking civilians, and is not 
meant to be an anthropomorphism. 
123 Article 50(1), AP I; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 11, ¶ 6; CIHL, Rule 5; Prosecutor v. Blaškić 
(ICTY Trial Judgment) IT-95-14-T (3 March 2000), ¶ 180. 
124 Cf. Noel E. Sharkey, ‘The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare’ (2012) 94 International 
Review of the Red Cross 787, 789 (arguing that such a negative formulation “does not provide a 
definition that could give a machine with the necessary information”). 
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Other persons who must be both respected and protected include medical,125 
religious126 and humanitarian relief personnel,127 amongst others.128 On the one hand, 
these specific categories of persons may require no further programming efforts than 
those that will be afforded to civilians, as these persons will also satisfy the inverse of 
the status-based criteria for combatants. This is helpfully reinforced by the restriction 
of medical personnel to “light individual weapons”129 in AP I130 and in the 2016 GC I 
Commentary,131 to avoid the perception that they are equipped to commit (outside their 
humanitarian duties) acts harmful to the enemy.132 Namely, as permissible and 
‘restricted’ arms are all amenable to object recognition,133 these rules will potentially 
support respect for medical personnel by LAWS-deploying forces. 
 
On the other hand, respect may be bolstered by programming additional (positive) 
forbidding criteria when these persons bear machine-perceptible signs. Specifically, 
medical and religious personnel are required to wear a water-resistant armlet bearing 
the emblem of the Red Cross or Red Crescent, to denote protected status to attacking 
forces.134 Moreover, when carrying out their duties in a battle area, these persons shall 
                                                          
125 Articles 24 and 25, Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 
75 UNTS 31 (hereafter, GC I); Article 36, Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered 
into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (hereafter, GC II); Article 20, Geneva Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into 
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (hereafter, GC IV); Article 15(1), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 71; 
CIHL Rule 25.  
126 Article 24, GC I; Article 36, GC II; Article 15(5), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 71; CIHL Rule 27. 
127 Article 71(2), AP I; Article 7(2), Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel (adopted 9 December 1994, entered into force 15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363; AMW 
Manual, Rule 102(a); CIHL, Rule 31. 
128 See, for example, Articles 26 and 27, GC I, on personnel of National Red Cross and other Voluntary 
Aid Societies, and Societies of neutral countries, respectively. 
129 See Heather Brandon, ‘Joint Series: Restricting Medical Personnel, Units, and Transports to ‘Light 
Individual Weapons’’, Intercross Blog (16 February 2017) <http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/joint-
series-restricting-medical-personnel-units-and-transports-to-light-individual-weapons> accessed 17 
August 2018. 
130 Article 13(2)(a), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 74(c)(i). 
131 Knut Dörmann et al. (eds.), Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (CUP, 2016),       
¶¶ 1864 and 1874 (in relation to military medical personnel). 
132 Ibid., ¶ 1868. 
133 Ibid., ¶¶ 1864 and 1868 (noting that pistols and standard-issue rifles are acceptable, but man-portable 
and anti-tank missiles and crew-served machine guns are not). See also AMW Manual Commentary, 
Rule 74(c)(i), ¶ 3. 
134 Articles 38-41, GC I; Articles 41-42, GC II; Article 4 and 5, Annex I to Protocol I Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949: Regulations Concerning Identification (as amended on 30 November 
1993, entered into force 1 March 1994) (hereafter, Amended Annex I); AMW Manual, Rule 72(a); 
CIHL, Rule 30. 
199 
 
– as far as possible – wear headgear and clothing that also bears the distinctive 
emblem,135 and they may (should) use materials that make the emblem recognisable 
by technical means of detection.136 These should further increase the likelihood of 
reliable machine perception and the application of forbidding criteria by a LAWS. 
 
So far, there appears to be a relatively clear textual basis for distinction between 
categories of persons, which LAWS may be expected to satisfy in at least some 
circumstances. However, in contemporary conflicts sub-categories often appear, 
which complicate the distinction task. 
6.5.2.3 Civilians Not Protected from Direct Attack 
In particular, civilians may take a direct part in hostilities (DPH) and, for such time 
that they do, they become targetable.137 This temporal element complicates matters 
because to be liable to attack, a civilian must act on a ‘spontaneous, sporadic or 
unorganised basis’138 and must, in the view of the ICRC, cumulatively meet its 
threshold of harm with direct causation and a belligerent nexus.139 Moreover, 
measures taken to prepare for a specific act of DPH, as well as deployment to and from 
the location of that act, also qualify as DPH.140 On the other hand, the ICRC considers 
there to be a ‘revolving door’, whereby suspension of civilian protection lasts only as 
long as the person engages in DPH,141 even if there are persistently recurrent cycles.142 
While this legal view is often disputed,143 it is generally acknowledged that the factual 
                                                          
135 Article 5(4), Amended Annex I. 
136 Article 5(3), Amended Annex I; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 72(b), ¶ 2 (suggesting thermal 
tapes). 
137 Article 51(3), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 28; CIHL Rule 6. 
138 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC, 2009), 34. 
139 Ibid., 46-64 (discussing the ‘Constitutive Elements’ of DPH). 
140 Ibid., 65-68. 
141 Ibid., 70-73. 
142 Ibid., 44. 
143 See, for example, William H. Boothby, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities – A Discussion of the 
ICRC Interpretive Guidance’ (2010) 1 International Humanitarian Legal Studies 143, 162 (arguing that 
repeated and persistent DPH is a reliable indicator as to future conduct, and that a persistent participator 
should remain targetable until he renders an “overt and unambiguous act of renunciation”); Michael N. 
Schmitt, ‘The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2010) 1 
Harvard National Security Journal 5, 36 (arguing that ‘for such time’ should extend “as far before and 
after a hostile action as a causal connection existed”); US DoD Manual, §5.8.4.1 (laying down the 
official US position, that persons DPH remain targetable until they have “permanently ceased 
participation in hostilities”). 
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circumstances giving rise to DPH in the first instance are not always objectively 
discernible.144 
 
This creates a conduct-based targeting challenge that will be very difficult for near-
term LAWS to meet. Specifically, ATR systems will find it very difficult to recognise 
offensive behaviour from a civilian, with no other tangible cues.145 On the other hand, 
three potential solutions have been suggested. First, Henderson, Keane and Liddy 
argue that some DPH indicators currently applied by human decision-makers are 
relatively tangible, and may be programmed into a LAWS.146 These include whether 
an individual is openly armed; his proximity to the fighting and/or other military 
equipment; and the direction and manner of his movement.147 So long as each 
characteristic is appropriately weighted, it is conceivable that a combination of such 
criteria pointing in the same direction might be a strong indicator of a civilian 
undertaking DPH.148 However, this approach seems plausible only in a limited range 
of circumstances, with much scope for erroneous targeting. Namely, it ignores the 
near-infinite combinations of relevant cues, the metacognitive approach of human 
soldiers in situations of uncertainty149 and their reliance on “gut feeling”150 versus the 
deterministic response of a robot.  
 
                                                          
144 Michael N. Schmitt and Eric W. Widmar, ‘On Target: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary 
Law of Targeting’, (2014) 7 Journal of National Security Law & Policy 379, 390 (“The status of an 
individual can sometimes be unclear…consider…civilians sitting on a hillside overlooking a commonly 
used helicopter landing zone. Without additional intelligence indicating they are being used as an early 
warning system…IHL requires them to be treated as civilians and protected from attack”). See also the 
examples of ‘hostile intent’ and ‘hostile act’ illustrated by Gaston in Chapter 5, n 146 therein. 
145 Markus Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and 
Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 1371, 1392-93 (commenting on the contextual reasoning required to accurately assess DPH, and 
to distinguish it from innocuous activity or lawful self-defence). See also 2.5.5.2, especially the kirpan 
example at n 296. 
146 Ian S. Henderson, Patrick Keane and Josh Liddy, ‘Remote and Autonomous Warfare Systems: 
Precautions in Attack and Individual Accountability’ in Jens David Ohlin (ed.), Research Handbook on 
Remote Warfare (Edward Elgar, 2017), 346-47. 
147 Ibid.  
148 A remaining legal difficulty will be to set the required degree of confidence and an acceptable failure 
rate for a LAWS to determine this. 
149 Boothby (n 31), 149 (noting that in ambiguous situations of DPH, the soldier must “take into account 
all information that is reasonably available to him…including any indication that there may be as to the 
reliability of information from that source”) (emphasis added). 
150 Robin Geiss, The International Law Dimension of Autonomous Weapons Systems (Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung Study, October 2015), 14 (also noting the difficulty of configuring machine perception for 
equivocal combat situations). 
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Second, Ford considers a ‘narrow deployment’ approach, focusing on the common 
insurgency practice of emplacing an improvised explosive device along a road. The 
author argues that this is both amenable to machine perception151 and it potentially 
justifies lethal attack by a LAWS, in a way compatible with the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance.152 However, this kind of deployment may also be subject to targeting error. 
For example, a LAWS may detect a person with explosive chemical signatures on a 
construction site, and open fire on civilians undertaking innocuous commercial 
activity; though there are also control mechanisms to mitigate this risk.153 
 
Finally, perhaps the most commonly-cited approach is Arkin’s ‘conservative use of 
lethal force’ concept.154 This argues that robots do not necessarily have a self-
preservation instinct, thus can be programmed to hold fire on all civilians until fired 
upon.155 Arguably, opening fire on a LAWS goes beyond mere ‘hostile intent’156 and 
may be regarded as prima facie evidence of a ‘specific hostile act’, which is the very 
essence of DPH.157 Moreover, with the use of optical/acoustic detection systems, 
gunfire is easily recognisable by a robot158 and should legally permit a defensive lethal 
response. However, even this approach is problematic. As mentioned in 2.5.4.3, 
gunfire is merely ‘target indication’, which in most cases will require a ‘tipping and 
cueing’ of sensors and further (automatic or controlled) processing before it can 
progress to full ‘target identification’. Thus, relying on gunfire alone may lead to 
numerous other problems, including: 
                                                          
151 Ford (n 73), 438 (referring to radar-based human detection and spectrographs that can detect the 
chemical signature of explosives). 
152 Ibid. (noting that a LAWS would be able to track the insurgent while deploying to and/or from the 
location of emplacement, and wait until no other civilians are present before lethally engaging him). 
153 Ibid., 438-39 (suggesting: (1) deploying appropriately sophisticated LAWS, (2) spatio-temporal 
restrictions, (3) system updates on specific persons undertaking DPH, and (4) operator control. Many 
of these implicate the deliberate targeting process, during which risks can be further mitigated with 
intelligence-gathering and deployment only in circumstances where lawful activities with overlapping 
indicators have been ruled out).  
154 Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour in Autonomous Robotics (Chapman & Hall/CRC, 
2009), 46. 
155 Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and 
the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2013) 4 Harvard National Security Journal 231, 264. 
156 This ROE term was rejected in the Interpretive Guidance for being too context-specific, hence 
“unhelpful, confusing or even dangerous” to apply as general guidance for defining DPH: ICRC (n 138), 
52. 
157 Ibid., 43-45. For a definition of both ‘hostile intent’ and ‘hostile act’, see NATO Military Committee, 
NATO Rules of Engagement, MC 362/1 (NATO HQ, 30 June 2003), Appendix 1, Annex A, ¶¶ 3-5. 
158 See 2.5.4.3 on target indication. 
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• The risk of ‘shoot and scoot’, where insurgents open fire from areas of civilian 
concentration, before fleeing to confuse the adversary.159 This may become a 
common ‘baiting tactic’ if LAWS are deployed in urban areas or equipped with 
indirect fires,160 and it may lead them to return fire into civilian areas, even 
though a metacognitive human may have had cause to hesitate and reassess. 
• The risk that the insurgent is using a human shield, and the likelihood that a 
LAWS will return fire and kill the latter. While the legal status of human 
shields is controversial,161 there is near-consensus that involuntary human 
shields retain their protected status.162 In which case, precautions in attack must 
be taken, and any expected harm to them must be fully factored into the 
proportionality assessment.163 
• In the most chaotic situations, there is the broader risk of civilians being caught 
in the cross-fire, as well as fratricide.164 
 
Consequently, while narrow conditions may exist where civilians taking DPH are 
amenable to autonomous attack, the risk of unforeseen circumstances, elusive 
behaviour and consequent distinction failure is arguably too great to give LAWS target 
engagement authority in a DPH setting. Thus, near-term LAWS deployments will be 
better-suited to traditional battlefields, where enemy combatants offer a clearer basis 
for distinction. 
6.5.2.4 Persons Hors de Combat 
Yet, even in such battlefields, there may remain the problem of systems not 
recognising when combatants become persons hors de combat,165 and thus protected 
                                                          
159 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘The Principle of Distinction and Weapon Systems on the Contemporary 
Battlefield’ (2008) 7 Connections 46, 54.  
160 Ibid., 55; Colonel Richard Jackson, ‘Autonomous Weaponry and Armed Conflict’, ASIL Panel 
Discussion (10 April 2014) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=duq3DtFJtWg> accessed 10 May 
2018.  
161 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ (2009) 47 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 292. For a brief survey of the various views, see Boothby (n 31), 137-39; 
Schmitt and Widmar (n 144), 388-89. 
162 Boothby, ibid., 136-37; Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, 
Proportionality and Precautions in Attack under Additional Protocol I (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 215. 
163 Ibid. Again, this implicates the need for controlled processing and metacognitive thinking at the point 
of trigger-pull/weapons release. 
164 For a dramatic account of the “messy chaos of war” where human soldiers over-reacted and 
inadvertently shot each other in response to gunshots, see Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous 
Weapons and the Future of War (Norton, 2018), 253-55 (specifically linking this to the expected risk 
of poor performance by a LAWS deployed in similar circumstances). 
165 Sassóli, (n 29), 327.  
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from direct attack.166 This may occur in one of three ways: a) capture by friendly 
forces, b) clearly expressing an intention to surrender, or c) incapacitation, hence an 
inability to defend oneself.167 The first of these is not relevant to LAWS, as captured 
personnel are under the control of the LAWS-deploying side.168 The second may be 
simple or difficult, depending on context and circumstances. For example, in 
demilitarised zones some basic surrender recognition capabilities currently exist,169 
which may be complemented by more recent developments in deep learning for 
emotion-reading.170 In active combat situations, there are a number of other potential 
(albeit imperfect) solutions,171 the most robust being a restriction of LAWS 
deployments to particular operational environments;172 for example, combat between 
armoured vehicles or submarines, where established conventions on surrender are 
amenable to machine perception.173 In the case of anti-personnel targeting, there is also 
the fact that persons hors de combat – be that via surrender or incapacitation – will 
clearly cease any military-style ‘behaviour and movements’, and this may negate the 
three-/four-part criteria for detecting active combatant status.174 
 
However, in more difficult surrender contexts, as well as incapacitation that is not 
amenable to machine perception,175 the technical challenges will bring into play some 
important legal questions. The wording of Article 41(1), AP I, is particularly important 
here, where it prohibits the targeting of anyone “who is recognized or who, in the 
                                                          
166 Article 41(1), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 15(b); CIHL, Rule 47. 
167 Article 41(2), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 15(b); CIHL, Rule 47. 
168 See also AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 15(b), ¶ 3 (excluding capture for being irrelevant to aerial 
warfare). 
169 See ‘Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot’, GlobalSecurity.org (7 November 2011) 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/sgr-a1.htm> accessed 17 August 2018 (detailing the 
now-retired Samsung SGR-A1 sentry robot, which was equipped with gesture recognition technology, 
to recognise ‘arms held high’ as a sign of surrender). 
170 See 2.5.2, and especially (notes and text accompanying) nn 204-205 within that. 
171 Robert Sparrow, ‘Twenty Seconds to Comply: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Recognition 
of Surrender’ (2015) 91 International Law Studies 699, 712-18 (discussing four control mechanisms: 
humans-in-the-loop; restriction to anti-material targeting and/or non-lethal munitions; surrender 
beacons; and restriction of LAWS to particular operational environments). 
172 Ibid., 717-18. 
173 Ibid., 718 (noting the reversing of turrets and opening the hatch on a tank; and submarines using an 
‘underwater telephone’, or rising to the surface and waving a white flag). 
174 Or, they can throw aside all weapons and raise their arms, as suggested in AMW Manual 
Commentary, Rule 15(b), ¶ 7. 
175 For example, where the combatant initially satisfies the three-/four-part criteria and falls into the 
crosshairs, but becomes hors de combat in a way that may be mistaken for taking cover. See ibid., ¶ 6.  
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circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat”.176 According to Boothby, 
this means that if an alternative and reasonably available means or method of attack 
would permit such recognition, the “should be recognized” criterion is satisfied, and if 
a LAWS erroneously proceeds with an attack, the rule is violated.177 This interpretation 
of Article 41(1) assumes that the requirement of ‘feasibility’ under Article 
57(2)(a)(i)178 sets the correct standard and, if accepted, would mean that limitations of 
ATR technologies will not, in themselves, afford an excuse for failing to comply with 
the principle of distinction. Consequently, commanders will have to consider very 
carefully their deployment options, even in simple and remote battlefields.  
 
However, there is a compelling counter-argument with Henderson, Keane and Liddy 
contending that Article 41(1) itself sets the correct standard for determining hors de 
combat.179 Under their approach, the legal issue is not whether an alternative and 
reasonably available weapon system would have permitted accurate recognition; but 
whether, based on the actual weapon system employed, a person should have been 
recognised as being hors de combat.180 This would appear to be consistent with State 
practice: means and methods of warfare have long involved indirect fires181 and, since 
the 1960s, a range of other ‘beyond-visual-range’ (BVR) engagements, particularly in 
air combat.182 None of these assist attackers in determining whether persons to be 
engaged are hors de combat, yet they continue to be routinely deployed with no legal 
difficulty. Moreover, as the AMW Manual Commentary explains, combatants must 
effectively communicate their intention to surrender. If they do not, and if attackers 
conducting a BVR engagement remain unaware of their intention to surrender, the 
attack may lawfully proceed; so long as the lack of knowledge on the part of the 
attackers is reasonable in the circumstances.183 
                                                          
176 Article 41(1), AP I (emphasis added). 
177 Boothby (n 64), 109. 
178 See 7.3.2.1. 
179 Henderson, Keane and Liddy (n 146), 348. 
180 Ibid. 
181 NR. Jenzen-Jones (ed.), Indirect Fire: A Technical Analysis of the Employment, Accuracy, and 
Effects of Indirect-Fire Artillery Weapons (ARES, January 2017), 15-58 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/indirect-fire-technical-analysis-employment-accuracy-and-
effects-indirect-fire-artillery> accessed 17 August 2018 (detailing the historical background, purpose 
and types of indirect-fire systems, and issues relating to their employment). 
182 John Stillion, Trends in Air-to Air Combat: Implications for Future Air Superiority (CSBA, 2015) 
<http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Air-to-Air-Report-.pdf> accessed 17 August 2018. See also 
AMW Manual Commentary, Rules 7(c), ¶ 3 and 13(b), ¶ 8. 




In view of this, where the sensory limitations of a LAWS cause it to fail to detect 
surrender or incapacitation, this should not in itself render an attack unlawful. To 
effectively communicate surrender to attacking forces, the burden is on surrendering 
forces to communicate with the forces conducting an autonomous attack; even if this 
requires contacting other forces, which can pass the information to the relevant 
commander/WO in good time.184  
 
The issue is even clearer in the ICRC’s restatement of customary law, which simply 
prohibits attacks on “persons who are recognized as hors de combat”, with no 
alternative ‘should be recognised’ criterion.185 This is likely to be the default legal 
position for States not Party to AP I, such as the US and Israel. 
6.5.3 Objects 
As far as objects are concerned, ‘military objective’ is defined in Article 52(2), AP I, 
as: 
 
[T]hose objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.186  
 
One of the most heavily debated provisions in AP I,187 this is often referred to as a 
‘two-pronged test’ in that it comprises two cumulative criteria, as indicated by the 
conjunctive “and”.188 First, there is the “effective contribution to [the enemy’s] 
military action” (ECMA) by reference to the “nature, location, purpose or use” ;189 
                                                          
184 Ibid. 
185 CIHL, Rule 47 (emphasis added). 
186 Article 52(2), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 1(y). See also CIHL, Rule 8. 
187 Stefan Oeter, ‘Means and Methods of Combat’ in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (3rd ed., OUP, 2013), 169 (noting the hostility of Western militaries to the apparently 
restrictive drafting, which limits the categories of objects that can be legitimately attacked). Article 
52(2) has also given rise to controversies regarding war-sustaining capabilities versus harmful 
reverberating effects. See W. Hays Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War’ (1990) 32 Air Force Law 
Review 1, 135-45; Cf. Judith Gail Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’ (1993) 87 
American Journal of International Law 391, 404-10. 
188 Henderson (n 162), 51; Horace B. Robertson, Jr, ‘The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law 
of Armed Conflict’ (1997) 8 United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 35, 48. 
189 Despite the apparent ‘closed-list approach’ and use of the conjunctive “or”, which normally indicates 
alternatives, these four are merely key sub-criteria used to guide targeting decisions. They are neither 
the sole considerations nor are they mutually exclusive. Indeed, it may be necessary to examine more 
than one category in determining whether there is a definite military advantage in the circumstances 
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second, the “definite military advantage” (DMA) to the attacker, to be assessed “in the 
circumstances ruling at the time”. Both criteria must be fulfilled in light of their 
qualifiers,190 though there seems to be no consensus on timing: some argue that both 
conditions must be simultaneously present;191 others seeing no temporal aspect;192 yet, 
others taking a ‘middle-ground’ with a condition of reasonableness.193 
 
An accurate understanding of the definition of military objective and its application is 
indispensable, not only for commanders to know which objects they can legitimately 
attack, but also for ensuring humanitarian protection. This is because ‘civilian objects’, 
which are immune from direct attack, are defined in the negative.194 As a general 
proposition, it is assumed that the broader and/or more concrete the application of each 
component of the definition, the more amenable it will be to algorithmic determination 
in the ‘narrow loop’.  
6.5.3.1 ‘Nature’ and ‘Location’ 
The AMW Manual Commentary explains that an object is a military objective by 
nature when its “inherent characteristic or attribute” contributes to military action”.195 
Examples include military aircraft (including unmanned); military vehicles (excluding 
medical transports); missile batteries and other weapons; military equipment, 
fortifications, facilities and depots; warships; and ministries of defence and armaments 
                                                          
ruling at the time of attack. See Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian 
Law in War (2nd ed., CUP, 2016), 510.  This chimes with Henderson (n 162), 54, who sees the four sub-
criteria not as words of limitation, but as a test for determining what is a military objective, instead of 
having a more restrictive list of specific objects. Accordingly, if a true ECMA arises other than through 
“nature, location, purpose or use”, the author argues that there is unlikely to be any objection to an 
attack solely on that basis. Contrast the drafting of Article 56(1). 
190 Boothby (n 31), 102 (arguing that listing specific examples of military objectives is liable to cause 
confusion and arbitrariness, and that the real issue is whether an object actually fulfils the Article 52(2) 
definition at the time of the decision to attack. In this regard, the author is consistent with Henderson, 
ibid.). 
191 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2018.  
192 Marco Sassóli, ‘Legitimate Targets of Attack Under International Humanitarian Law’, Harvard 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Background Paper (2003), 7 (omitting the 
temporal aspect and merely stating that an object must “cumulatively fulfil [the] two criteria”). 
193 Henderson (n 162), 52 (arguing that simultaneous fulfilment is not required (too strict), but mere 
cumulative fulfilment is not enough (too lax), and illustrating this with the example of a computer 
system used for long-term planning of military operations). 
194 Article 52(1), AP I, defines civilian objects as “all objects which are not military objectives as defined 
in paragraph 2”. See also AMW Manual, Rule 1(j); CIHL Study, Rule 9. The AP I Commentary, ¶ 2012, 
justifies this with the fact that there are more civilian objects than military objectives. Arguably, it is 
also justifiable as being consistent with the rule of ‘doubt’ in Article 52(3), and with the approach to 
defining civilian in Article 50(1). 
195 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 22(a), ¶ 1 (emphasis added)  
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factories. Crucially for LAWS, the military characteristics of these objects are non-
changeable, meaning that they “always constitute lawful targets during armed 
conflict…even when not in use”.196 This is further reinforced, both in the AMW 
Manual Commentary197 and by academic opinion.198 If accepted, it eliminates the need 
for context-based evaluation at a given point in time, thus facilitating ex ante 
programming199 and deployment for both a TS and TLC.200 The AP I Commentary 
appears to take an even broader view, simply defining military objective by nature as 
“all objects directly used by the armed forces”, before providing a relatively short 
illustrative list;201 again, facilitating ex ante programming. Moreover, given the 
technical features of ATR explained in 2.5.4.1, these robust definitions render such 
objects highly machine-perceptible via a quantitative assessment of inherent, non-
changeable and easily-recognisable characteristics, like image, size, shape, sound, 
heat, velocity and material content.202 The reliability is further bolstered in the case of 
cooperative targets, which emit signals that can be easily detected by passive 
sensors;203 and by drawing on stationary and/or moving target indication.204  
 
Conversely, there is a body of academic opinion, which maintains that a military object 
is not a military objective by default, and that the former are only targetable if they 
independently meet the two-pronged test of the latter.205 In this sense, such opinion 
diverges from the approach taken in the AMW Manual Commentary; not in relation to 
ECMA per se, but in relation to the DMA qualifying the ECMA. Given the two-
pronged, cumulative drafting of Article 52(2), it is submitted that this latter view must 
be correct, with the overall effect that military objects by ‘nature’ become relatively 
                                                          
196 Ibid.  
197 Ibid., ¶ 3 (stating, “[t]heir distinctive feature is that they qualify as military objectives by nature in 
all circumstances”) (emphasis added). 
198 For example, Robertson (n 188), 49 (arguing “[s]ome objects, ‘by their nature’, are military 
objectives and remain so at all times, regardless of their location or use”) (emphasis added). 
199 Dinstein – one of the key architects of the AMW Manual – similarly defines ‘nature’ by reference to 
the “intrinsic [military] character” of an objective, before suggesting a more detailed (non-exhaustive) 
list. See Dinstein (n 6), 110-11; Yoram Dinstein, ‘Legitimate Military Objectives under the Current Jus 
in Bello’ (2002) 78 International Law Studies 139, 146-47. 
200 For fixed and moving objects, respectively; hence, subject to relatively more careful programming 
of target parameters in the case of TLC. 
201 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2020 (listing weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, depots, and 
buildings used by armed forces, such as staff headquarters and communications centres). 
202 See 2.5.4.1, especially on how multisensory phenomenologies and cross-cueing aids the process. 
203 See 2.5.4.2. 
204 See 2.5.4.3. 
205 For example, Boothby (n 31), 103; Henderson (n 162), 51, 55. 
208 
 
less amenable at autonomous attack. Conversely, as will be seen below in 6.5.3.3, the 
DMA alone rarely negates the definition of military objective. 
 
An object is a military objective by location when its geographical location makes an 
ECMA, irrespective of its nature,206 use, or even purpose.207 This includes bridges 
situated in militarily strategic areas, or even a specific area of land en masse,208 where 
it is important for military operations to seize that location, to deny the enemy from 
seizing it, or to force the enemy to retreat from it.209 Accordingly, attacking a location 
is only lawful under certain circumstances,210 as every plot of land is unique and may 
offer a shifting and contextual value for the enemy’s military action. This calls for 
deliberative human input in the determination of which specific locations to target. 
 
Concretely, this means that – unlike military objects by ‘nature’ that can be engaged 
in TLC – attacking a ‘location’ will almost certainly have to be a TS. It will need to 
benefit from the controlled processing and metacognitive thinking that goes into the 
deliberate or dynamic targeting cycle, leaving the weapon system to act autonomously 
only in relation to the timing of the attack and (potentially) the munition selected. It is 
also likely that, in line with precautionary measures,211 commanders will have to 
demarcate the smallest area of land consistent with the requirements of military 
necessity,212 and the one whose military utility (for the enemy) is least likely to erode 
during the time of deployment. However, contrary to the unsupported assertion of the 
                                                          
206 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2021 (giving the canonical example of a bridge that is/may become part of a 
militarily important route). 
207 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 22(b) (referring to mountain passes that may be blocked in case 
the enemy needs to retreat; attacking high ground to blind the enemy; or destroying natural cover to 
deprive them of an observation point. In all cases, the attack may be to safeguard the attacker’s 
operations and diminish the enemy’s options, irrespective of actual current or intended future use by the 
enemy). 
208 Marco Sassóli, Antoine A. Bouvier and Anne Quintin, How Does the Law Protect in War?: Cases, 
Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law, 
Vol. I (3rd ed., ICRC, 2011), Chapter 9, 5. 
209 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2021. 
210 Ibid., ¶ 2025(a) (noting country statements and declarations, which mentioned “circumstances” as 
well as “location” as relevant factors that can turn a specific area of land into a military objective); 
Dinstein (n 6), 115; (n 199), 150 (“There must be a distinctive feature turning a piece of land into a 
military objective, e.g., an important mountain pass or defile, a specific hill of strategic value, a 
bridgehead or a spit of land controlling the entrance of a harbour”). See also AMW Manual Commentary, 
Rule 22(b) and its accompanying commentary (summarised at n 207, above). 
211 See 7.3 and especially 7.3.2.2 on the choice of target that minimises civilian risk. 
212 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2026 (stating that an area of land being targeted “can only be of a limited size” 
and this is cited with approval by Henderson (n 162), 56; presumably to avoid speculative attacks and 
to retain a definite military advantage). 
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AP I Commentary,213 a location-based military objective is unlikely to be restricted to 
the immediate combat area,214 especially when areas outside the contact zone are 
typically used as logistical routes.215 There is no obvious reason why this would be 
any different in the case of an autonomous attack.  
 
Once these legal boundaries are applied and integrated into the targeting process, 
location becomes the most amenable to machine perception of the four ECMA sub-
criteria. Unlike the determination of an object’s ‘nature’, which calls for stochastic 
reasoning, a location is objectively ascertainable via the Global Positioning System 
(GPS).216 Even in denied areas, where GPS guidance systems may be ineffective or 
vulnerable to hacking, a LAWS will still be able to operate reliably via electro-
optical/infrared scene-matching.217 
 
To summarise, LAWS fitted with appropriate ATR and guidance systems are indeed 
capable of being deployed in compliance with the nature and location sub-criteria. This 
is helped by the fact that the effective contribution to military action need not be critical 
or even significant for an object to qualify as a targetable military objective;218 so long 
as it does in fact contribute to the enemy’s military action.219 Arguably, the binary 
nature of this condition supports the application of presumptions over context-based 
evaluation, thus making it more likely that ex ante programming and machine 
perception will operate in line with legal requirements. 
6.5.3.2 ‘Purpose’ and ‘Use’: The Problem of ‘Dual-Use’ Objects 
In contrast, the last two ECMA sub-criteria – ‘use’ and ‘purpose’ – are more difficult 
to assess, both for human soldiers and, even more so, for LAWS. At their core is the 
                                                          
213 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2026 (asserting that the ‘location’ concept “is only valid in the combat area”, 
though with no further discussion and citing no authority for this). 
214 Henderson (n 162), 56-57 (pointing out the lack of support for this limitation in the AP I Commentary, 
and that it is conspicuously absent in both the negotiating history of AP I and in State practice. 
Furthermore, there is no discernible need to read such a limitation into ‘location’ when the same is not 
applied to ‘nature’, ‘use’ or ‘purpose’). 
215 This point is particularly important as it accords with the idea of offering an ECMA to the enemy (if 
preserved) and a DMA to the attacking party (if destroyed, captured or neutralised). 
216 See 2.5.4.4. Crucially, GPS guidance systems can also prevent attacks on locations placed on a ‘no-
strike’ list, such as fixed medical units, non-defended localities and demilitarised zones under Articles 
12, 59 and 60, AP I, respectively. See also 6.5.3.4. 
217 See 2.5.4.5. 
218 Schmitt and Widmar, (n 144), 392. 
219 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 1(y), ¶ 4. 
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fact that both concepts involve dual-use objects; namely, those that “simultaneously 
serve both the military and the civilian population of the enemy”.220 Such an object, 
“on the face of it, is civilian in nature…but subsequently becomes a lawful target as a 
result of conversion to military use”.221 Crucially, with simultaneous military and 
civilian use, an attack can only proceed subject to the principle of proportionality,222 
which presents an extra layer of complexity for a LAWS, with perhaps a greater need 
for controlled processing during the targeting cycle.223  
 
While not strictly a legal term, dual-use objects give rise to two distinct factual 
problems. First, attacks on these objects often have a more perilous effect on civilians, 
either because the latter are more likely to be present and/or because these attacks tend 
to inflict damage or pose dangers to them that continue for long periods;224 though, 
this is more a policy and legal proportionality concern. Second, and more pertinent to 
the principle of distinction, both sub-criteria are highly malleable, especially during 
hostilities; hence, they demand that greater attention be paid to the adjectives 
“effective” and “definite”, to ensure the object being targeted really has acquired the 
legal status of ‘military objective’.225  
 
That said, it was noted above that the effective contribution need not be critical or even 
significant; so long as an ECMA does in fact exist. Furthermore, ECMA does not 
presuppose a direct connection with combat operations, as is implied in Article 51(3) 
regarding persons.226 Thus, Article 52(2) can make a civilian object targetable through 
‘use’ or ‘purpose’ that is only indirectly related to military action; again, so long as it 
makes an effective contribution.227 This relative breadth of the ECMA concept can, in 
                                                          
220 Dinstein (n 6), 120. See also AP I Commentary, ¶ 2023. 
221 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 22(d), ¶ 1. 
222 Ibid., Rule 22(d), ¶ 7; AP I Commentary, ¶ 2023.  
223 See 7.2. 
224 Boothby (n 31), 104-05 (arguing that such ‘reverberating’ effects must also be considered, both in 
the proportionality analysis and in applying precautionary measures. This is to get a more accurate 
measure of the expected collateral damage, for comparison with the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated. See also Gardam (n 187), 404-10, on the attacks on civilian infrastructure during 
the Gulf War). 
225 Boothby, ibid., 105. 
226 Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsche and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict: 
Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1982), 324. Namely, Article 51(3) makes civilians targetable only when they take a direct part 
in hostilities. 
227 Ibid. Hence, the possible inclusion of factories that ‘merely’ contribute to the war effort, for example, 
by producing soldier’s uniform or parts for military vehicles. 
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some circumstances, make it more amenable to autonomous application, although the 
bigger picture is that the determination of use and purpose will generally need a greater 
input of deliberative human reasoning. 
 
‘Use’ means the enemy is presently utilising the object for military ends,228 regardless 
of “its original nature or…any (later) intended purpose”,229 and regardless of the extent 
of military use.230 Importantly for a LAWS, this latter point makes it a ‘binary concept’ 
in that an attacker need only recognise ‘military use’ but need not measure its degree 
or intensity.231 An example of a situation that may be amenable to machine perception 
is where enemy forces commandeer civilian cars and taxis,232 to transport 
troops/supplies, or merely to use these vehicles as cover. If those persons satisfy the 
three-/four-part criteria for status-based targeting, their perceptible use of civilian 
vehicles may make the latter a military objective by ‘use’, regardless of the extent of 
that use. Similar reasoning may apply to some other civilian objects like dwellings, a 
hotel or a school (for troop accommodation, for taking cover, or as observation 
points)233, or bridges (for vehicle and troop movements). Insofar as these objects are 
utilised transparently by enemy combatants, they may become targetable by a LAWS 
during TLC.  
 
However, in other cases ‘military use’ can be relatively opaque. For example, power 
grids and computer hardware and software are unpredictably malleable during an 
armed conflict, and it is often unclear who is using them.234 The same can be said of 
dwellings and other civilian buildings, when used in discreet ways (as a military 
storage facility via underground tunnels). In yet other cases, the problem is less opacity 
and more a lack of machine-perceptibleness: consider a civilian broadcast facility used 
                                                          
228 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2022. 
229 Dinstein (n 199), 149. 
230 Schmitt and Widmar (n 144), 393 (emphasis added). 
231 Ibid. (noting that “the object…qualifies as a military objective once it is converted to military use, 
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232 Dinstein (n 199), 149; (n 6), 111 (citing the celebrated ‘Taxis of the Marne’, commandeered in 
September 1914 to transport French reserve troops to the frontline, thereby saving Paris from the 
advancing German forces).  
233 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2022; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 22(d), ¶ 2. 
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for military transmission and enemy propaganda.235 LAWS algorithms will be trained 
in advance and in relatively abstract settings, yet it is difficult – if not impossible, in 
the case of computers – to identify when, how and in which context these objects are 
destined for military use.236 Similar difficulty will bedevil a LAWS in assessing when 
discreet (or machine-imperceptible) military use comes to an end, at which point the 
object ceases to be a lawful target and may no longer be attacked.237 Accordingly, the 
pliable concept of use at any given moment – already very challenging for human 
combatants to apply – will be nigh-on impossible for a LAWS to assess in the midst 
of TLC, and in situations of opacity and imperceptibleness.238 
 
‘Purpose’ takes this difficulty to the next level, as it refers to the intended future use 
of an object.239 Accordingly, ‘purpose’ is determined after the crystallisation of the 
original ‘nature’ of an object, but before its actual ‘use’.240 This permits the targeting 
of a civilian object in between uses, and even prior to initial use,241 thus recognising 
that an attacker need not wait for a civilian object to actually be utilised for military 
ends before striking it.242 Tempering this, however, is a requirement that there be a 
‘reasonable belief’ of actual intended future use, not just the mere ‘potential’ or 
‘objective possibility’ for it.243 As Dinstein asserts: 
 
Purpose is predicated on intentions known to guide the adversary, and 
not on those figured out hypothetically in contingency plans based on 
a ‘worst case scenario’.244 
 
                                                          
235 Office of the Prosecutor, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2000) 39 ILM 1257, ¶ 71 et 
seq. 
236 Sassóli (n 192), 7. 
237 Boothby (n 31), 104; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 22(d), ¶ 4. Furthermore, this complicates the 
proportionality assessment, as when such an object is put to military use it forms part of the ‘military 
advantage anticipated’, but when not in military use it is part of the expected collateral damage. 
238 However, this does not necessarily mean LAWS will be precluded altogether from engaging such 
objects, if the ‘use’ can be determined by intelligence analysts during the targeting process and tasked 
to a LAWS in a TS. 
239 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2022 (“The criterion of ‘purpose’ is concerned with the intended future use of 
an object, while that of ‘use’ is concerned with its present function”) (emphasis added). See also AMW 
Manual Commentary, Rule 22(c), ¶ 1. 
240 Dinstein (n 199), 148; (n 6), 113. 
241 Henderson (n 162), 59. 
242 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 22(c), ¶ 1; Schmitt and Widmar (n 144), 393. 
243 Henderson (n 162), 60-61; Boothby (n 31), 103. 
244 Dinstein (n 199), 148; (n 6), 114. 
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At the very least, determining the enemy’s future intention requires knowledge of its 
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, and the gathering and analysis of intelligence.245 
Even then, reaching a firm and reliable conclusion is not always easy. Sometimes, 
enemy intentions are “crisply clear”, as in the case of overtly-announced plans;246 other 
times, intentions are “not so easy to decipher”, and will require relatively more 
painstaking intelligence efforts in advance.247 This latter scenario entails the assembly 
of fragmented pieces of information, often of varying degrees of reliability and with 
no coherent picture.248 Hence, there is a need to assess a) the reliability of 
intelligence;249 and b) either what is missing and where to obtain it, or “conjecture to 
fill in the missing pieces of the puzzle”.250 To add further to the cognitive task, 
conjecture itself must remain consistent with the ‘reasonable belief’ standard.251 
 
This all leads to two pertinent conclusions. First, the determination of a military 
objective by purpose clearly calls for autonoetically metacognitive thinking,252 which 
is a uniquely human domain.253 This is underscored by the AMW Manual Commentary, 
which advises that: 
 
The attacker must always act reasonably…[and] ask itself whether it 
would be reasonable to conclude that the intelligence [regarding future 
intentions] was reliable enough to conduct the attack in light of the 
circumstances ruling at the time.254 
 
As discussed in 3.2.2.2.1, applying such broad standards as ‘reasonableness’ to 
concrete facts, along with the degree of introspection implied here, involves higher-
order thinking skills that will arguably not be automated in the near-term.  
 
                                                          
245 Ford (n 73), 440; subject to foreseeable actions in context, n 246. 
246 Dinstein (n 199), 148; (n 6), 114 (also noting, at 126, foreseeable actions in particular contexts, such 
as urban warfare waged house-to-house, where the whole block of dwellings may become a military 
objective by purpose). 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid.; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 22(c), ¶ 3 
249 AMW Manual Commentary, ibid. 
250 Dinstein (n 6), 114. 
251 Boothby (n 31), 104. 
252 See 3.2.2.2, especially the metacognitive skills and traits listed at page 96. 
253 Except for certain narrowly-defined situations that may be amenable to machine stochastic reasoning, 
such as the urban warfare scenario suggested by Dinstein at n 246. 
254 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 22(c), ¶ 3. 
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The second conclusion is that the above account of intelligence activities to establish 
‘purpose’ would seem to describe the kinds of tasks that occur in the deliberate 
targeting process; in particular, during Phase 2 (target development).255 Accordingly, 
the difficulty of establishing enemy intentions and the ‘purpose’ of an object does not 
necessarily preclude a LAWS from engaging such objects. Indeed, human pilots 
currently do not attempt to establish the ‘purpose’ of an object, but instead operate 
their planes and weapon systems to complete missions in accordance with the ‘target 
package’ provided to them.256 The higher-order thinking therefore takes place during 
the earlier phases of the largely human-controlled targeting cycle, with the human pilot 
merely executing a TS. Even in a dynamic targeting scenario, pilots are briefed with 
necessary information to engage a target that has, nonetheless, been subjected to 
considerable human analysis and pre-selected by other specialist personnel.257 
Arguably, there is no reason to believe that a LAWS cannot engage a military objective 
by purpose in the same way. 
 
‘Use’ and ‘purpose’ both make clear that LOAC incorporates a dynamic element, as 
civilian objects are liable to become military targets depending on the plans, actions 
and behaviours of both parties.258 Unlike the analysis of large military objectives by 
nature or location, both of which rely more on quantitative matching (automatic 
processing), the legitimacy of attacking much of the above is highly fluid and context-
dependent. This points to sophisticated qualitative analysis (controlled processing) to 
which humans are predisposed,259 and this situation is likely to remain true for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
                                                          
255 See 5.3.1.2. 
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However, contrary to assertions that this makes LAWS unlawful, risky or of limited 
military value,260 it merely requires that military objectives by use and purpose be 
engaged in a TS; or, at most, that LAWS ROE be restricted to military objectives by 
nature and location. Arguably, these restrictions are not too onerous because, in 
practice, most attacks are based on an object’s nature (in TLC) or use (in a TS),261 
thereby accommodating LAWS deployments. 
6.5.3.3 The ‘Definite Military Advantage in the Circumstances Ruling at the Time’ 
Once the first (ECMA) criterion is satisfied, another difficulty may still present itself 
in the second criterion to be assessed: that the destruction of an object must offer (to 
the attacker) a ‘definite military advantage’ (DMA) in ‘the circumstances ruling at the 
time’.262  
 
This second prong requires that the military advantage to the attacking party be 
definite, not merely “potential or indeterminate”;263 lest an excessive range of objects 
become open to attack.264 Yet, the DMA need not directly flow from the attack;265 nor 
must it offer immediate tactical gain, but it can be an “operational advantage accruing 
to the larger campaign”.266  
 
On the one hand, some commentators consider that this merely duplicates the first 
criterion,267 such that the two “mostly presuppose each other”.268 If not always, then 
at least “most objects” will fulfil both prongs “[a]s a practical matter”.269 If so, a LAWS 
that is able to meet the first criterion will likely satisfy the principle of distinction vis-
à-vis objects.  
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On the other hand, the AP I Commentary270 and several academic commentators271 
take a different view, focusing on the temporal aspect of the second criterion.272 If this 
interpretation is accepted, it may require that tactical LAWS units be fed constant 
updates from the commander on the circumstances of the military operation and its 
evolution:273 a requirement that at first blush might seem too onerous, perhaps even 
undermining the purpose of weapons autonomy. That said, such temporal distinctions 
are generally rare and occur more as an aberration. In addition, it is arguable that all 
military objectives by nature can be assumed, by default, to also be military objectives 
by purpose, so long as they are not completely battle-damaged. This is because of the 
risk that abandoned military objects may be reoccupied by the enemy and put back to 
military use,274 or (if partially damaged) utilised for spare parts. Thus, the second 
(temporal) criterion may be less relevant to such objects, enabling a LAWS to engage 
them without needing to undertake complex value judgments. 
6.5.3.4 Civilian Objects and Specifically Protected Objects 
Once the criteria for military objectives are delineated and applied in a LAWS context, 
civilian protection becomes easier. Like the analogous provision for persons, Article 
52(1), AP I, prohibits making civilian objects “the object of attack or of reprisals”.275 
Again, the nature and wording of this prohibition renders compliance relatively simple: 
a matter of ex ante programming and appropriate deployment,276 which should pose 
no difficulty for commanders acting in good faith.277 Subsequent AP I rules protect 
specific objects the destruction of which would have an indirectly detrimental effect 
on civilians. In relation to these, some authors have commented on the limits to 
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when the two criteria are “simultaneously present”, thereby implying that they can disintegrate). 
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machine perception and have queried how LAWS will respect these rules.278 Yet, on 
closer examination, these prohibitions can also (largely) be seen as programming and 
deployment matters, which may be expected to pose little or no difficulty for 
commanders utilising the Joint Targeting process and acting in good faith.  
6.5.3.4.1 Cultural Property 
For example, Article 53(a), AP I, prohibits “acts of hostility directed against…historic 
monuments, works of art or places of worship”.279 The adverb ‘directed’ clearly goes 
to deliberate human choices made during the targeting cycle, and the same can be said 
about Paragraph (c), which prohibits “mak[ing] such objects the object of reprisals”.280  
 
However, the ICRC’s restatement of customary law goes further than AP I, and states 
that: 
 
Special care must be taken in military operations to avoid damage to 
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, education or charitable 
purposes and historic monuments unless they are military objectives.281 
 
In a LAWS context, much of this ‘special care’ will begin at Phase 2 of the deliberate 
targeting cycle. For example, using the UNESCO World Heritage List282 and World 
Heritage in Danger List,283 targeteers have an immediate and authoritative basis to 
enter high-priority sites on the no-strike list, which a LAWS would ‘respect’ by 
avoiding any attacks on the relevant GPS coordinates (immovable cultural property) 
and/or image matches (movable or immovable). Of course, not all cultural sites benefit 
from a UNESCO listing, so attacking forces may also have to consult other lists. In 
many cases, however, the most comprehensive and relevant lists of protected heritage 
(and other protected buildings and monuments) are in the hands of the host State, 
which has no specific obligation to provide that information to its adversary.284 On the 
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other hand, there may be a general obligation to do this under Article 58, AP I,285 if 
not under the Article 1(1), AP I, obligation to respect and to ensure respect for LOAC 
erga omnes.286 
 
Perhaps a better option, which is relatively within the control of attacking forces, is to 
work with archaeologists to identify all relevant sites that merit protection287 and to 
begin this process even before commencement of the formal targeting process, if 
willing experts can be found.288 Separately, where a protected object is characterised 
by distinctive architecture, this may be amenable to the object recognition of an ATR, 
thus avoidable even in the absence of any list.289 
 
Where cultural property becomes a military objective,290 the AMW Manual 
Commentary advises that the decision to attack be taken by an “appropriate level of 
command”, which is taken to mean at least an air squadron or battalion commander.291 
Further, such a decision is to be made “with due consideration of its special character 
as cultural property”, as such decisions “cannot be taken lightly”.292 This clearly 
involves complex value judgments, which implicate human metacognitive thinking 
and discretion; again going back to the human-led targeting process in deploying 
LAWS for a TS. Namely, attacks on cultural property cannot be lawfully executed 
through generalised parameters programmed for TLC, as the automatic processing of 
the control software will not be able to make the necessary value judgments. 
                                                          
to the conflict must respect cultural property, knowing its location is a prerequisite for this to happen. 
However, the Hague Convention does not envisage the exchange of relevant information between 
warring parties”). 
285 See 7.3.3. 
286 As also seen in the customary rule restated in CIHL, Rule 144. 
287 See, for example, Peter Stone, ‘The Identification and Protection of Cultural Heritage During the 
Iraq Conflict: A Peculiarly English Tale’ (2005) 79 Antiquity 933 (outlining the author’s role in advising 
the UK Ministry of Defence on cultural sites to be protected in Iraq, both before and during the 2003 
invasion). 
288 This is not always easy, as some archaeologists with the right expertise may be opposed to assisting 
military preparations. See, for example, John Curtis, ‘Relations Between Archaeologists and the 
Military in the Case of Iraq’ in Peter G. Stone (ed.), Cultural Heritage, Ethics and the Military (Boydell 
Press, 2011). More broadly, archaeologists face a plethora of complex considerations in deciding 
whether to assist, thus their participation is not guaranteed. See Umberto Albarella, ‘Archaeologists in 
Conflict: Empathizing with Which Victims?’ (2009) 2 Heritage Management 105. 
289 For example, distinctive church or mosque architecture, which an ATR can be trained to recognise 
via supervised learning; on which, see 2.5.1.3. 
290 As anticipated in CIHL, Rule 38(B); and AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 95(b), ¶ 4. Presumably 
this would occur by location, use or purpose only. 
291 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 96, ¶ 5. 
292 Ibid., Rule 96, ¶ 6. 
219 
 
6.5.3.4.2 Objects Indispensable for Civilian Survival 
Article 54(2) prohibits attacks against “objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population…for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance 
value”.293 Once again, the wording of the provision clearly indicates human choices 
made through the targeting cycle. This is underscored by the UK’s and France’s 
statements of interpretation upon ratifying AP I that Article 54(2) does not apply to 
attacks carried out for a specific purpose other than denying sustenance to the civilian 
population.294 Moreover, the AMW Manual Commentary emphasises the need for a 
‘specific purpose’ and precludes “incidental  distress of civilians resulting from 
otherwise lawful military operations”.295 Accordingly, so long as commanders – 
supported by multiple battle staffs and legal advisers, and overseen by the Joint 
Targeting Coordination Board – do not deploy LAWS to attack such indispensable 
objects for the specific purpose of denying sustenance to the civilian population, or as 
a reprisal,296 compliance with Article 54(2) should be relatively easy. 
6.5.3.4.3 Infrastructure That May Release Dangerous Forces 
Article 56(1) prohibits making the object of attack “[w]orks or installations…[that] 
may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the 
civilian population”, even if such works or installations are military objectives.297 As 
with the last two prohibitions, this one also does not pose insurmountable compliance 
difficulty for a LAWS-deploying Belligerent, which utilises a formal targeting 
process. First, it is significant that the protection from direct attack is limited to three 
specific types of infrastructure: dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating 
stations.298 Together with the cumulative nature of the criteria299 and the focus on ex 
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ante scrutiny,300 this limits the burden on intelligence analysts during Phase 2 of the 
deliberate targeting cycle (or the target stage of the dynamic cycle), and it should 
facilitate the compilation of a definitive list of such objects and their precise locations. 
Second, the protection is “unique” in that it continues even when the works or 
installations are put to military use and thus “glaringly constitute military 
objectives”.301 Arguably, the combined effect of these two factors is to create an 
administrable no-strike category: a set of a ‘binary actions’ that are amenable to both 
pre-deployment programming and in-field machine perception via GPS guidance 
systems.302  
 
Furthermore, given the possibility to integrate collateral damage estimation 
capabilities into LAWS,303 this argument may even extend to the second prohibition 
in Article 56(1), against attacking other nearby military objectives, if such an attack 
may also cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe civilian losses. 
Thus, underlying the prohibition is a “worst case analysis”, which assumes that such 
attacks will induce “massive risks” to the civilian population. Specifically, these risks 
are assumed to be a) “unacceptably high”, b) almost never outweighed by military 
advantage and, thus, c) cannot be justified by any claim of military necessity, except 
under the three specific exceptions in Article 56(2).304 Again, the specificity of the rule 
may be expected to support machine application 
 
The fact that protection under Article 56(1) is qualified by the verb ‘may’ and the 
adjective ‘severe’ does not imply that a LAWS will have to undertake any value 
judgments. Rather, as the AP I Commentary points out, ‘severe’ (losses among the 
civilian population) is a matter of ‘common sense’ and is to be applied in ‘good faith’ 
on the basis of objective criteria, such as population density and the proximity of 
inhabited areas.305 Accordingly, commanders and their battle staffs are to make these 
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judgment calls when deciding which specific objects and locations to put on the no-
strike list, which a LAWS will simply be programmed not to attack. 
 
Arguably, the same is true with respect to the specific grounds on which protection 
from attack shall cease under Article 56(2). These require that a) the work, installation 
or nearby military objective is used in regular, significant and direct support of 
military operations, and b) that an attack is the only feasible way to terminate such 
support. This sets the bar significantly higher than the ‘effective contribution to 
military action’ that an object must make to qualify as a military objective under 
Article 52(2) and it calls for a commander “at the highest military level” to make the 
judgment call,306 usually based on prior intelligence. This again points to the deliberate 
(or at least the dynamic) targeting cycle in reaching a deliberative human decision to 
conduct an attack pursuant to Article 56(2), while a ‘narrow loop’ LAWS will merely 
execute the attack via TS, and will refrain from such actions at all other times. 
6.5.3.4.4 Medical Capabilities 
The protection of medical capabilities to treat the sick, wounded and shipwrecked is a 
particular concern in IHL/LOAC, and is an essential component of efforts to humanise 
war. To this end, there are specific distinction-based AP I rules that afford respect for, 
and protection to:  
• Fixed and mobile medical units,307 with Parties to the conflict being encouraged 
to notify each other of the locations of fixed units.308  
• Medical vehicles used exclusively for transportation.309  
• Hospital ships and coastal rescue craft.310  
• ‘Other’ medical ships and craft.311  
• Medical aircraft.312 
 
Like the previous prohibitions, these are also simple programming and deployment 
matters. However, as the AMW Manual Commentary points out, “to respect” medical 
                                                          
306 Ibid., ¶ 2159 
307 Article 12(1), AP I; Article 19, GC I; Article 18, GC IV; CIHL, Rule 28. 
308 Article 12(3), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 73. 
309 Article 21, AP I; Article 35, GC I; Article 38, GC II; Article 21, GC IV; CIHL, Rule 29. 
310 Article 22, AP I; Articles 22, 24, 25, 27 and 28, GC II; CIHL, Rule 28. 
311 Article 23, AP I, also expanding on analogous provisions in GC II. 
312 Article 24, AP I; Article 36, GC I; Article 39, GC II; CIHL, Rule 28. AMW Manual, Rule 72(a). 
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personnel and facilities is broader than simply refraining from directly attacking them, 
and it includes a prohibition against “unnecessarily preventing them from discharging 
their functions”.313 Thus, a LAWS would have to be programmed to, for example, keep 
a distance from such facilities, lest it inadvertently creates a fear of impending attack, 
thereby disrupting medical operations. Crucially, recognition of protected status – an 
essential prerequisite for respecting it – can be greatly enhanced via technical means, 
which exploit the strengths of automatic processing. 
6.5.3.4.5 Enhancing Detection by Technical Means 
First, as noted above, whenever the location of a fixed protected object is known, 
respect will be effectuated primarily by assigning a no-strike categorisation to its GPS 
coordinates.314 Beyond this, and in the case of unknown or movable objects, there are 
additional safeguards, which may support autonomous attack and make it more 
discriminating. These include: 
• The Blue Shield that denotes cultural property.315  
• The international special sign (three bright orange circles) for works and 
installations containing dangerous forces.316  
• The distinctive emblems of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,317 which denote 
medical and religious personnel and facilities.318  
 
Importantly, these can all be specifically designed to facilitate detection by the ATR 
of a LAWS; for example, using ancillary lighting, thermal ribbons and detailed colour 
contrasts.319  
                                                          
313 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 71, ¶ 12 (giving the example of blocking medical supplies). 
314 Boothby (n 81), 81. In addition, GPS coordinates will aid respect for non-defended localities and 
demilitarised zones under Articles 59 and 60, AP I (restated in CIHL, Rules 37 and 36), respectively. 
The terms, conditions and boundaries of both are extensively deliberated by human negotiators, after 
which LAWS need only be programmed correctly to comply with those (spatio-temporal) boundaries. 
315 Articles 6, 10, 16, 17 and 20, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict (adopted 14 May 1954, entered into force 7 August 1954) 249 UNTS 240. 
316 Article 56(7), AP I; Article 17, Amended Annex I. 
317 Article 4, Amended Annex I; CIHL, Rule 30. 
318 Article 18, AP I, provides that each Party “shall endeavour” to ensure that relevant personnel and 
facilities are identifiable; and shall implement methods and procedures to enhance recognition, mainly 
via the distinctive emblems, but also using the ‘distinctive signals’ in addition or in lieu (on which, see 
below). 
319 Article 17(4), Amended Annex I, states that in times of reduced visibility, “the [international special] 
sign may be lighted or illuminated…[and] made of materials rendering it recognizable by technical 
means of detection”. Article 5(3) provides the same in relation to the distinctive emblem, and it suggests 




Furthermore, there is a range of ‘distinctive signals’ for the exclusive use of medical 
units and transports; for example, the distinctive light signal,320 radio signals and radio 
messages,321 and various forms of electronic identification.322 Each is individually 
predisposed to relatively reliable detection by technical means, and in combination 
with each other and with the distinctive emblems, they offer an invaluable means of 
detection-confirmation. These will further enhance the distinction capabilities of a 
LAWS, and help to avoid the kinds of unintended engagements seen with manned 
targeting.323  
 
That said, attacking forces must remain vigilant and avoid any over-reliance on 
emblems, signs and signals. Indeed, placing too much faith in these safeguards – and 
in human efforts to deploy them fully and accurately – may lead to a watering down 
of commander-led targeting efforts and, ultimately an increase in distinction failure. 
6.5.3.4.6 Enhancing Confidence in Technical Detection 
Helping to enhance the confidence of attacking forces in their ATR assessments, 
Article 38, AP I, prohibits adverse Parties from making any improper use of emblems, 
signs or signals;324 for example, by attaching them to military objectives. Moreover, 
                                                          
instruments”. This is significant for autonomous attack, as infrared instruments will be a standard 
feature on LAWS. See also AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 72(b) and its accompanying commentary. 
320 Article 7, Amended Annex I, recommends a distinctive blue light signal with specific boundaries for 
its chromaticity and flashing rate. This will clearly aid recognition by the visual and light sensors of a 
LAWS. 
321 Article 8, Amended Annex I, provides that the radio signal shall consist of a standardised urgency 
signal and distinctive signal; and that any subsequent radio message is transmitted in English and will 
convey specific data, such as the call sign of the medical transport, its position, intended route, etc. This 
will aid detection by a LAWS fitted with a radio receiver and speech recognition software. 
322 Article 9, Amended Annex I, provides that radar transponders and underwater acoustic signals may 
be used to identify protected medical aircraft and vessels, via standardised/agreed upon codes. This will 
clearly aid detection by autonomous drones installed with the Secondary Surveillance Radar system, or 
autonomous undersea vehicles installed with, for example, a hydrophone. 
323 See the numerous incidents of wrongful targeting, which were largely down to human error in 
competences involving automatic processing. For example, where war-weary pilots have failed to check 
the no-strike list and have not paid sufficient attention to clearly visible protective signs and emblems, 
this has resulted in erroneous attacks on hospitals and ICRC facilities. The result has often been a 
reduced capacity to distribute humanitarian supplies and medical services on the ground. Yet, 
autonomous drones operating with sophisticated ATR and GPS guidance systems would almost 
certainly have avoided those attacks. See ‘ICRC Warehouses Bombed in Kabul’, ICRC News Release 
01/43 (16 October 2001) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-
earlier/57jrcz.htm>; ‘Bombing and Occupation of ICRC Facilities in Afghanistan’, ICRC News Release 
01/48 (26 October 2001) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-
earlier/57jrdx.htm>; ‘Kunduz Bombing: US Attacked MSF Clinic ‘In Error’’, BBC News (25 November 
2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34925237>;  all accessed 21 August 2018. 
324 Article 38, AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 112(a)-(b); CIHL, Rules 59-61. 
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should such improper use become perfidious,325 this will elevate the violation to a 
gross breach of AP I and, therefore, a war crime.326 The discussion on perfidy in 
6.5.2.1.2 applies equally here, including the likelihood that adversarial examples, 
which merely imitate the recognised emblems, signs or signals, will be sufficient to 
establish a violation. 
6.5.4 Will LAWS be Able to Sense Targeting ‘Doubt’? 
It was argued in 3.2.2.2.1 that the decision to attack is often based on incomplete or 
inconclusive information. The resulting uncertainty (or ‘fog of war’), which pervades 
armed conflict raises the question: “how certain must [an attacker] be that the object 
or person is a lawful target before proceeding?”327 As a matter of law, both the question 
and its answer are crucial, as AP I mandates that in the event of ‘doubt’, civilian status 
shall be presumed for both persons328 and objects,329 thereby protecting them from 
direct attack.330 Importantly, this presumption relates to civilian status and is not a 
conduct-based presumption against DPH.331 In relation to objects, the language of the 
AP I norm is reproduced in Amended Protocol II,332 which regulates the use of anti-
personnel mines. Significantly, these weapons also operate with humans out-of-the-
narrow-loop, thereby underscoring the need to act on doubt in such circumstances.333 
With these in mind, the AMW Manual Commentary fully extends the rule of doubt to 
                                                          
325 See 6.5.2.1.2 on the elements of perfidy and their application to LAWS. 
326 Article 85(3)(f), AP I. 
327 Ian Henderson and Bryan Cavanagh, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Do They Pose Legal 
Challenges?’ in Hitoshi Nasu and Robert McLaughlin (eds.), New Technologies and the Law of Armed 
Conflict (TMC Asser Press, 2014), 204. 
328 Article 50(1), AP I: “In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered 
to be a civilian.” See also CIHL, Rule 6. 
329 Article 52(3), AP I: “In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian 
purposes…is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not 
to be so used.” See also CIHL, Rule 10. 
330 And requiring that they be taken into account in proportionality and precautionary considerations. 
331 Boothby (n 31), 149, 427; Cf. ICRC (n 138), 75-76. Recall from 6.5.2.3 that near-term LAWS are, 
in any event, unlikely to be given target engagement authority in DPH situations, because of the high 
metacognitive demands. 
332 Article 3(8)(a), Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices (adopted 10 October 1980, amended 3 May 1996, entered into force 3 December 1998) 2048 
UNTS 93. 
333 Though it is acknowledged that the doubt is addressed to the human emplacing the mine, not the 
mine itself. Even so, it highlights the importance of an analogous exercise of doubt in a LAWS context, 
when planning a TS. 
225 
 
autonomous lethal targeting,334 where it will be a prominent factor in both the 
development and deployment of LAWS.335  
 
That said, the degree of doubt required to trigger the presumption of civilian status is 
not codified in treaty law, and with varying State practice there is arguably no 
customary standard.336 To be sure, war is replete with uncertainty, and the mere 
existence of some doubt is insufficient to preclude an attack;337 rather, as the AP I 
Commentary makes clear, ‘doubt’ is likely to be context-specific.338 Accordingly, the 
ICTY Trial Chamber in Galić articulated the legal standard as: 
 
…when it is not reasonable to believe, in the circumstances of the 
person contemplating the attack, including the information available to 
the latter, that the potential target is a combatant [or an object being 
used to make an effective contribution to military action].339 
 
The AMW Manual Commentary echoes this,340 as does the ‘positive identification’ 
(PID) standard set out in some ROE, which requires “a reasonable certainty that the 
proposed target is a legitimate military target”.341 Henderson and Cavanagh therefore 
argue that ‘reasonable belief’ and ‘reasonable certainty’ are practically synonymous 
and, when considered in the circumstances of the attacker – including the information 
or intelligence available to him – provide a sufficiently clear and practical test;342 at 
least for a metacognitive human. 
 
                                                          
334 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 5 (“The standards…regarding doubt apply equally to UCAV 
attacks, whether autonomous or manned”) (emphasis added). 
335 Thurnher (n 59), 191. 
336 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations (2nd ed., CUP, 2017) (hereafter, Tallinn Manual 2.0), Rule 95, ¶ 3 (noting that, despite no 
definitive boundary, the mere existence of some doubt is insufficient). 
337 Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 95, ¶ 3 (persons) and Rule 102, ¶ 9 (objects); AMW Manual Commentary, 
Rule 12(a), ¶ 4 (persons) and Rule 12(b), ¶¶ 4 and 5 (objects). 
338 AP I Commentary, ¶ 1920 (referring to those “whose status seems doubtful because of the 
circumstances”). 
339 Prosecutor v. Galić (ICTY Trial Judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003), ¶ 50 (persons), ¶ 51 
(objects), (emphasis added). See also ¶ 55 (“the Prosecution must show that in the given circumstances 
a reasonable person could not have believed that the individual he or she attacked was a combatant”). 
340 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 12(a), ¶ 4 (“The degree of doubt necessary to preclude an attack 
is that which would cause a reasonable attacker in the same or similar circumstances to abstain from 
ordering or executing an attack”). 
341 See CFLCC and MNC-I ROE Cards, reprinted in LCDR David H. Lee (ed.), Operational Law 
Handbook (JAG’s Legal Center & School, US Army, 2015), 109-10 (emphasis added). 
342 Henderson and Cavanagh (n 327), 205. 
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In a LAWS context, this means where there is enough doubt that a reasonable human 
attacker – possessing the same information and in a similar situation as the LAWS – 
would hesitate, then an attack will not legally be allowed to proceed.343 In such a case 
of uncertainty, the LAWS must be programmed to a) recognise the situation of ‘doubt’ 
that would cause a human to hesitate and b) abort the attack,344 or at least contact a 
human operator for further instructions.  
 
Yet, for the reasons discussed in 3.2.2.2.1, this framing of doubt in human 
reasonableness terms will complicate translation into a LAWS context.345 A significant 
challenge will be to develop an automated mechanism that a) accurately gauges doubt, 
and b) reliably factors in the unique situation in which the LAWS is operating.346 In 
this regard, the Trial Chamber in Galić noted that observations relating to the clothing, 
activity, age, or gender are relevant when determining whether a person is a civilian347 
and, therefore, whether there is enough doubt to trigger the presumption of civilian 
status. Other factors have already been mentioned, above, again in relation to 
persons.348 However, it is not clear how amenable to automatic processing these will 
be in any given battlefield. Certainly, in the most dynamic battlefields there will 
potentially be relevant factors that are not foreseen by programmers (or by case law), 
but to which metacognitive human combatants would be able to improvise. 
 
It should be noted that in relation to objects, the rule is not about doubt in general, but 
specifically about whether a civilian object is being put to military ‘use’.349 In that 
regard, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 points out that in establishing doubt versus the 
reasonableness of an assessment of military use, an attacker should consider: 
 
[T]he apparent reliability of the information, including the credibility 
of the source or sensor, the timeliness of the information, the likelihood 
of deception, and the possibility of misinterpretation of data.350 
 
                                                          
343 Thurnher (n 335), 191-92. 
344 Wagner (n 258), 113; Weizmann (n 273), 14. 
345 Schmitt (n 63), 16-17 
346 Ibid.; Thurnher (n 335), 192. 
347 Prosecutor v. Galić (Trial), ¶ 50. 
348 See (notes and text accompanying) nn 146-147. 
349 See n 329. Thus, the rule of doubt does not extend to military objectives by nature, location or 
purpose. 
350 Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 102, ¶ 8. 
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Namely, in case of any doubt as to whether a civilian object is making an ECMA by 
use, it may only be attacked after a “careful assessment” of the situation.351 This clearly 
calls for the marshalling of higher-order metacognitive skills, which a LAWS will not 
possess. It was one of the reasons argued at 6.5.3.2, for why military objectives by use 
(or purpose) are likely to be engaged only via a TS. Namely, the need for extensive 
intelligence analysis and human deliberation will likely demand the rigours of the 
deliberate (or at least the dynamic) targeting cycle, led by human decision-makers.  
 
On the other hand, it was also argued at 6.5.3.2 that where clearer, more machine-
perceptible instances of military ‘use’ are detected, this may be amenable to 
autonomous attack. Specifically, in relation to aircraft, the AMW Manual Commentary 
provides an illustrative list of factors, which are potentially relevant to recognising 
‘doubt’ in air warfare.352 Processing these data is similar to the quantitative matching 
mentioned in 2.5.4.1, in relation to ATR. In a similar vein, Arkin discusses recognition 
of ‘uncertainty’ through a weighted average of discrete values, e.g. binary (absent or 
present), or categorical (absent, weak, medium, strong); or real continuous values.353 
This may also combine with ‘conservative use of lethal force’, where a LAWS – not 
affected by any survival instinct – can hold fire to resolve doubt. 
 
Ultimately, whether a LAWS can administer targeting doubt to the legally required 
standard will – like much of the above analysis – depend on the system, the task being 
programmed and the operational environment. The more complex and dynamic the 
task and environment, the more likely the system will be legally non-compliant for 
lack of controlled processing. Conversely, the simpler and more static the task and 
environment, the more likely targeting doubt can be resolved through overlapping 
criteria and statistical confidence thresholds (i.e. automatic processing). Perhaps the 
more important ‘doubt’ that needs to be taken into account is that of the commander, 
when deploying systems into specific missions. 
                                                          
351 Ibid. See also CIHL, Rule 10 (stating “in case of doubt, a careful assessment has to be made under 
the conditions and restraints governing a particular situation as to whether there are sufficient 
indications to warrant an attack). 
352 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 40, ¶ 4 (a)-(i) (listing visual image; response to warnings; infrared, 
radar and electromagnetic signatures; identification modes and codes; number and formation of aircraft; 
altitude, speed, track, profile and other flight characteristics; pre-flight and in-flight air traffic 
information). 
353 Arkin (n 154), 59. 
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6.5.5 Ensuring the Compliance of LAWS Operations with the Principle of 
Distinction 
On balance, therefore, compliance with the principle of distinction is not just 
contingent on system capabilities, but is more about commanders undertaking an early 
‘matching exercise’. That is, to take into account the assigned task and the prevailing 
operational environment; to understand system capabilities, limitations and how the 
LAWS will interact with its task and environment; and to ensure that one is 
appropriately matched to the other.354  
 
Thurnher elaborates on this by pointing to the spectrum of battlefields, from the most 
uncluttered right through to full urban warfare.355 Clearly, as the task and environment 
become more complex, the demands on the LAWS sensory capabilities will increase, 
with progressively more robust sensor packages and ATR software becoming 
necessary. The author concludes: 
 
Ultimately, autonomous weapons will only be an option in areas where 
the systems are able to reasonably distinguish between combatants and 
civilians and between military objectives and civilian objects given the 
particular battlefield circumstances ruling at the time.356 
 
A similar position is taken by Anderson, Reisner and Waxman357 and Boothby,358 
while Crootof359 and Scharre360 point out that in simple environments, a degree of 
autonomous operation is already achievable. In this connexion, the April 2018 Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE) meeting saw a canonical example of a LAWS 
currently in development being discussed:  
 
                                                          
354 Schmitt (n 63). Note that this is also the basis on which the landmines regime works: to prohibit 
deployment where distinction is not possible, due to a cluttered operational environment and/or 
limitations of the munitions’ capabilities. 
355 Thurnher (n 335), 188. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict 
to Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 90 International Law Studies 386, 401-402 (giving the 
canonical examples of an aerial dogfight over the high-seas and undersea attacks on submarines).  
358 Boothby (n 81), 78-79 (also emphasising the importance of the weapons review process in 
demarcating this). 
359 Rebecca Crootof, ‘The Killer Robots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications’ (2015) 36 Cardozo 
Law Review 1837, 1874-75. 
360 Scharre (n 164). 
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[A]n underwater autonomous vessel equipped with a sonar, ship 
registry data, and torpedoes [that] would be able to recognise and 
differentiate between civilian and military vessels based on the input 
from the sonar system and comparison of the input with the onboard 
ship registry. In case a civilian vessel is detected, the torpedoes would 
not be launched or would be diverted.361 
 
Being in a simple and structured environment, to pursue cooperative targets using 
appropriate sensors and data on potential civilian presence, this particular LAWS is 
unlikely to pose a significant distinction challenge.  
 
However, even in a complex and dynamic battlefield with a high degree of comingling, 
restricting the ROE of a LAWS may offer another way to comply with the principle 
of distinction in TLC. Namely, DPH is a permissive exception while military ‘use’ and 
‘purpose’ are merely alternative targeting criteria: none of these necessarily have to be 
invoked, much less so in an autonomy context. As Backstrom and Henderson explain: 
 
[I]f a commander was prepared to forgo some theoretical capability, it 
is possible…to confine the list of targets that are subject to automatic 
target recognition to a narrow list of objects that are clearly military 
objectives by their nature.362  
 
The same is potentially true in relation to traditional combatants, who may be 
identifiable using the three-/four-part criteria. By restricting LAWS ROE in this way, 
commanders will exploit the speed and precision of automatic processing, while 
human combatants pursue the more abstract and malleable categories, which require 
nuanced judgment and controlled processing to determine their battlefield status.363 
Alternatively, those categories may be engaged in a TS, where the controlled 
processing and extensive metacognitive thinking is undertaken by a plethora of 
personnel in advance, leaving the LAWS to execute the strike with machine-precision. 
In all these cases, there is clearly a ‘division of labour’ between man and machine, 
based on their respective cognitive strengths. 
                                                          
361 ‘Chair’s Summary of the Discussion on Agenda item 6(a) 9 and 10 April 2018, Agenda item 6(b) 11 
April 2018 and 12 April 2018, Agenda item 6(c) 12 April 2018, Agenda item 6(d) 13 April 2018’, 
Chair’s Documents at the 2018 GGE Meeting on LAWS (9-13 April 2018), 6-7 
<https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/DF486EE2B556C8A6C125827A00488B9E
/$file/Summary+of+the+discussions+during+GGE+on+LAWS+April+2018.pdf> accessed 21 August 
2018. 





Complementing Backstrom and Henderson, Canning also proposes restricting LAWS 
(or at least their autonomous capabilities) to anti-material engagements.364 Namely, 
for machines to target machines (mostly weapons), while humans target humans.365 
This is aptly described as targeting “either the ‘bow’ or the ‘arrow’, but not the human 
‘archer’”.366 The idea is to use non-lethal force to convince the enemy to abandon its 
weapons, before destroying the latter and removing the former’s destructive 
capabilities;367 people may still be killed, but only as a secondary consequence of 
targeting the weapon.368 This proposal aims to address the distinction challenge by 
assuming that military-grade weapons and other military equipment, which are 
relatively more amenable to ATR, are only of interest to combatants or civilians who 
undertake DPH. There is some disagreement with this assumption,369 though it is 
submitted that any residual targeting errors would be the same, if not worse in the case 
of manned targeting,370 and can often be mitigated by civilians exercising due 
caution.371 While imperfect on its own, Canning’s proposal does suggest another way 
for LAWS to be deployed in compliance with the principle distinction and, if the 
author’s “dream machine” is realised, may even offer a deployment option in urban 
warfare.372 
 
                                                          
364 John S. Canning, ‘A Concept of Operations for Armed Autonomous Systems’, Presentation at Third 
Annual Disruptive Technology Conference (6-7 September 2006), 14-16 
<https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2006/disruptive_tech/canning.pdf> accessed 21 
August 2018. 
365 Ibid., 14 (suggesting that the same LAWS may be used throughout, but with ‘dial-a-level’ autonomy 
to switch from one mode to another). 
366 John S. Canning, ‘You’ve Just Been Disarmed. Have a Nice Day!’ (2009) 28 IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine 12, 14. 
367 Canning (n 364), 14.  
368 Ibid., 17. 
369 For example, Wagner (n 145), 1391 (arguing that civilians with a legitimate use for rifles – be that 
for cultural reasons, self-defence or hunting – may still be wrongly targeted). 
370 See, for example, Luke Harding and Matthew Engel, ‘US Bomb Blunder Kills 30 at Afghan 
Wedding’, The Guardian (2 July 2002) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/02/afghanistan.lukeharding> accessed 21 August 2018 
(reporting on one of many wedding party incidents in Afghanistan, where US forces mistook celebratory 
gunfire as a threat, thereby returning fire and killing 30 wedding guests, all civilians).  
371 Dinstein (n 6), 141 (advising civilians not to brandish self-defence weapons near the contact zone, 
and to postpone recreational shooting until calmer times). 
372 Canning (n 366), 14 (positing a weapon system that would confront an enemy soldier/civilian DPH, 




To summarise, the lawful use of LAWS is possible where the system can reasonably 
distinguish between the relevant categories, given its ATR and the specific battlefield 
circumstances ruling at the time; and where appropriate constraints and parameters can 
be put on its engagement options. This makes compliance with the principle of 
distinction largely a programming and deployment issue rather than one that should be 
judged on the state of technology alone. Concretely, it speaks largely to the pre-
deployment phases of the Joint Targeting Cycles. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Distinction is undoubtedly one of the most important of LOAC norms, yet it is clearly 
not easy to comply with in every situation. Yet, by using common sense and acting in 
good faith, commanders can in principle find suitable restrictions and precautions as 
to deploy LAWS appropriately, and in a way that adequately distinguishes lawful from 
unlawful targets. Of course, this assumes a) effective training of commanders, and full 
knowledge on both the capabilities and limitations of prevailing ATR systems, and b) 
a degree of self-restraint on the part of those commanders, who may be operating under 
extraordinary operational pressures. Arguably, neither of these conditions will 
necessarily hold true all of the time, and certainly not on all sides of an armed conflict. 
Thus, while compliance with the principle of distinction is possible, this will only 






Targeting Law II: Can LAWS Be Deployed in 
Compliance with the Principle of Proportionality and 
with Adequate Precautions? 
7.1 Introduction 
The following chapter continues the targeting law analysis of lethal autonomous 
weapon systems (LAWS) under both treaty1 and customary2 international 
humanitarian law (IHL)/law of armed conflict (LOAC). It will continue bearing in 
mind the factors bullet-pointed at the start of 6.4, and will continue gleaning insights 
from the AP I Commentary,3 and the Air and Missile Warfare Manual4 and its 
Commentary,5 where relevant. The examination begins at 7.2 with the highly 
amorphous principle of proportionality, first clarifying some pivotal terms in 7.2.1 
before exploring the problematic nature of its application in a LAWS context, in 7.2.2. 
As will be seen here, proportionality compliance will pose one of the biggest 
challenges for LAWS deployments, because of a) the shifting and contextual nature of 
military advantage, b) the incommensurability between that and collateral damage, and 
c) the indeterminate nature of ‘excessiveness’. Collectively, these call for highly 
deliberative thinking, which would tend to negate the automated application of 
proportionality. That said, there are potential ways to guard against excessive collateral 
damage by a LAWS, which are briefly considered at 7.2.3. These are mainly rooted in 
the targeting process and the fact that collateral damage estimation is highly amenable 
to automatic data-processing.  
                                                          
1 Principally, under Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 
December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (hereafter, AP I). 
2 Restated in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules (CUP, 2005) (hereafter, CIHL). All Rules available at: <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul> accessed 10 June 2018. 
3 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June, 1977, to the Geneva Convention of 12th August,1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 
(hereafter, AP I Commentary). 
4 Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research at Harvard University (HPCR), HPCR Manual 
on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (Harvard College, 2009) (hereafter, AMW 
Manual). 
5 HPCR, Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile 




Subsequently, 7.3 examines precautionary measures, both passive (7.3.2) and active 
(7.3.3). Three themes will emerge here. First, active precautions will be taken in how 
LAWS are deployed and used, and LAWS deployments may in themselves represent 
a precautionary measure. Second, there may be an important interplay between active 
and passive precautions, in that announcing the deployment of LAWS may enhance 
the obligation of the opposing side to take certain passive precautionary measures. 
Third, the automatic processing capabilities of a LAWS are arguably more amenable 
to narrow precautionary measures, relative to proportionality, and this may enhance 
the ability of commanders to achieve the latter. This is complemented in 7.3.5, where 
it is argued that precautionary measures should be taken relatively earlier and in the 
broader context of military operations, not just attacks. Namely, the Joint Targeting 
process itself has pervasive precautionary value for LAWS deployments. Not least 
because it lends itself to a strong element of ‘front-loading’, and because it allows for 
a broader range of technically apt precautionary measures to be developed; a theme 
that will be explored in 7.3.6. 
7.2 The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality protects civilians and civilian objects that are not 
directly targeted, but which may be incidentally affected in an otherwise legitimate 
strike. It is engaged after the commander satisfies the principle of distinction and takes 
all feasible precautions,6 at which point the proportionality rule provides an “extra 
protective layer” of commensurability.7 Specifically, it is prohibited to launch or 
continue with an attack that:  
 
…may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.8 
 
                                                          
6 Prosecutor v. Galić (ICTY Trial Judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003), ¶ 58; (Appeals Judgment) 
IT-98-29-A (30 November 2006), ¶ 190.  
7 Remarks by Janina Dill, ‘Interpretive Complexity and the IHL Principle of Proportionality’ (2014) 
108 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 82, 83. 
8 Articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b), AP I (emphasis added). See also AMW Manual, Rules 14, 32(c) 
and 35(c); CIHL, Rules 14, 18 and 19.  
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In all, the concept is codified four times in AP I,9 albeit without any reference to the 
term ‘proportionality’. Instead, the focus is on ensuring that the expected collateral 
damage10 (ECD) from an attack is not ‘excessive’ in relation to the military advantage 
anticipated (MAA).11 In that regard, Schmitt notes that “[w]hile the rule is easily 
stated, there is no question that proportionality is among the most difficult of [LOAC] 
norms to apply”.12 Similarly, in its Final Report, the Office of the Prosecutor to the 
ICTY pointed out that: 
 
It is much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general 
terms than it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because 
the comparison is often between unlike quantities and values.13 
 
This requirement to compare ‘apples with oranges’ introduces a strong element of 
subjectivity, which bedevils consensus in a given case or consistent application across 
cases. As Dill notes, “[l]oss of human life and military gain are never in harmony: 
reasonable people disagree on all but the most extreme cases of excessive civilian 
casualties”.14 Arguably, proportionality will present the single most difficult 
compliance problem for LAWS;15 though, difficulty need not mean intractability.16  
 
                                                          
9 (1) In Article 51(5)(b), as part of the prohibition on indiscriminate attack; (2) in Article 57(2)(a)(iii), 
as part of the precautionary considerations when launching an attack; (3) in Article 57(2)(b), for when 
an attack is in progress and may need to be cancelled or suspended; and (4) in Article 85(3)(b) on acts 
which, when done wilfully, are regarded as grave breaches of AP I. 
10 While neither ‘collateral damage’ nor ‘collateral effects’ are legal terms, they are used 
interchangeably here as shorthand for both incidental damage to civilian objects, and incidental death 
and injury to civilians. 
11 Note that CIHL, Rule 14, contains near-identical wording, but is entitled ‘Proportionality in Attack’. 
12 Michael N. Schmitt, Essays on Law and War at the Fault Lines (TMC Asser Press, 2012), 190. 
13 Office of the Prosecutor, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2000) 39 ILM 1257 (hereafter, 
OTP Report), ¶ 48 (emphasis added). 
14 Janina Dill, Legitimate Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing (CUP, 
2015), 251. See also OTP Report, ibid., ¶ 50 (noting “it is unlikely that military commanders with 
different doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories 
would always agree in close cases”). 
15 Yoram Dinstein, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law’ in Wolff Heintschel 
von Heinegg, Robert Frau and Tassilo Singer (eds.), Dehumanization of Warfare: Legal Implications 
of New Weapons Technologies (Springer, 2018), ¶20 (“The principal problem that the [LOAC] will 
have to address upon baptism by fire of AI robots relates to the application and calculation of 
proportionality in attack”). See also Markus Wagner, ‘Autonomy in the Battlespace: Independently 
Operating Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), International 
Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), 115 (noting that 
proportionality can be stated, but not fully defined in the abstract). 
16 See 7.2.3 on ensuring compliance of LAWS with the principle of proportionality. 
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Despite its misgivings, proportionality is a vivid example of the military necessity-
humanity balance,17 as it explicitly accepts the harsh reality of civilian harm, so long 
as this is ‘justified’ by the military advantage of attacking a lawful target; yet, it puts 
an upper limit on that harm, despite any perceived sense of military necessity by the 
attacker.18 Accordingly, proportionality is one of several clear and categorical 
rejections of Kriegsraison.19 That said, some pivotal terms codifying the principle are 
often ignored or misapplied, thus they are in need of clarification. 
7.2.1 Clarifying Some Pivotal Terms 
As emphasised in italics in the above reference to the AP I norm, the terms ‘expected’ 
and ‘anticipated’ make clear that the commander’s judgment of the opposing variables 
(ECD and MAA) is made before an attack is launched. Thus, he is not dealing in 
certainties, but is making an assessment based on the information available at the 
relevant time.20 Should this information be subsequently found to be flawed or 
incomplete, it is still the ex ante situation that matters for the legal assessment of 
proportionality.21 In line with the Rendulic Rule,22 the linchpin is foresight not 
hindsight;23 thus, the popular trend towards effects-based condemnations is legally 
incorrect. This undoubtedly makes the principle more administrable to those on the 
ground, and to those seeking to deploy LAWS. 
 
Crucially, the MAA must be “concrete and direct” in that it must be “substantial and 
relatively close” to the kinetic effects of an attack.24 This does not mean the MAA 
should crystallise instantly,25 but it does rule out putative advantages that are “hardly 
perceptible” and “which would only appear in the long term”.26 The AMW Manual 
Commentary takes all this to mean that the MAA should be “clearly identifiable and, 
                                                          
17 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2206.  
18 Michael Newton and Larry May, Proportionality in International Law (OUP, 2014). 
19 United States v. List (Wilhelm) et al. (The Hostage Case) Case No. 7, 19 February 1948 (1950) 11 
TWC 1230, 1256.  
20 William H. Boothby, The Law of Targeting (OUP, 2012), 94. 
21 Ibid., 95. 
22 The Hostage Case, 1297. 
23 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict (3rd ed., 
CUP, 2016), 157; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 14, ¶ 5. 
24 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2209. 
25 Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and 
Precautions in Attack under Additional Protocol I (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 200 (noting the 
conspicuous absence of ‘immediate’, or any similar wording in the AP I provisions). 
26 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2209. 
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in many cases, quantifiable”.27 This can also be seen to support (or at least to not 
undermine) LAWS deployments, as programmers and battle staffs will need to think 
through MAA values and consider their significance, before translating these into 
machine code. 
 
A related matter concerns how closely confined to the current battle the MAA must be 
to qualify as ‘direct’. The AP I Commentary suggests that proportionality is to be 
assessed on the tactical level,28 and this has some qualified academic support.29 The 
more accurate view, however, is that the MAA relates to the ‘attack as a whole’ and 
not from isolated or particular parts of it.30 Not only does this have strong academic 
and expert support,31 it is also reflected in military practice32 and in the Rome Statute, 
which explicitly adds the adjective “overall” to its formulation of MAA.33 Importantly, 
this broader view is also consistent with the idea that the MAA and proportionality are 
more appropriately assessed at the operational or strategic level. At these levels, senior 
commanders are able to consider the larger operational picture and come to a more 
comprehensive judgment.34 Conversely, small-unit commanders and individual 
combatants often have a limited objective and are not briefed on its value within the 
overall scheme of attack, nor on its changing value as battlefield dynamics evolve.35 
Accordingly, such personnel should avoid unilaterally halting an attack, except in the 
case of extreme or unconscionable collateral damage. Once again, this may be seen to 
                                                          
27 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 14, ¶ 9 (emphasis added). 
28 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2207. 
29 Henderson (n 25), 202 (“…an attacker cannot argue ‘this war is about national survival, therefore the 
allowable collateral damage is great’…However…attacks on strategic objectives [can] be assessed in 
[their strategic] context”). 
30 UK, Reservations and Declarations Made Upon Ratification of AP I (28 January 1998), Statement 
(i). 
31 Boothby (n 20), 95; Schmitt (n 12), 192; Dinstein (n 23), 161; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 14, 
¶ 11. 
32 See 5.3.1.2 on Target System Analysis, which recognises the substitutability of some targets (from 
the enemy’s point of view), hence the need to attack them together, for the military advantage to 
materialise. See also AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 14, ¶¶ 12-13 (referring to multiple bridges across 
the same river and attacks as ruses). 
33 Article 8(2)(b)(iv), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3; UN Doc. A/CONF.183.9. As Boothby (n 20), 97, points out, 
despite this provision fulfilling its own purpose under international criminal law (ICL), it is still worth 
bearing in mind here as it represents the most recent internationally adopted text on proportionality. 
34 Dinstein (n 23), 108, 161; W. Hays Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War’ (1990) 32 Air Force Law 
Review 1, 172, 175-76.  
35 Hays Parks, ibid., 176 (citing the extreme example of the D-Day landings, where only a top General 
such as Dwight D. Eisenhower was in a position to measure the MAA of each component of the 
bombing attack, thus it would be inappropriate for an individual pilot to halt his own attack in response 
to a few extra civilians appearing). 
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support LAWS deployments, as tactical autonomous units will be unlikely to 
undertake their own proportionality assessment for every strike, but may instead 
proceed with pre-programmed thresholds and/or real-time human input,36 in line with 
the ‘individual attack’ limitation.37   
 
As alluded to above, the biggest problem with the proportionality principle is its 
subjective application and the idea of ‘weighing’ dissimilar values.38 On the one hand, 
collateral damage can now be estimated with a high level of rigour and objectivity, by 
using the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDEM).39 On the other hand, 
the MAA of an attack is not only subjective,40 but is highly contextual and, therefore, 
constantly shifting as the battlefield evolves.41 When ‘weighing’ the two variables, the 
fulcrum word that should guide any assessment is ‘excessive’ and not 
‘disproportionate’. The latter suggests that a fine balancing of the two is required and 
that the rule is violated with a slight tipping of the scales.42 Yet, despite some 
prominent academic43 and judicial44 support for this view, notions of ‘disproportion’ 
do not actually appear anywhere in the text of AP I. Instead, the proportionality rule is 
framed as an ‘indiscriminate attack’, and its negotiating history shows that 
                                                          
36 See 7.2.3. 
37 See 4.3 and 5.5.2. 
38 Dill (n 14), 84 (noting that “human life and military gain cannot be expressed or determined in terms 
of each other” and that “a gain in one [usually] implies a loss in the other”, such that finding a legally 
correct ‘balance’ between these two often competing variable is “prima facie subjective”). 
39 This US-based methodology takes certain inputs, such as the precision of a weapon; its blast radius; 
other known materials, objects and explosives within that radius; attack tactics; and the probability of 
civilian presence near targets. These are combined to derive a ‘collateral effects radius’ and ‘potential 
collateral damage’ output figure, comprising both civilians and civilian objects. See Jeff Thurnher and 
Tim Kelly, ‘Panel Discussion: Collateral Damage Estimation’, US Naval War College (23 October 
2012) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AvdXJV-N56A> accessed 6 September 2018. 
40 Dinstein (n 23), 162 (arguing that MAA is usually the progeny of military planning and may not be 
transparent to the external observer; thus, it cannot be assessed independently from the attacker’s 
subjective state of mind). 
41 Newton and May (n 18); Wagner (n 15), 112. 
42 WJ. Fenrick, ‘Targeting and Proportionality During the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
Yugoslavia’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 489, 501 (“…resolution of the 
proportionality equation requires a determination of the relative worth of military advantage gained by 
one side and the civilian casualties or damage to civilian objectives incurred in areas in the hands of the 
other side”).  
43 For example, ibid.; WJ. Fenrick, ‘The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare’ 
(1982) 98 Military Law Review 91, 106 (suggesting there is an equivalence between ‘excessive’ and 
‘disproportionate’).  
44 Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel et al. (2005) HCJ 769/02 
(Targeted Killings Case), ¶ 45 (referring to a “balancing between conflicting values and interests”, so 




‘disproportionate’ was deliberately replaced with ‘excessive’.45 This was to mitigate 
the subjective element and the ‘apples and oranges’ problem of needing to devise an 
‘exchange value’ between incommensurate variables.46 Accordingly, a significant and 
unreasonable outweighing of MAA by ECD is needed before the rule is violated.47 
Complementing this approach, the commander enjoys a “fairly broad margin of 
judgment”,48 the combined effect of which is to make the rule more administrable and 
to decrease the likelihood of inadvertently violating it. Notably, the Rome Statute 
affords an even greater margin of appreciation, with the adverb “clearly”49 implying 
that the disparity between ECD and MAA must be “gross and obvious” before an 
offence has been committed.50 
 
Significantly, this leads to the argument that proportionality is not necessarily 
subjective, but is an objective standard51 that is applied in a subjective manner because 
fallible human beings are conducting the assessments.52 This is arguably in line with 
the ICTY Trial Chamber’s judgment in Galić, which articulated the ‘reasonable 
military commander’ standard as: 
 
…whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of 
the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information 
available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian 
casualties to result from the attack.53  
 
                                                          
45 For a summary of the diplomatic woes over the wording, see Hays Parks (n 34), 171-72; Samuel 
Estreicher, ‘Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part II)?: The “Proportionality” Principle under 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2011) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 143, 151-53.  
46 Ibid. See also Prosecutor v. Galić (Trial), where the ICTY Trial Chamber did not distinguish between 
knowingly causing excessive collateral damage and a careless indiscriminate attack (¶ 387), as both 
abandon the legal requirement to spare civilians as much as possible (¶ 58). 
47 Schmitt (n 12), 190; Dinstein (n 23), 158-59; Boothby (n 20), 97; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 
14, ¶ 7. See also the Targeted Killings Case, ¶ 58 (discussing the “zone of proportionality”). 
48 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2210. 
49 That is, collateral damage must be “clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
[MAA]” under Article 8(2)(b)(iv), Rome Statute. 
50 Boothby (n 20), 97.  
51 Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Proportionality in the Law of Armed Conflict’ in Andrew Clapham and Paola 
Gaeta (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP, 2014), 337 (“By 
nature, proportionality is an objective standard. There would be no use in requiring a State to consider 
humanitarian interests in the pursuit of its military objectives if the balance of interests could be struck 
according to the State’s subjective perception”). See also AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 14, ¶ 6. 
52 Newton and May (n 18); Marco Sassóli, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: 
Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified’ (2014) 90 International Law 
Studies 308, 331-33. 
53 Prosecutor v. Galić (Trial), ¶ 58 (emphasis added).  
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A ‘reasonably well-informed person’ who makes ‘reasonable use’ of the available 
information is clearly an objective standard; qualifying this with the ‘circumstances of 
the actual perpetrator’ allows for a realistic subjective element.54 As further 
clarification, and partly in line with Galić, Wright argues for an administrable two-part 
‘subjective-objective’ test.55 For part one, the commander’s evaluation of both the 
ECD and MAA is the result of a subjective assessment, done with an objective degree 
of diligence: namely, with “common sense and good faith”, and in light of the available 
information.56 For part two, these opposing values are compared for an objective 
determination of whether the ECD was ‘proportionate’, ‘excessive’ or ‘clearly 
excessive’.57 On its face, this approach is potentially amenable to the automatic 
processing capabilities of a LAWS, which can reliably routinise the comparison of 
data values; subject, however, to human input on the more deliberative aspects of the 
initial valuations. 
 
Taking the ‘objective standard’ argument one step further, Estreicher argues that the 
“proper test [for excessiveness] is one of ‘necessity’”.58 Namely, so long as the attack 
does in fact offer a concrete and direct MAA,59 the commander simply needs to select 
the “least deleterious (in terms of civilian loss) means of achieving that objective”, 
without needing to inquire into “complex, metaphysical exchange rates” between 
dissimilar values.60 This interpretation is clearly more aligned with military 
operational and tactical logic,61 and it is undoubtedly the one that is most amenable to 
the automatic processing capabilities of a LAWS.62 However, it is also legally 
incorrect as it focuses exclusively on distinction and precautions in attack.63 
Proportionality has an independent (and somewhat subjective) existence beyond the 
                                                          
54 Henderson (n 25), 222 (noting that after the subjective evaluation of MAA, “the conclusions to be 
reached on whether collateral damage is expected and whether it is proportional” are objective 
standards) (original emphasis). 
55 Jason D. Wright, ‘Excessive Ambiguity: Assessing and Refining the Proportionality Standard’ (2012) 
94 International Review of the Red Cross 819, 851-52. 
56 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2208. 
57 Wright (n 55), 851-52. Note that ‘clearly excessive’ is specific to ICL proceedings.  
58 Estreicher (n 45), 156.  
59 And holding that MAA constant between the different means, methods and objects of attack. 
60 Estreicher (n 45), 156-57. 
61 In that it offers a more objective and administrable standard for commanders and their battle staffs to 
apply. 
62 In that it merely requires the machine the recognise a military objective, before selecting the munition, 
and the timing and direction of attack that minimises the ECD value from its integrated CDEM. 
63 In particular, Articles 52(2) and 57(2)(a)(ii), AP I.  
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precautionary measures; the latter can greatly mitigate the difficulty for commanders 
when assessing the former,64 but the two are not necessarily interchangeable.65 
 
Finally, the AP I Commentary seems to assume a ‘finite relationship’ between ECD 
and MAA, as it categorically rules out “extensive” collateral damage.66 Ostensibly, 
this would require a finer level of judgment, thereby adding to the difficulty of the 
‘balancing exercise’. Yet the weight of academic and expert opinion is equally 
categorical: that the fulcrum word is ‘excessive’; that this continues to govern the 
relationship between ECD and MAA, even at very high levels of both variables; and, 
therefore, that neither ‘extensive’ nor even ‘severe’ collateral damage is automatically 
unlawful.67 In short, ‘context is king’ and even horrendous civilian casualties may be 
lawful if the MAA is significant enough to ‘justify’ these. 
7.2.2 Problematic Compliance with Proportionality in LAWS 
Deployments 
First, note that proportionality is about limiting the harm to civilians and has nothing 
to do with the effects of armed conflict on combatants.68 Thus, similar to the principle 
of distinction, remote battlefields and demilitarised zones which contain no civilians 
should pose no proportionality issue. Conversely, where civilians are present in or near 
the contact zone, proportionality will arguably pose similar and even greater 
challenges for LAWS than distinction.69  
 
To elaborate, the ability to distinguish between civilians and combatants (and between 
civilian and military objects) is a prerequisite for LAWS to be able to undertake 
proportionality assessments;70 namely, by correctly sorting persons and objects into 
either the ECD or MAA category. Yet it does not end there: while the CDEM can 
                                                          
64 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 14, ¶ 5. See also 7.3.5. 
65 As Dill (n 14) notes at 84-85, there are three criteria to operationalise proportionality: adequacy 
(distinction); necessity (minimising collateral damage); and commensurability (the final protective 
layer). Thus, Estreicher clearly stops short of giving full legal effect to the proportionality principle. 
66 AP I Commentary, ¶ 1980. 
67 For example, Dinstein (n 23), 156-57; Newton and May (n 18), 164; Wagner (n 15), 118; Schmitt (n 
12), 191; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 14, ¶ 8. 
68 Dinstein, ibid., 154-55. 
69 Wagner (n 15), 115. 
70 Wagner, ibid., 119. 
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potentially be automated71 and programmed to recognise ‘any non-positively 
identified person or object’ as being of a civilian nature,72 the overwhelming weight 
of academic, expert and NGO opinion is that LAWS will struggle to assess the MAA.73 
This is because the MAA of an attack is both context-specific and holistic,74 and it 
constantly evolves, depending on the commander’s plans and the development of 
military operations on both sides.75 Certainly, attacking a command and control post 
at the start of an armed conflict will yield greater military advantage than towards the 
end, when enemy forces are in disarray and nearing defeat.76 Exactly how much higher 
or lower – or indeed whether the MAA remains ‘concrete and direct’ – is a contextual 
question, which demands consideration of a broad range of qualitative factors.77 In 
turn, this would: 
 
…necessitate understanding of military strategy, operational issues, 
and tactics. The LAWS would furthermore have to be able to 
comprehend continual changes in goals and objectives, internal 
changes to their relative importance, and the anticipated military utility 
of achieving them.78 
 
                                                          
71 Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and 
the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2013) 4 Harvard National Security Journal 231, 255 (“[CDEM] analysis 
is performed using objective data and scientific algorithms”, therefore it is clearly amenable to 
automatic processing). 
72 In line with the negative definitions of civilian and civilian object in Articles 50(1) and 52(1), AP I, 
respectively. 
73 For example, Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 255; Sassóli (n 52), 331-32; William H. Boothby, Conflict 
Law: The Influence of New Weapons Technology, Human Rights and Emerging Actors (TMC Asser 
Press, 2014), 110; Nathalie Weizmann, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Law’, 
Academy Briefing No. 8 (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 
November 2014), 15; Robin Geiss, The International Law Dimension of Autonomous Weapons Systems 
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Study, October 2015), 15; Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case 
Against Killer Robots (Human Rights Watch, 2012), 32-34. 
74 Pablo Kalmanovitz, ‘Judgment, Liability and the Risks of Riskless Warfare’ in Nehal Bhuta et al. 
(eds.), Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (CUP, 2016), 150-51 (pointing out that 
CDEM is primarily a policy tool for determining the level of command required to authorise an attack. 
The greater the collateral risk, the higher the authority needed for clearance, precisely because the 
assessment of MAA is for a human commander to make. Namely, the more potential harm there is for 
protected persons and objects, the more judgment and experience the commander will need when 
deciding whether such harm is ‘excessive’ in relation to the concrete and direct MAA).  
75 Sassóli (n 52), 331-32. 
76 Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 255. 
77 Wagner (n 15), 120; Markus Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: 
Legal, Ethical, and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 1371, 1397. 
78 Kjølv Egeland ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Humanitarian Law’ (2016) 
85 Nordic Journal of international Law 89, 104; though, see 7.2.3. 
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Accordingly, the mental operation required to deliberate the MAA calls for “complex, 
value-based case-by-case decision-making in which circumstances have to be weighed 
in their totality”.79 This all points to a clear geographical and temporal dimension, in 
that the MAA may be accurately known on deployment, but the longer a LAWS loiters 
and the further out it travels, the more the battlespace – hence, the MAA of a given 
attack – is liable to change. According to Sassóli, this is “the most serious IHL 
argument” against even the theoretical possibility of prolonged autonomy, and it can 
only be resolved if the system is “constantly updated about military operations and 
plans”.80  
 
On the other hand, there are two counter-arguments. First, longer loitering times and 
superior sensory capabilities may afford an opportunity to wait for a more 
‘proportionate’ situation to arise before a LAWS executes a specific attack.81 Second, 
recall the Rendulic Rule and the focus of the proportionality standard on ex ante 
judgments. In this connexion, the legally relevant proportionality assessment may be 
the one undertaken by the commander on deployment.82 This is similar to the case of 
launching a tactical cruise missile, where any unforeseen changes in ECD and MAA 
are largely irrelevant to the initial decision to deploy,83 and it would most likely apply 
to a LAWS deployed on a targeted strike.84 
 
A large body of academic, expert and NGO opinion also considers that the ‘weighing’ 
exercise will pose even greater problems for LAWS. To be sure, assessing 
proportionality will rarely be a case of counting civilian bodies versus combatant 
bodies;85 more often, the challenge is to determine the number of acceptable civilian 
casualties in exchange for the destruction of a tank or a bridge.86 As mentioned above, 
even if correct values are known, the incommensurability between ECD and MAA 
                                                          
79 Geiss (n 73), 15 (emphasis added). 
80 Sassóli (n 52), 332. In this regard, see the alternative options in 7.2.3.4 versus 7.3.6.4-7.3.6.6. 
81 Wagner (n 77), 1413-14. For example, unlike a ‘fire-and-forget’ munition, a LAWS can loiter until 
passing civilians have moved out of the collateral effects radius; or it can follow a military objective 
until the latter moves into a deserted area, where a kinetic attack would inflict lower, or no collateral 
damage. 
82 William H. Boothby, ‘How Far Will the Law Allow Unmanned Targeting to Go?’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), 
(n 15), 58. 
83 Ibid., 59. 
84 See 7.2.3. 
85 Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 254; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 14, ¶ 7. 
86 Dill (n 14), 84; Wagner (n 15) 120.  
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negates any “reasonably exact proportionality equation between them”;87 hence, no 
universally accepted or encodable definition of ‘excessive’ exists.88 Instead, the 
proportionality assessor has to consider the full variety of available data and assign 
relative weights to each aspect in the circumstances ruling at the time,89 and on three 
distinct levels.90  
 
At this point, it is worth recalling the distinction between rules and standards from 
3.2.2.2.1. Arguably, proportionality is the canonical example of a standard that calls 
for the most deliberative and metacognitive thinking in its application.91 This is less to 
do with any apparent subjectivity, and more a result of the need for case-by-case 
determinations, taking into account numerous variables and infinite combinations 
thereof; and resolving unique value conflicts that will not have been foreseen, much 
less coded in advance. As Cannizzaro argues, this means: 
 
[P]roportionality can be seen as a law-making process that continuously 
adapts the content of the rule to changing social needs, circumventing 
the complexities of the rules of change in the international legal order.92 
 
To be sure, machines may apply well-defined rules that are amenable to automatic 
processing,93 but they cannot make legal rules.94 The latter requires controlled 
processing to perceive competing interests, assess their respective weights in the light 
of specific circumstances, and to compare one with the other, before formalising a new 
rule.95 
                                                          
87 Fenrick (n 43), 102. 
88 Dill (n 14), 84; Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 254; Boothby (n 73), 110; Weizmann (n 73), 15; Human 
Rights Watch (n 73), 36. 
89 Markus Wagner, ‘Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law 
(2011) 21 Journal of Law, Information & Science 155, 163. 
90 Wagner (n 77), 1399 (namely, target selection; choice of munition; and the means of engagement, 
such as the direction of attack. This broadly reflects the Joint Targeting process detailed in 5.3). 
91 Cannizzaro (n 51), 332-33 (contrasting the ‘classical model’ of law-making, where “the normative 
content is determined directly by the rule”, and the ‘proportionality model’, where “the normative 
content emerges…from a secondary process of law-making based on the assessment of 
proportionality”). 
92 Ibid., 333 (emphasis added). 
93 Recall from 3.2.2.2.1 that this includes playing chess and Go, and even applying road-traffic law, 
much of which consists of well-defined rules that impose strict liability. 
94 Human Rights Watch (n 73), 32-33 (noting that it would be impractical to program a LAWS with all 
the situations and combinations of value conflicts in advance; or, to expect that it will fully understand 
its environment and perceive every relevant cue required to apply the proportionality standard).  
95 Ibid., 33 (“Those who interpret [LOAC] in complicated and shifting scenarios consistently invoke 




Yet, given the above discussion on ‘disproportionate’ versus ‘excessive’, this problem 
should not be exaggerated on account of autonomy. NGO claims that a LAWS would 
have to engage in a “delicate balancing of the two factors [of ECD and MAA]”96 and 
would be “unlikely to be able to qualitatively balance them”97 are arguably raising the 
proportionality challenge to a difficulty level that even humans cannot routinely meet. 
Instead, the correct standard is one of ‘excessiveness’, whereby the objectively 
reasonable commander would see the ECD as significantly higher than the notional 
MAA. This makes it relatively more likely that a LAWS would act ‘proportionately’ 
on the battlefield, given appropriate real-time human input and/or advance 
precautionary measures. That said, the importance of these latter two (alternative) 
conditions should not be underestimated: given the antecedent risk of machines 
wrongly evaluating the MAA, the problem of “garbage in = garbage out” will always 
bedevil the fully autonomous proportionality assessment.98 Again, we arrive at the 
conclusion that the assessment of MAA and proportionality calls for strong 
deliberative reasoning and a distinctly human judgment, which must be rendered on a 
case-by-case basis. As will be seen below, this can occur in a LAWS context, but only 
with appropriate human input before and/or during deployment.  
 
To sum up, despite some administrable features, the proportionality principle as a 
whole remains problematic for LAWS deployments for three reasons.  
• The shifting and contextual nature of the MAA, many aspects of which are 
likely to be abstract and not amenable to machine perception. 
• The need to compare contradictory and dissimilar values with no common 
metric; namely, ECD versus MAA. This creates an ‘apples and oranges’ 
problem that may be stated in general terms, but cannot be precisely defined in 
the abstract, let alone in software code. 
• The inherently indeterminate nature of ‘excessive’, which also makes the 
application of proportionality highly contextual, though subject to a standard 
of reasonableness within a broad margin of judgment. 
 
                                                          
96 Human Rights Watch, Advancing the Debate on Killer Robots: 12 Key Arguments for a Preemptive 
Ban on Fully Autonomous Weapons (Human Rights Watch, May 2014). 
97 Ibid., 6 (emphasis added). 
98 HR. Taylor, Data Acquisition for Sensor Systems (Springer, 1997), 3. 
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The importance of the above barriers should not be underestimated. As noted in 
2.2.3.2, robots need tasks and desired/prohibited actions to be both precise (specified 
in sufficient programmable detail) and tangible (with quantifiable expected outcomes), 
if they are to operate autonomously, reliably and lawfully.99 Raw “common sense and 
good faith”100 will very likely elude a LAWS, and will lead to unlawful actions on the 
battlefield; unless there is timely and appropriate human input, to translate these into 
machine-perceptible data. 
7.2.3 Ensuring the Compliance of LAWS Operations with the Principle of 
Proportionality 
7.2.3.1 Restricted Deployments 
As noted above, proportionality – like distinction – will not pose any legal challenge 
where there is little or no civilian presence. Accordingly, one solution that is implicit 
in much of Wagner’s writings is to restrict LAWS deployments to remote battlefields, 
to attack military objectives by nature.101 This option is also supported by Thurnher, 
who discusses high-intensity conflict in remote deserts or undersea, or deployments in 
demilitarised zones.102 Boothby echoes this with an additional restriction: to deploy 
LAWS in a “remote, unpopulated or sparsely populated area [to search] for specific 
military objectives whose destruction would be militarily most valuable”.103 Namely, 
to use LAWS in these benign environments specifically for targeted strikes (TS) 
against high-value targets (HVT), for the greatest possible control and the lowest risk 
of ‘disproportionate’ attack.  
 
Crootof adds a similar but slightly wider possibility, suitable for tactical-level combat 
(TLC). That is, where the commander has determined that all foreseeable engagements 
within a tight set of spatio-temporal restrictions and specific target parameters104 
comply with the proportionality principle, and he duly authorises the LAWS to select 
                                                          
99 Sassóli (n 52), 331 
100 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2208. 
101 Wagner (n 89), 163; (n 15), 122. 
102 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of fully Autonomous Targeting’ 
(2012) 67 Joint Force Quarterly 77, 80. 
103 Boothby (n 82), 57 (emphasis added). 
104 See also 7.3.6.4 and 7.3.6.5. 
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and engage targets within those constraints.105 Indeed, the Harpy is currently employed 
on this basis, with commanders doing ex ante proportionality assessments when they 
are able to take into account anything that may reasonably occur during deployment.106 
 
With the return to Great Power Competition,107 the ‘restricted deployments’ option is 
arguably not as limiting as it might seem,108 and it may well become more prominent 
over time. However, there is also likely to be a range of other situations in which States 
will want to deploy LAWS. For these situations, militaries will need to combine 
automatic and controlled processing in ways to effectuate a meaningful human control 
(MHC) and to maximise the likelihood of lawful outcomes on the battlefield. Some of 
the following deployment options will incorporate Newton and May’s ‘rules of 
thumb’, which are intended to guide military planners “in a class of common cases in 
which proportionality considerations arise”.109 
7.2.3.2 Thurnher: ‘Workarounds’ 
Thurnher has presented a number of ‘workarounds’ that may address the 
proportionality challenge in the face of civilian presence. First, the author credits future 
LAWS with integrated CDEM as being able to determine whether collateral damage 
exceeds a predetermined limit, but also acknowledges that the proportionality test calls 
for a greater sense of what is ‘excessive’.110 The workarounds then aim to exploit the 
data-processing advantage of CDEM, while shifting the onus onto the commander for 
controlled processing. These include the following. 
• Deploying LAWS in TSs where high ECD is acceptable, for example, against 
HVTs.111 This option would seem to invoke Newton and May’s Civilian 
Precautionary Principle, which asserts, “[w]henever civilian lives are greatly 
risked…very clear weighty military objectives have to be discerned for the 
tactic to be prima facie proportionate”.112 Presumably, such situations would 
                                                          
105 Rebecca Crootof, ‘The Killer Robots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications’ (2015) 36 Cardozo 
Law Review 1837, 1878. 
106 Recall from 2.4 that the Harpy only engages radar-emitting objects, within very tight spatio-temporal 
limits. 
107 See 1.2.2. 
108 Cf. Wagner (n 89), 163; (n 15), 122 (presenting this option as a necessary drawback, rather than a 
solution). 
109 Newton and May (n 18), 12. 
110 Thurnher (n 102), 82. 
111 Ibid., 81. 
112 Newton and May (n 18), 286. 
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also require the commander to have an idea of the likely concentration of 
civilians, in order to assess the risk of ECD rising beyond the MAA.  
• Designating ECD thresholds per TS mission or per target engagement, where 
the commander knows the MAA in advance and is reasonably confident that 
this will not change significantly.113 Notably, some HVTs (like enemy 
headquarters) are likely to remain fairly static in their MAA, certainly for the 
duration of a LAWS deployment.114 The LAWS can then loiter until its CDEM 
reveals that ECD is below the threshold. Where the ECD exceeds the threshold, 
a LAWS can be programmed to hold fire; launch non-lethal munitions, to get 
civilians and vehicles to flee the collateral effects radius; or it can seek human 
approval for the engagement.115 
• In the case of TLC, changes in MAA can even be pre-programmed in 
accordance with known or anticipated changes on the battlefield, such as how 
many other targets have been destroyed or neutralised;116 or whether tanks 
appear individually or in concentrations.117 Importantly, such ex ante 
determinations need not be perfect, so long as they are reasonable in the 
circumstances. This is because commanders enjoy a “fairly broad margin of 
judgment”118 in their proportionality assessment, which must reflect “common 
sense and good faith”.119 
• In support of the above, some additional control measures may be prudently 
employed. For example, tight spatio-temporal constraints will reduce the risk 
of MAA changing beyond the commander’s reasonable expectation.120 In 
addition, as MAA is contextual, conservative ECD thresholds can be set with 
a dial-in capacity for commanders to alter these further, as and when 
required.121  
                                                          
113 Thurnher (n 102), 81. 
114 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Ford, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Law’ (2017) 69 
South Carolina Law Review 413, 445 (“Even on today’s modern, fast-moving battlefield, the military 
advantage of some targets remains fairly static”). 
115 Thurnher (n 102), 81. See also 7.2.3.3. 
116 See also 7.2.3.4. 
117 Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 256-57.  
118 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2210. 
119 Ibid., ¶ 2208. 
120 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems’ in Paul AL. 
Ducheine, Michael N. Schmitt and Frans PB. Osinga (eds.), Targeting: The Challenges of Modern 
Warfare (TMC Asser Press, 2016), 189. See also 7.3.6.4. 
121 Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 256. See also 7.2.3.4. 
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7.2.3.3 Boothby: The Precautionary Value of Process 
Boothby considers a more data-driven approach, which strongly integrates precautions 
in attack.122 Of particular importance here is ‘pattern of activity’123 data to establish 
when and where large civilian movements typically take place, and to derive a 
reasonable prediction of the collateral risk of attacking a particular target (or target 
group) at a particular time.124 This will help to determine the exact time of attack, to 
minimise both ECD and the likelihood that it may be excessive. Yet, unexpected 
events may occur, such as a column of refugees crossing a previously deserted area. 
In such a case, there are two possible solutions.125 
• A sophisticated LAWS may detect the presence of more civilians than 
expected, wait for them to pass and to clear the area before initiating an attack; 
or its mission control software may suspend the search and contact 
commanders for a proportionality reassessment.126  
• Alternatively, a less sophisticated LAWS may simply be fed with an expected 
image of the contact zone before deployment. Its mission control software can 
then be programmed to refrain from any attack if the image observed on the 
battlefield differs in any material respect from the programmed image.127 
7.2.3.4 Van den Boogaard: Proportionality and the Levels of Warfare 
Arguably the most sophisticated solution, which also combines automatic and 
controlled processing, comes from van den Boogaard, who focuses on the level of 
command at which proportionality assessments should take place.128 Recall from 7.2.1 
that for practical reasons, proportionality has traditionally been assessed at the strategic 
or operational level, while the A  P I Commentary requires it to be assessed at the tactical 
level. Similarly, LAWS are assumed to only be able to determine the ECD and MAA 
of their own attack (tactical), while State Practice is to consider these from the attack 
                                                          
122 Boothby (n 82), 56-58. See also 7.3. 
123 ‘Pattern of activity’ describes the aggregate behaviours and activities of all entities (persons, vehicles, 
etc.) flowing through a given geographic location, as well as their timings. See Patrick Biltgen and 
Stephen Ryan, Activity-Based Intelligence: Principles and Applications (Artech House, 2016), 116, 
119-20. 
124 Boothby (n 82), 58. 
125 Both of which potentially comply with the ‘cancel or suspend’ obligation in Article 57(2)(b), AP I. 
See 7.3.2.3. 
126 Boothby (n 73), 118. 
127 William H. Boothby, ‘Autonomous Attack – Opportunity or Spectre?’ in Terry D. Gill (ed.), 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2013, Vol. 16 (TMC Asser Press, 2015), 83. 
128 Jeroen van den Boogaard, ‘Proportionality and Autonomous Weapons Systems’ (2015) 6 Journal of 
International Humanitarian Legal Studies 247, 275-77. On the levels of command, see 5.2.3. 
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as a whole (operational and strategic).129 Accordingly, both ECD and MAA should 
ideally be estimated on all three levels.130  
 
With this in mind, van den Boogaard envisages a TLC scenario with strong 
communication links and elaborate data flows: both horizontally, between tactical 
autonomous units; and vertically, between those same units and the operational and 
strategic headquarters.131 In such a case, it is possible to continuously update the 
situation on each level, thereby deriving time-sensitive tactical, operational and 
strategic proportionality assessments. In particular, multilateral data flows and 
feedback enable each level of command to update the assessments of ECD, MAA and, 
therefore, ‘proportionality’ – all in real time. For example, if an attack by a tactical 
autonomous unit derives a military advantage and gets closer to achieving the goals of 
the larger operation, this will decrease the assigned value of the MAA that other parts 
of that same operation are intended to achieve, thereby reducing the likelihood that a 
‘disproportionate’ attack may be planned at the operational level.132 Likewise, if 
changes in strategic priorities occur at the political level, these can be manually 
inputted at strategic headquarters, thereby updating the MAA of targets assigned to 
each tactical unit; importantly, the human-inputted MAA must be ‘converted’ into an 
ECD threshold, for automatic processing. Accordingly, human commanders remain in 
control at the broader operational and strategic levels, due to the need for highly 
qualitative assessments involving strategic and political factors at those levels.133 
Concurrently, rapid and data-heavy proportionality calculations are autonomously 
done at the tactical level, which can sometimes move too fast for human operators to 
keep pace.134 This enables (tactical) ‘narrow loop’ autonomy to proceed alongside 
human judgment in the ‘wider loop’ of (strategic and operational) control. 
 
                                                          
129 Ibid., 275-76. 
130 Ibid., 276. 
131 Ibid., 276. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid., 277. 
134 To reiterate: autonomous proportionality calculations here are derived from: human-inputted MAA 




This approach deftly addresses Sassóli’s objection to prolonged autonomy in 7.2.2, 
above,135 using a combination of a dial-in capacity and Newton and May’s Common 
Denominator Principle.136 It also has intuitive appeal and implicit support from other 
commentators,137 yet it poses at least one major limitation: the system would require 
reliable and continuous communication links. This may be possible in an asymmetric 
(low-intensity) conflict, where the LAWS-deploying side will have a major 
technological advantage, but it cannot always be guaranteed. Indeed, as noted in 
2.5.4.4, symmetric (high-intensity) battlefields – which will likely characterise 
conflicts resulting from Great Power Competition – often become GPS-denied or 
jammed environments. In such instances, communication links are either unavailable, 
or they must be deliberately switched off to avoid spoofing, and this will clearly 
undermine any remote dial-in capacity. That said, three recent developments in US 
defence circles are worth noting. 
• Advances in anti-jam receiver technology are now providing over 10,000 times 
improved jamming resistance over previous models.138  
• Next-generation wideband high frequency (WBHF) communication links have 
recently been refined, tested and demonstrated to transfer data files of up to 
one megabyte; both rapidly and reliably over a 5,000-mile distance.139 The 
project is specifically intended to enable Air Force communications in GPS-
denied and jammed environments, using robust terrestrial-based ‘Beyond-
Line-of-Sight’ systems.140  
                                                          
135 Namely, that the only way to address the shifting and contextual nature of the MAA is for systems 
to be “constantly updated about military plans and operations”: Sassóli (n 52), 332.  
136 This seeks to address the incommensurability problem with the maxim: “[t]ry to find a common 
metric to translate both types of value”. See Newton and May (n 18), 285 (suggesting the example of 
military objectives expressed in terms of lives saved, compared with civilian casualties). 
137 For example, Kalmanovitz (n 74), 151 (discussing the linkages between tactical and strategic military 
advantage: how LAWS may be able to estimate the former; and why the latter implicates political goals, 
thereby necessitating some human involvement in proportionality calculations). 
138 ‘Rockwell Collins Delivers Latest Digital GPS Receiver Technology to US Air Force Special 
Operations Command’, Rockwell Collins News (24 August 2017) 
<https://www.rockwellcollins.com/Data/News/2017-Cal-Yr/GS/20170824-DIGAR-delivery.aspx> 
accessed 8 September 2018. 
139 ‘Rockwell Collins Successfully Demonstrates 5,000 mile Next-Generation Wideband High 
Frequency Communications Link’, Rockwell Collins News (18 September 2017) 
<https://www.rockwellcollins.com/Data/News/2017-Cal-Yr/GS/20170918-PACAF-HF-Comms.aspx> 
accessed 8 September 2018. 
140 ‘Wideband High Frequency Communications Provide Net-Centric, High-Speed Beyond Line of 
Sight Communications in Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2/AD) Battlefield Environments’, International 
Defence, Security & Technology (11 August 2017) <http://idstch.com/home5/international-defence-
security-and-technology/technology/ict/wideband-high-frequency-communications-provide-net-
centric-high-speed-beyond-line-sight-communications-anti-accessarea-denial-a2ad-battlefield-
environments/> accessed 8 September 2018. 
251 
 
• The US Army recently began testing and refining ‘pseudolites’ with human 
soldiers on the ground.141 Pseudolites are a localised communication and 
PNT142 infrastructure, consisting of satellite-like transmitters and powerful 
anti-jam antennas. The system functions like GPS, and is intended to augment 
or replace GPS signals when these are weak or inaccessible.143 Transmission 
hardware is terrestrially located – either airborne or ground-based – and while 
these can be moved around, they are restricted to a defined geographical area 
at any one time. Thus, transmitters are situated closer to their intended 
receivers, enabling far stronger signals than is possible with GPS, hence there 
is significantly less scope for interference or deliberate jamming. 
 
In a more distant future, LAWS may eventually become part of a ‘giant, armed nervous 
system’ in which “[e]very weapon, vehicle, and device [is] connected, sharing data, 
constantly aware of the presence and state of every other node in a truly global 
network”.144 At present, these plans are confined to the US military, and they remain 
both classified and at the conceptual stage.145 However, tangible steps have been taken 
towards realising them with the Pentagon’s recent announcement of the Joint 
Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI).146 Together with the aforementioned 
projects, this may be expected to provide a robust and secure dial-in capability. Thus, 
there may be less reason in future to doubt the reliability of LAWS communication 
links, so long as deploying forces remain one step ahead of enemy counter-measures, 
and ensure their own infrastructure remains fit for purpose. 
                                                          
141 Kathryn Bailey, ‘Pseudolites Preserve Position Information During GPS-Denied Conditions’, US 
Army Press Release (2 June 2016) 
<https://www.army.mil/article/169033/pseudolites_preserve_position_information_during_gps_denie
d_conditions> accessed 8 September 2018. 
142 That is, ‘Position, Navigation and Timing’, which is the essence of all GPS capabilities. 
143 Michael Jones, ‘Army Pseudolites: What, Why and How?’ GPS World (9 August 2017) 
<http://gpsworld.com/army-pseudolites-what-why-and-how/> accessed 8 September 2018. 
144 Patrick Tucker, ‘The Future the US Military is Constructing: a Giant, Armed Nervous System’, 
Defense One (26 September 2017) <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/09/future-us-
military-constructing-giant-armed-nervous-system/141303/> accessed 8 September 2018. 
145 “This push is too new, and still too developmental, to have attracted much concern from the public 
or from Capitol Hill. But that will change”: ibid. 
146 This is a cloud computing contract, which will provide the tools to help fulfil the military’s vision of 
a highly data-integrated armed nervous system, from the homefront through to the tactical edge. See US 
Department of Defense, ‘Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI)’, US Department of Defense 
Memo (6 November 2017) <https://www.nextgov.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/121217fk1ng.pdf> 
accessed 8 September 2018. 
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7.2.4 Conclusion on Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality will clearly present LAWS-deploying forces with their 
most difficult LOAC compliance challenge. Despite being an objective standard with 
several administrable features, its overwhelmingly indeterminate nature and the 
potentially infinite combinations of (incommensurate) value conflicts make it near-
impossible to administer with automatic processing alone. However, with full use of 
the Joint Targeting process and an appropriate system design that optimises task 
allocation between man and machine – and assuming durable communications 
superiority – there are clear possibilities for designing-in MHC, for the necessary input 
of controlled processing. Arguably, this will enable LAWS-deploying forces to apply 
the proportionality principle in both TSs and TLC, to at least the legally required 
standard.  
7.3 Precautionary Measures 
Distinction and proportionality can pose difficult compliance challenges for LAWS-
deploying forces. Accordingly, a separate but overlapping set of precautionary rules 
reaffirms these two principles,147 and it provides a more concrete set of obligations to 
enhance compliance with them. Much of these rules have been addressed indirectly 
throughout 6.5 and 7.2, and directly in several existing works.148 The following will 
provide a selective evaluation of these along with a few additional applications, before 
arguing for a) a possible interplay between active and passive precautions in the 
context of LAWS deployments, b) a case for elevating (active) precautions to the status 
of a LOAC principle, and c) some potential applications thereof. 
7.3.1 The General Obligation Under Article 57(1), AP I 
Article 57(1), AP I, provides: 
 
In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to 
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.149 
 
                                                          
147 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2189. 
148 For example, Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 259-62; Ian S. Henderson, Patrick Keane and Josh Liddy, 
‘Remote and Autonomous Warfare Systems: Precautions in Attack and Individual Accountability’ in 
Jens David Ohlin (ed.), Research Handbook on Remote Warfare (Edward Elgar, 2017); Jeffrey S. 
Thurnher, ‘Feasible Precautions in Attack and Autonomous Weapons’ in in von Heinegg, Frau and 
Singer (eds.) (n 15). 
149 Article 57(1), AP I; AMW Manual, Rules 30 and 34; CIHL, Rule 15. 
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This general obligation will be elaborated upon in 7.3.5.2. For now, it is worth noting 
that it applies to broader “military operations” (not just ‘attacks’) and it entails a repeat 
obligation (“constant care”), which is operationalised in subsequent paragraphs. 
7.3.2 Specific Treaty-Based Precautions Under Article 57(2) and (3) 
Paragraphs (2) and (3) pertain to “attacks”, which are defined as “acts of violence 
against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”.150 Thus, being more narrowly 
framed than Paragraph (1) and – in the case of Paragraph (2)(a) – addressed 
specifically to “those who plan or decide upon an attack”, the concrete rules apply to 
tactical commanders (who authorise deployments) and their battle staffs (who execute 
those orders).151 That said, the obligations are technologically agnostic:152 there is no 
stipulation that attacks must be planned or executed by people, just that responsible 
persons must discharge the listed obligations. This is even more clearly the case with 
Paragraphs (2)(b)-(c) and (3), which are expressed in the passive mood.153 
7.3.2.1 Target Verification 
Paragraph (2)(a)(i) requires these tactical staffs to: 
 
[D]o everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are 
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special 
protection but are military objectives…154 
 
This distinction-based obligation has been extensively – albeit indirectly – covered 
throughout 6.5. The ‘feasibility’ constraint means that the obligation only applies to 
the extent that it is “practicable or practically possible, taking into account all 
circumstances prevailing at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations”.155 The first part of the definition of feasible makes clear that this is an 
obligation of conduct, not result.156 Compliance depends on due diligence by way of 
                                                          
150 Article 49(1), AP I. As the AP I Commentary makes clear at ¶ 2188, the following rules apply equally 
to aggressors and to victims of aggression. 
151 Ford (n 114), 448. 
152 Boothby (n 159), 41. 
153 Boothby (n 20), 120 (noting that passive provisions focus on the obligation, not the person or thing 
discharging it). 
154 Article 57(2)(a)(i), AP I; AMW Manual, Rules 31 and 32(a); CIHL, Rule 16. 
155 AMW Manual, Rule 1(q). 
156 Kimberley N. Trapp, ‘A Framework of Analysis for Assessing Compliance of LAWS with IHL 
Precautionary Measures’ in Robin Geiß (ed.), Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Technology, 
Definition, Ethics, Law & Security (German Federal Foreign Office, 2016), 286. 
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verification processes, rather than outcomes.157 The middle part makes clear that this 
is an ex ante obligation,158 while the latter part of the definition clearly reflects the 
military necessity-humanity balance. Thus, if target verification is only possible using 
manned or remotely-piloted systems, the inability of a LAWS to perform to the same 
standard does not render this obligation infeasible, as an alternative means to achieve 
it is available.159 On the other hand, issues of force protection are a ‘military 
consideration’,160 which may counteract this and increase the likelihood of a given 
LAWS being deemed a feasible option.161 
 
The target verification provision has four implications for LAWS. First, in TLC and at 
the point of weapons release in a TS, it will almost certainly require full use of onboard 
sensors, to recognise legitimate targets to the correct confidence threshold.162 
However, in some circumstances, the use of external sensors163 – perhaps distributed 
via swarming164 – or newer  technologies like ‘ghost imaging’165 may also be required, 
where these are available and they have a mitigating effect;166 and where it is feasible 
to expect their use.167 A complementary point – in the case of aerial LAWS – concerns 
the altitude of deployment, which should be low enough (and confidence thresholds 
correspondingly high enough) to permit target verification168 to at least human levels 
                                                          
157 OTP Report (n 13), ¶ 29. 
158 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 1(q), ¶ 4. 
159 William Boothby, ‘Dehumanization: Is There a Legal Problem Under Article 36?’ in in von Heinegg, 
Frau and Singer (eds.) (n 15), 41. See also AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 6. 
160 Dinstein (n 23), 168; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 1(q), ¶ 5. 
161 AMW Manual Commentary, ibid., ¶ 6 (stating this to be a “matter of common sense and good faith”). 
162 Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 260; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 4. 
163 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2195 (noting the example of launching aerial reconnaissance. Here, this may be 
done via surveillance drones transmitting additional sensory data directly to LAWS units). 
164 See 2.5.5.1, and n 288 therein. 
165 See 2.5.5.1, and n 290 therein. 
166 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 1(q), ¶ 2. 
167 Dinstein (n 23) explains at 170 that mere availability of a mitigating technology, even with full 
possibility of its use, is not enough. Commanders have limited resources at their disposal and often plan 
multiple missions, where a subsequent use of a particular resource may have a greater overall mitigating 
effect on civilian risk.  
168 Daniel L. Haulman, ‘The US Air Force in the Air War over Serbia, 1999’ (2015) 62 Air Power 
History 6, 12 and 14 (noting the high altitude of NATO missions, which degraded the accuracy of air 
strikes because small targets like tanks were not easily discernible, and in one instance refugee convoys 
were hit when pilots confused long columns of tractors for tanks). 
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of accuracy.169 To remain feasible, however, this may have to be considered alongside 
issues of preserving combat capability.170 
 
Second, in the context of a TS planned under the deliberate targeting cycle, Article 
57(2)(a)(i) puts relatively more emphasis on targeteers at Phase 2 (target development) 
and Phase 3 (capabilities analysis) to verify all aspects of target and weapon selection 
that rely on controlled processing. This leaves the LAWS to execute missions with the 
speed and precision of automatic processing in the field.171 As explained in 5.5.3, a 
particularly vexing issue here is the use of decision-support systems such as Project 
Maven. These will need to be thoroughly tested, to ensure they enhance and do not 
undermine target verification by the staffs. 
 
Third, recall the technologically agnostic nature of Article 57. In planning for either 
TLC or a TS, commanders are legally required to use whatever means will discharge 
the target verification obligation most effectively, so long as their use is feasible.172 If 
a LAWS is able to verify targets more accurately than manned or remotely-piloted 
systems, because it uses a wider range of sensors and sources (including spectrums 
that are imperceptible to the human senses), and it processes these faster and without 
the fears and frailties of human imperfections,173 then this may obligate the use of 
LAWS.174 
 
Finally, recall from 6.5.2.1.1 that despite some calls for capture in lieu of lethal force, 
this is not a legal requirement under LOAC, which continues to authorise status-based 
targeting in armed conflict. Hence, to verify targets, an anti-personnel LAWS can 
arguably rely on the three-/four-part criteria for combatant status, and will not be 
required to undertake impractical conduct-based evaluations.175 
                                                          
169 Sassóli (n 52), 320; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 4. 
170 Haulman (n 168), 12 and 13 (noting that high-altitude missions were necessary to avoid effective air 
defences). 
171 Hence, much depends on the robustness of the targeting process in matching specific TSs and their 
operational environment with the appropriate LAWS, or other capability. See 6.5.5. 
172 Dinstein (n 23), 170. 
173 Henderson, Keane and Liddy (n 148), 341-42. 
174 Sassóli (n 52), 320; Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 260; Weizmann (n 73), 16; AMW Manual 
Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 6. 
175 See 6.5.2.1.1. 
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7.3.2.2 Minimise Collateral Damage 
The obligation to minimise collateral damage is a precursor to the proportionality 
assessment, and it exists in two forms: choice of means and method, and choice of 
target. On the former, Paragraph (2)(a)(ii) provides that those planning and deciding 
on attacks must: 
 
[T]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of 
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, [collateral 
damage].176 
 
Everything noted above in relation to feasibility applies equally to this provision. 
Consequently, a LAWS must not be deployed if other weapon systems are available 
that may inflict lower ECD, for a given MAA. The flipside is that if autonomous attack 
is likely to minimise collateral damage in the circumstances (for similar reasons 
discussed above) and if LAWS remain a feasible option, then Article 57(2)(a)(ii) will 
positively obligate their deployment and use.177 
 
Aside from the existential question of ‘means’, Paragraph (2)(a)(ii) also concerns 
‘methods of attack’. Part of this goes back to commander decision-making during the 
targeting process. For example, in deciding the broader timing of attack (whether day 
or night) or by loading an alternative munition with a smaller blast radius, these may 
enable the attack to deliver the same military advantage but with significantly lower 
collateral effects.178 Other human decisions that require controlled processing include 
weaponeering; the choice of aerial or ground-based LAWS; in the case of aerial 
LAWS, setting upper and lower boundaries for the altitude of attack; and whether 
advance warnings should be issued. These and other considerations mostly take place 
during Phases 3 (capabilities analysis) and 5a (mission planning).179 Moreover, a 
LAWS on deployment with integrated CDEM may utilise its automatic processing 
capabilities to minimise collateral damage. For example: 
                                                          
176 Article 57(2)(a)(ii), AP I; CIHL, Rule 17. 
177 Sassóli (n 52), 320; Schmitt and Thurnher (n 71), 261-62; Thurnher (n 148), 114 (arguing this 
highlights the unintended consequences of a LAWS ban, as it would deprive commanders of a 
potentially more humane option). 
178 Both examples from AP I Commentary, ¶ 2200. 
179 See 5.3.1.3 and 5.3.1.5. 
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• By quantifying the ECD of various onboard weapons and directions of attack, 
it can select the exact munition and approach angle that will achieve its mission 
goal with the lowest collateral damage.180  
• Unlike a ‘fire-and-forget’ munition, a LAWS can loiter until passing civilians 
have moved out of the collateral effects radius;181 or it can follow a moving 
target into an isolated or less populated area, before weapons release.182 
• Within the altitude boundaries set by the commander, an aerial LAWS may 
calculate an optimum altitude in the circumstances, to minimise a weighted 
risk factor.  
• A LAWS may issue its own advance warnings, to clear the collateral effects 
radius.183 
 
Paragraph (3), which complements the above, provides: 
 
When a choice is possible between several military objectives for 
obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall 
be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least [civilian 
risk].184 
 
An example may be an attack on a railway line, which aims to block a vital supply 
route, and where the same MAA is gained from attacking close to a highly populated 
train station compared with a more remote and uninhabited area.185 Either way, the 
enemy’s supply route is cut off, though in the latter scenario there is little, if any 
collateral damage. This task would seem to be amenable to automatic processing, as a 
LAWS can simply be programmed to recognise that attacking any point along a rail 
(or road) network is equally advantageous; beyond that, its integrated CDEM would 
enable it to select the part of the objective that poses the lowest civilian risk.186  
                                                          
180 Thurnher (n 148), 113. 
181 Boothby (n 73), 118. See also 7.2.3.3. 
182 Thurnher (n 148), 113. 
183 See 7.3.2.4. 
184 Article 57(3), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 33; CIHL, Rule 21. 
185 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2227. 
186 As noted in the AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 33, ¶ 5, Similar reasoning applies to a power-
generating facility and its various transformers, substations and power transmission lines. Where the 
objective is merely to disrupt power supplies to enemy forces, attacking any of these will achieve that 
goal, but targeting one of the latter three will do so with relatively less civilian risk. Even within those 
three categories, it is likely that integrated CDEM will enable a LAWS to select the one posing the 




However, in many cases target choices are less clear-cut, and this may necessitate 
complex contextual judgments to assess the closeness of their MAA values.187 
Moreover, lack of certainty often brings in an element of subjectivity in these 
assessments,188 and this extends to the composition of ECD.189 In such instances, the 
choice of objective will likely be a matter for commanders and their battle staffs 
through one of the Joint Targeting Cycles, with the LAWS simply executing a TS. 
Even then, it has been argued that the task of assigning particular MAA values to 
alternative but dissimilar targets is “next to impossible”, such that Article 57(3) will 
“only occasionally be applicable in practice”.190 
7.3.2.3 Cancel or Suspend Attacks 
Paragraph (2)(b) provides that: 
 
[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that 
the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or 
that the attack may be expected to [violate the proportionality rule].191 
 
This provision applies not only to those who plan or decide upon an attack, but also 
and primarily to those who execute it.192 Arguably, this puts relatively more onus on 
the LAWS sensors and control software, given the passive mood of the provision and 
that the counterfactual is often a pilot or weapons operator in the field.193 Nonetheless, 
Paragraph (2)(b) is only engaged where the likely violation becomes “apparent”. In 
most modern TSs, this is unlikely as front-line attackers – particularly at standoff 
ranges – rarely see in advance what they attack.194 Moreover, pilots are required to act 
on information in their target package195 and not to question it; especially when they 
possess so little contextual knowledge of the overall operation compared with senior 
                                                          
187 Thurnher (n 148), 112-13 (referring to the friendly force risk posed by different targets, and the 
holistic nature of MAA). 
188 Dinstein (n 23), 166-67. 
189 Henderson (n 25), 190-92 (questioning how many homes are worth a civilian life, in the context of 
choosing from several targets of equivalent MAA). 
190 Ibid., 189. 
191 Article 57(2)(b), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 35; CIHL, Rule 19. 
192 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2220. In this sense, it exemplifies the constant care obligation in Paragraph (1). 
193 Ibid., ¶ 2221; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 35, ¶ 3. 
194 Hans Blix, ‘Means and Methods of Combat’ in UNESCO, International Dimensions of 
Humanitarian Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 147.  
195 See n 256 in Chapter 6, on the typical contents of the target package given to F-16 pilots. 
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commanders.196 Legally, they are entitled to rely on instructions and, where images of 
the target and its surrounding area are provided, they may accept these as fully verified 
by the commander and his battle staffs.197 Front-line attackers should therefore only 
cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that something unbriefed in the 
target package – be that a protected object198 or an unexpected mass of civilians199 – 
appears without prior warning.  
 
Accordingly, for a LAWS deployment to comply with Article 57(2)(b), it need only 
be programmed to cancel or suspend an attack in the event that the target or target area 
no longer meets its programmed parameters to the correct confidence threshold.200 
Examples of how this might occur were provided earlier, in relation to both 
distinction201 and proportionality.202 Whether a specific weapon system complies with 
this rule will depend on whether it recognises the situation that calls for 
cancelation/suspension, and thereby refrains from launching an attack at least to the 
standard of a human operator in the same circumstances.203 
 
Certainly, in the right operational environment, the precision and responsiveness of 
autonomous control systems may even exceed human performance.204 This is because 
of the relatively short response time after a target is acquired and its vicinity 
reconnoitred, which tends to lower the risk of situational changes in which civilians 
unexpectedly enter the collateral effects area.205 Moreover, in the event that civilians 
                                                          
196 See (notes and text accompanying) nn 30-37. 
197 OTP Report (n 13), ¶ 85. 
198 Paul Scharre, ‘Centaur Warfighting: The False Choice of Humans Vs. Automation’, (2016) 30 
Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 151, 154 (describing an incident during the Kosovo 
air campaign, where an F-15E Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) launched a remotely-flown standoff 
weapon at an alleged radar site. 12 seconds before impact he noticed an unbriefed profile of a church 
steeple, before steering the weapon into an empty field). 
199 Henderson (n 25), 184-85 (noting that Australian F/A-18 pilots occasionally pulled out of bombing 
raids at the last minute when they detected unbriefed civilian presence, presumably to request a 
proportionality reassessment). 
200 Henderson, Keane and Liddy (n 148), 355. 
201 See, for example, 6.5.2.2 on sparing human visual and heat signatures that do not conform to the 
three-/four-part criteria for active combatant status; 6.5.3.4.1 on recognising the distinctive architecture 
of churches and mosques, similar to the F-15E WSO, above; and 6.5.3.4.5 on detecting distinctive signs 
and emblems. In all these cases, a LAWS would be programmed to hold fire. 
202 See 7.2.3.3 on possible ways to cancel or suspend a potentially ‘disproportionate’ attack. 
203 Sassóli (n 52), 320; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 39, ¶ 4. 
204 Wolfgang Richter, ‘Military Rationale for Autonomous Functions in Weapons Systems’, 
Presentation at the 2015 Meeting of Experts on LAWS (13-17 April 2015), 4 (on file with author). 
205 Ibid. (noting that while standoff-air-to-ground weapons and cruise missiles must fly several minutes, 
or even hours before hitting the identified target, LAWS will be able to do this within seconds). 
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do unexpectedly enter the target area, a LAWS will arguably be faster than humans to 
recognise this,206 and to assess the risk of further movement into the collateral effects 
zone. In such a case, the system may be better able to cancel or suspend the attack 
before any civilian harm occurs. The experiences of NATO forces in Grdelica, April 
1999, are particularly instructive.207 Here, the Weapon Systems Officer of an F-15E 
Strike Eagle made two recognition failures, resulting in a double-bombing of a planned 
target (a railway bridge), just as a passenger train appeared and moved further into the 
target area; this resulted in ten deaths and 15 injuries.208 The OTP Report noted the 
difficulty of multi-tasking in a high-speed jet, the short reaction time of seven or eight 
seconds, and the potential human error.209 Arguably, a LAWS – unencumbered by 
GPS-latency, G-lock, or neuromuscular delay – would have avoided this, by virtue of 
its superior sensory perception, its automatic processing capabilities, and the absence 
of any biological limitations. 
7.3.2.4 Effective Advance Warning 
Finally, “effective advance warning” must be given to civilians that may be affected 
by an impending attack,210 unless circumstances do not permit.211 The aim is that as 
many civilians as possible leave the area, or at least get out of the collateral effects 
zone. In a LAWS context, commanders will have to determine during the targeting 
process whether advance warning is compatible with mission goals; and if so, whether 
this should be done through traditional means (e.g. broadcast messages, or pamphlet-
drops),212 or via the LAWS. If they opt for the latter, integrated CDEM would likely 
enable the detection of civilians and civilian objects, hence the determination of 
whether a warning is needed in the particular circumstances.213 If so, a platform fitted 
with non-lethal munitions can discharge these before weapons release,214 similar to the 
                                                          
206 For example, via the proxy of ‘human heat signatures not positively identified as combatants’. A 
LAWS will process these data and act instantly, while humans exhibit a neuromuscular delay of around 
0.25 seconds. 
207 See OTP Report (n 13), ¶¶ 58-62. 
208 Ibid., ¶ 58.  
209 Ibid., ¶¶ 61-62. 
210 Article 57(2)(c), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 37; CIHL, Rule 20. 
211 Again, feasibility is an important precondition. Thus, if an element of surprise is necessary for the 
attack to deliver a military advantage, then the obligation to provide a warning may not apply: AP I 
Commentary, ¶ 2223; AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 37, ¶ 4. 
212 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2224. 
213 Because Article 57(2)(c) only requires advance warning of attacks “which may affect the civilian 
population”.  
214 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 37, ¶ 11 (noting the possibility of firing warning shots). 
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Israeli ‘roof-knocking’ technique.215 Once a non-lethal munition is released, the 
LAWS may then loiter and survey the area, where it performs repeat split-second 
calculations on fleeing civilians and vehicles in relation to the collateral effects radius. 
At the optimum time of attack, when observable civilians are sufficiently out of the 
kill zone, the weapon system can then discharge its lethal munitions.216 
7.3.3 The ‘Obligation’ to Take Passive Precautions Under Article 58 
Article 58, AP I, concerns passive precautions, or ‘precautions against the effects of 
attack’, which are to be taken by the Party in control of territory, not necessarily the 
one launching an attack.  
 
Specifically, Article 58 requires “to the maximum extent feasible” that the Party 
exercising control over civilians and civilian objects: 
a) “endeavour to remove” these from the vicinity of military objectives;217 and  
b) avoid locating military objectives within, or near densely populated areas.218  
 
This dual-obligation to unclutter the battlefield clearly works to enhance LAWS 
operations, by requiring the maintenance of a simpler operational environment. In turn, 
this will make the battlefield relatively more amenable to automatic target recognition 
(ATR). On the other hand, the ‘feasibility’ qualification and other wording 
(“endeavour”) negates the idea that Article 58 is a strict obligation, some 
commentators tending to view it more as a ‘recommendation’.219 
 
More generally, there is an open-ended obligation to take “other necessary 
precautions” to protect civilians and their objects from the dangers of military 
operations.220 This may include the provision of shelters and well-trained civil defence 
                                                          
215 ‘Roof-knocking’ is where an aircraft “targets a building with a loud but non-lethal bomb that warns 
civilians that they are in the vicinity of a weapons cache or other target”, thereby allowing “all residents 
to leave the area before the [Israeli Defense Force] targets the site with live ammunition”. See Israeli 
Defense Forces, ‘How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?’ IDF Blog (16 July 2014) 
<https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/hamas/how-is-the-idf-minimizing-harm-to-civilians-in-gaza/> 
accessed 8 September 2018. 
216 Alternatively, a differentiated swarm consisting of lethal and non-lethal micro-drones can do the 
same, while a standalone munition may fly low over the target before dive-bombing into it: AP I 
Commentary, ¶ 2224. 
217 Article 58(a), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 43; CIHL, Rule 24. 
218 Article 58(b), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 42; CIHL, Rule 23. 
219 Dinstein (n 23), 173. 
220 Article 58(c), AP I; AMW Manual, Rule 44; CIHL, Rule 22. 
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services;221 air-warning systems and air-raid shelters;222 and the deployment of 
protective emblems, signs and signals to assist discriminatory targeting.223 The AMW 
Manual Commentary specifically extends this obligation to attacks involving 
unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs),224 and it acknowledges that in modern air 
and missile warfare it may be “necessary to consider other methods than marking in 
order to bring protected locations to the notice of the enemy”.225 
7.3.4 A Potential Interplay Between Articles 57 and 58 
Importantly, there may be an interplay between Articles 57 and 58; namely, between 
the rules and obligations to take active and passive precautions. For at a more 
fundamental level, advance warnings under Article 57(2)(c) do not have to relate to 
specific or impending attacks, but “may also have a general character”.226 Thus, 
publicly announcing that autonomous systems relying on ATR will be deployed, but 
without necessarily specifying in which precise attacks, may enhance the obligation of 
the Party in control of civilians and civilian objects to take relevant passive precautions 
under Article 58(c).227 This may include the following: 
• Ensuring that protective emblems, signs and signals are deployed to assist 
discriminatory targeting by technical means.228  
• Ensuring these are produced with materials and paints that facilitate detection 
by ATR. 
• Providing GPS coordinates to help attacking forces avoid protected objects in 
fixed locations, which may be difficult to detect solely via ATR.  
 
                                                          
221 AP I Commentary, ¶¶ 2257-2258. 
222 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 44, ¶ 2. 
223 See 6.5.3.4.5.  
224 AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 44, ¶ 3. 
225 Ibid., Rule 42, ¶ 3. An obvious method would be to use materials that make signs and emblems 
recognisable by technical means of detection. Another may be to provide GPS coordinates of all 
protected fixed objects. 
226 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2225 (noting the possibility to warn that “certain types of installations or 
factories” may be attacked, or even containing “a list of the objectives that will be attacked”). 
227 This is an extension to AMW Manual Commentary, Rule 44, ¶ 4, which articulates a similar approach 
in relation to UCAVs because of their smaller visual, radar and noise signatures. These characteristics 
may allow greater penetrability into areas where air defences would normally deter manned aircraft 
attacks, hence the enhanced obligation of the Party in control of civilians and civilian objects to take 
passive precautions in those areas.  
228 See 6.5.3.4.5.  
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As above, this is all subject to the feasibility requirement. Thus, to effectively enhance 
the Article 58 obligation, advance warnings must themselves be ‘effective’ in the 
circumstances.229 For example, it is likely that such warnings will have to be as 
geographically bounded as possible, and sufficiently far in advance of an attack to 
afford the Party in control of territory a reasonable opportunity to distribute the 
protective emblems and signs. Where this is likely to be problematic, it is possible that 
the LAWS-deploying side may also notify the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and interested non-governmental organisations, which may also assist in the 
sourcing and distribution of specially designed protective emblems and signs.  
 
As explained in 6.5.3.4.6, there are legal protections in Articles 37, 38 and 85(3) that 
prohibit any improper use of the above safeguards. Despite these, however, the same 
caveat put forth in 6.5.3.4.5 applies here: attacking forces must remain independently 
vigilant and avoid any over-reliance on emblems and signs. Concretely, the safeguards 
are in addition to active precautions and other commander-led targeting efforts, and 
they do not permit or justify a watering down of such efforts.230  
7.3.5 ‘Elevating’ Precautions to the Status of a LOAC Principle 
7.3.5.1 Precautions as the Lynchpin of the Targeting Process 
One of the most striking features of the above precautionary rules is their relatively 
concrete and objective nature. This is not absolutely the case, as the feasibility 
requirement and the need to assess MAA in some instances calls for complex value 
judgments. However, compared with the amorphous proportionality principle, the 
Article 57 rules do afford the commander a strong package of measures for civilian 
risk mitigation; an effective counter-weight to military necessity, yet one that is well-
aligned with military operational and tactical logic.231 In some instances, the 
precautions will entail lowering ECD through smarter planning;232 in other instances, 
                                                          
229 Boothby (n 20), 127-29. 
230 Article 51(8), AP I; AMW Manual Commentary, Rules 46 and 37, ¶ 16. 
231 Geoffrey S. Corn, ‘War, Law, and the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary Measure’ 
(2015) 42 Pepperdine Law Review 419, 423 (arguing that commanders often see feasible precautions 
as “more rationally aligned with the overall tactical and operational concept of operations”). 
232 For example, through the choice of target, weaponeering, or varying the time of deployment. 
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they entail objectively ascertainable tasks or determinations that are amenable to 
automatic processing.233  
 
In the chronology of targeting presented in 5.3, addressing the distinction principle is 
clearly the first step in civilian risk mitigation. Next, the commander and his battle 
staffs consider an array of precautionary measures, before applying the proportionality 

















Accordingly, precautionary measures “bridge the conceptual borderline between 
distinction and proportionality”235 (see Figure 7.1, above), such that they mitigate the 
difficulty of applying the proportionality principle as a final step. This they do by 
minimising the ECD in every feasible way possible so that the proportionality balance 
will tip decisively in favour of the MAA, thereby obviating the need to make such 
complex judgment calls on the battlefield.236 This approach is now officially 
                                                          
233 For example, when assessing the area of a target with the lowest ECD, or in cancelling an attack that 
does not meet confidence thresholds. 
234 This accords with Dill’s three-part criteria for operationalising proportionality: adequacy, necessity, 
and commensurability (at n 65). 
235 Geoffrey S. Corn and James A. Schoettler, ‘Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation: The Essential 
Role of Precautionary Measures’ (2015) 223 Military Law Review 785, 799.  
236 Ibid.; Corn (n 231); Kenneth Watkin, ‘Military Advantage: A Matter of Value, Strategy and Tactics’ 
(2014) 17 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 277, 311-14. 
Figure 7.1: The chronology of targeting. Source: Corn (n 231), 436. 
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documented in the US DoD Manual,237 which notes that the requirement to take 
feasible precautions and the proportionality principle are “mutually reinforcing 
obligations”.238 As LAWS will not be able to undertake their own proportionality 
assessments, this clearly has value for commanders contemplating such deployments. 
Namely, well-planned precautions will increase the likelihood that an autonomous 
attack will remain within the “zone of proportionality”,239 and indeed this is exactly 
the approach taken by Thurnher and Boothby, above.240 However, not all the 
precautionary rules will apply equally (or at all) in every LAWS deployment; while in 
other deployments some hitherto unfamiliar precautions may be beneficial. This raises 
the question as to whether ‘elevating’ precautions to the status of a full LOAC principle 
may positively assist future LAWS-deploying forces. 
7.3.5.2 A Precautionary Principle? 
Recall from 3.2.2.2.1 that there is a fundamental difference between rules and 
standards/principles, based on whether the exact content of the norm is determined 
before (rules) or after (standards/principles) relevant facts have materialised.241 
Consequently, rules are relatively precise and applicable only to the specific contexts 
anticipated in their terms, while principles are more vaguely drafted and they serve as 
a general source of guidance.242 As a corollary, principles guide the interpretation and 
application of specific (under-inclusive) rules, and they guide decision-making where 
no discernible rule exists.243 Thus, while both rules and principles enjoy the same 
(binding) normative status, they differ greatly in their scope and breadth of application. 
 
Distinction and proportionality are unquestionably seen as “cardinal principles” of 
IHL/LOAC,244 and they command most legal and public attention during an armed 
conflict.245 By contrast, the precautionary measures tend to be under-valued in IHL 
discourse, and this may reflect the understanding of these measures as rules-based 
                                                          
237 US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (Office of General Counsel, DoD, 2015, December 
2016 Update), § 5.10. 
238 Ibid., § 5.10.5. 
239 Targeted Killings Case, ¶ 58. 
240 See 7.2.3.2 and 7.2.3.3. 
241 Louis Kaplow, ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal 557. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Corn and Schoettler (n 235), 833. 
244 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Reports 226, ¶ 78. 
245 Watkin (n 236), 311. 
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obligations.246 Moreover, being restricted to ‘attacks’, the rules are not instinctively 
integrated into other aspects of military operations, such as training and staffing.247 
 
However, this approach is arguably wrong as it fails to account for the pervasive 
obligation in Article 57(1), AP I. The lynchpin of this provision is to take “constant 
care” in the conduct of “military operations” vis-à-vis civilian protection.248 Aside 
from the AP I Commentary specifically describing this as a “general principle”,249 
there are two other reasons why this is arguably true. First, ‘constant care’ – while not 
defined – clearly imposes a repeat obligation; thus, it is insufficient to take care during 
pre-deployment preparations but to then ignore changes in civilian risk once a LAWS 
is in-flight, or vice versa.250 Second, this obligation should inform all aspect of 
‘military operations’, not just ‘attacks’. While the latter are merely “acts of violence 
against the adversary…”,251 military operations are more broadly defined as “any 
movements, manoeuvres and other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed 
forces with a view to combat”.252 As noted above, this may include training and 
staffing issues, amongst others.  
 
Accordingly, ‘constant care’ is a pervasive obligation, which is incumbent upon all 
persons who have control over the use and deployment of LAWS.253 Paragraphs (2) 
and (3) reflect this broader principle and are merely practical applications of it,254 but 
they should not be seen as the limit of that principle. Namely, the specific rules are 
illustrative, but not exhaustive.  
 
In a US/NATO context, the Joint Targeting process arguably provides a basis for fully 
implementing precautions as a principle. This is because of the symmetry between 
operational practice and targeting law, and the elaborate nature of the targeting process 
itself. Together, these enable commanders and their staffs to integrate precautionary 
                                                          
246 Corn and Schoettler (n 235), 834. 
247 Ibid., 835. 
248 See also CIHL, Rule 15; AMW Manual, Rules 30 and 34. 
249 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2191. 
250 Ford (n 114), 448. 
251 Article 49(1), AP I. 
252 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2191.  
253 Boothby (n 159), 41. 
254 AP I Commentary, ¶ 2191. 
267 
 
measures earlier on during the attack-planning process and to a greater extent than the 
legal minimum, such that the outcome is to increase the range of precautionary options 
that come to light, and to increase the likelihood of their uptake.255 For LAWS-
deploying forces, which may find that the listed precautions do not always suffice, this 
provides a useful starting point to ensure that precautionary measures are broadly-
conceived, pervasive and fit for purpose in a LAWS context.  
7.3.6 Potential Applications of a Precautions Principle for LAWS 
Deployments 
More specifically, elevating precautions to the status of a full LOAC principle will 
arguably assist in reducing the margin of error in LAWS operations, thereby bringing 
these more comfortably within the commander’s margin of appreciation. This will 
occur as specific and apt precautionary measures will enable more predictable 
operation in the field, and thus attacks may be expected to comply more effectively 
with the principles of distinction and proportionality.  
 
The following examples illustrate how, both within and beyond the Joint Targeting 
process, more LAWS-specific precautionary measures may arise. In some instances, 
these will draw insight from relevant specific weapons treaties, and in all cases the aim 
is to afford a degree of MHC to LAWS operations. 
7.3.6.1 Front-Loading 
Already implicit in much of the above, Lewis argues that a crucial precautionary 
measure is to undertake as many critical tasks as possible in a pre-deployment setting, 
thereby reducing the number of algorithmic decisions to be made on a chaotic 
battlefield.256 In a LAWS context, such front-loading of critical tasks is likely to focus 
on those that require controlled processing, which will be undertaken by the 
commander and his battle staffs. Examples include the determination of the MAA of 
a HVT;257 of a set of MAAs of alternative targets;258 or the assessment of whether a 
dual-use object is being put to a military use or purpose.259  
                                                          
255 Corn (n 231). 
256 Larry Lewis, ‘Redefining Human Control: Lessons From the Battlefield for Autonomous Weapons’, 
Center for Autonomy and AI (March 2018), 11-12 <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2018-
U-017258-Final.pdf> accessed 10 June 2018. 
257 See 7.2.3.2. 
258 See 7.3.2.2. 




In all cases, there is a ‘division of labour’ between man and machine, with the latter 
completing all aspects of the mission that require automatic processing. The challenge 
for future LAWS-deploying forces is therefore to separate out all tasks and decisions 
that require controlled processing, and to undertake these either in a pre-deployment 
setting, or on the battlefield using a dial-in capability.260 
7.3.6.2 Developing Capabilities 
Front-loading of critical tasks is undoubtedly enhanced when a State possesses the 
appropriate capabilities. In this connexion, recall that precautionary measures are 
obligations of conduct, which implicate due diligence.261 In turn, this carries an 
obligation to develop relevant capabilities, which itself varies with a State’s socio-
political circumstances, its general technological capabilities, and its particular 
development of battlefield technologies.262 Thus, a well-resourced State that is 
constantly engaged in (or threatened with) war may be expected to develop advanced 
surveillance and target identification capabilities; even outside of armed conflict, in 
preparation for it. Arguably, this due diligence obligation is not limited to technology, 
but extends to more painstaking precautionary activities. An example may be working 
with archaeologists to build a database of cultural property in a particular conflict zone, 
to enhance compliance with the customary rules restated in CIHL, Rule 38(A).263  
7.3.6.3 A Precautionary Approach to Online Learning 
Should machine learning take place ‘online’ (in the battlefield), there is the risk that a 
LAWS may ‘learn the wrong lessons’ and behave unpredictably, and this was vividly 
illustrated in 2.5.3.2. The most precautionary approach would be to restrict learning to 
‘offline’ training exercises and laboratory scenarios, to ensure that any acquired 
unlawful behaviour occurs in a safe and non-critical context, and can be overridden by 
human programmers. The system would then be ‘frozen’ on deployment so that it 
cannot continue to learn new tasks, tactics or target sets. However, this may mean 
forgoing certain military advantages that States are unwilling to abandon;264 for 
                                                          
260 Similar to 7.2.3.4. 
261 Trapp (n 156), 286. 
262 Ibid., 288. 
263 See 6.5.3.4.1.  
264 James Farrant and Christopher M. Ford, ‘Autonomous Weapons and Weapons Reviews: The UK 
Second International Weapon Review Forum’ (2017) 93 International Law Studies 389, 406. 
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example, adapting to slight changes in the operational environment for greater 
targeting accuracy and precision.265 
 
Accordingly, deploying forces may develop and implement ‘procedural 
safeguards’.266 An example would be to make algorithmic updates on the battlefield 
subject to human approval, perhaps in between sorties, before going ‘live’.267 Of 
course, this assumes the proposed updates are scrutable and intuitive; for example, 
through ‘Explainable AI’, so that the human reviewer can make an informed and 
accountable decision.268 Also, depending on the nature and extent of the algorithmic 
update, it may obligate a whole new legal review under Article 36, AP I,269 potentially 
requiring a legal review team to be despatched in the field. 
7.3.6.4 Spatio-Temporal Restrictions270 
Fourth, LAWS deployments may be subject to relatively tighter spatio-temporal 
restrictions, similar to other weapons that operate with humans out-of-the-narrow-
loop. For example, Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons271 requires human supervision of anti-personnel mines within a confined, 
monitored and protected area;272 or, for mines emplaced outside such an area, to self-
destruct or self-deactivate within a maximum time period as specified in the Technical 
Annex.273 The Protocol then adopts a graduated approach, as it relaxes the spatial 
                                                          
265 See 2.5.1.4 on reasons for online learning. 
266 Kush R. Varshney and Homa Alemzadeh, ‘On the Safety of Machine Learning: Cyber-Physical 
Systems, Decision Sciences, and Data Products’ (v2 22 August 2017) 
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.01256v2.pdf> accessed 7 July 2018. 
267 Paul Christiano, ‘Approval-Directed Algorithmic Learning’, AI Alignment Blog (21 February 2016) 
<https://ai-alignment.com/approval-directed-algorithm-learning-bf1f8fad42cd> accessed 7 July 2018.  
268 See 2.5.3.3. Note that Explainable AI is still in development. 
269 Farrant and Ford (n 264), 406. 
270 For a fuller analysis of spatio-temporal restrictions in the context of extracting legal transplants for 
a LAWS regulatory regime, see Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘Ensuring Fully Autonomous Weapons 
Systems Comply with the Rule of Distinction in Attack’ in Stuart Casey-Maslen et al. (eds.), Drones 
and Other Unmanned Weapons Systems under International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 2018), 148-50. 
271 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
(adopted 10 October 1980, amended 3 May 1996, entered into force 3 December 1998) 2048 UNTS 93. 
272 Article 5(2)(a), Amended Protocol II, lays down the triple requirement of: durable and visible 
perimeter-marking; monitoring by military personnel; and fencing or other protection, to exclude 
civilians from the area. 
273 Sub-Paragraph 3(a) of which requires at least 90% of activated mines to self-destruct within 30 days 
of emplacement. The provision also requires a back-up self-deactivation feature, such that at least 99.9% 
of activated mines either self-destruct or self-deactivate within 120 days after emplacement.  
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restrictions for a maximum period of 72 hours, so long as certain additional 
requirements are met.274 
 
These and other rules in Amended Protocol II aim to keep civilians out of the kill zone, 
while anti-personnel mines are operational and liable to cause them harm; and they 
limit the time during which there can be a non-human controlled threat to the civilian 
population. Accordingly, such rules bound the independent ‘operation’ of landmines 
in time and space, to ensure that accountable humans remain in control. Similar 
precautions may be taken by LAWS-deploying forces, so human operators can 
exercise frequent, or at least periodic control over potentially lethal engagements by 
robotic weapons.275 Their controlled processing will be more likely to recognise 
changing battlefield circumstances that a LAWS will not perceive, thereby enabling 
operators to adjust deployments in a timely manner. As a corollary, tighter spatio-
temporal restrictions will also safeguard the opportunity to shift to a law enforcement 
model (as changing circumstances dictate), wherein human rights norms will play a 
greater role.276  
 
There is no way to specify an appropriate set of spatio-temporal limits in the abstract; 
rather, these will likely emerge from prior testing and evaluation of specific LAWS 
models, and they should also be subject to adjustment by commanders in a given 
deployment scenario. In doing so, commanders may also wish to consider the ‘boxed 
autonomy’ approach,277 which combines the three-dimensional ‘kill-box’ with tight 
target parameters (see below) and exhaustive front-loading.278 
7.3.6.5 Target Parameters279 
The landmines regime also contains several provisions that effectively set target 
parameters in order to retain advance human control over the kinds of persons or 
                                                          
274 Article 5(6), Amended Protocol II. The additional requirements are a) the munitions propels 
fragments in a horizontal arc of less than 90 degrees; and b) they are placed on or above (not below) the 
ground. 
275 Maya Brehm, ‘Defending the Boundary: Constraints and Requirements on the Use of Autonomous 
Weapon Systems Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’, Geneva Academy 
Research Brief (2017). 
276 Ibid. Namely, where there will be a preference for non-lethal options, such as capture and arrest. 
277 International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW), ‘Focus on Technology 
and Application of Autonomous Weapons, “Focus on” Report No. 1 (August 2017), 15-16. 
278 See also Homayounnejad (n 270), 139 (discussing kill-boxes as a possible application of the 
landmines regime to LAWS). 
279 For a fuller analysis of LAWS, target parameters and the landmines regime, see ibid., 150-52. 
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objects that are targeted. Thus, Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty280 comprehensively 
prohibits “anti-personnel mines”, which are defined as devices that are designed to 
target a “person”, while excluding from its purview anti-tank mines.281 Similarly, 
Article 2(3), Amended Protocol II, states that its more permissive, yet highly 
precautionary approach282 only applies to mines that are “primarily designed to be 
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person…”283 By contrast, Article 
1(1) specifically excludes any application of the Protocol to anti-ship mines at sea, 
where there is unlikely to be a concentration of civilians; assuming these are not 
deployed along commercial shipping routes. 
 
Again, these provisions aim to keep civilians out of harm’s way, but this time by 
bounding the kinds of targets against which mines may be triggered. By imposing 
relatively permissive rules on anti-tank mines (with more resistant pressure plates) 284 
or anti-ship mines (designed for deployment at sea or in inland waterways), we see 
lighter regulation on those munitions whose effective target parameters are limited to 
heavy, durable military objects. While persons may be killed during these mine 
deployments, this is a secondary consequence of targeting the military object, and it is 
assumed that the inhabitants of a tank or a ship sailing along certain routes are, in any 
event, likely to be targetable combatants.285 By contrast, anti-personnel mines, which 
have relatively broader target parameters via the proxy of more sensitive pressure 
plates or tripwires,286 carry a greater risk of unintended engagements with civilians, 
including children. This explains the correspondingly greater precautionary 
requirements.  
 
                                                          
280 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction (adopted 18 September 1997, entered into force 1 March 1999) 2056 
UNTS 241.  
281 Article 2(1), Mine Ban Treaty (specifically excluding “[m]ines designed to be detonated by…a 
vehicle as opposed to a person”) (emphasis added). 
282 Several key military States, such as China, Russia and the US are not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, 
on grounds of military necessity. Instead, they have signed up to the permissive yet precautionary 
Amended Protocol II. 
283 Article 2(3), Amended Protocol II (emphasis added). 
284 Most anti-tank mines require a weight force of a mass in excess of 100 kilograms for detonation.  
285 Though this assumption is not perfect, and it is not inconceivable that a warship might contain 
medical personnel and/or chaplains, who are not targetable combatants under Article 43(2), AP I. 




This graduated approach, which links the breadth of target parameters to the normative 
constraints on the commander, may provide inspiration to LAWS-deploying forces 
too. Namely, there is a risk that systems programmed with broad parameters (‘large 
vehicle’, with a given set of dimensions) and deployed in areas where civilian and 
military objects comingle may inadvertently engage civilian objects, like trucks or 
buses. In such a case, it would be prudent to narrow the target parameters as much as 
possible; for example, commanders may specify exact models that are both exclusive 
to the enemy and recognisable to the ATR systems, like ‘T-80 tank’.287 In line with 
the graduated approach, this degree of specificity may be relaxed in simpler 
operational environments; for example, an undersea LAWS programmed to pursue 
‘large metallic objects with an acoustic signature’ may be lawful without any further 
precautions, as there is unlikely to be any civilian objects fitting those parameters in 
that particular context. However, it is arguably not possible to lay down ex ante bright-
lines. Instead, ‘rules of thumb’ would likely be more administrable, such as requiring 
commanders to opt for the narrowest possible target parameters, consistent with ATR 
capabilities and the exigencies of military necessity in the operational environment.288 
7.3.6.6 Upper Engagement Limits289 
To complement the above three constraints, upper engagement limits (UEL) may also 
offer a precautionary measure that enhances human control. This is especially useful 
where a LAWS is deployed for TLC, to attack numerous specific targets in a number 
of different target categories; and/or where there is a high degree of comingling, with 
a correspondingly greater civilian risk. In this regard, the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions290 (CCM) may offer some useful pointers within its Article 2(2)(c) technical 
criteria.291 Specifically, criterion (i) requires fewer than ten explosive submunitions 
                                                          
287 See 4.5.1. 
288 Another possible application of the landmines regime is to restrict LAWS to anti-material targeting; 
or even Canning’s approach of targeting either the ‘bow’ or the ‘arrow’ but not the ‘human archer’. See 
6.5.5. 
289 For a fuller analysis of upper engagement limits applied to LAWS in TLC and TSs, respectively, see 
Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘Ensuring Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems Comply with International 
Humanitarian Law, TLI Think! Paper 85/2017 (2017), 55-58 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073893>; 
Maziar Homayounnejad, ‘The Lawful Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems for Targeted Strikes (Part 
2): Targeting Law & Practice’, TLI Think! Paper 13/2018 (2018), 62-68 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200416> both accessed 2 October 2018. 
290 Convention on Cluster Munitions (adopted 30 May 2008, entered into force 1 August 2010) 2688 
UNTS 190. 
291 More precisely, for a weapon to be excluded from the definition of the (prohibited) ‘cluster 
munition’, it must satisfy the humanitarian effects chapeau, which will be presumed if the following 
criteria are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) each munition contains fewer than 10 explosive submunitions; 
273 
 
per (sensor-fused) weapon, in order to help ‘greatly limit’ the risks posed by 
unexploded submunitions (UXO) and to help avoid the incidence of indiscriminate 
attack.292 The CCM Commentary explains that this works by restricting the number of 
explosive items that can distribute explosive force and fragmentation across a pre-
defined area, despite their capacity to ‘detect and engage a single target object’.293 
This is significant, as it suggests the reasoning is two-fold: a) there is likely to be a 
limit to how many clearly detectable military objects there are in a relatively tight 
spatio-temporal boundary;294 and, importantly for LAWS, b) the ATR of the 
submunitions can fail to accurately classify targets, and to distinguish military from 
civilian objects. The combination of these two will potentially result in an 
indiscriminate attack.  
 
Similarly, it may be prudent to impose an upper limit on the number of specific 
engagements that a LAWS platform may undertake in a single ‘out-of-the-loop’ TLC 
mission. Namely, as the number and diversity of targets being pursued – and the extent 
of comingling – all increase, so too will the likelihood that an engagement will lead to 
distinction failure, for a given ATR and weapon system. Thus, it is arguable that the 
twin aims of the CCM of a) greatly limiting the probability of UXO and b) avoiding 
indiscriminate area effects (the latter partly emanating from the risk of ATR distinction 
failure) may combine to suggest a limit to the number of LAWS engagements per ‘out-
of-the-loop’ mission. This also supports the argument that autonomous lethal targeting 
should be restricted to a single ‘attack’, which may comprise multiple (though limited) 
acts of violence;295 hence, the utility of applying UELs. 
 
On the exact UEL figure per ‘out-of-the-loop’ mission, there is again no bright-line 
rule that can be set in advance, as there is in Article 2(2)(c)(i), CCM. Instead, the exact 
UEL per deployment should depend on three cumulative sets of factors.  
                                                          
and, in turn, each explosive submunition (ii) weighs more than four kilograms; (iii) is designed to detect 
and engage a single target object; (iv) is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism; and 
(v) is equipped with an electronic self-deactivation feature. 
292 Bonnie Docherty et al. ‘Article 2: Definitions’ in Gro Nystuen and Stuart Casey-Maslen (eds.), The 
Convention on Cluster Munitions: A Commentary (OUP, 2010), ¶¶ 2.121 and 2.129. 
293 Ibid., ¶ 2.124. 
294 There are major spatio-temporal differences between a sensor-fused weapon and a LAWS. 
Ultimately, however, deploying more force and target engagement capacity in advance and without 
contemporaneous human oversight arguably results in a greater likelihood of striking civilians or other 
protected persons and objects. 
295 See 4.3. 
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• The sophistication and reliability of the ATR and the control software. This 
may lead to upper engagement guidelines set by engineers, who will have 
regard to both the predetermined confidence thresholds and failure rates that 
were established during testing and evaluation. Guidelines may also take into 
account the platform’s weapon carriage capacity and its range of damage 
potentials. 
• The prevailing conditions in a given deployment, for example, the extent of 
clutter and comingling on the battlefield; the ‘uniqueness’ of the applicable 
target (categories); and the opportunities for multisensory phenomenologies, 
for detection-confirmation. This may lead to commanders and their battle staffs 
applying and adapting the guidelines set by engineers, to suit the operational 
environment and the mission and task at hand. 
• The damage potential of the system on a given deployment, by way of the level 
and lethality of its armaments; whether these are anti-personnel or anti-
material; the magazine depth; and the potential speed of engagements.296 These 
may lead to commanders and their battle staffs further adapting engineers’ 
guidelines. 
 
Importantly, a LAWS will not necessarily have to return to base once the engagement 
limit is reached. Instead, UELs may be combined with an interim review of 
performance by way of a battle-damage assessment (BDA) and a system diagnostic 
check at the end of each cycle.297 This would arguably provide a human buffer against 
distinction failure and indiscriminate attack, with weapons operators granting a 
‘permission to continue’ if it appears that all engagements have been LOAC-
compliant. Conversely, if problems are discovered mid-deployment, the operator 
should intervene in a way that is commensurate with the nature and extent of that 
problem. Options may include: lowering the UEL, hence increasing the frequency of 
human review; reverting the system to remotely-piloted mode; withdrawing the 
problematic LAWS from deployment; or withdrawing the entire fleet.298 
                                                          
296 Paul Scharre, ‘Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk’, CNAS Ethical Autonomy Project 
(February 2016), 18-19 <http://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-
weapons-operational-risk.pdf> accessed 22 September 2018. 
297 Recall from 4.4 that BDAs are a form of MHC. Recall also from 5.3.1.6 and 5.3.2.1 that the BDA is 
the final step in both Joint Targeting Cycles. 
298 This would be appropriate where poor performance is caused by a common component or feature of 




In this sense, the human operator will act as a ‘fail safe’;299 hence, UELs will arguably 
enhance the MHC afforded by tightly-constrained target parameters and spatio-
temporal limits. Above all, a judiciously-set UEL will help to keep LAWS 
deployments within the ‘individual attack’ limitation.300 
7.3.6.7 Training 
Much of the above precautionary measures implicate the need for commanders and 
their battle staffs to undergo LAWS-specific LOAC training. As Corn points out, 
“training is the fundamental foundation upon which the soldier forms his judgment as 
to what is and is not permissible conduct during combat”.301 It should therefore be seen 
as both a prerequisite for the implementation of effective precautions, and as a 
precautionary measure in and of itself.  
 
To illustrate the significance of LOAC training more broadly, Directive 5100.77302 
requires every member of the US Armed Forces to receive annual LOAC training, to 
enable them to fulfil their assigned functions in a legally compliant manner.303 This is 
to maximise the chances of legally sound military operations and to minimise the risk 
of IHL violations; to the extent that LOAC training is now incorporated in virtually all 
classroom and field training exercises.304 As Corn points out, such pervasive legal 
training reflects the fact that LOAC implementation demands more than mere 
knowledge of black-letter law. 
 
“[M]ilitary personnel at every level must be provided the opportunity 
to test their battlefield judgment and develop a genuine understanding 
of the relationship between the law and the execution of their mission 
through the crucible of realistic training.”305 
 
                                                          
299 See 4.2.1. 
300 This is more likely to be an issue in TLC; by definition, each TS is an individual attack, subject to 
reasonable spatio-temporal limits. 
301 Corn (n 231), 445. 
302 US Department of Defense, Directive No. 5100.77: DoD Law of War Program (9 December 1998) 
(hereafter, Directive 5100.77) <https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf2/d510077p.pdf> 
accessed 22 September 2018. 
303 Ibi .d , §§ 4 (Policy), 5 (Responsibilities). 
304 Corn (n 231), 446. 
305 Ibid., 446-47. 
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Moreover, in the case of LAWS, training is regarded as a MHC touchpoint, which 
ensures the input of effective controlled processing during the targeting cycle.306 
Accordingly, for commanders and their battle staffs to maximise the front-loading of 
critical tasks; to activate online learning in a safe manner; to set prudent spatio-
temporal and target parameters; and to implement judicious UELs, a strong element of 
applied LOAC training will arguably be needed before autonomous weaponry is 
fielded and ready for deployment. Given the highly contextual nature of these 
precautionary measures and the absence of any bright-lines, targeting personnel will 
need, first, to appreciate the capacities and limitations of the LAWS that they are to 
deploy; and, second, to develop their judgment in a range of realistic training scenarios, 
where inadvertent errors become learning opportunities rather than fatalities. Only 
once these skills are developed and refined through the precautionary step of applied 
LOAC training can LAWS be deployed with the confidence that the precautionary 
measures developed during the targeting cycle will be fit for purpose. 
7.3.6.8 Staffing 
While a lay understanding of capacities and limitations and how to prudently apply 
precautionary measures is usually sufficient for final decision-makers, the overall 
targeting process will arguably need more than this. To be sure, the more complex and 
stochastic the weapon system, the greater the need for roboticists and software 
engineers to be integrated into the battle staffs.307 In this connexion, the highly 
technical nature of LAWS and their likely brittleness will arguably give rise to 
information asymmetries and safety risks, which can only be resolved by integrating 
appropriate technical personnel.308  
 
Currently, Article 82, AP I, requires States to ensure that commanders have access to 
legal advisers before making decisions, but there is no specific requirement for 
technical personnel to give advice on performance and effects.309 Without doubt, the 
integration of such personnel into the battle staffs would be a broad precautionary 
measure that is outside the scope of the narrow LOAC rules. Above all, it would 
                                                          
306 See 4.4 (Table 4.1), 4.5.2 (commander understanding of technology) and 4.5.3 (operator training). 
307 Tony Gillespie, ‘New Technologies and Design for the Laws of Armed Conflict’ (2015) 160 The 
RUSI Journal 50. 
308 Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson, ‘New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary 
Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 Weapons 
Reviews’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 483. 
309 Gillespie (n 307), 50. 
277 
 
provide commanders with access to indispensable expertise, in the face of strong 
information asymmetries. 
 
On a practical note, recall from Chapter 5 that US doctrine on Joint Operations is 
organised around ‘Joint Functions’. With the recent addition of Information, partly to 
cater for the increasing complexity of software in weapon systems,310 there are now 
seven Joint Functions.311 Within these, roboticists and software engineers could 
arguably fit into Fires and Information, to provide the technical input that lay 
commanders would take into account when deciding on deployments, and when 
formulating LAWS-specific precautionary measures. 
7.3.7 How to ‘Elevate’ Precautions to a Full LOAC Principle 
While none of the eight precautionary measures suggested above are specifically 
mandated by law, all of them may conceivably flow from a broader precautionary 
principle.312 To this end, we may query how such a recasting of the precautionary 
norms, from a set of narrow rules to a generally applicable principle, may be 
effectuated. As noted in 7.3.5.2, this should not require a change in the law as such, as 
the ‘constant care’ obligation already provides a legal basis for a precautionary 
principle.313 Instead, the challenge of ‘elevating’ precautions should be regarded as an 
effort to enhance compliance with LOAC.314 
 
Certainly, in a US/NATO context this may be expected to be relatively straightforward 
because of Joint Targeting Doctrine, which already infuses the targeting process with 
a strong precautionary character. To increase the likelihood that this will be optimised 
                                                          
310 More precisely, it is an acknowledgment that virtually all of the work of the Armed Forces is now 
driven by information networks, especially in space and cyberspace operations. 
311 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (25 
March 2013, incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017), I-17–I-19 (detailing the Joint Functions: C2; 
Intelligence; Fires; Movement and Manoeuvre; Protection; Sustainment; and Information). 
312 Though some of these measures may also flow from efforts to comply with the precautionary rules. 
For example, narrowing the target parameters, as described in 7.3.6.5, may be regarded as essential for 
complying with the target verification rule in Article 57(2)(a)(i), AP I. 
313 Moreover, with the use of the auxiliary verb “shall” in Article 57(1), AP I, the binding status of this 
obligation is beyond question. The same reasoning applies to th s’CRCI e  restatement of customary law 
 htiw CIHL, Rule 15, stating that “constant care must be taken…” (emphasis added). 
314 In the case of some non-NATO States, there is arguably also a need for advocacy in relation to their 
interpretation of “constant care”. See Jean-Françoise Quéguiner, ‘Precautions Under the Law 
Governing the Conducting of Hostilities’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 793, 796 
(noting the tendency of some States and commentators to see the constant care obligation as “merely 




for LAWS deployments, a three-pronged and iterative approach is proposed. First, a 
pervasively precautionary doctrine on autonomous attack can be developed and 
documented in Joint Doctrine Publications. These can outline some LAWS-specific 
measures (such as those examined in 7.3.6.1-7.3.6.8) and they can detail the process 
of developing further specific measures for a given deployment.315 This will provide 
commanders, their legal advisers and their battle staffs with a blueprint for how to put 
into practice a genuine precautionary principle for LAWS deployments.316  
 
Second, all commanders, legal advisers and battle staffs would need to undergo 
LAWS-specific LOAC training, to ensure the finer details of the new doctrine is fully 
absorbed and correctly translated into targeting practice. This is already required of 
US forces by Directive 5100.77 and the reasoning for it is outlined in 7.3.6.7, above. 
Much of what is discussed there also applies here, with the addition that applied LOAC 
training will instil in all personnel an understanding that ‘precautions’ is a broad 
principle, and that doctrine and process are a deliberate means to realise this.317 
 
Third, there will arguably be a need to identify and share best practices between armed 
forces.318 Across NATO, and even within NATO States, military structures tend to 
differ,319 and this is likely to negate a one-size-fits-all approach.320 Yet, such 
idiosyncrasies do not justify an erosion of the process of LOAC implementation, nor 
any disintegration of the precautionary principle. This arguably calls for best practices 
                                                          
315 In preparing these, an extensive Joint Doctrine development process will need to be undertaken for 
entirely new doctrine publications. Shorter and/or expedited processes will suffice for LAWS-specific 
updates to other (general) doctrine publications. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, AAP-47: Allied 
Joint Doctrine Development (Edition B Version 1, NATO Standardisation Office, June 2016); Joint 
Staff, Joint Doctrine Development Process, CJCSM 5120.01A (Joint Staff, 29 December 2014).  
316 As alluded to in the previous footnote, such documentation would ideally consist of a dedicated Joint 
Doctrine Publication on LAWS deployments; as well as updates and amendments to existing 
publications, such as those on Joint Targeting that were cited in Chapter 5. 
317 As noted in 7.3.6.7, training is therefore an essential means for elevating precautions to a full LOAC 
principle, and it is a precautionary measure in itself.  
318 Jakob Kellenberger, Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts: States’ 
Consultations and Way Forward (ICRC, 12 May 2011), 2 (noting that ways to strengthen LOAC 
compliance include “the elaboration of soft law instruments, the identification of best practices and the 
facilitation of expert processes aimed at clarifying existing rules”) (emphasis added) 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-
conference/icrc-president-statement-2010-05-12.pdf> accessed 26 March 2019. 
319 Corn (n 231), 429. 
320 Indeed, as the AP I Commentary points out, at ¶ 3344, this is one reason why the Article 82 obligation 
to provide commanders with legal advice is qualified by allowing States to decide the level of command 
at which to integrate legal advisers. 
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to be identified and “marketed” to less developed armed forces, to promote a more 
uniform commitment to implementing the precautionary principle.321 
 
Finally, once training is established, LAWS are being actively deployed, and best 
practices have been identified and disseminated, it is likely that some actual or desired 
changes to the original doctrine will be discovered. If so, Joint Doctrine on LAWS 
should be updated and its associated Publications should be amended to reflect this, 
thereby continuing to ‘elevate’ precautions in an iterative manner. 
 
The above approach is arguably feasible for its focus on a limited number of relatively 
like-minded (NATO) States, which are already predisposed to treating precautions as 
a principle. However, as LAWS are likely to be fielded by other (non-NATO) States 
too, it is preferable to share best practices more widely and to facilitate expert 
processes aimed at clarifying the application of the constant care obligation.322 
Moreover, as some non-NATO States may not even regard precautions as being a 
broader principle,323 it will also be necessary to clarify and advocate the correct legal 
interpretation, to ensure those States will be receptive to any sharing of best practices. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Proportionality is clearly the most difficult of LOAC norms for a LAWS to satisfy 
through automatic processing alone. Yet, we must not exaggerate the difficulties, as 
many aspects of the principle that require controlled processing can be delegated to 
the commander during the targeting process, or to a weapons operator acting through 
a dial-in capability. If neither option is available, deployments will simply have to be 
restricted. More useful for LAWS are the precautions in attack rules, both as tasks to 
be front-loaded for controlled processing and/or as machine actions that can be 
resolved through automatic processing in the field. However, the listed precautions in 
AP I are limited in scope and are not necessarily apt for LAWS operations. An 
arguably better approach is to harness precautions as a full LOAC principle, to 
maximise the range of LAWS-specific precautionary measures that will be fit for 
                                                          
321 Corn (n 231), 429; also arguing, at 452, that relevant best practices should relate to a) integrating 
legal advice into the targeting process, and b) ensuring the process itself maximises LOAC compliance. 
322 Kellenberger (n 318), 2. See also 8.2, on the merits of producing a LOAC Manual on LAWS. 
323 See Quéguiner’s comments on how some States see the constant care obligation, at n 314. 
280 
 
purpose in the circumstances of each deployment.324 This will increase the likelihood 
of securing compliance with the principles of distinction and proportionality. 
Accordingly, before LAWS are fielded it is crucial that US/NATO forces begin 
developing and applying a broader precautionary principle for autonomous attack. 
 
                                                          
324 In addition to the eight broader precautionary measures illustrated above, the use of a kill switch with 
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identified as an aspect of MHC in 4.4 and Table 4.1 (‘use and abort’), 4.5.2, 4.5.4 (timely intervention) 
and 4.5.5 (feedback loop and abort). On mandating kill switches via legal transplants from the landmines 





With numerous States actively developing lethal autonomous weapon systems 
(LAWS) and the world’s largest defence bureaucracy (US Department of Defense) 
integrating autonomy into its latest National Defense Strategy,1 it is arguably likely 
that offensive autonomous capabilities will soon appear on the battlefield. Add to that 
the rapid pace of technological change,2 the return to Great Power Competition,3 and 
the potential offence-defence dynamic,4 and the prospect that some States will field 
and deploy LAWS in the near-term looks almost inevitable. The consequent 
substituting of algorithmic targeting for narrow-loop human targeting sounds bleak, 
especially when it concerns matters of life and death. However, as has been 
demonstrated in this thesis, there are means and ways to make autonomous attack both 
lawful and relatively humane, and of sufficient military utility as to incentivise armed 
forces to act lawfully. Yet, this is by no means a guaranteed outcome: it will require a 
carefully considered application of the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) in the context 
of an elaborate targeting process; fully informed by the human-machine cognitive 
differences, and firmly resisting any temptation to anthropomorphise the systems.  
8.1 Linking Back to the Research Question  
With this in mind, recall the research question laid down in 1.4: 
 
To what extent can US/NATO forces apply the existing LOAC 
targeting rules, to ensure the lawful deployment and use of near-term 
LAWS? 
This arguably implies two sub-questions:  
(1) To what extent can the existing LOAC targeting rules be applied to ensure the 
lawful deployment and use of LAWS? 
(2) To what extent are US/NATO forces in particular able to undertake this 
challenge? 
                                                          
1 See 1.1 
2 See 1.2.1. 
3 See 1.2.2. 
4 See 1.2.3. 
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In relation to (1), this thesis has demonstrated that the lawful deployment of LAWS 
will be possible if commanders can ensure that a) appropriate systems are deployed, 
b) in a suitable operational environment, c) to undertake machine-feasible tasks, along 
with d) appropriate precautionary measures to sufficiently mitigate civilian risk. 
Deployment A in Figure 8.1, below, shows all these elements equally present, 
collectively meeting the ‘threshold of lawfulness’ at a notional 100. However, where 
any one of these elements is lacking, the other(s) should be adjusted in some way to 
compensate. For example, where autonomous attack is planned in a relatively complex 
operational environment, commanders may still meet the threshold of lawfulness by 
deploying a more sophisticated system, for simpler (more machine-feasible) targeting, 
and with relatively stronger precautions in attack. This is illustrated in Deployment B. 
 
Of course, there are no bright-lines and the precise balance of these four factors will 
be a matter for commanders to resolve in any given scenario, utilising their training, 
their common sense, their legal and battle staffs, and always acting in good faith. 
Accordingly, in Deployment C it may be more appropriate to keep the system and task 
constant, but to significantly boost the precautionary measures, to overcompensate and 









Deployment A Deployment B Deployment C Deployment D Deployment E
System Sophistication Simplicity of Operational Environment
Machine-Feasibility of Task Precautionary Measures
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ensure the deployment stays on the right side of the margin of error. Meanwhile, 
Deployment D sees the commander opting for simpler systems restricted to the 
simplest and most machine-feasible (anti-material) targeting, again overcompensating 
for the complex operational environment. Ultimately, context is king, and it will be for 
the commander to decide how a LAWS deployment will meet (or exceed) the threshold 
of lawfulness in the specific mission at hand. Conversely, where the threshold is not 
met due to shortfalls that cannot be offset, then a LAWS cannot be lawfully deployed; 
as in Deployment E, which will have to go ahead with manned or remotely-piloted 
systems, or be cancelled altogether.  
In relation to the second sub-question, it was seen in Chapter 5 that US/NATO forces 
operating under Joint Targeting Doctrine already have an effective and robust 
infrastructure in place to meet the ‘threshold of lawfulness’ challenge. Moreover, 
Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated that this can indeed interact with targeting law in such 
a way as to ensure legally compliant LAWS deployments. Certainly, some adjustments 
to the targeting process will be needed, such as elevating precautions to a full LOAC 
principle, and integrating more technical personnel into the battle staffs. Furthermore, 
some current developments, such as Project Maven and any other form of wider loop 
autonomy, will need to be closely monitored to assess whether these do actually 
enhance human control during target development. Yet, these are not insurmountable 
goals; the existing Joint Targeting process arguably provides US/NATO forces with 
an effective starting point and a means to achieve them. 
8.2 Beyond the US/NATO Context: The Value of Standardisation 
Outside the US/NATO context, the above LAWS-specific approach may not always 
be obvious; certainly not to every commander in every potential situation in armed 
conflict. The result may be that some fail to implement it, particularly those from less 
advanced militaries that have a more limited provision of legal and technical staffs; or 
indeed inexperienced and poorly supported commanders coming under extraordinary 
pressures in armed conflict. Accordingly, as noted in 1.1, there have also been calls 
for specific regulation of LAWS, either through a binding treaty or a non-binding 
LOAC Manual, to at least set out a common understanding of how such weapon 




We need not look too far for real-world conflicts that support this latter view. For 
example, consider the uses of white phosphorous, flechettes, and (allegedly) Dense 
Inert Metal Explosive weapons during the Gaza Conflict of January 2009. Such 
weapons are neither illegal per se nor are they specifically regulated,5 but their 
deployment and use are still subject to the generally applicable rules and principles of 
LOAC. Yet, during the Gaza Conflict these weapons may have been used unlawfully; 
for example, by being deployed in areas containing a concentration of civilians.6 
Arguably, this occurred partly because of the lack of specific regulation of these 
weapons, which left the application of the law in the hands of individual commanders, 
whose legal assessments were in stark contrast to those of human rights groups.7  
Along similar lines, there may be a case to specifically regulate, or provide soft-law 
guidance on, the deployment and use of LAWS. Indeed, given the novelty of lethal 
autonomy – especially when combined with long loitering capabilities – rules 
specifically crafted for such weapons will arguably be a welcome step in the 
development and application of LOAC. However, the utility of this approach goes 
beyond merely helping to standardise the practice of non-NATO forces. It may also 
support efforts within NATO to ‘elevate’ precautions to the status of a full LOAC 
principle in a LAWS context. Namely, a treaty or LOAC Manual may act as an 
effective precursor to the kinds of implementation steps explained in 7.3.7. 
Thus, with a LAWS regulation treaty negotiated by the States, or a LOAC Manual 
formulated by a group of experts, we should move closer to a common understanding 
of the deployment and use of LAWS in full compliance with the rules that regulate the 
conduct of hostilities; both in a NATO context, and in a broader global context. This 
now raises the question as to which of the two instruments – treaty or Manual – might 
be preferred, and for what reasons. 
                                                          
5 Although there is specific regulation of munitions containing white phosphorous if they are “primarily 
designed to set fire to objects or…cause burn injury to persons”: Article 1(1), Protocol on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (adopted 10 October 1980, entered into force 2 
December 1983) 1342 UNTS 171. 
6 See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict (25 September 2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, especially 191-98 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf> accessed 13 
October 2018. 
7 See, for example, Harriet Sherwood, ‘Israel Using Flechette Shells in Gaza’, The Guardian (20 July 
2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/20/israel-using-flechette-shells-in-gaza> 
accessed 13 October 2018.  
285 
 
8.2.1 The Normative Status and Value of a Treaty versus a LOAC Manual 
Recall from 1.3.1 that treaties and LOAC Manuals each have a different normative 
status under international law. Treaties – be they standalone instruments or a new 
Protocol under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons8 (CCW) – are a 
recognised source of international law; thus, they enjoy binding status.9 By contrast, 
LOAC Manuals are a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”;10 
hence, they offer valuable interpretive guidance, but they are non-binding. On this 
basis alone, a treaty may be considered to be more valuable for LOAC compliance. 
On the other hand, treaties are often less comprehensive than LOAC Manuals, as States 
rarely wish to bind themselves to detailed and rigid legal provisions, especially in 
evolving fields. This will arguably reduce the utility of a LAWS regulation treaty, as 
it may only be possible to conclude such an agreement on such a broad category of 
systems and deployment contexts by using vague or heavily caveated provisions, along 
the lines of Protocol V to the CCW.11 Even where we do see precision and detail in 
Protocol V, this only relates to its non-binding Technical Annex, which contains 
‘voluntary best practice’.12 Moreover, this instrument and its Annex stretch to no more 
than 14 pages, whereas LOAC Manuals tend to be more comprehensive, often with 
hundreds of pages of details and guidelines. For example, the AMW Manual13 consists 
of 56 pages, while the Tallinn Manual 2.014 contains a staggering 598 pages. Free from 
the political pressure of States trying to avoid rigid legal positions, these Manuals can 
offer relatively greater insight and guidance on applying LOAC in a given domain, 
leaving it to the commander to apply the rules in the context of a specific deployment. 
                                                          
8 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (adopted 10 October 1980, 
entered into force 2 December 1983, amended on 21 December 2001) 1342 UNTS 137. 
9 Article 38(1)(a), Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 
24 October 1945) 145 BFSP 832 (hereafter, ICJ Statute). 
10 Article 38(1)(d), ICJ Statute. 
11 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW) (adopted 28 November 2003, 
entered into force 12 November 2006) 2399 UNTS 100 (frequently caveating its provisions with “where 
feasible”, “to the maximum extent possible”, and “as far as practicable”). 
12 Moreover, under Article 9, Protocol V, States are only “encouraged” to take “generic preventive 
measures aimed at minimising the occurrence of explosive remnants of war”, meaning that even 
consultation of the Technical Annex is not mandatory. 
13 Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research at Harvard University, HPCR Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (Harvard College, 2009). 
14 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations (2nd ed., CUP, 2017). 
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An alternative scenario might involve a hard core of States and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) pressing ahead with a more detailed set of treaty proposals, with 
the intention that other States will eventually follow suit. This would provide a 
combination of detail and binding status. However, with the current CCW membership 
strongly in disarray over how to move forward with LAWS, and some States remaining 
rather unresponsive to NGO pressures,15 even this may be unlikely to work. Instead, 
such an approach risks turning LAWS into a “Balkanized sector of weapons law”,16 
with significant LAWS-deploying States likely to opt out. Indeed, this is how the 
Ottawa Process ended: despite leading to the comprehensive Mine Ban Treaty,17 States 
like the US, Russia, China, and South Korea all refused to sign and/or to take part, 
even while they mostly comply on a voluntary basis.18 Of course, a LAWS regulation 
treaty would not go so far as to ban autonomous weaponry, but would instead clarify 
its terms of deployment and use. Yet, the countervailing context is equally important: 
anti-personnel mines had already lost some of their military utility by the time the 
Ottawa Process was underway, thus they were relatively susceptible to a treaty ban. 
By contrast, many States proclaim the potential military utility of LAWS, so it is likely 
that even more of them will refuse to sign up to a detailed instrument that ties their 
hands in advance; hence, the reference to the ‘Balkanization’ of weapons law.  
Once again, we arrive at the conclusion that an expert LOAC Manual on LAWS is the 
approach that is most likely to succeed and be effective, because of its combination of 
flexibility, detail, and specificity. In turn, the Manual is relatively more likely to see 
widespread adoption and effective compliance by LAWS-deploying forces. 
                                                          
15 See, for example, Denise Garcia, ‘Governing Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems’, Ethics & 
International Affairs (13 December 2017) 
<https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/governing-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/> 
accessed 10 June 2018 (explaining that State parties are split along three major lines: those wanting a 
ban or moratoria; those opposing a ban, or even any specific regulation; and those advocating a 
politically binding agreement based on meaningful human control concepts, but no legal solution). 
16 Sean Watts, ‘Autonomous Weapons: Regulation Tolerant or Regulation Resistant?’ (2016) 30 Temple 
International & Comparative Law Journal 177, 187. 
17 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction (adopted 18 September 1997, entered into force 1 March 1999) 2056 
UNTS 241. 
18 A similar situation exists with the Oslo Process that led to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(adopted 30 May 2008, entered into force 1 August 2010) 2688 UNTS 190. States like the US, Russia, 
China, and South Korea either refused to sign up or even to participate in this NGO-led process. In part, 
they objected to the stringent technical design criteria – now codified in Article 2(2)(c) – which these 
States saw as depriving them of legitimate military utility to be gained from using ‘cluster munitions’. 
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The overall value of a LOAC Manual on LAWS can therefore be listed as follows: 
• It will provide an authoritative source of expert interpretive guidance, 
specifically on applying international law to a new generation of weapon 
systems, and with an appropriately interdisciplinary focus. 
• It will fill gaps in treaty law relatively quickly, without the political or 
procedural complexity of the treaty-making process. 
• Due to its non-binding status, the rules, principles and guidance of a LOAC 
Manual can go into considerable detail, offering commanders and their legal 
advisers an invaluable source of expert insight. 
• Also due to its non-binding status, a LOAC Manual is more likely to be 
adopted by the world’s militaries, which will apply its rules, principles and 
guidance with appropriate flexibility. 
• Collectively, the above will promote a more standardised approach to the 
deployment and use of LAWS for legal compliance, both within and outside 
NATO. 
Over time, such standardisation may also foster the development of a new customary 
international law on autonomous lethal targeting; even more so if States copy the 
LOAC Manual’s rules, principles and guidance into their own national military 
manuals. 
8.2.2 The Potential Contours of a LOAC Manual on LAWS 
With the above in mind, we can now address the substantive headings that may appear 
in a LOAC Manual on LAWS. These will all benefit from a strongly interdisciplinary 
input from recognised experts on robotics, software engineering, cognitive sciences, 
weapons design and human-machine interaction, and international law. 
The Manual can be divided into eight broad chapters. First, a Definitions section can 
set forth key LAWS-specific definitions, such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘online learning’ 
versus ‘offline learning’, amongst others. It can also set out key LOAC definitions, 
such as ‘military objective’, ‘collateral damage’, and ‘military advantage’. Crucially, 
this section can also include a detailed account of the ‘meaningful human control’ 
(MHC) standard and its potential elements, for reference in subsequent sections. 
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Second, a General Framework section can affirm that LAWS are governed by 
existing LOAC (and other international laws); that they are not inherently unlawful; 
yet the fundamental principle remains that the right of the Parties to armed conflict to 
choose their methods or means of warfare is not unlimited; hence, LAWS are subject 
to the customary law requirement of legal review.19 This section can also explicitly 
affirm that the Manual is a restatement of existing treaty and customary law, and that 
it operates without prejudice to the existing treaty obligations of States. 
Third, a Weapons Law section can restate the rules that prohibit weapons whose very 
nature or design leads to unlawful results;20 and it may provide guidance, or restate a 
prohibition, on the use of online learning.21 This section can also include rules and 
policy guidelines for LAWS development; for example, it may address whether all 
systems should be equipped with a ‘kill switch’ or a built-in self-neutralisation 
mechanism. It may also address minimum sensory requirements and processing 
capabilities for LAWS that could be required to make reasonably foreseeable 
distinction-based determinations.22 Moreover, the section can reaffirm the customary 
law requirement of legal review and it can suggest some broad principles in relation to 
this, such as the need for interdisciplinary review panels. 
Fourth, a Jus ad Bellum section can address situations where the use of LAWS may 
affect the initial recourse to force. This would take the Manual beyond LOAC issues; 
however, as with the Tallinn Manual 2.0, such a broadening of scope is justified and 
appropriate where the weapon system may genuinely pose risks to the ad bellum 
framework, or otherwise obscure its application.23 In a LAWS context, the canonical 
example of an ad bellum complication is the risk of ‘flash war’.24 This may occur 
where opposing fleets of LAWS, deployed during peacetime, meet very closely in time 
and space and observe each other on high alert, while looking for any sign of an 
                                                          
19 Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict 
to Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 90 International Law Studies 386, 407. 
20 For example, the rules prohibiting superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, environmental 
damage, inherently indiscriminate operation, and uncontrollable effects; under Articles 35(2)-(3) and 
51(b)-(c), AP I, respectively. See 6.3. 
21 See 2.5.1.4. 
22 Anderson, Reisner and Waxman (n 19), 407. 
23 See Tallinn Manual 2.0, Part III: International Peace and Security and Cyber Activities. 
24 See Paul Scharre, ‘Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk’, CNAS Ethical Autonomy Project 
(February 2016) <http://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-
operational-risk.pdf> accessed 22 September 2018. 
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impending attack. In such a scenario, systems from State A may well misinterpret the 
(potentially innocuous) manoeuvres of systems deployed by State B, triggering a swift 
and sudden military offensive, followed by a counter-offensive and rapid escalation 
into high-intensity conflict.25 If and when this occurs, it may leave great uncertainty as 
to whether the initial shot was an unlawful use of force or a violation of territorial 
integrity;26 or a legitimate act of (anticipatory) self-defence.27 A Manual could address 
this by recommending safeguards to prevent such algorithmic calamities. For example, 
it may consider circumstances that call for relatively tighter attack parameters; a ‘shoot 
second’ policy; and, potentially, the sharing of certain non-classified algorithmic 
features, to bring adversarial systems closer to ‘peacetime compatibility’. 
Fifth, a Targeting Law section can address many of the same issues that were raised 
in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis: how to deploy LAWS in compliance with the rules 
and principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Much of the 
analysis put forward in this thesis may therefore provide an input; however, as LOAC 
Manuals are meant to express the consensus of experts, it is likely that the analysis in 
Chapters 6 and 7 would be subject to further input and amendment, in order to reach 
such consensus.  
For this hypothetical fifth section, a LOAC Manual could usefully incorporate the 
following features:28 
• Clarifying that decisions regarding distinction and proportionality are made by 
commanders and weapons operators not the LAWS; and that such decisions 
are generally moved forward in time, to the point of deployment or earlier 
(unless there is a ‘dial-in’ capability).29  
                                                          
25 Jürgen Altmann and Frank Sauer ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability’ (2017) 59 
Survival 117, 128. 
26 Article 2(4), Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 1 UNTS XVI (hereafter, UN Charter). 
27 Article 51, UN Charter; The Caroline Case (1841) 29 BFSP 1137. With digital data-recording, it will 
be relatively easy to determine which side took the first shot, but more difficult to determine whether 
that first shot was reasonable in the circumstances; hence, whether it was an unlawful use of force or a 
legitimate act of (anticipatory) self-defence. 
28 Some of these are also put forward in Anderson, Reisner and Waxman (n 19), 407; and Steven Groves, 
‘A Manual Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems’, Margaret 
Thatcher Center for Freedom, Special Report No. 183, (The Heritage Foundation, 7 April 2016), 4-6 
<http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/SR183.pdf> accessed 4 October 2018. 
29 This will help to avoid anthropomorphisms, in order to retain MHC; and it will avoid unhelpfully 
dystopian narratives of ‘killer robots’ making their own ‘decisions’ and running amok, which often 
distracts from a lucid analysis of legal compliance. 
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• Providing an interpretive application of LOAC to LAWS, explaining a) what 
information commanders must have and b) what questions they must generally 
ask before and during deployment. 
• Setting out realistic deployment scenarios, from the benign to the highly 
complex, and considering relevant elements of the MHC standard needed to 
secure compliance with LOAC norms.30 This can usefully be placed within the 
framework of the ‘threshold of lawfulness’ challenge laid out in 8.1.  
• Restating the importance of the ‘constant care’ obligation and its implication 
for a LOAC precautionary principle; and applying this in the LAWS context.31  
• Considering situations in armed conflict where human rights norms will 
assume greater significance, hence where a stronger element of 
contemporaneous human judgment and control will be necessary, even to the 
point where a LAWS will have to be shut down or remotely-piloted. 
Importantly, the above should also consider how the rules and their application to 
LAWS might vary between international and non-international armed conflict. 
Sixth, an Accountability and Responsibility section can restate and apply the various 
rules on (individual and command) responsibility in international criminal law; this 
may extend beyond combatants and commanders, to include software programmers, 
designers, and manufacturers. Separately, the section may also link to the previous 
one, to clarify the levels of technical knowledge (of system capacities and limitations) 
needed by a weapons operator or commander, to establish them as an accountable 
person in LOAC; again, this may extend to non-traditional entities, such as legal 
review panels and procurement teams. Finally, this section can restate and apply the 
relatively non-controversial rules on State responsibility, for when any use of LAWS 
by a State’s armed forces leads to unlawful damage, death or injury; even where such 
harm was unpredictable or due to a malfunction. 
Seventh, a Law of Neutrality section can restate and apply to LAWS the rules that 
preserve the inviolability of the territory of neutral States; and the rights and 
obligations of those neutral States in relation to LAWS-deploying Belligerents. 
                                                          
30 As opposed to regarding human involvement as an independent legal requirement. See 4.5.6. 
31 The aim would be to instil a pervasively precautionary approach that fosters the creation of apt, 
LAWS-specific precautionary measures in every deployment. 
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Finally, a Law of Occupation section can restate and apply the rules relating to respect 
for protected persons and property in occupied territory; public order and safety; and 
the security of the occupying authority, amongst others. Importantly, as there is a 
stronger role for human rights norms during occupation, this section may restate a 
requirement for relatively tighter attack parameters, non-lethal operation, and/or 
contemporaneous human judgment and control in some deployments.  
The above only represents the broad contours; nonetheless, it does suggest that a 
relatively comprehensive LAWS Manual is, on the face of it, viable. 
8.2.3 Potential Challenges to Developing a LOAC Manual on LAWS 
Yet, on closer examination, such an undertaking will not be easy: unlike previous 
LOAC Manuals, such as AMW and Tallinn, a LAWS Manual would be developed and 
published in a hostile political environment.32 As discussed in 1.1, there is a growing 
campaign led by NGOs and, increasingly, some States to pre-emptively ban LAWS. 
This will raise a significant political challenge to the broad acceptance of any 
permissive norms restated in a LOAC Manual. Namely, as the momentum amongst 
these stakeholders is to ban and not normalise LAWS, there is a clearly suboptimal 
environment for developing a widely-accepted LAWS Manual.33 Not helping the 
situation is the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
remained rather reticent on the LAWS issue, and has even voiced some concerns.34 
This may indicate its reluctance to support a LAWS Manual, which would be in 
contrast to previous projects, such as the San Remo Manual on naval warfare.35 There, 
the ICRC was supportive throughout, and this gave the San Remo Manual a strong air 
of legitimacy, largely because of the organisation’s status as an impartial, neutral and 
independent body with an exclusively humanitarian mission. Accordingly, the ICRC’s 
apparent lack of enthusiasm for the potential benefits of machine autonomy may 
further undermine the prospect of gaining broader acceptance for a LAWS Manual. 
                                                          
32 Groves (n 28), 8 (noting that other LOAC Manuals benefited from an absence of NGO resistance). 
33 Ibid. 
34 ICRC, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems – Q&A’, ICRC Article (12 November 2014) 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapon-systems-challenge-human-control-over-use-
force> accessed 10 June 2018 (stating that while it “has not joined these calls [for a ban] for now”, the 
ICRC remains concerned about “allow[ing] machines to make life-and-death decisions”, as this “would 
reflect a paradigm shift…in the conduct of hostilities”. Thus, it cautions against the use of such weapons, 
unless LOAC compliance can be “guaranteed”, which is a very high – arguably unattainable – standard). 
35 Louise Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts 
at Sea (CUP, 1995), 5 (crediting the ICRC for its supportiveness, in line with its humanitarian mandate).  
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That said, the ICRC has not officially joined the call for a ban.36 Instead, the 
organisation has become more active in researching and convening meetings of 
technical experts on human-machine interaction.37 This has resulted in some extensive 
contributions to the debate on human control and its determinants,38 which may 
indicate a cautious willingness to be involved in developing the normative framework 
for LAWS deployments. 
8.2.4 A Possible Way Forward 
The issue of LAWS is clearly divisive, and the rapidly evolving nature of its 
technology brings numerous future uncertainties. However, if we accept the 
inevitability of LAWS; that these machines can potentially be used lawfully; and that 
appropriately planned deployments may result in fewer civilian casualties, then the 
best response to division and uncertainty is arguably a non-binding LOAC Manual. 
Building on the success of other Manuals – San Remo, AMW, and Tallinn, to name just 
a few – an organisation like NATO could convene a group of experts drawn from the 
armed forces, legal academia, robotics, software engineering, cognitive sciences, and 
weapons design. Ideally, this group would have equal representation from all States, 
but it is likely that most experts in robotics, weapons design, and international law will 
be drawn from a small number of developed nations.39 Moreover, some States that 
have called for a ban are likely to be reluctant to send any experts, or even to recognise 
the project, while NGOs are likely to actively campaign against it. For this reason, it 
is even more important that the convenor enlists the ICRC, to bring a greater sense of 
legitimacy to the LAWS Manual process. Despite its apparent reticence, the ICRC may 
be cautiously willing to be involved, if only because it recognises the inevitability of 
LAWS and may see the opportunity to infuse the process with a stronger humanitarian 
approach. This should arguably be welcomed, so long as it maintains and does not 
displace the delicate balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns. 
Above all, the involvement of the ICRC may help to gain broader acceptance for a 
Manual that will very likely be swimming against a tide of NGO resistance. 
 
                                                          
36 ICRC (n 34). 
37 ICRC, ‘Statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross Under Agenda Item 6(b)’, ICRC 
Statement Delivered to the 2018 GGE Meeting on LAWS (27-31 August 2018) 
<https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/151EF67AD8224E14C125830600531382/$
file/2018_GGE+LAWS+2_6b_ICRC.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018.  
38 See 4.5.4, and the references contained therein. 
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